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Abstract
Institutional Pluralism and Interorganisational Relations 
in Local Health Care Provision in Uganda:
Institutionalised Pathologies or Healing Organisations?
This thesis is an examination of health care provision in Uganda by means of a case 
study in Kamuli District. In Uganda, the response to political and economic breakdown 
in the 1970s has been the spontaneous, decentralised emergence of a pluralist, but 
fragmented system made up of public, private and voluntary sector providers. While 
theorists and policy-makers previously placed almost exclusive emphasis on state health 
care provision, they now favour a system of institutional pluralism. This approach 
attempts to use the particular advantages attributed to each type of provider to meet 
diverse needs and conditions. The thesis undertakes a comparative performance analysis 
of each sector in relation to access, efficient use of resources and quality of care to 
determine each provider's relative strengths. While the public sector performs worst, the 
other two sectors also suffer from performance gaps.
An institutional analysis is used to explain the differences in (mal-)performance. 
First, the thesis assesses the intraorganisational institutional mechanisms of each 
provider type and their ability of ensuring accountability, financial responsibility and 
appropriate staff incentives. Secondly, it examines the nature of interorganisational 
interactions and the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms for the co-ordination 
and regulation of the system as a whole and illuminates how these affect organisational 
performance.
The study demonstrates that the intraorganisational institutional set-up, the 
governance mechanisms and the interorganisational interactions are characterised by a 
lack of accountability and therefore are constantly distorted through the operation of 
perversive incentives. These institutionalised pathologies, especially in the public sector, 
affect performance negatively. It is argued that a system characterised by institutional 
pluralism is superior. However, to benefit from its full potential and to heal organisations 
and put them in a position to heal, it is necessary to manage the intraorganisational and 
interorganisational dimensions simultaneously and to strengthen accountability 
mechanisms and the actors' capacities and willingness to co-operate.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1. The Ugandan Case: A Pluralistic Health Care System
During the 1950s and 1960s, Uganda was called the pearl of Africa. At Independence in 
1960, it had one of the best developed health services in Africa. A few years later, 
however, Uganda began to move into political turmoil, which resulted in a predatory state, 
in chaos and repression, and eventually civil war. This also led to the breakdown of social 
services, and particularly in the health care system (Dodge 1987). The decline of 
government health services provided a boost to informal private activities and increased 
the relevance of mission church health care services. Voluntary sector organisations also 
began to run their own health services, especially from the 1980 onwards. Because of the 
breakdown of health care services and the negative impacts the civil war had on the 
country's epidemiological profile, Uganda's health situation suffered serious deterioration.
The National Resistance Movement (NRM), which took over in 1986, must be 
credited for its enormous efforts at engaging in political and economic reconstruction, 
namely democratisation, decentralisation, liberalisation, and privatisation. Nevertheless, 
Uganda shows the features typical of least developed countries (LDCs), i.e., weak state 
institutions and capacity as a result of prolonged institutional decay, patronage and 
patrimonial relationships deeply embedded in social structure, high levels of corruption, 
and systemic problems in the government's revenue and expenditure management (cf. 
Brett 1998b, Kjaer 1999). Access to the state is still one of the principal means of 
acquiring wealth (Watt et ai. 1999). Democratisation is incomplete, as Uganda can be 
considered as a single-party state. Further, Uganda's legal system is under-resourced and 
underdeveloped, and human rights abuses still occur (Oloka-Onyango 2000, HRW 1999). 
All of these factors -  coupled with the civil war in the northern part of the country that 
devours enormous amounts of resources -  constrain the alleviation of poverty and 
maintain the high levels of deprivation, scarcity and insecurity. Although economic 
growth rates average nearly 6 percent per annum for the last decade, real poverty has 
increased. In 1993, 55 percent of the total population is categorised as "poor", and in
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1999, per capita GDP was only US$ 300 (Oloka-Onyango 2000: 44). The human 
development outturn places Uganda among the bottom 10 percent of all countries.1
Despite 15 years of rehabilitation (attempts) and large donor support since the early 
1980s, the health status of the Ugandan population, as measured by DALE , is one of the 
worst five of the 191 WHO member states (estimates for 1997, WHO 2000). Equally 
problematic are the very unequal health outcomes among Ugandans (Gwatkin et al. 2000). 
AIDS is also a severe problem, as every sixth to seventh adult over 15 years is infected 
with HIV (World Bank 1994). This increases the burden of disease and the need and 
demand for health care services. Table 1.1 further illustrates Uganda's lagging behind.
Table 1.1: Health indicators
Uganda AllLDCs
Life expectancy (years) 43 62
Crude death rate per 1000 20 10
Total fertility rate 7.2 3.8
Malnutrition among children (%) 45 28 (for SSA)
Births considered high risk (%) 65.9
Source: World Bank 1993: 2 in Brett 1998b, Bigsten et al. 1999, and Hutchinson 1999.
*5
The NRM inherited a pluralistic, but fragmented health care system , comprising 
public, private and voluntary sector health care providers, including home care.4 This 
health care system is characterised by growing diversity, dynamics and complexity, but it 
is troubled with organisational-institutional deficits and funding gaps. As the WHO 
emphasises, apart from other determinants, such as education, income and sanitation, 
health care systems do make a large difference to health through their core functions of 
financing, generating inputs and the provision of services (WHO 2000: 9). The lengthy 
period of conflict that Uganda has seen posed particular challenges, but also opportunities
1 Uganda is at the 158th position in 1999 out of 175 countries (Oloka-Onyango 2000).
2 Disability adjusted life expectancy
3 A health care system includes "all activities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore and maintain 
health" (WHO 2000: 5).
4 Pluralistic and fragmented systems are not a phenomenon restricted to health care, but also found in 
education, solid waste management and transport. This is equally the case for other poor countries (Batley 
1996: 733; cf. Chapter 3.3).
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for the post-conflict era.5 Nevertheless, Uganda's decentralised and pluralistic health care 
system and the problems related thereto are not unique; rather, they are typical of many 
African and developing countries (cf. World Bank 1993, 1997a, Green 1992, WHO 2000, 
Zwi/Mills 1995, Bennett et al. 1997, Bennett et al. 1999, Leonard/Leonard 20006).
The problems of African systems comprise financial shortcomings, low efficiency 
and sustainability, quality concerns and unequal health outcomes. Service provision of the 
public sector is inadequate and fails in terms of allocation (such as insufficient spending 
on cost-effective programs), in terms of internal, technical efficiency (wasteful public 
programs of poor quality), unsuccessful user fee schemes and equity (due to inequitable 
distribution of the benefits of health services) (World Bank 1993, Bennett et al. 1995, 
Russell/Gilson 1995). Inadequate drug availability, rude staff behaviour and inefficient 
use of staff resources in the public sector are problems found in many of the poorest 
countries in both Africa and Asia. Governments are increasingly liberalising and 
encouraging the entry of private and NGO sector providers (Mackintosh 1999). Moreover, 
public health services have been de facto marketised through widespread private practice, 
drug sales and informal charging (Cornwall et al. 2000). The existence of a large (partly 
informal) private sector in many of these countries constitutes a challenge. Reviewing the 
evidence indicates that the regulatory systems generally do not operate well in developing 
countries (Bennett et al. 1994, Kumaranayake 1998; Mackintosh 1999); nor is there clear 
evidence whether the private sector performs better than the public sector (Bitran 1995, 
Mills 1997b). Another common deficit is the lack of coordination and integration of the 
public, private and the voluntary sectors, resulting in unequal coverage and duplication of 
services (Bennett et al. 1995, Bragha/Zwi 1998, Bennett et al. 1994). Thus, "the miracle 
of the market" has not occurred (Leonard/Leonard 2000: 3) and, ultimately, the need for 
reforms is large (Mogedal et al. 1995, Cassels 1995).
Ideally, in a health system characterised by institutional pluralism7, the division of 
labour should be based on each organisation's relative strengths, but it is impossible to
5 Such opportunities are the reappraisal of public policy and health policy in particular, and rapid inflows of 
international aid (Macrae et al. 1994: ix)
6 For country studies, cf. for example Tibandebage/Mackintosh 1999 (Tanzania), Killingsworth et al. 1999 
(Bangladesh), van der Geest et al. 2000 (Zambia), D. Leonard 2000 (Africa), Silva 1997 (Zimbabwe).
7 When speaking of institutional pluralism, institutional-organisational pluralism is meant that refers to the 
existence of different provider types, namely public, private and voluntary sector organisations.
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ndetermine in the abstract what the relative strengths of each organisation are. Secondly, 
this pluralism is accompanied by a multitude of different interorganisational relationships 
between these providers, ranging from conflicts, co-existence, dependency and inter­
dependency to co-operation and competition, regulation and co-ordination (cf. 
RogersAVhetten 1982, Brett 1998a, Robinson et al. 2000). A system based on institutional 
pluralism and interorganisational relations has significant implications for the quantity 
and quality of health care, efficiency and equity objectives. It also raises concerns about 
how it is "getting along", that is, how it manages itself so as not to end up in disorder. 
Thus, any reform discussion in relation to a government’s endeavours to improve and 
extend services and to bring them closer to the people will centre around the following 
key question: Which sector or which provider type should be focused on and promoted 
and how, and how should the mix of interorganisational relationships be shaped?
A number of (District) studies have investigated specific aspects of health care 
provision in Uganda relating to these issues, including:
• The research on the informal survival strategies and private sector activities of 
government health workers (Asiimwe et al. 1997a, 1997b, McPake et al. 1998) and 
the quality of care and accessibility of the public sector (McPake et al. 1999);
• A study of the scope of urban private practitioners and the consumers' perception 
(Okello et al. 1997);
• A government health service review at the District level (Kipp et al. 1991);
• A comparison between government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as 
regards resource utilisation, costs and consumer satisfaction in 1992/93 (Okello et al. 
1998);
• An efficiency comparison between government and NGO hospitals (Pearson 1997);
• A study of patient-drugshop transactions (Whyte 1991);
• A study of the role of NGOs in the delivery of health services touching upon 
interactions with the District administration (Kwagala 1997);
• A study of the public/private mix (Assimwe/Lule 1993, Bennett/Ngalande-Banda 
1994);
• A qualitative District pilot study on access of the poor (Girard/Ridde 2000);
8 For a conceptual elaboration of relative strengths, see Chapters 1.2 and 2.2.
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• A survey on a variety of public sector health care provision aspects (Azfar et al. 
2000); and
• A qualitative study on local government health care provision in two Districts 
(Golooba-Mutebi 1999).5
But there has been no comprehensive comparative performance analysis that 
simultaneously includes all three sectors (public, private and voluntary) and that is 
combined with an examination of the institutional-organisational factors and the impacts 
of interorganisational relationships to explain each sector's performance and the 
performance of the system as a whole. Likewise, there have been no comparisons between 
private and NGO clinics. The aim of this thesis is, therefore, to study institutional 
pluralism and interorganisational relations in health care provision by means of a case 
study of Kamuli District in Eastern Uganda to see how these affect service delivery. It 
will be demonstrated that, while institutional pluralism is superior, the present 
institutional-organisational arrangements and the prevailing interorganisational 
relationships make the system's health care provision fail, and what we find is a situation 
of institutionalised pathologies. Yet this institutionalisation is not irreversible, and there is 
potential to move to a situation of healing organisations.
The focus of this thesis is on the institutional factors of provider performance, and, as 
such, it recognises the utmost importance of having the appropriate institutions and 
organisations for service delivery and provision. The next section spells out the rationale 
behind institutional pluralism and provides the theoretical frameworks used in 
approaching this research problem (these will be further elaborated in Chapter 2).
1.2. The Case for Institutional and Organisational Pluralism and the Implications
1.2.1. From ''Either/Or" to "Both/And" Conceptualisations
Institutions can be understood as ''rules of the game", i.e., the complexes of formal and 
informal "rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behaviour that
9 The decentralisation of health services has equally constituted a research focus (e.g. Bagambisa 1995, 
Hutchinson 1999, Kisubi/Mugaju 1999, Kostansjek 1997). Medical-anthropological studies (for example 
Allen 1991, 1998, Whyte 1992, 1997) are not primarily concerned with the above research aspects.
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structure repeated human interaction" through constraints, incentives and enhancement 
(North 1989: 1321). These human interactions occur between individuals and within and 
between organisations. Social order and (political) culture are the sum of specific patterns 
of informal institutions, in which organisations are embedded, whereby informal 
institutions may support or subvert formal institutions within a given context. Informal 
institutions have thus a major effect on how an organisation functions (cf. Atkinson et al. 
2000: 619). Organisations, in turn, can be defined as social systems that have been 
actively established to pursue specific aims and objectives (cf. Hill et al. 1989: 24-25); 
hence, organisations are the manifestation of both formal and informal institutions.
The study of institutions (and hence of organisations) has been experiencing a 
renaissance throughout the social sciences, and despite the differences in assumptions and 
foci among the disciplines, the common conviction is that institutional arrangements and 
the rules of the game do matter (Israel 1987, Powell/DiMaggio 1991, Batley 1996, 
Grindle/Hildebrand 1995, Grindle 2000). In other words, it has been realised that 
institutional weaknesses and inappropriateness slow down development (Ostrom et al. 
1993, Toye 1995). Translated to the micro-level, service delivery fails because of 
inadequate intra-organisational institutions and inappropriate interorganisational 
institutions combined with inappropriate incentives.10
Acknowledging the importance of institutions implies recognising the large spectrum 
of possible institutional arrangements. From this follows the existence of institutional 
choice, and specifically, the necessity to find the "right" institutions and to have the 
"right" type of organisation in place for service provision. This aspect is a crucial one and 
equally particularly relevant for health care provision in light of the inadequacies briefly 
described above but also in light of adjusting economies in which the state has to undergo 
changes (Batley 1994b).
The broader development debate is about the appropriate roles of the public, private 
and voluntary sector organisations.11 It is clear now that the path to sustainable
10 The intra-organisational set-up applies to those institutions operating within organisations, namely among 
organisational members and between them and the end-users. Interorganisational institutions refer to the 
relationships between organisations.
11 The term "voluntary” is imprecise, since many organisations are not run on a voluntaristic basis. Other 
terms are "solidaristic" or "third sector", although, in the end, each term has its weaknesses. Instead of 
discussing endless attempts of definitions and terms, the term "NGO sector" and "voluntary sector" is used 
interchangeably.
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(economic) development is not a choice between more or less government or more or less 
market -  none of these extremes has proven to be of practical relevance (Bennett 1991, 
Nwankwo 1997). By overcoming the contextless "either/or" dichotomies -  state versus 
markets, or state versus NGOs -  in which orthodox public administration theorists and 
structuralists, neo-liberals, and proponents of a third way of "development from below" 
(Wegner 1993) have engaged, each provider type's strengths (and weaknesses) can be 
fully appreciated according to the circumstances.
This call for "getting the institutions right" demands a role-redefinition, intrasectoral 
reforms (mainly regarding the public sector), re-balancing of the sectors' role and reforms 
regarding the relations between the public, private and voluntary sector, but also a change 
of perception on the part of the different agents (de Janvry et al. 1993, Batley 1994b, 
Batley 1999a, Nwankwo 1997, Preker et al. 1999).12 Moving away from a mere 
substitution strategy, the search for adequate institutional arrangements encompasses a 
"both/and" notion implying a new balance and a complementation of the sectors and 
provider types for the provision of goods and services. Given an intellectual trend and an 
even more pragmatic practice, broader institutional conceptualisations of development are 
now underway, which recognise context specificity, historical experience and cultural 
expectations (Evans 1997a: 1). Equally relevant is the ability to create an open system that 
allows for a wide range of institutional arrangements to provide services (World Bank 
1993, Grindle 1997).
These developments are equally reflected in the discussions about health care provision:
Historically, the debate about the appropriate roles for public and private sector[s] 
[organisations] in health care has been polarised [...]. During recent years the tone of 
this debate has changed; it has been recognised that neither a purely private nor a 
purely public health care system may be appropriate (Bennett 1997b: 93).
Especially in the 1990s, a move has been underway to what can be called a "co- 
ordinative and contractual approach", as the pluralism and diversity of providers and their 
interactions require co-operation, co-ordination and contracts (Tizio 2000; Perrot 2000; 
Preker/Harding 2001, WHO 2000). Growing recognition and consensus that state reform 
should foster a reduced role for government in direct service delivery implies that the role
12 The New Public Management practice in effect in rich countries has equally nurtured the discussion and 
rethinking of the roles of the sectors (Batley 1999a: 755), as has the donors' growing disillusion with the 
governments of developing countries (Green/Matthias 1995: 566).
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\of the state changes and increases as to managing other actors. In other words, the 
government’s "behind-the-scenes" roles, such as policy analysis, co-ordination, regulation 
and enabling become more important (Batley 1999a: 756). It is important to note, 
however, that these roles must not necessarily be taken on by the state alone.
As noted above, a system based on institutional and organisational pluralism with its 
resulting interorganisational relationships needs some form of order through 
"governance", namely guided social, organisational or intentional action by government 
or other agents. The three main governance mechanisms are competition, regulation 
(including enabling) and network co-ordination (these are elaborated in Chapter 2.3). The 
difficult task lies in allowing for, fostering and promoting the most useful combination of 
service providers as well as the most appropriate mix of competition, regulation and 
network co-ordination in order to organise the ensemble of the providers and to optimise 
the system output -  that is, to promote efficient and equitable provision in the health 
sector as a whole. The success of these approaches depends fundamentally on the 
government’s capacity to undertake the new roles expected of it (Bennett et al. 1995: i) 
and to guarantee this openness.
The analysis and the search for the best institutional and (interorganisational 
constellation take place at two levels: (1) improving the functioning of institutions 
operating intra-organisationally, and (2) identifying and implementing/realising the most 
appropriate interorganisational relationships and governance/co-ordination mechanism. In 
other words: What is the best mix of efforts in improving the efficiency of public 
providers and in developing government capacity to negotiate and monitor contracts and 
regulate the private sector?
1.2.2. Potentials and Pitfalls of Institutional Pluralism
Institutional and organisational pluralism refers to the existence of different provider 
types, namely, public, private and voluntary sector organisations, as well as institutional 
arrangements based on combinations thereof. Each of the three sectors, given its 
institutional set-up, has specific strengths and weaknesses (see Chapter 2 for a more 
detailed conceptualisation). From this, it follows that institutional pluralism fosters a 
diversity of solutions, structural redundancy and more competition, in order to allow for
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the best use of resources (Leonard 1983: 289; cf. Preker et al. 1999).13 Likewise, 
institutional pluralism, and thus institutional diversity, may allow for "valuing difference 
and working with diversity" thereby taking into account the varying needs and preferences 
of different social groups (Beall 1997, Mathauer/Ng 1997). The main advantage of 
institutional pluralism is that it enables a division of labour according to each 
organisation's relative strengths for optimal system performance, in that each organisation 
can concentrate on what it does best (Nugent 1993, Simon et al. 1993, Simon et al. 1997). 
Consequentially, competition and consumer choice would produce a division of labour 
based on relative strengths, at least in theory. However, this does not come about 
automatically, since competition is imperfect and since state agencies and voluntary sector 
organisations also operate on the basis of other principles.14
The search for relative strengths is also relevant for the provision of only one service 
or good. People differ in their ability to pay for health care, which results in market 
segmentation and product differentiation. The various types of organisations may thus 
play different and complementary roles. Alternatively, we may find that all three provider 
types offer the same good or service, while not each of them may actually be skilled 
enough to do so. Hence, reforms to improve service provision must be based on sound 
knowledge of the appropriateness and fit of each. The argument is that it makes a 
difference whether there are several provider types or just one, since they are run on 
different principles, implying different advantages and disadvantages. Bennett argues that 
institutional pluralism may increase both equity and efficiency, when governments 
maintain the provision of the whole range of health care services, instead of segmenting 
the market by type of service between the various providers (1997b: 109).
Institutional pluralism also opens opportunities for the creation of co-operative 
institutional arrangements and public-private partnerships to produce synergies by pooling 
resources and utilizing each organisation's relative strengths (cf. Ostrom 1996).15 That 
said, institutional pluralism is accompanied by dependency and interdependency, which 
poses numerous challenges (not only) for the government. One example of these
13 In theory, institutional pluralism also increases consumer choice, which is considered to be a welfare 
increase per se.
14 In addition, the division of labour between the sectors is also the product of economic, institutional, and 
above all, political factors (Preker et al. 1999: 11).
15 For the growing literature on partnerhips, cf. Nwankwo 1997, Moyo 1997, Cornwall et al. 2000, Jalal 
1999, Unom 2000, Bennett 1998.
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challenges is personnel siphoning, i.e., the drain of health workers from the public to the 
private sector where more attractive salaries may be gained resulting in acute staff 
shortage in the public sector (Green 1992: 85, Bennett et al. 1994: 4). Interdependencies 
also result from the private practitioners' treatment of diseases of public health 
significance and the need for a comprehensive referral system in a context of unequal 
coverage. Other problems arising from institutional pluralism are goal conflicts between 
the different sectors -  for example, the private sector is interested mainly in profit -  and 
the overall fragmented nature of the health care system, particularly due to the atomisation 
amongst NGOs, as found in Uganda (see Chapter 3.3). This makes overall integration and 
a comprehensive approach difficult.
Clearly, institutional pluralism provides huge potentials by allowing for a division of 
labour that is based on relative strengths and for interorganisational relationships that 
produce synergies. But the challenges and implications of interorganisational relations 
and interdependency must be adequately considered. This indicates the importance of 
governance to ensure efficiency and adequate health services for everybody.
Anticipating the results of the empirical analysis in the following chapters, we will 
see, however, that there is a huge gap between the expected advantages of institutional 
pluralism as described above and what we find in reality. In such a case, Brett (2000c) 
notes, one may question the coherence of the theory itself, or else ask whether the 
preconditions and assumptions for this theory to be valid are (fully) met in the given 
instance. In fact, the case for institutional pluralism is based on a number of preconditions 
that may not necessarily prevail in LDCs, namely the existence of a functioning public, 
private and voluntary sector according to theory. Yet in an environment that is 
characterised by weak state institutions, weak civil society, low levels of trust and 
collective action, high rates illiteracy, and above all, extreme poverty, deprivation and 
insecurity, which is typical of LDCs, including Uganda, it is questionable whether the 
required assumptions can exist. Hence, apart from inherent, "natural" state and market 
failures as well as the acknowledged weaknesses of the voluntary sector, the failure of
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public, private and voluntary sector organisations is even more severe due to 
underdevelopment that undermines the presence of these assumptions.16
Likewise, the second dimension and implication of institutional pluralism, namely 
the need for conducive interorganisational relationships to effectively manage the 
interplay and antiplay of the various agents, is based on specific assumptions, like 
managerial capacity and the agents' willingness to interact constructively as well as their 
mutual trust. They may not exist either given the prevailing conditions in LDCs. These 
gaps urge us to explain what we actually find on the ground and to reflect on the 
implications of the concept of institutional pluralism in LDCs.
This raises another question, namely, whether a system of institutional pluralism is 
still superior to a one-sectoral set-up, even if the related assumptions are not met, so that 
all providers perform inadequately. From a methodological point of view, the question is 
thus why operate with a model of institutional pluralism at all. There are various reasons. 
First, donor policies are based on the rationale of this model, as is the administration and 
health care system of LDCs (World Bank 1997b, WHO 2000) and that of Uganda (Fallers 
1965). Second, the model's intellectual thrust is very powerful and constitutes a useful 
analytical approach to the research problems of "real" health care, even in a situation 
where the assumptions are not met. Thus, it should allow us to get insights on feasible 
institutional reforms. Likewise, the empirical analysis should indicate whether it will be 
worthwhile to attempt to fulfil these assumptions in the prevailing context or whether 
policy makers should search for a different approach.
While the focus is on incentives and principal-agent relationships, eclectic use of 
institutional analysis approaches and concepts of interorganisational relations will be 
made to examine and explain why organisations (providers) and the organisational system 
function the way they do. By making eclectic use of institutional analysis, it is possible to 
look at both actors (individuals) and organisations (see Chapters 2, 7 and 8 for further 
conceptual elaboration).
16 The distinction into inherent sector failures and failures due to underdevelopment is an artificial one, 
since, empirically, the differences are fluent and barely distinguishable.
1.3. Aims and Rationale of the Thesis: Research Questions and Research Focus
The aim of this research is to examine institutional pluralism and interorganisational 
relations in health care provision by means of a case study of Kamuli District in Eastern 
Uganda. It undertakes a comparative performance analysis of the public, private and 
voluntary sector as regards access, efficiency in staff resource utilisation and quality of 
care.17 The thesis assesses and explains each provider type's relative strengths and relative 
performance by choosing an institutional analysis approach in order to study the 
effectiveness of the accountability and financial responsibility mechanisms as well as the 
staffs incentives. It then analyses the impacts of the prevailing interorganisational 
relationships upon organisational performance and the performance of the system as a 
whole. This includes looking at the effectiveness of regulation, enabling and coordination 
and the way in which organisations interact.
The case study provides a detailed micro-level analysis for Kamuli District. By 
comparing the findings with other District or national studies, it reveals that what is found 
in Kamuli is typical for Uganda.18 Moreover, while the prevailing constellation, 
combination, extent and degree of problems described may be specific to Uganda 
(particularly to the more deprived Districts), the nature and complexity of the multi­
dimensional problems of health care provision found in Uganda reflect the challenges 
LDCs with characteristics similar to Uganda are faced with. In other words, inasmuch as 
it is argued that relative strengths and weaknesses can only be determined empirically, 
and not a priori (see Chapter 2), and since they are contingent upon the intra- and 
interorganisational institutional set-up and the sum of informal institutions, the 
functioning of each country's health care system is, in principle, specific. This 
notwithstanding, many African countries suffer from similar institutional deficiencies, so 
that their problems in health care provision are equally similar, if not identical. This study 
will thus contribute to the understanding of the recurrent problems of health care
17 See Chapter 2 for the selection of these performance criteria.
18 There are, of course, inter-District differences, so that the findings of Kamuli are more representative of 
similarly deprived and less developed Districts and those in the third group of decentralisation, and less 
representative of the more advanced Districts in the central region (Buganda) and the south-west.
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provision in LDCs and may hence provide more general lessons, and the broader policy 
implications derived from the Ugandan case will be relevant for similar countries.19
Focusing on an organisational system, the originality of this research lies in the 
simultaneous application of institutional and interorganisational analysis to the subject of 
relative strengths and provider performance. Further, how organisations interact, why they 
interact the way they do and what the impact of these interactions is has been heretofore 
little addressed. Thus, this research addresses the issues that are at the top of the current 
research agenda in health care (cf. Bennett et al. 1995, Mills et al. 1997, Batley 1994b, 
Batley 1999b, Preker/Harding 2001) and that reflect the problems and goals spelt out in 
Ugandan health care policies (see Chapter 3.3). The research also provides some 
methodological reflections on how to define and determine relative strengths (see Chapter 
2.4).
Specifically, the following general research questions are addressed:
1. Comparative performance analysis
• What are the relative strengths of each curative health care provider type?
2. An intra-organisational institutional account
• What accounts for these strengths or weaknesses?
• How do intra-organisational institutional mechanisms affect performance?
3. Interorganisational relationships
• How are the relationships between the service providers governed and how does this 
affect performance?
• How do the various health care providers interact with each other and what is the 
impact of these interactions?
• Why do the providers interact the way they do?
19 Moreover, while this study is concerned with health care provision and while the institutional and 
organisational aspects of health care systems seem to be more advanced in both practical and theoretical 
terms, the study also contributes to the general understanding of (social) service delivery in pluralistic 
systems and the institutional and inter-organisational factors explaining performance or malperformance.
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Anticipating Chapter 3, which outlines the present situation of health care provision 
and local government in Uganda, the following hypotheses were derived and provided the 
starting point for the field research. As we will see, some of these hypotheses will be 
confirmed, while others must be rejected or qualified in a place like Kamuli District.
1. NGOs have relative strengths in curative health care over public and private sector 
organisations given their value-drivenness.20
2. The public sector performs worst in curative health care due to a lack of functional 
accountability and financial responsibility mechanisms.
3. State regulation is insufficient and ineffective and hence does not correct market 
failures and imperfections.
4. Provider co-ordination increases efficiency in resource use.
5. NGO -  public sector partnerships create synergies.
In order to keep this research within a reasonable scope, the study of relative strengths 
focuses on curative health care without ignoring the utmost importance of 
preventive/promotive services.21 Further, the focus is on biomedical health care providers, 
with an established facility and premises.22 Hence, the research excludes home care, self- 
medication, and "traditional" healers (sorcerers, bone-setters, etc.), even though, 
admittedly, the differences between these categories are blurred23 The analysis of 
interorganisational relationships in Chapter 8 is based on both curative and 
preventive/promotive health care (PPHC) providers. An additional question is whether the 
poorest have equally access to quality services 24
20 For the purposes of this research, an NGO is understood as a non-governmental, not-for profit 
organisation, formal-legally independent from the state and outside direct state control, delivering services 
and operating in more than one community.
21 As curative health care services consume 70-80 percent of the public health sector budget and since they 
are vital to the sick in the short term, the study of curative services is a key issue for the analysis of 
government health systems (Leonard/Leonard 2000: 3).
Biomedicine refers to the scientific, allopathic clinical-medical knowledge, often (misleadingly) termed 
Western medicine, in contrast to alternative techniques of therapy (Allen 1998, see Chapter 4.5).
23 Given the importance of biomedicine in reducing the burden of disease (WHO 2000: 9) and since people 
increasingly accept and demand biomedical care (cf. Adome et al. 1996, Whyte 1992), the focus on 
biomedical health care providers is well justified.
24 This concern follows from the growing consensus that inequalities in health outcomes between the poor 
and the rich are unjust, whether these occur between countries or within a country (Wagstaff 2000: 5).
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1.4. Research Methods and Data Collection
This research started with a pilot study and action research undertaken for the German 
Development Service (DED) on the promotion of devolution and intersectoral 
collaboration. Uganda was chosen, in discussion with the DED, because of its reform- 
orientation, policy commitments towards intersectoral collaboration and the ambitious and 
far reaching process of decentralising power to its 45 Districts. Fieldwork was carried out 
in Kamuli District in Eastern Uganda in three phases: from May to November 1997, 
January to May 1998 and April to September 1999.
Kamuli District is situated 160 kilometres northeast of Kampala, the capital, and off 
the Kampala-Kenya road. It is bordered by Lake Kyoga in the North and by the River 
Nile in the West. The tarmac road ends in Kamuli Town. About 561,000 people live in the 
District. Administratively, Kamuli District comprises 4 Counties (LC4, local councils), 23 
Subcounties (LC3), 133 Parishes (LC2), and 1130 villages (LC1).25 Kamuli Town (the 
administrative District headquarter) and three rural Subcounties were chosen as research 
sites (see Annex 1.1 and Chapter 4 for the choice for Kamuli District and the selection 
procedures for the Subcounties).
The methods used for data collection as well as the analysis were both quantitative 
and qualitative, thereby combining the strengths of both approaches as well as balancing 
out their weaknesses (Yach 1992, Hentschel 1999). Table 1.2 summarises the methods 
applied for the various topics and issues (see also Annex 1 for further elaboration).
This mix of methods, known as "methodological integration" (Warwick 1993) 
enabled extensive cross-checking of information and triangulation, thereby improving 
objectivity and validity. For example, the government health unit records, one of the most 
doubtful data sources, could thus be crosschecked with the observation data (see Annex 
1.10 for further elaboration). Likewise, while health professionals may behave differently 
during the researcher's presence, the view of Health Unit Management Committee 
(HUMC) members, the consistent household respondents' answers and DED health 
professionals' observation provided a good understanding of what was actually going on.
25 See Chapter 3.3 for a discussion of the administrative system.
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Table 1.2: Research methods and research aspects
Methods Research aspects
Exit interviews (146) with open and closed questions at 16 
providers
(see Annex 4 for the distribution of interviews)
• Patient-provider interaction, user's perception of providers, reasons for utilisation
• Access
• Experience with and perception of Subcounty councillor, HUMC, PPHC 
interventions
Household interviews (112) with open and closed questions 
(see Annex 1.11 for the distribution of respondent characteristics)
• Same as above
Focus group discussions (52) with the LC1 Executive Committee, a 
group of men, women and youth
in 15 communities (action research in 1997-98, in 2 rural 
Subcounties, anonymously referred to as Subcounties A and B26)
• Same as above
• Perception of decentralisation, functioning of the LC system, elections, council 
representation, accountability, voice mechanisms
• Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with state and non-state service provision
Focus group discussions (15) with the groups of 
10 PPHC NGOs
• Member's/beneficiary's perception of PPHC NGO service provision
Focus group discussions with communities (12) (in 1999). • Follow-up of above LC issues
• Patient-provider interaction, user's perception of providers, reasons for utilisation
• Access
• Experience with and perception of Subcounty councillors, HUMC, PPHC 
interventions
26 If not further specified, data collection took place in all 4 places (Kamuli Town and the three rural Subcounties).
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cont. (Table 1.2)
Methods Research aspects
Facility survey: Semi-structured interviews (key questions) with
• Health professionals at public, private and NGO providers
• Drugshop attendants
• Resources and services available, revenues, problems of the facility
• Staff satisfaction, referral behaviour, supervision
• Exemption practice and deferral payment
Semi-structured interviews with
• HUMC members
• Secretaries for Health at Subcounty and District level
• Chairpersons of Subcounty and District Health Committees
• Supervision
• Health facility management, decision making, planning
• Problems of facility, staff behaviour and incentives, drug supply and availability
Semi-structured interviews with
• LC2, LC3, LC5 Executive Committee members
• Parish Chiefs, Subcounty Chiefs, Subcounty Accountants
• Chief Administrative Officer and Deputy ->
• Chief Financial Officer and Deputy
• DMO, Sectional Heads of DMO, Assistant Drug Inspector ->
• Women leaders
• Health Assistants, Community Based Service Officers, 
Agricultural Extension Officers
• Perception of decentralisation, administrative culture, operation of the LC system
• Same as above, and donor funding
• Same as above
• Range of services, planning, supervision
• Co-ordination, regulation of non-state providers
• Gender aspects of decentralisation
• Range of tasks, planning, supervision
• Co-ordination and interaction with NGOs
30
cont. (Table 1.2)
Methods Research aspects
Observation at health units and drugshops (32 providers) • Staff behaviour, consultation time, waiting time, patient encounter, privacy, etc.
Drugshop observation study
in 6 drugshops by a local nurse
• Sales, prescription patterns, credit provision, costs,
• People's buying behaviour
Health units/patient records27 • Patient numbers, revenues, income, expenditure
• Clinical-medical assessment of patient treatments by DED health professionals
"Healthy patient" test (visit of a healthy person at all health 
facilities in Kamuli Town and simulation of being sick)
• Examination procedures, staff behaviour, treatment quality, user charges, waiting 
time, consultation time
Semi-structured interviews with
• Sectional Heads of District Departments of health, education, 
agriculture, community development, and water
• Staff of 20 NGOs in Kamuli and regional headquarters
Network analysis28
• Interaction and co-ordination among departments, between the administration and 
NGOs, and among NGOs
• Planning, funding
Participant observation during
• NGO-Local Administration networking workshops
• NGO Forum and working group meetings
Network analysis:
• Nature and form of interaction, interaction problems
• Willingness and capacity to interact
27 Results are reported for one year (August 1998 -  August 1999). If available, data was collected for the previous two years to crosscheck.
28 This network analysis included all the health care providers.
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cont. (Table 1.2)
Methods
................. ...............
Research aspects
Interviews at the national level with
• Ministries (MoH, MoLG, MFEP, MoA), donors
• Umbrella NGOs, medical bureaux
• Medical Council (UMDPC)
Included a selection of these topics:
• Civil society, SWAP, policy making, health policy implementation, decentralisation 
problems, NGO co-ordination,
• Regulation
• Health expenditure, health policies
Analysis of District documents
• Minutes of committee meetings, department and committee 
reports, district work plans, district budgets
• Triangulation of the issues above
Analysis of primary data of DED evaluation
• 60 exit interviews at 3 providers
• 60 household interviews in 3 areas
• User costs and access, user's choice of provider
Qualitative interviews and informal talks with DED health 
professionals
• Utilisation, problems of facilities, staff behaviour, incentives, resources and services 
available, medical practice, staff knowledge
DED annual reports Same as above
Observation
• Council meetings, electoral meetings,
• at District Headquarters
• Administrative culture
• Planning and budget allocation
• Relationship between councillors and Executive Committee
Newspaper clips • Health care issues
See Annex 2 for the list o f interviews and focus groups.
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Key questionnaires
Semi-structured interviews with the various types of respondents (providers, civil 
servants, councillors, and so forth) were based on key questionnaires. The advantage is 
that they allowed for flexible adaptation to explore more extensively emerging topics in 
order to understand meanings and contexts. At the same time, as a core set of issues were 
covered in all interviews, comparisons and quantitative analysis were still possible.
Focus group discussions and action research
Both the focus group discussions in the 15 selected communities during 1997-98 and the 
individual discussions with staff of all 20 NGOs operating in Kamuli District and located 
in Kamuli Town followed an action research logic (for further elaboration on the selection 
procedures, see Annex l).29
In addition to the respondent-interviewer relationship, group interviewing takes 
advantage of the group interaction and dynamic which is a stimulus to elaboration and 
expression and which thus produces new and additional data (Frey/Fontana 1993: 32). 
This is particularly the case for the rather abstract and complex nature of research topics 
that were investigated (such as local government service delivery problems, council 
representation, accountability, transparency, voice, reasons for choosing one provider 
rather than another, etc.). The disadvantage of group interviews is that the view of 
individuals cannot always be followed up during the session; likewise, weaker group 
members may keep silent. But at the same time, observing these group interactions also 
allows the researcher to get an idea of the power relations prevailing within a community 
and a group, which is important to get an idea of the social context.
Another interest of this research was how people's problems and the related causes 
can be dealt with, which is why an action research approach was used. Action research 
means that the people themselves are involved in the "research process", i.e. they reflect 
on and analyse their "research problem". This is followed by a solution-finding process in 
which the people concerned identify and discuss a possible course of actions in order to 
overcome or at least reduce the problems. Action research aims, thus, at promoting 
people's problem solving capacity in order to change and improve their social, economic
29 Ten NGOs engage in curative and/or PPHC services, three NGOs are partly involved in PPHC activities. 
The other seven NGOs work in agriculture, women and community development (see Table 4.7).
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and political living conditions (Fals-Borda 1987). Focus group discussions provide a good 
starting point for this to take place (for the strengths, weaknesses and the modalities of the 
action research, see Annex 1.5).
Facility survey
To study relative strengths of the various health care providers, a sample had to be 
selected (see Chapter 4.3 for the procedure). Based on purposive sampling, the core 
sample comprised 16 curative health care providers (see Table 4.3 for a list). Further 
information was collected on another 16 providers (however, no exit interviews and 
record analyses were conducted in these cases). DED reports and interviews with DED 
staff, as well as health unit visits and observation during 1997/98, provided further data on 
another 11 government health units. In all, information was collected on a total of 43 
health care providers.
Exit interviews
Exit interviews have the advantage of allowing for direct triangulation and comparison of 
the patient's views and statements with the researcher's observation thereby enabling the 
researcher to correct respondent errors. The patient's recall period is minimal, allowing the 
researcher to get Ms/her immediate impression and/or facts that one could not find out 
easily in household interviews. On the other hand, exit interview responses may also be 
distorted by the patient's social desirability behaviour and their reluctance to make 
(negative) statements about the provider's services whilst in physical proximity. 
Therefore, the exit interviews took place out of hearing and out of sight of the provider 
(see below on considerations of reliability and validity and the means applied to increase 
them). The technicalities of how exit interviews were conducted and how respondents 
were selected and classified in poor and "better-off' groups are outlined in Annex 1.7.
Household interviews
To extend the insights into the patients' views, household interviews were undertaken. 12 
catchment areas (LC1 zones) were chosen, which were located about 4-6 km from the 
government or NGO clinics and in an area where alternative providers (drugshops and
30 This is not to say that the relatively "better-off people are not poor.
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1informal private practitioners) operated. One of the objectives was to examine how and 
whether the very poor have access to health services. Therefore, a sample was selected in 
which at least half of the household respondents belonged to the presumably poorest.32 
Random and other selection procedures were attempted, but posed practical problems (see 
Annex 1.7). For that matter, the research team started a transect walk roughly 5 km from 
the health unit, following the footpaths clock-wise through the zone. Every fifth home 
was chosen for the interview, if there was an adult at home; otherwise, the next home was 
targeted. Making full use of the research assistant's experience and judgement, these 
households were classified as poorest or "better-off" (i.e. less poor) by means of asset, 
wealth and social indicators.33
These included the housing type and condition (roof and walls)34; sleeping facilities 
(where possible to observe without entering the property: bed, mattress, mat, or floor); the 
overall state of the compound; possession of assets (e.g., livestock, bicycle, radio, dryer, 
latrine); condition of the children (obvious malnutrition); the number of the children not 
going to school; and the educational level and main occupation of the respondent and of 
the spouse, where relevant. Self-evidently, wealth and asset indicators do not really 
capture the full extent of poverty, which ultimately means being "excluded from full part 
in the society in which they live" (de Hann 1999). Further, this poverty "measurement" 
does not grasp health status, which in turn may not correlate at all with these indicators 
chosen. Finally, people may have a very different understanding of what means poor or 
who is poor. But while the chosen approach of this study has its limitations, it produces a 
good approximation of what we are looking for.
This sample is not random and hence not representative. Also, since the household 
wealth of the sample households was not quantified, there is some uncertainty about
31 The selection of these catchment areas was again purposive, in that zones with similar features were 
chosen (located to the north of and within similar distance to the health centre and to the next trading 
centre).
32 55 percent of Uganda's rural population are categorised as poor below the poverty line (World Bank 1993, 
in Oloka-Onyango 2000: 44). But even the highest expenditure in the seventy-fifth percentile is only 1.3 
times that of the poverty line, so the characteristics of those above the poverty line are very similar to those 
just below it. For the Eastern District, to which Kamuli District belongs, die percentage is even higher. In a 
representative sample, in which wealth and assets are quantified, the poorest are usually referred to as the 
bottom quartile (cf. World Bank 1996: 80).
33 For a statistical procedure of classifying household in quintiles by using wealth indicators on the basis of 
a representative sample, see Filmer/Pritchett 1998 and Gwatkin et al. 2000.
34 The state of the roof (grass versus iron sheets) and walls (mud versus brick stone) are also indicators used 
in the Ugandan National Household Survey 1995/96 (MFEP 1996).
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whether the poorest 10 or 30 percent in the rural areas were identified. Still, without 
denying that poverty differences exist among the poorest, this sample selection procedure 
provided valuable insights of how the very poor cope as regards health care seeking in 
comparison to the relatively better-off, who are nevertheless poor. The research team did 
come across and spoke with extremely poor people, some of them very sick, with the bare 
minimum to survive on and unable to pay for and seek health care.35
Household interviews are equally subject to respondent error, and in particular, recall 
bias (Kroeger 1983 in Pannarunothai/Mills 1997). While household responses are subject 
to verification, they can be confirmed by triangulation with other data. Exit and household 
interview results sometimes differ. But since bias in exit interview results is more likely, 
household interviews are usually given more credibility and hence validity when there are 
differences. Different sample rationales as regards drugshop utilisers explain the different 
results between the exit interviews, the household survey and the drugshop observation 
study. The drugshop observation provided an indication of all consumer transactions, 
whereas exit interviewees were patients or attendants that bought drugs for a patient. 
Household respondents usually only remembered the more severe disease incidents.
Data analysis
All interviews and focus group discussions were recorded by taking notes. Exit and 
household interviews were processed with SPSS. A great part of the data was of 
qualitative nature and therefore coded later during the data analysis process. Focus group 
discussions and all other interviews were coded and processed by means of a content 
analysis. The primary data material of the DED evaluation was equally processed with 
SPSS or by means of a content analysis.
Reach, reliability and validity
The research questions touch delicate and personal issues about people's health, their 
ability to seek treatment, and their ability to pay. The motives and rationales behind the 
exit and household interviewees' providing the researcher with their "truth" differ among
35 All of the these people or a related household member were interested in the interview, and it was felt that 
this was extremely important in order not to exclude this central group of people, but to find out how they 
cope. After the interview, we left the sick respondents some money in order to go to a health facility.
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Nthe better-off and the poorer respondents.36 Likewise, health professionals wanted to make 
me believe that they behave ethically and that the services they deliver do not give cause 
for complaint. Further, respondents may unknowingly provide a wrong answer (for 
example as regards the question whether they have obtained a full dose of chugs or not at 
a health care provider). In order to find out what can be considered to be "true", it is 
necessary to take into account what people are expected to say on the basis of their 
interests and motives. In case of two contradictory statements, triangulation with a third 
source often helped. But when triangulation was not possible, only one's instinct to judge 
the respondents' versions of "truth" remains. Formalised into an "interpretative 
framework",37 most weight was given to the statements of those respondents who had the 
least incentive to hide or distort information, instead of weighing every statement equally. 
In other words, I believed some people more than I did others -  i.e., credibility rather than 
internal validity was used as the criterion for evaluating "truth" (Yach 1992: 605).
The research assistants as well as some NGO staff whom I befriended constituted 
crucial and valuable key informants, providing important insights, but also helping reflect 
about the various versions of the "truth". Further, DED health professionals had been 
working in Kamuli's government health facilities for several years, and some of them had 
comparative country experience. Thus, they could obtain crucial insights into what was 
happening at the health units. One may argue, however, that Ugandan health workers 
behaved differently in the DED workers' presence. Yet, there appears to have been a 
process of habituation, otherwise the DED health professionals could not have witnessed 
the quite appalling incidents at the health units that they did. One may also argue that the 
DED health professionals' view was distorted by their own interests in seeing their own 
"truth". However, a recent evaluation in 1997, together with many internal discussions 
within the DED health team, focused on the structural problems in health care provision, 
which yielded a realistic judgement of the limited leverage the technical DED intervention 
had on the system's functioning. For these reasons, their statements were an overall valid 
means for triangulation. Nevertheless, what was "true" or not could not be fully clarified 
at some points, so the interpretation there remains speculative. In such cases, I have to 
spell out the problem in order to contextualise the possible "lie" or "truth" when
36 Also, respondents hardly reported STDs and were also reluctant to admit bribes.
37 Personal communication, Barbara McPake.
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presenting and interpreting the empirical data in order to draw out the wider implications
•JO
of such divergent statements (for further elaboration on the reliability and validity see 
Annex 1.10).
The strength of this study lies in its exploratory and qualitative character. Therefore, 
given the non-random selection and the sample size of both the household respondents 
and the health units, quantitative statements are not claimed to be representative for the 
whole of the population of Kamuli District or beyond. However, the results are highly 
indicative, since the findings reflect what other studies on particular aspects have found as 
well (see the literature indicated in Chapters 1.1 and 3 to 8).
Confidentiality
The institutional analysis of accountability issues and interorganisational relations was of 
a very delicate nature. In order to obtain information on these aspects, I promised 
confidentiality to the respondents. Therefore, to protect the respondent, his or her position 
is kept anonymous as much as possible, even though indicating the precise position may 
strengthen an argument.
Limitations of the study
Obviously, the strength of the study could have been increased with a representative and 
larger sample, but time and funding constraints did not allow for this. DED colleagues on 
a voluntary basis carried out the analysis of quality of clinical care, so again a larger 
budget would have enabled a more comprehensive and detailed study.
Another weakness of the research was the prevailing language barrier. Although I 
undertook some language training in Lusoga (the local language) which allowed me to 
greet and ask basic things as well as to follow a conversation broadly, research assistants 
played a key role in translation and focus group facilitation. Translating questions into a 
different language increases the scope of error (Bulmer 1993: 207), but this was 
minimised by a "decentring translating process" for the key questionnaires, namely an 
iterative process of back and forth translation, until both language versions of the 
questionnaire were identical (cf. McKay et al. 1996, WCW 1997). On the other hand, 
there are also advantages of working with translators (see Annex 1.2).
381 owe this point to Barbara McPake.
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It was particularly difficult to obtain detailed information from private practitioners, 
especially from the rural based ones, as well as from drugshops. Given the rural providers’ 
illegal status, informality and inadequate service provision, they were possibly afraid of 
being pinpointed, and even the explicit explanation that the research interest in them was 
nurtured by the general motive of finding out how services could be improved and what 
kind of support providers would need did not help much. Here, long-term anthropological 
and ethnographic research would have been required, but this was not undertaken, since it 
would not have allowed for the analysis of other research questions.
Finally, a danger of qualitative research is the problem of observational bias, 
specifically the distortions of the researcher's judgement by the absorption of local views. 
Again, triangulation and continuous reflection on the information gathered and its "truth" 
are therefore necessary to minimise this effect.
1.5. Overview
Chapter 2 begins with clarifying the nature of the good of health care (Section 2.1). It then 
specifies the analytical-conceptual frameworks used for the empirical analysis, namely the 
sector model (Section 2.2) and the governance mechanisms and interactions (Section 2.3). 
Section 2.4 provides methodological reflections on how to define and determine relative 
strengths.
Chapter 3 outlines the nature and structure of health care provision in Uganda and the 
historical legacies prevailing in today's health care system. The historical-institutional 
account of local government evolution up to 1986 reveals that accountability never 
became institutionalised (Section 3.1). Section 3.2 analyses the post-independence 
organisational/institutional changes in the health care system up to 1986. The discussion 
of the health policies since 1986, policy-making and the role of donors (Section 33) and 
the local government development since 1986 (Section 3.4) then reveals the constraints 
with which today's decentralised health care system is faced. The nature of Uganda's 
health care system in the 1990s and the key features of the three sectors are outlined in 
Section 3.5. Chapter 4 provides the necessary background of the empirical study in the
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four chapters that follow and therefore focuses on health care provision (Sections 4.1-4) 
and utilisation (Section 4.5) in Kamuli District in more detail.
Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to a comparative performance analysis of the public, 
private and voluntary sectors. Chapter 5 analyses the providers' accessibility by assessing 
and comparing each provider type's payment procedures, the total direct financial costs 
incurred by the patients to get treatment, the extent of informal charges, the exemption 
practice, the deferral payment options, physical accessibility, and the utilisation rates in 
relation to whether people are poor or "better-off' (Sections 5.1-8). An overall assessment 
is provided in Section 5.9.
Chapter 6 deals with the issues of efficiency in staff resource utilisation and quality 
of care. Section 1 focuses on the efficient use of staff resources. Quality of care is 
assessed by the following indicators: drug availability; staff behaviour; the provision of 
privacy; waiting time; the presence of and attendance by qualified staff; the quality of 
consultation and examination; clinical quality of care; and the patients' satisfaction with 
medical care (Sections 6.2.1-2.9). Section 6.3 concludes with a discussion of which 
provider type performs best or least worst over the three performance criteria of access, 
efficiency in staff resource utilisation and quality of care.
Chapter 7 aims at explaining the performance and malperformance noted in the 
previous two chapters. Institutions that produce accountability, financial responsibility 
and equity between the staffs obligations and rights are considered key for organisational 
performance (Section 7.1). For each provider type, the operation of such institutional 
mechanisms is analysed, providing further insights into why they are not functioning 
(Sections 7.2-4).
Chapter 8 focuses on interorganisational relationships in order to further explain 
organisational (mal)performance. After some methodological considerations (Section 
8.1), the chapter examines how state regulation and supervision of private clinics and 
drugshops (Sections 8.2-3) as well as NGO clinics (Section 8.4) function. This is followed 
by an assessment of the effectiveness of network coordination (Section 8.5). Section 8.6 
examines the potentials and pitfalls of partnerships. Section 8.7 analyses the actors' 
incentives and the prevailing "interaction culture" and interaction structure to explain why 
organisational actors interact the way they do. A study of the referral system shows the
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gaps caused both by the providers' referral indiscipline and patients' self-referral (Section 
8.8).
The final chapter, Chapter 9, provides an overall conclusion. It summarises the 
potentials and pitfalls of institutional pluralism found in Kamuli District (Section 9.1). 
From this, wider implications and reflections follow (Section 9.2). A guide to policy 
action is provided in Section 9.3. The final section, Section 9.4, addresses the question of 
institutionalised pathologies versus healing organisations.
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Chapter 2
Health Care Provision. Institutional Pluralism and Interorganisational Relations
This chapter sets out the analytical-theoretical frameworks for studying institutional 
pluralism and interorganisational relations in health care provision. First, it is necessary 
to discuss the nature and the characteristics of health care and of health care markets 
(Section 2.1). Section 2.2 examines the institutional characteristics and attributed 
strengths and weaknesses and the assumptions related thereto of each sector as a service 
deliverer/producer -  in contrast to provision that ensures the availability o f a service . 
The next section introduces the conceptual framework for studying interorganisational 
relationships and their impact upon organisational performance, namely governance 
mechanisms (2.3.1) and interactions (2.3.2). The final part of this chapter (Section 2.4) 
discusses the process of defining relative strengths (2.4.1), the criteria selection process 
(2.4.2) and the chosen performance criteria (2.4.3). It is crucial to note that these 
theoretical frameworks and models are mere tools to guide the analysis of institutional 
pluralism and interorganisational relations, in that they indicate how in theory and under 
what assumptions they are valid. But they equally assist in examining how these models 
may not function. In the latter case, there is need to further inquire and explain why they 
do not function.
2.1. Goods Characteristics of Health Care
Health, as defined by the WHO, is "a state of physical, mental and social well-being and 
not merely the absence of disease or infirmity" (WHO 2000). This definition goes beyond 
the narrow notion of health as being related simply to the mechanics of bodily organs and 
includes social and economic relationships. Apart from direct health care activities
39 Production refers to the act of physically generating and delivering a service ("rowing"), whereas 
provision and ensuring the availability of a service refers to shaping the arrangements of production 
("steering", or, as it is termed here, "governance") (Batley 1994b: 8). Commonly the term "health care 
provider" is used for an organisation or individual that delivers a service, and this meaning is applied, 
unless specified otherwise.
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(curative, preventive and promotive), a multitude of non-health care related factors affect 
health outcomes, such as income and employment opportunities, (female) education, and 
water and sanitation (Abel-Smith 1994, WHO 2000). Health and access to health care are 
considered a human right and of intrinsic value for expanding one's ability to choose the 
sort of life one wishes to lead (cf. World Bank 1993, Mills 1997b). What people really 
desire is improved health, so health care is a derived demand. Illuminating the 
characteristics of health care goods helps one understand the prevailing incentives related 
to its provision and consumption.
From a consumption perspective, some preventive and promotive health care 
(PPHC) services constitute pure public goods (e.g., vector control and health education), 
which are non-excludable and non-rival, so that people are not willing to pay for them 
and markets will not provide them. Certain PPHC activities, such as immunisation and 
family planning, which are excludable and rival goods, have very strong positive 
externalities and meritorial character (cf. Griffith 1988, World Bank 1993). However, 
PPHC with a future benefit is often little valued, so that people are again less willing to 
consume and pay for them (Bloomington 1994, Bennett 1997b, Colclough 1997).
Curative services constitute a private, i.e., an excludable and rival good, for which 
people are in principle willing to pay. Still, markets for curative health services are not in 
equilibrium in most developing countries (Leonard/Leonard 2000). This is because the 
production characteristics of health care goods cause market imperfections and failures. 
This happens for three reasons. First, while contestability in the production of ambulatory 
care at the primary level is in principle high40, supply in practice is low, that is, provider 
choice is still more limited than it is for many consumer goods. Second, health care goods 
are characterised by low measurability, in that health care outputs and outcomes are 
qualitative, intangible and therefore difficult to measure. Third, informational 
asymmetries between the provider and the patient make it difficult for the latter to assess 
the appropriateness and quality of the activities of the provider. Health care services are 
hence highly complex goods, which makes monitoring agent behaviour particularly 
difficult and costly (Preker/Harding 2001, Russell et al. 1999).
40 Contestability refers to the possibility of entering or exiting the market as a provider.
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In reality, the distinction between public and private goods is not that clear. Some 
goods show both private and public characteristics. For example, the treatment of 
communicable diseases is of individual and collective benefit. Also, externality, 
excludability and merit are not a matter of either/or but rather a matter of degree, as they 
constitute scalar concepts.41 The categorisation into public and private is eventually a 
question of interpretation and judgement that requires a political decision to "determine" 
the degree of externality, merit and desirability of exclusion or rejectability (Batley 
1994b, Bennett 1991). In other words, a service has to exhibit the characteristics of both 
market failure and be considered of fundamental importance to be designated "public" 
(Corry et al. 1997: 7). Hence, the distinction is relative and what is classified as a public 
service will vary with the circumstances (above all the epidemiological profile) and the 
economic wealth of a country (Fisher 1998: 5).
There are three rationales for state interventions in health care markets. First, public 
goods with large positive externalities require intervention, because the market does not 
provide them. Secondly, as health is considered to be a fundamental right and a "merit 
good", state intervention (public financing or other forms of provision) is necessary to 
provide access to health services for the poor who could otherwise not afford it. Thirdly, 
market failures and imperfections must be addressed to improve the market functioning 
and to raise welfare (World Bank 1993, cf. Bennett 1991, Mills 1997b).
While the consumption characteristics, specifically the public-private good 
distinction, provide guidance on whether the state should intervene or not, they do not 
help in specifying the form of intervention. At this point, the production characteristics 
(contestability, measurability, information asymmetry) are relevant for thinking about the 
how of state intervention, the degree and nature, and the level and form of intervention, 
whether as a producer (direct service delivery) or a provider (ensuring the availability of 
the service by regulatory and enabling activities) (McPake 1997). Based on the strengths 
and characteristics of each provider type and governance mechanism as assumed by 
theory, Preker et al. (1999) categorise the various health care goods by means of their 
production characteristics and outline whether provision should be based on market 
competition, "buy options", or left under hierarchical control. The actual functioning of
41 Moreover, excludability is also related to the technical aspects of service provision.
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the sectors and their strengths and weaknesses as regards the production of services are 
illuminated in more detail in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 then examines the governance 
mechanisms and their strengths and weaknesses, as theoretically presumed.
2.2. Private, Public and Voluntary Sector Organisations: Strengths and Weaknesses 
in Health Care Provision
For developing countries, the most common model is one with three sectors or three 
poles (cf. Figure 2.1) to capture organisational pluralism into organisational types and 
sectors (cf. Uphoff 1993). These are (1) private sector organisations, (2) public sector 
organisations, which consist of all kinds of state agencies, and (3) voluntary sector 
organisations, encompassing non-governmental organisations, community based groups, 
self-help groups and other forms of associations that do not fall under the previous two 
sectors. The sectors do not operate in isolation. For example, the functioning of the 
market is related to the effectiveness of state regulation (cf. Section 2.3).
Figure 2.1 (cf. Wegener 1995): The sector poles
Private sector
Voluntary sector 
organisations
Community
In this conceptual framework, the sectors constitute ideal-types42 and are analytically
42 An abstract ideal-type is an "idealised description of the 'forms of action' involved in the functioning of 
particular institutions" by relating them to social facts. The thrust of an ideal-type model is to point to the 
difference between the actual and potential capacities within the operation of a given institution and 
organisation (Brett 1973: 6-7).
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differentiated by their particular compliance mechanism that is manifested in the 
organisational and institutional set-up. Their compliance mechanisms imply specific 
incentives and disincentives for behaviour and thus predict specific strengths and 
weaknesses in relation to organisational performance. In reality, the sector attribution is 
not that straightforward and we must be aware of its limitations (see Section 2.2.4). The 
sector model serves analytical purposes, in that it provides an idea about the key features, 
the functioning of the compliance mechanisms, and in relation thereto, the assumed 
strengths and weaknesses of each sector, which will be outlined below. In the health care 
literature, a health system's and the providers' strengths and weaknesses are commonly 
assessed in terms of technical and allocative efficiency, quality of care, and access 
(World Bank 1993, Bennett et al. 1994, Colclough 1997, WHO 2000). The former aspect 
follows from a health care system's needs, whereas the latter aspect is based on the 
understanding that health is a human right, to which everybody should have access. The 
need for quality of care goes without saying (cf. WHO 2000) (see Section 2.4 and 
Chapters 5 and 6 for further elaboration on these performance criteria).
Kaufinann provides a useful conceptualisation for the study of the internal 
"technology" and the effectiveness of compliance mechanisms. He suggests three 
components to look at -  guidance, control and feedback -  and adds that an effective 
compliance mechanism requires a fit and link between the three: "[G]uidance is exercised 
by any process ... that indicates to single actors standards by which they can ascertain the 
value or the expected utility of their actions in a wider context". Control elements ensure 
that the expected value or expected actions are realised. Finally, feedback and evaluation 
maintain the chain of actions and "facilitate its adaptation to unexpected problems" 
(Kaufrnann 1985: 219).
2.2.1. The Private Sector
When discussing the private sector, it is important to note that it is not a homogenous 
entity. The extent and type of activity is diverse ranging from informal to very formal 
health care providers (Kumaranayake 1998: 4), so that the strengths and weaknesses 
apply to different degrees. The fundamental assumption of the market is the "homo 
oeconomicus", whose prime interest is profit maximisation. The overall argument of neo­
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liberals is that the private sector is superior in technical and allocative efficiency due to 
competition, the price signal and the client's exit options, which imposes hard budget 
constraints. The question of quality inextricably follows from this, as the provider will be 
sensitive to the preferences of the consumer, so that for-profit agencies will (should) 
maximise quality for a given level of input (World Bank 1987: 39, in Bennett 1997b: 95). 
Maximising efficiency derives from the congruence of the elements of guidance, control 
and feedback that are all expressed within the price (cf. Kaufmann 1985: 222). But 
because the guidance dimension of private sector organisations is based only on the logic 
of maximising efficiency, market failures are produced, namely externalities, exclusion 
and unequal access and distribution, which reduce allocative efficiency. Also, private 
sector organisations will usually not supply public goods, but this is not to say that they 
could not produce them.
Further, there are inherent market imperfections in health care, such as informational 
asymmetries due to low-measurability of health care services and a low number of 
suppliers. Information gaps are particularly critical, since most patients are unable to 
judge the value of a specific service or to compare prices among providers, particularly 
when they have fallen sick. As a result, supplier-induced inefficiencies and ethically 
unacceptable behaviour arise (World Bank 1993: 131, Bennett et al. 1994: 3). For 
example, providers may offer unnecessary services and deliver poor quality services at 
higher prices than would be charged in a perfectly competitive market.43 Mills stresses 
that
Conclusive evidence is lacking, at least in the poorest countries, that non-public
services necessarily perform any better in terms of efficiency (1997b: 249).
There is no such thing as a "perfect" market, since market imperfections are inherent 
and since market failure is a "natural" by-product of markets. Thus, most markets require 
some form of correction and regulation. However, in Uganda, as in other LDCs, markets 
are less developed, and market imperfections and failures are particularly severe, given
43 Where information is particularly imperfect about skills, a "market for lemons" will exist, in which 
lower-price, low-quality practitioners will compete higher-cost higher-quality providers out of existence if 
the latter are unable to demonstrate their superior quality (Akerloff 1970 in Leonard/Leonard 1998: 35).
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the conditions prevailing there, including an "economy of affection"44, and low levels of 
trusts in contractual agreements, in the laws governing market transactions, and in law 
and regulatory enforcement (Ruzindana 1995 in Nicholls 1998). Further shortcomings 
include low literacy rates, under-capitalisation and low saving rates (Kasekende/Atingi- 
Ego 1999), poor business ethics and high levels of opportunism in the general context of 
extreme poverty, deprivation, scarcity and uncertainty (Munene 1991, 1995; Munene et 
al. 1997, 2000; Nicholls 1998 for Uganda). As in many African countries, important 
institutions, such as professional associations, or health insurance markets are poorly 
developed or absent (Leonard/Leonard 2000).
2.2.2. The Public Sector
The compliance mechanism primarily used by the state is hierarchical control.45 
Hierarchy is characterised by the existence of stratified authority and the respective 
following rules whereby one "actor" directs and controls the activities of another one 
through rules within certain bounds (Miller 1992: 16, Mitchell 1991). This allows the 
state to perform functions that other sectors cannot. In day-to-day behaviour, hierarchy is 
thus manifested in "duty, authority and adherence to rules and procedures about how 
tasks shall be performed" (Moore 1996: 3). In its ideal-typical form, state service delivery 
is very efficient if it is based on hierarchical bureaucracy of the Weberian type and on 
democratic accountability46 Accountability is "a function of the leverage exerted" over 
agents by their principals (Brett 2000c: 41; see Chapter 7 for further elaboration). 
Democratic accountability mechanisms refer to the chain of civil servants being 
accountable to elected politicians who are again accountable and responsive to the 
citizens.
The Weberian model of hierarchical control and bureaucracy is efficient only if the 
conditions of standardisation, insulation of bureaucrats from society, and impartiality are
44 This is a network of support, communication and interaction among structurally defined groups 
connected by blood, kin, community and other affinities, which aim to service the needs of dependants, 
thereby preventing the accumulation of savings (Hyden 1983: 8, in Munene et al. 2000: 342).
45 Governments increasingly introduce other compliance mechanisms (see Section 2.2.4). Note that 
hierarchy is also exerted within non-state organisations as a principle of structure and compliance, which 
will be discussed where pertinent.
46 Uganda's administration is based on the Weberian type (Fallers 1965, Brett 1993), as are those of other 
developing countries (cf. Simon 1993, Preker et al. 1999).
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met (Moore 1996). It is therefore considered to be particularly appropriate for routine 
tasks (Batley 1994b: 10). The strengths are neutrality, fairness and clear responsibility 
chains. Further, professionalism and codes of conduct make civil servants adhere to 
standards (e.g., quality of care). Most importantly, state service provision allows for 
altering distribution, pursuing equity objectives and other collective goals of society 
(Brett 2000c). In theory, we would therefore expect the state to be better than the market 
in delivering low-measurability health care goods and in providing the poorest access to 
its services.
However, state hierarchy implies inherent weaknesses. Democratic accountability is 
deficient due to imperfect mles about the aggregation of individual values (Arrow 1963, 
Preker et al. 1999). "Perfect" hierarchical control fails, because laws and regulations 
require interpretation. Orders may be ambiguous and objectives may be multiple and 
conflicting (Hood 1976 in Larmour 1997). Ultimately, hierarchy suffers from principal- 
agent problems and information asymmetries, even more since there is no congruence in 
the devices for guidance, control and feedback. In particular, there is no inherent 
feedback mechanism within hierarchy (Kaufinann 1985: 222). These deficits cause state 
failure, or more specifically hierarchy failures, which result in lack of or weak incentives 
for performance. Another consequence is the rise of "intemalities", i.e., goals that apply 
within non-market organisations to guide, regulate and evaluate agency performance and 
the performance of agency personnel deviate from the public interest (Wolf 1988: 66). 
These are palpable in the pursuit of private interests, opportunistic behaviour, corruption 
and rent-seeking (Mackintosh 1992). Another problem is cost expansion due to the 
separation of revenues and spending (Niskanen 1971).47 The results of these deficits are 
allocative and technical inefficiency, inequity and poor quality.
Decentralisation theories claim that such state failures are less severe in devolved 
state agencies, which is why decentralisation has been suggested as a major structural 
reform to improve performance within the public sector. The key argument for 
decentralisation is that increased local autonomy over decision-making, based on local 
legitimisation by the population to be served, will make health care planners and
47 For the problems of tax financed health care, cf. Joenson/Musgrove 1997.
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providers more responsive to local needs. This will also increase their accountability in 
terms of both the quality of care offered and the use of resources, as well as of social 
development goals (Atkinson et al. 2000: 620).48 Even though not an argument against 
devolution, this may pose new problems, not least for the health care system (Mills 1994, 
1997b, Collins/Green 1994, cf. Brett 1998b for Uganda).
The existence and nature of state failures is independent of the type of regime. But 
as for markets, state failures are particularly severe in LDCs, in that the related 
assumptions for functioning state provision are not fully met in the context of weak state 
institutions, lack of collective action, low levels of social capital, a weak civil society and 
high rates of illiteracy, all of which weaken accountability. Moreover, informal 
institutions and rules, such as the "politics of the belly" (Bayart 1992)49, the "economy of 
affection" (Hyden 1992) and the tendency towards "personal rule" (Kjaer 1999) 
undermine the insulation of bureaucrats from society, their impartiality, and their 
neutrality. This leads to patronage and clientelisation and subverts the operation of formal 
institutions (often imported from the West) (Munene et al. 2000). Uganda is no exception 
to this, as we will see.
2.2.3. The Voluntary Sector
There is great diversity of organisations in the voluntary sector. For the purpose of this 
study, the focus is on non-government organisations and church-affiliated organisations 
that deliver health services.50 The ideal-type voluntary sector organisation is structurally 
separate from government, self-governing, and enjoys a significant degree of autonomy. 
Its distinct compliance mechanism is based on value-drivenness and solidaristic concerns 
and motivations (Brett 1993, Streeck/Schmitter 1985). These are nurtured by norms 
prevailing within a community, religious belief or other humanitarian convictions, which 
limit the pursuit merely of self-interests. Compliance is driven by social responsibility
48 For discussions on the benefits of decentralisation, cf. Biehl 1987, Maddick 1963, Rondinelli/Cheema 
1983, Rothchild 1995, SamofF 1990, Simon 1993, 1994a, Smith 1985, Wunsch/Oluwu 1990, Bossert 1998.
49 This refers to "eating” in a wide sense. It is more than corruption in that it ultimately denotes a power 
struggle and a struggle for social mobility and allocating scarce resources, whereby amassing and 
redistributing wealth (including state resources) turns a person of power into a person of honour (Kjaer 
1999: 96).
50 Cf. Green (1987: 38) for the range of types of voluntary sector organisations in health care provision.
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and solidarity vis-a-vis others, whether within the immediate community context or on a 
wider level (cf. Wegener 1995). Solidarity can be distinguished into altruism, reciprocity, 
and loyalty (Neubert 1997: 70), each of which gains relevance under particular 
arrangements and circumstances. Religious belief may nurture all three aspects.
Altruism can be defined as an individual disposition which "guarantees the 
inclination of actors to contribute without expecting a benefit of the same kind" (Hegner 
1985: 410), whereas loyalty is manifested in the belief that "keep[ing] faith with another 
person or group of persons without economically weighing the advantages and 
disadvantages of that behaviour step-by-step, at least in the long run, is more favourable 
than breaking faith with the collectivity" (ibid.: 411). Reciprocal behaviour is based on 
"do ut des" -  there may be a temporary forgoing of advantages, but it is expected that 
"the other(s) will respond in some way in the future" (ibid.).
The guidance component of solidarity directs behaviour, but control and feedback 
components are rather elusive because they are not inherently defined within the 
compliance mechanism. A voluntaristic organisation must therefore set up specific 
accountability mechanisms, since altruism and loyalty by themselves provide no 
accountability basis, whereas the threat of withdrawal from a reciprocal relationship may 
exert some pressure on both sides. Further, donor dependency and hence accountability to 
donors constitute a surrogate or complement for the elusiveness of solidarity (Brett 
1993). Despite the common attribution of solidaristic motivation, the NGO sector is best 
characterised in terms of its diversity in size, financing and services provided 
(Green/Matthias 1995: 569). Given this diversity and the elusiveness of the compliance 
mechanism, it is more difficult to make absolute, general statements about the advantages 
of voluntary sector organisations.
NGOs are said to deliver high quality services at lower cost to the poorest and most 
disadvantaged people, that is, they are considered to be more efficient than the state. This 
technical efficiency is thought to result partly from their ability to react quickly to 
changing needs, to make decisions at the health facility level without reference to a 
higher authority and to use funds and human resources flexibly, as they are not as 
constrained as government bureaucracies are (Gilson et al. 1994: 18). Given the voluntary 
sector's solidaristic motivations, we would expect it not to exploit the information
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asymmetries that result from low-measurability goods, which explains its higher quality 
services. Likewise, solidarity guarantees better access for the poorest (Green/Matthias 
1995). Because of their strong motivational basis and greater flexibility, NGOs are also 
believed to be more innovative than the state. Operating at the local level and therefore 
closer to the people, and allowing for a higher degree of participation makes them more 
responsive and more effective in mobilising resources than the state 
(Bebbington/Farrington 1993, Jessen 1992).51 It is important to note that, apart from 
solidaristic motivations, NGO performance in service provision requires collective 
action, trust, effective accountability structures, and an ability and willingness to 
participate.
Following the concept of state and market failures, Salamon argues that the inherent 
features of voluntary sector organisations cause "voluntary sector failure" (1987: 111), 
such as lack of professionalism, lack of scale and lack of integration.52 They are accused 
of wanting management systems, failing to meet national health needs and quality 
standards and being unplanned and technically and allocatively inefficient (WHO 1985 in 
Green 1987: 40, Robinson/White 1997). Overall, available evidence as to their efficiency 
is limited and variable (Gilson et al. 1994: 18). Further, accountability mechanisms are 
often less clear and participation is costly, which again questions their cost-effectiveness 
(cf. Brett 1993, 1996a). Finally, NGO staff may not be motivated by altruism, but by high 
salaries, such that they emerge as a privileged group on a second labour market. Self- 
interest may be equally strong and result in opportunistic behaviour and malfeasance (cf. 
Nabuguzi 1995, Neubert 1997, Klempp 1996 for East Africa).
So, while arguments on efficiency, service quality, equity and resource mobilisation 
can be made in favour of NGO health care provision, the same arguments can be used 
against NGOs (Green 1987: 50). It is therefore hard to see any theoretical justification for 
the premise that the NGO types we are talking about have an overall comparative 
advantage over state provision (Green/Matthias 1995: 570) or market provision in all
51 Bennett argues that the fee collection performance of missions is probably better (Bennett 1991 in Mills 
1997b: 253). Other parts of the NGO health sector have been little studied (ibid.).
52 While these failures are empirically valid observations, the conceptualisation as "voluntary sector failure" 
is unjustified, because these failures do not follow from their compliance mechanism but from a lack of 
organisational capacities.
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situations.53 In sum, NGO performance is based on several assumptions. Whether these 
are all present in a context like Kamuli, is an empirical question.
2.2.4. The Institutional and Context Contingencies of the Sectors' Appropriateness 
The intellectual thrust of the sector model is about carving out the ideal-typical key 
characteristics of the three sectors, thus providing an idea of each sector’s strengths and 
weaknesses. Yet, these general attributions of strengths and weaknesses do not provide 
universally applicable rules, as they only spell out the problems involved in the provision 
of health care, rather than giving us an absolute indication of which sector is appropriate 
in a specific context. For example, when one sector performs better in a given situation, it 
is unclear whether it derives from its inherent compliance mechanism or whether this is 
only due to the failures of the other two sectors. Strengths and weaknesses of the various 
agencies are relative and contingent upon each other within a given moment and location; 
they are situational.
Furthermore, the strengths of each sector cannot only be determined on the basis of 
the nature of the good and a sector's compliance mechanism. The functioning of health 
care markets also depends on the local epidemiological profile, socio-economic 
conditions, civil society, the nature of interorganisational relationships, and, in particular, 
the extent of regulation -  all of which are often underdeveloped (Bennett et al. 1995: 4) 
(see below and Chapters 7 and 8). It is very difficult to make universally valid statements 
on the sectors’ specific strengths and role without specifying the multiplicity of factors 
that affect performance (cf. Mathauer 2000). Hence, relative strengths can be determined 
only empirically. This latter point is even more valid once the sector assumptions are not 
(fully) met, as is the case for Kamuli District. It is then again an empirical question of 
which provider type operates best or least worst.
The ideal-type sector model stands against a continuum of organisations that do not 
fit clearly into one sector and that may comprise more than only one compliance 
mechanism (Kenis/Schneider 1991, Green 1987, 1995). Further, the conventional sector 
conceptualisation of the state is now moving towards a new ideal-type. Governments 
have increasingly come under reform pressures to move to the New Public Management
53 The comparison between NGOs and markets is rarely found in the literature.
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model as a new (ideal-)type of administration. There are also many other possible 
institutional arrangements for delivering services, such as co-production and 
collaboration between various organisations (Batley 1994b, Ostrom et al. 1993, Bennett 
1991; see Section 2.3). Hence, in practice, the conventional sector boundaries are blurred, 
and we will see in Uganda that a process of hybridisation has taken place. What often 
remains is the sectors' formal-legal basis, whereas objectives and interests of public 
sector organisations or NGOs have become private (cf. Green/Matthias 1995).54
Despite its limitations, the sector model provides a useful initial conceptual 
framework needed for examining and understanding institutional pluralism and to guide 
the search for the best institutional arrangement in a specific situation. On the other hand, 
in the end, any role attribution must be context-specific (cf. Robinson/White 1997: 16, 
Green 1987: 51). In that sense, Preker et al.'s (1999) guidelines on which service provider 
is adequate to produce which health care goods are only indicative. Brett notes that
Optimal results are only achieved when the most appropriate type of agency is 
selected for the tasks in hand. This is a matter of relating agency to context on the 
basis of a rigorous understanding of the principles of each type, and sound empirical 
knowledge of the situation in which it will have to operate (1993: 301, my 
emphasis).
It is therefore most relevant to understand the functioning of the compliance mechanism 
and the institutional set-up of an organisation in a given context. This set-up is the array 
of institutions that constitute the chain of guidance, control and feedback, as well as other 
(informal) institutions. These must be critically examined further in order to explain 
organisational performance or malperformance (for further elaboration see Chapter 7).
2.3. Interorganisational Relations
Interorganisational relations are an inherent part of institutional pluralism and create, but 
also meet the need for some order. They refer to interorganisational institutional
54 The boundaries between the public and private sector are also blurred due to double-employment and tbe 
fluctuation of health workers between the sectors.
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mechanisms -  "governance mechanisms" -  and interactions. Governance mechanisms 
denote those institutional mechanisms at the system level that "govern", "steer", "control" 
and "co-ordinate" organisations55 (see Section 2.3.1). Here, interactions are defined as an 
event where "two or more organisations transact resources of any kind" (Van de 
Ven/Ferry 1980: 297) or where one organisation directly interferes in the affairs of 
another. Interactions represent a continuum from obstruction/restriction and conflict to 
co-operation and collaboration (see Section 2.3.2). Governance mechanisms are closely 
interwoven with interactions. However, not every interorganisational relationship is 
governed in one way or the other; organisations may also co-exist (cf. Brett 1998a).
2.3.1. Governance Mechanisms
The three ideal-type forms of governance are (1) competition (market co-ordination), (2) 
regulation (hierarchical co-ordination), and (3) network co-ordination (for this tripartite 
distinction, cf. Moore 1992, Francis et al. 1991, Powell 1991, Robinson et al. 2000). 
Governance mechanisms serve to increase organisational performance and, on an 
aggregated level, to increase system output, such as allocation, distribution, efficiency, 
equity and responsiveness (Kaufinann 1985: 210).
Analytically, the "technology" of the governance mechanism is identical with the 
compliance mechanism (of sectors), in that organisations are made to behave in a certain 
way. However, their entry points differ. The compliance mechanism refers to intra- 
organisational aspects of delivery, whereas the governance mechanism addresses 
interorganisational relations and the interorganisational aspects of provision. In the case 
of competition and the price mechanism, however, the compliance mechanisms and 
governance mechanisms are identical, since competition relies upon the existence of 
other organisations' behaviour and supply. As a compliance mechanism, market 
competition works on technical efficiency; as a governance mechanism, it affects 
allocative efficiency. It is useful to apply again Kaufinann's conceptualisation for the 
study of the "technology" of governance mechanisms by looking at the fit and the link 
between guidance, control and feedback (cf. Section 2.2). Each governance mechanism
55 Other terms used are "steering” or "coordination" mechanisms (Bradach/Eccles 1991, Kaufinann et al. 
1985, Kickert et al. 1997).
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will be discussed in relation to these three elements to outline their strengths and 
weaknesses.
2.3.1.1. Competition
The space associated with competition is the market, the co-ordinating instrument of 
which is the price, which motivates and regulates interactions and transactions (Marshall 
1991, White 1993). The health care market does not necessarily consist only of private 
sector organisations; rather, any set of organisations or individuals can constitute a 
market if they compete. In Kamuli, for example, public, private and NGO health clinics 
compete against each other, and NGOs also compete among themselves for donors and 
target groups (cf. Fowler 1998). Provided that there are no market imperfections and 
failures, competition produces allocative efficiency. This strength derives again from the 
congruence of the elements of guidance, control and feedback. But because of the one­
dimensional logic of the market, there are market failures that reduce allocative 
efficiency. This is more so the case if the functioning of the market is severely 
undermined by market imperfections and underdevelopment (cf. Section 2.2.1).
It is questionable whether allocative efficiency of the health care sector as a whole 
increases in a competitive setting when there is still undercoverage or duplication of 
efforts (Green 1987, 1992, Bennett 1997b). Likewise, competition is often incompatible 
with integration, which is why it may be difficult to bring private practices into referral 
systems (Bennett et al. 1994: 4, cf. WHO 1996: 4). Thus, competition fails to solve many 
concerns of an interorganisational system. Bennett (1994) concludes that the neoliberals' 
claims of greater efficiency benefits are likely to materialise only if the market is 
effectively regulated.
2.3.1.2. Regulation
Regulation serves to address market imperfections or to reduce market failures. It can be 
broadly understood as the state's actions to manipulate prices, quantities, distribution and 
quality of services (Maynard 1982 and Roemer 1993 in Kumaranayake 1998: 8) in order 
to affect access, equal coverage and quality standards as well as to achieve integration of 
services. This includes such tasks as accrediting health facilities, licensing medical
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schools and physicians, establishing a referral system, fixing price levels, regulating the 
sale of drugs, reviewing medical practices and guiding the location of clinics (ibid.). The 
rationale behind regulation is based on some form of public interest in order to overcome 
or reduce market failures (Bennett et al. 1995: 30).56
The traditional basis of regulation is hierarchy, involving a bureaucracy accountable 
through hierarchical chains to politicians (Batley 1994b: 13). By means of hierarchy and 
regulation, i.e., legislative power and power over resources, information and 
accountability, the state is able to alter the distribution of resources, to guarantee equal 
access and to provide incentives to influence private providers’ behaviour. If services by 
specific private or NGO organisations are mutually exclusive or conflicting and express 
motives beyond mere altruism, the state is the only entity that can act as a "primus inter 
pares". Its regulatory capacity constitutes "a potential integrating framework to both 
reinforce, regularise and rationalise [non-state] provision, reflecting some broader notion 
of public welfare [...]" (Robinson/White 1997: 24, emphasis there).
However, regulatory approaches are costly and may fail to achieve planned 
objectives, as governments may misjudge the impacts of an intervention due to 
information deficits or because some of the stakeholders are too powerful and dominant. 
A distorted regulatory intervention may be the result. In that case, regulation may even 
worsen the problem (Bennett 1997b: 114). This is because hierarchy suffers from a lack 
of congruence between the devices for guidance, control and evaluation and because it 
has no inherent feedback mechanism (Kaufinann 1985: 222). As mentioned above, this 
makes state service delivery fail and, likewise, it explains the limits of regulation. 
Another problem is "regulatory capture", where the regulating body is sympathetic to or 
influenced by the regulatee, for example through bribes, or where it operates on the basis 
of perverse incentives, so that the purpose of the legislation is undermined 
(Kumaranayake 1998: 16).
The capacity and effectiveness of regulation also depend upon a number of factors, 
namely the availability and validity of information, funding and resources for 
implementation, effective monitoring and enforcement and the willingness of private
56 The alternative to the "public interest theory of regulation" is "self-interest or capture theory of 
regulation" (Kumaranayake 1998) (see Chapter 8.2).
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providers to collaborate in providing this information (Bennett et al. 1994: 9). States 
often feel that they do not have the capacity, even though they have the authority to 
supervise and monitor (WHO 1991 in Bennett et al. 1995: 37). In fact,
There is an irony 'that the need for regulation is greatest in economies which have
the most limited capacity to manage it' (Adam et al. 1992: 77 in Batley 1994b: 13).
If these fundamental prerequisites for regulation are absent, it is even more difficult to 
say whether poor state regulation (or state service delivery) is still superior to competition 
in an imperfectly functioning market.
Because of the limits of hierarchic regulation, the government's role as enabler for 
non-state provision is increasingly propagated in both developed and developing 
countries.57 Incentive-based instruments are oriented at promoting non-state health care 
providers and at fostering market conditions, particularly in cases where it is difficult to 
monitor their behaviour (Bennett 1997a). Although having a more positive connotation 
than regulation, enabling is directed at the same parameters, namely, influencing prices 
and the quality and quantity of health care. Enabling aims to increase the number of 
private providers, particularly in rural areas for a geographically more equitable 
provision, to improve their quality of care, or to encourage them to perform certain 
activities, such as PPHC or disease notification (Bennett et al. 1995: 33).
The respective instruments comprise tax breaks and exemptions, financial incentives 
for public health activities or other specific behaviour, as well as incentives such as 
training, technical support and provision of free supplies (Bennett et al. 1994: 7-8, 
Bennett/Ngalande-Banda 1994: 36). Enabling is closely related to and precipitates 
interaction and co-operation (see Section 2.3.2). It has been argued that non-state 
providers should be promoted when they have a long-term comparative advantage in 
provision and in financing, for example, by meeting a need which is otherwise not 
catered for, making a positive contribution to the health system or improving coverage 
(Gilson et al. 1994: 21).
That said, enabling may suffer from the same shortcomings as hierarchical
57 Cf. for example Osbome/Plastrik 1997, World Bank 1997b, Robinson et al. 2000, Batley 1994b, 1999b; 
for the health sector, cf. Bennett et al. 1994, 1997b, World Bank 1993, Preker/Harding 2001.
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regulation, since the logic of guidance, control and feedback is elusively structured. 
There may be the same informational asymmetry resulting in the provision of the 
"wrong" incentives. A fundamental precondition for the success of a regulatory and 
incentive-based approach is therefore an open and trusting relationship between the 
different parties (Bennett et al. 1994: 10, cf. Mackintosh 1997 in Kumaranayake 1998: 9), 
not only for implementation and monitoring, but also for the formulation of such 
incentives. Hence, enabling is less of a one-sided unilateral process and can be 
implemented on the basis of contractual obligations (Kumaranayake 1998:33).
The interaction with non-state providers raises new questions of accountability and 
probity (Batley1994b: 13). In order to effectively perform its new roles of regulation and 
enabling, a government needs the technical capacity of a bureaucracy, but transparency 
and other external factors are equally necessary, such as a critical civil society and media 
to control self-granting and corrupt practices (Bennett et al. 1995: 31, 37). The 
simultaneous practice of hierarchical control/regulation and enabling poses conflictive 
tensions within the public sector and are difficult to manage (cf. Batley 1994b). So far, 
such incentive instruments have a short history, and evidence is limited (Bennett 1997b). 
The ultimate question is whether LDCs fulfil these preconditions and requirements for 
regulation and enabling to be effective. Given these shortcomings, Mackintosh (1999) 
argues that in practice regulation is a mix of formal regulatory rules and informal patterns 
of behaviour and that effective formal regulation therefore needs to be grounded in the 
local culture and legitimate with those who have to conform.
2.3.1.3. Network Co-ordination
In response to failures of competition and regulation, alternative institutional mechanisms 
such as co-ordination and mutual adjustment of two or more parties received increased 
attention in the 1990s, in both developed and developing countries (Kooiman 1993, 
Messner 1995, Kickert et al. 1997, Robinson et al. 2000, Hewitt 2000; for health care, 
Tizio 2000, Mackintosh 199958). Like regulation, network co-ordination aims to achieve 
integration and to address efficiency (the use of resources is optimised through mutual 
adjustment as to space, time and content, as well as through resource pooling), prices
58 Note however that the latter two scholars do not explicitly refer to the term "network co-ordination".
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(access), quantities (and location) and quality.
Network co-ordination can be generally understood as a manifestation of "rules of 
the game negotiated and agreed by" interdependent actors within more or less stable 
patterns of social relations (Rhodes 1997: 7, cf. Klijn 1997: 14). Its instruments are 
mutual adjustment, interest mediation, negotiation, bargaining and persuasion to shape 
the arrangement of service delivery (Robinson et al. 2000, Hewitt 2000).59 It can be 
viewed as an "interaction process in which actors exchange information about problems, 
preferences and means, and [then] trade off goals and resources" (Kickert et aL 1997: 9). 
The element of guidance within this governance mechanism is therefore much more open 
in nature. The elements of control and feedback are rather elusive if and when no clear a- 
priori agreements have been established within an arrangement of network co-ordination.
Network co-ordination seems to be more adequate in dealing with the growing 
diversity, dynamic and complexity of the problems with which a society must cope, 
which is for example clearly illustrated in Tendler's case study of Brazil (1997). This is 
because network co-ordination spreads accountability and responsibility around public 
and private actors (Kickert et al. 1997 Kooiman 1993, Evans 1997). Further, as 
development and poverty eradication are multi-dimensional problems with intertwined 
causes, one single organisation will not be able to deal with the complex challenges of 
poverty eradication and health improvement. Problem solving may be more effective 
through integrative approaches based on co-ordination and co-operation (cf. Zeitz 1980) 
in order to ultimately optimise the use of scarce resources and to respond effectively to 
people's needs. Finally, network co-ordination implies transaction costs (just like 
regulatory and enabling schemes), but these should be offset by the benefits gained 
through better services and optimised resource use.
The rationale for co-ordination is not necessarily based on solidarity; it may be 
induced by sheer necessity and recognition that other forms of governance are less 
adequate in a given situation. Yet effective network coordination relies upon a number of 
conditions. It depends on the capacity and willingness of organisations to coordinate and 
collaborate, as well as reciprocity to come to an agreement (cf. Benz 1994). Furthermore,
59 Cf. Francis et al. 1991, Benz 1994, Scharpf 1993, Hanf/Scharpf 1978, Jansen/Schubert 1995, Majone 
1985, Kaufinann et al. 1985.
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it is contingent upon mutual trust to co-operate in the pursuit of national policies; in other 
words, it requires high levels of social capital, whereas strong power differences are a 
severe obstacle to network co-ordination. For network co-ordination to take place at the 
local level, some degree of decentralisation is necessary to provide the actors with room 
to manoeuvre. Whether these conditions are met in an LDC context is therefore a critical 
question.
2.3.1.4. The Institutional and Context Contingencies o f the Governance Mechanisms’ 
Appropriateness
The ideal-type governance mechanisms described above have various derivatives in 
reality. For example, within the New Public Management rationale, the state applies 
market derivatives, such as competitive tendering and contracting, which constitute a 
mixture of a regulatory approach and competition (Batley 199921, Russell et al. 1999, 
Broomberg 1994, Mills 1997a for the health care sector; cf. Lingnau 1996 for the public 
sector in Uganda).60 Further, regulation and network co-ordination can also be exercised 
by non-state actors; one of the possible forms is "state-sponsored self-regulation" 
(Kenis/Schneider 1991: 35; cf. Bennett et al. 1995).
The governance mechanisms complement each other; for example, regulation can 
only take place in relation to non-state providers.61 Each governance mechanism is 
appropriate under particular circumstances, and each calls for a specific role of the public 
sector and specific responsibilities (Batley 1994b: 9).62 Like the ideal-type sector model, 
the conceptualisation of governance mechanisms illuminates their operation, assumptions 
and their strengths and weaknesses. But even though it is obvious that market failures and 
imperfections call for regulation, this conceptualisation does not provide a-priori 
guidelines or prescriptions as to which mechanism is most suitable for a given situation. 
In the abstract, it is not known whether regulatory failure is the least bad option in
60 Depending on the type of contract, contracting can be classified as competition, enabling, network 
coordination, or collaboration. For the different forms of contracts, cf. McPake/Ngalande-Banda 1994, 
Mills 1997a, Perrot/Adams 2000.
61 In this study, state regulations of quality of care in public sector facilities is subsumed under the state's 
(internal) compliance mechanism of hierarchy.
62 Cf. Robinson/White 1997, Batley 1994b and Kumaranayake 1998 for an overview of existing and 
potential arrangements.
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comparison to market failure or whether network co-ordination is more adequate than 
hierarchical regulation.
More so, the transaction costs of the governance mechanisms are difficult to grasp. 
The actual functioning of governance mechanisms depends on institutional aspects 
relating to guidance, control and feedback, as well as to autonomy, accountability and 
transparency (cf. Bennett et al. 1995: 39). Which governance mechanism is most 
adequate is thus an empirical and context-specific question. Again, the question becomes 
even trickier if the assumptions of the functioning of these governance mechanisms are 
not fully present. It is therefore crucial to understand the contextual factors and informal 
institutions that affect these mechanisms. This point is also made by 
Mackintosh/Tibandebage who emphasise the enormous importance of a "contextual 
understanding of the informal regulatory relationships" that shape a pluralistic health care 
system in a given place and moment (2000: 3). Another major concern is the 
organisational capacity of governments to administer the new roles assigned to them, as 
well as the capacity of other organisations that participate in network co-ordination.
2.3.2. Interactions and Synergies
Interorganisational relationships involve different kinds of interactions, ranging from 
conflict and restriction, to (inter-) dependencies, co-operation and partnerships. Conflicts 
refer to disagreements and disputes over setting priorities, goals and interests 
(Rogers/Whetten 1982, Van de Ven/Ferry 1980). Co-operation can be understood as 
constructively working together in the pursuit of individual and collective benefit, and the 
term partnership is increasingly used for such arrangements. Co-operation can take on 
various forms, such as joint ventures, co-production, co-funding and joint decision­
making. These arrangements are an adaptation for generating better performance by 
combining the sectors' strengths in order to overcome one sector's weaknesses of 
provision. The benefits of co-operation are synergies and efficiency gains, which derive 
from the exploitation of complementarities and relative strengths among organisations 
thereby saving resources, from mobilising and pooling of extra resources, from improved 
program design and from increased accountability by partners with mutual control (cf. 
Evans 1997a, Tendler 1997, Paul 1992, Salamon 1995, Esman/UphofF 1984,
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Robinson/White 1997). Ostrom (1996) concludes that co-production of public goods is a 
means to achieve higher levels of welfare. Yet, like network co-ordination, co-operative 
interaction requires the willingness and capacity of the actors.
Further, interactions are intertwined with (inter-)dependency and affected by power 
structures. Power is based on an organisation's possession of resources (Pfeffer/Salancik 
1978), which translates into the ability to make another organisation do what it wants or 
to influence and determine collective decisions according to an organisation's own 
interests (Jansen/Schubert 1995: 13). Large inequalities in power distribution are 
problematic, in that they can cause open and latent conflict between organisations and 
hence fully undermine the potential synergies of co-operation.
Interorganisational interactions may also suffer from many other problems, such as 
the breaking of agreements, state instrumentalisation, corruption, cronyism, politicisation 
and clientelisation. Not only do they reduce efficiency gains through foregone successful 
co-operation, but they also distort accountability, ownership and participation. In many 
instances, NGOs prefer to avoid contact or co-operation with the state in order not lose 
control over their goals and approach, which may be quite different from that of the state 
(cf. Bratton 1989, Fowler 1991a, Sandberg 1994, Simon et al. 1993, Robinson/White 
1997). Hence, the realisation of synergies and the use of complementarities cannot be 
taken for granted, and the interaction between public and voluntary sector organisations 
may not necessarily deliver a beneficial impact. Like governance mechanisms, this is 
contingent upon the context.
2.4. Determining Relative Strengths and Performance Criteria
The term "relative strengths" -  or "comparative advantages" -  is widely used in the 
literature , but there is no clear or uniform definition or understanding of it. While it may
63 Cf. Green 1987, Gilson et al. 1994, World Bank 1997b, Simon 1993, 1994b, Bebbington/Farrington 
1993; Fowler 1990, 1991b; Carroll 1992; Heidjen 1986; Sandberg 1994; Steinich 1997, Paul 1988; Ridell 
1994 (using the term "comparative advantage(s)"); Triche 1990 in Wema 1993 ("relative strengths"); 
Hirschman 1970 ("comparative efficiency"); Ostrom et al. 1993 ("comparative strengths"). Here, the term 
"relative strengths" is preferred in order not to confuse it with Ricardo's "comparative advantages" of two 
countries exchanging products.
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be very straightforward to clearly state what relative strengths mean in relation to health 
care provision, that is efficiency, access and quality of care (see Section 2.2), it is 
important and insightful to illuminate this definition process from a methodological point 
of view.
2.4.1. A Notion of Relative Strengths
Complex methodological problems make the evaluation of organisational performance 
very difficult (Brett 1993: 273; cf. Green 1987). So, the question of how to determine the 
"optimal" division of labour based on each organisation's relative strength is also a little 
answered one. The literature that explicitly deals with relative strengths, 
institutional/organisational choice and the search for the optimal division of labour on a 
theoretical basis are institutional analysis and institutional choice approaches, concepts of 
state modernisation and NGO sector discussions.64 These diverse approaches are at least 
implicitly (if not explicitly) based on a notion of relative strengths in search for the 
"right" organisation to provide adequate services, but their methodology, depth and 
rationales for this search differ.
They also vary in the criteria chosen as well as in the respective operationalised 
indicators, in accordance with which the superiority of one organisation over another is to 
be assessed. The fact that they vary in the definition of what it is "better" means that no 
such "better" exists in general, and that there may be different interests involved in the 
definition of relative strengths. Trade-offs will have to be made between criteria, so the 
choice (and weighing) of criteria will determine the final attribution of relative strengths. 
Hence, there is a fundamental difficulty in comparing organisations, as Brett points out, 
because "performance criteria are not absolute but relative to social expectations, the
64 The approaches under review are the work by Ostrom et al. 1993, Wunsch 1994, Schuppert 1994a, 
1994b, Muller 1993 for institutional analysis/choice; Naschold 1998, Prittwitz 1998 for the concepts of 
state modernisation; Cemea 1988, Fowler 1990, Bebbington/Farrington 1993, Riddell 1990, 
Riddell/Robinson 1993, Salamon 1995 for the NGO sector discussion. The extensive literature on 
organisational theory is not included, as it is concerned with organisational-technical and management 
principles, but not with comparing different provider types per se.
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availability of resources, the task at hand and the organisational alternatives available to 
achieve given ends" (1993: 281). Ultimately, a (normative) choice has to be taken to 
select the "relevant" criteria.
2.4.2. Criteria Selection Process
It is crucial that performance criteria and indicators reflect the needs and preferences of 
the users and beneficiaries of services in order to come up with adequate policy 
recommendations. It is also the users and beneficiaries that must make the final decision 
regarding trade-offs between criteria (cf. Ostrom et al. 1993: 117). Equally insightful are 
the providers' perceptions and views that help understand the feasibility of achieving the 
performance indicators.
External actors can contribute to this definition process by drawing on a wider 
sphere of experience in order to suggest pathways (Farrington/Bebbington 1993: 89, 115; 
cf. Carroll 1992: 37). The advantage of an outsider's view lies in his or her ability to 
judge the potentials and limits, given the knowledge about what else has been attempted 
and achieved elsewhere. Such comparative knowledge will be particularly important 
where different local groups have contradictory objectives or when they do not know 
what might be possible. Also, unlike the people concerned, the (external) social scientist 
is not caught up in the social processes he or she studies, and thus he or she "should 
therefore be able to see their situation more objectively than they" (Brett 1973: 9). 
Furthermore, any analysis is based on normative assumptions, which determine the 
choice of unit of analysis, the selection of evidence and the criteria against which the 
object of analysis is assessed (ibid.: 6). What is hence important is to expound those 
assumptions and values openly. The observer's side is not an imposed view or theoretical 
extract but eventually the balanced and reconciled conclusion of empirical analysis that 
favours the poor and vulnerable.
Therefore, the selection of the criteria to be applied in the case study will be based, 
on the one hand, on people's views and needs. For that matter, people were directly asked 
about their views and preferences. The providers' perception on what they think 
constitute relative strengths were equally assessed. The view of NGOs in particular not 
only lessens the possible problems of people's short time-horizons, information deficits
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and non-consideration of externalities but also help to represent the views of the 
marginalised and the poor given the voluntary sector's assumed advocacy for the poor. 
On the other hand, the criteria selection takes into account the observer's view, i.e., the 
researcher's perspective, which is informed by the health care literature and Uganda's 
health care policies as a reflection of the current systems needs (see Chapters 3.4 and 
3.6).
2.4.3. Performance Criteria
There are a multitude of factors that influence a person's health, as mentioned in Section
2.1. Since it is not a single disease incident that determines health status, but many factors 
in conjunction, and since people use several providers even for one disease incident (see 
Chapter 4.5), the impact of a single health care provider cannot be measured.65 Thus, 
given the focus on service delivery and provision and health care providers, the 
performance criteria must refer to intermediate measures of health, namely to the health 
care providers' output. It is thereby assumed that health care outputs have an impact and 
translate into improved health.66 Asking people about their preferences as regards health 
care was therefore directed towards the level of health care outputs.67
People's views, their utilisation behaviour and the reasons behind it, as well as the 
private sector and NGOs' perceptions, will be discussed in Chapter 4. Anticipating these 
results, the following three performance criteria have constantly recurred in the observer's 
model and the actors' views; they shall therefore guide the comparative performance 
analysis of service providers.
• Efficiency
• Access
• Quality of services
65 Further, the curing of a disease is not only contingent upon the practitioner’s, but also upon the patient's 
efforts and skills (Leonard/Leonard 1999: 6).
66 There is a complicated chain that leads from health care services to health care outputs and to health 
outcomes.
67 Cf. Haddad et al.'s study (1998) of community perceptions on primary health care quality, in which 
people chose criteria primarily at the output level.
68 These are the internationally promoted health goals (Berman 1995 in Bossert 1998). It is not surprising 
that the criteria used in the literature are congruent and complementary with people's views, in that the 
former uses criteria from the real world (cf. Haddad et al. 1998: 391).
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While the people's preferences put emphasis on quality and access concerns, it is equally 
necessary to apply a macro and long term view that includes efficiency (allocative, 
technical efficiency and cost-effectiveness) as well as sustainability.69 An organisation 
has relative strengths if it performs better (than another organisation) in these criteria.
Technical efficiency relates to "the capacity of the individual, organisational unit, 
facility, operation or activity to produce measurable results in proportion to the resources
70extended" (Carley 1980: 64), whereby minimal input for maximal output is sought. In 
this study, the efficiency analysis is confined to an efficiency analysis of staff resource 
utilisation. Access implies that everybody is able to receive a decent package of health 
care services independent of his or her income and ability to pay. Quality o f care is 
understood as the health care production process that protects the patient's dignity and 
that comprises an appropriate consultation and examination, correct treatment (drugs) and 
friendly staff behaviour and commitment.
In practice, there are often trade-offs in the realisation of these criteria (Green 1990, 
Gilson et al. 1997, WHO 2000). This is because the aspects are interrelated by the 
financing mechanism, which affects access and equity, and quality of care (as well as 
sustainability). Access determines service utilisation, and hence cost-effectiveness and 
technical efficiency. The latter is again related to quality of care. On the other hand, 
ceteris paribus (low) quality of care equally determines service utilisation and again 
efficiency (see Chapter 6). The comparative performance analysis in Chapter 5 on access, 
6.1 on the efficiency of staff resource utilisation, and 6.2 on quality of care will further 
elaborate on the understanding and operationalisation of these performance criteria.
69 Given the huge donor support to the Ugandan government (see Chapter 3), full local self-reliance is still 
unrealistic, which is why sustainability is not included as a performance criterion. Sustainability can be 
defined as the ability of a system to function effectively without external support or with a minimum of 
external inputs and without endangering the future functioning of that system (cf. Flessa 1998: 3, Lafond 
1995: 63).
70 Having decided beforehand that the aim is to compare curative health care providers, the focus is not on 
allocative efficiency at this point. However, without technical efficiency, there is no allocative efficiency.
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Chapter 3
Historical Legacies and the Nature and Structure of 
Health Care Delivery in Uganda
This chapter provides the background and context for the comparative performance 
analysis and the study of interorganisational relationships. Section 3.1 depicts a 
historical-institutional account of the local government development and its decline 
from colonial times up to 1986, which is followed by an analysis of post­
independence organisational change in the health care sector up to 1986 (Section 3.2). 
This serves to illuminate the historical politico-administrative and structural legacies 
prevailing in today's decentralised framework and health care system. Section 3.3 
discusses the health care policy developments from 1986 to the late 1990s and the role 
of donors in health care funding and agenda setting. After 1986, Uganda's 
administrative system was again decentralised, the formal-legal structure of which and 
the actual implementation will be outlined in Section 3.4. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 are 
crucial for understanding the current administrative context of health care provision as 
well as the enormous constraints impinging upon Uganda's health care system. It is 
against this background that the nature and structure of the current health care delivery 
in Uganda can be discussed in order to outline the research problem (Section 3.5).
3.1. Local Government during Pre-Independence and Re-centralisation in the 
1970s
Colonial rule began in 1884. The colonial state established a centralised 
administrative system with standard bureaucratic practice for the central state 
apparatus. At the local level, the system of "indirect rule" was introduced, whereby 
traditional chiefs were used at lower levels, who -  in a hierarchical stretch -  were then 
responsible to the county chief, the district commissioner, and finally to the governor 
(Brett 1992, Mamdani 1996). The chiefs were in charge of collecting taxes, 
maintaining law and order and supervising the administration of services, such as 
primary schools, dispensaries, primary health care, local roads and water. There is no 
scope to outline in detail the incremental establishment of local
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administration/government structures from 1919 up to independence and its later 
destruction during the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Richards 1982, Sathyamurthy 1986, 
Golooba-Mutebi 1999). The crucial points, however, will be noted:
There was rapid change, which meant that by the 1950s the administrative system 
was (formally) a copy of the Western orthodox bureaucratic model (Brett 1992: 13). 
The European-introduced conception of civil service bureaucracy along Weberian 
lines, though, was structurally incompatible with the traditional Ugandan institutions 
of state and lineage, creating tensions and an accountability dilemma between the 
universalistic norms of the former and the particularistic relationships of the latter 
(Fallers 1965: 238, Burke 1964: 36, 230).71 This became manifest in interpersonal and 
inter-group conflicts, when a chief had to satisfy "traditional" loyalties, such as claims 
from kinsmen and clients, while this would be against the impartiality norm of the 
administration. The participation of a chief in both systems was thus ambivalent and 
the reaction was possibly agitation against the local government or withdrawal from it 
(Fallers 1965: 240). By the 1950s, civil servants had masters at the local and central 
level, which further complicated their position. Systemic problems included the 
omission of favoured people on the tax register, personal interests interfering with the 
administrative day-to-day routine and the misappropriation of funds by chiefs. 
Likewise, it was found that
The men in charge of the medical dispensaries have been known to demand [...] 
pocket money before they will treat the sick. If the chief is receiving his cut, it is 
extremely difficult to render anyone accountable (Fallers 1965: 116).
It was also reported that almost no council meeting went without the attempts on the 
part of the councillors to increase their allowances (ibid.).
Decentralisation proceeded, and with independence, Uganda inherited local 
governments in formal-legal terms. Local governments underwent serious capacity 
building between 1962 and 1966 to strengthen local ownership and accountability 
(Kaswarar 1989 in Kwagala 1997). However, significant distortions and problems 
prevailed and service provision was ineffective and inefficient. At the same time, 
further legislation reshaped again intergovernmental relationships in favour of central
71 It is important to emphasise that both European and African "traditions" and customs were frequently 
themselves colonial inventions and in parts excessively conceptualised as dichotomisations in the 
process of establishing and legitimising colonial rule (Ranger 1983).
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government. The 1967 Constitution then sharply reversed these achievements and 
precipitated a process of recentralisation. Simultaneously, President Obote began to 
erode democracy in the 1960s, which was then fully eliminated when Amin’s military 
regime took over in 1971. During the 1970s in particular, service quality and 
efficiency severely degenerated, and accountability and popular participation in 
development activities rapidly decreased.72 This re- and overcentralisation process in 
the late 1960s and particularly 1970s was aggravated by the politicisation of local 
governments, which allowed and legitimised the tyrannical behaviour of local chiefs 
towards the citizens. There was thus a continuation of the "decentralised despotism" 
that had emerged by the end of the colonial rule (Mamdani 1996). In sum, although 
Uganda had experienced a phase of local government in the pre-Independence times 
up to the late 1960s, accountability or an appreciation for accountability had never 
really been institutionalised. As we will see in Chapter 7, this is still one of today's 
crucial deficits.
3.2. Post-Independence Organisational Change up to 1986: Service Provision
Breakdown and Rehabilitation
Biomedical health care was brought to Uganda in 1878 by the Imperial British East 
Africa Company, which sent doctors to look after its staff. In 1894, the Colonial 
Office took over administration and set up a medical department in the Ugandan 
Protectorate to cater for the colonial staffs health care needs. Given numerous 
epidemics, it was soon realised that this "cordon sanitaire" could not be upheld and 
health care services were extended to Africans (Okuonzi/Macrae 1995: 125). Local 
chiefs were put in charge of supervising the administration of social services like 
primary health care (Brett 1992: 12). At the same time, the missions offered health 
care services as part of their evangelisation strategy. Together with other non­
governmental organisations, they made up a large share of health care facilities.
After independence in 1962, the state claimed responsibility for the provision of 
services, with health care (expansion) having high priority in order to strengthen the
72 This was also due to unfavourable economic policies.
73 For the introduction and social construction of biomedicine in Africa, cf. Vaughin (1991).
70
state’s legitimacy as a newly emerging nation-state and as a democracy that takes care 
of its people. Donor funding was very low during those years. Health was not 
specifically supported, but assistance to multisectoral programmes, which included 
health care, accounted for about 75 percent of all aid agreements (Kasekende/Atingo- 
Ego 1999: 624, 628). The central government was in charge of hospital services, and 
local governments offered primary health care, all of which were offered free of 
charge and financed through the tax system. Almost 10 percent of all development 
expenditure was spent on health services, since the government aimed at increasing 
agricultural production through a better health status. After 1947, the district 
administrations' percentage of expenditures allocated to health rose from about 3.5 to 
almost 20 percent in 1970, while the central government "consistently allocated a 
minimum of 6.5 percent of the total recurrent and capital budget to health services" 
(Scheyer/Dunlop 1985: 27). The churches and other NGOs, which charged a small fee 
for their services, kept an important role in the health sector throughout (Nabuguzi 
1995: 196). In addition, there were some 50 registered private practitioners operating 
in the larger cities and towns offering various curative services to those willing and 
able to pay (Scheyer/Dunlop 1985: 28, Iliffe 1998).74
Up to the early 1970s, Uganda had one of the best developed health services in 
Africa. In 1970, an estimated 60 percent of the population did not have to travel more 
than ten kilometres to their nearest health post (Wiebe/Dodge 1987). An increasing 
number of people used these facilities. People had gained a relatively high health 
status, which was reached through the "cumulative and synergistic interaction" with 
the national economic development strategy (Scheyer/Dunlop 1985: 25).75 However, 
this health care system was characterised by a curative and urban bias, with 
insufficient attention to preventive and promotive aspects of health (Macrae et al. 
1996: 1097, cf. King 1966). It was also based on the critical assumption of continuing 
and massive economic growth (Scheyer/Dunlop 1985).
The overthrow by Amin in 1971 was the starting point for a continuous decline, 
both economically and politically. The policies introduced in the 1970s led to
74 Little information is available on informal private practice, but it must have been much lower in 
comparison to what was observed during the 1970s (Iliffe 1998).
75 For health status data, cf. Scheyer/Dunlop (1985).
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economic regression, fiscal crises and hyperinflation, consequently also causing 
disruptions in the health care sector. These included fiscal and logistical difficulties, 
staff shortages due to the expulsion of the Asians, a brain drain and attrition due to 
low or non-existent salaries (Dodge/Wiebe 1985, Wiebe/Dodge 1987). In 1973, about 
half of the some thousand physicians left the country, creating serious problems in the 
health care delivery system (Scheyer/Dunlop 1985: 32). Likewise, as Asians had 
overwhelmingly owned the pharmaceutical industry, only half a dozen registered 
pharmacists remained (Williams 1985: 61). Ministry of Health (MoH) plans could not 
be implemented, and government services deteriorated rapidly. By 1975, few drugs 
and other medical supplies could be imported, and thus the government health 
services were increasingly unable to deliver services and to respond to health 
problems. The decline of both the civil service in general and social services in 
particular led to an upsurge of informal private activities, known as magendo. 
Magendo became a normal part of life and constituted an important source for income 
or indeed the most important one, once people were unable to make a living on 
regular wages (Scheyer/Dunlop 1985: 29). For the health sector this meant that it 
became increasingly difficult to get free access to treatment and drugs:
A sick person or his relative has to grease so many hands to get to the point of 
treatment, and pay even more bribes after diagnosis in order to get supposedly free 
drugs (Kironde 1985: 65).
Also, village health workers of primary health care have been reported to pick up their 
salaries and sell the issued drugs on a private basis, while otherwise not having been 
seen and known in the village as health workers (Stockely 1985: 221).
As real salaries declined and as government doctors did not receive the respective 
appreciation expected towards their profession, many opened private clinics to work 
in parallel (Iliffe 1998: 148). Using one's government position for additional income 
was very widespread, but, because of the patients' urgent needs, it became most 
obvious in the health sector. On the other hand, many health professionals continued 
to work with little or no pay, so that medical staff was no more corrupted than other 
government workers (ibid.: 156). Likewise, laboratories, pharmacies and drugshops
76 Magendo denotes the parallel, informal economy and blackmarketeering (Bergschlosser/Sieger 
1990).
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began to mushroom all over the country, selling and issuing certain drugs for which 
they had no licence. The administration was incapable of enforcing statutory controls 
and registration (Roll 1987, Adome et al. 1996), or, as Iliffe claims, the MoH seemed 
to have been completely ignorant of them (1998: 153). This "privatisation” was 
equally fostered by changes on the demand side. Because of the bribes in the 
government sector, most people in despair went to private practitioners or unlicensed 
pharmacies to save time and money (Kironde 1985: 65).
There was also a general expansion of biomedicines in the 1970s (Whyte 1991). 
This can be explained by people’s strongly felt need for curative medicine, whether in 
the informal or formal sector, because of the high morbidity prevailing. As a result of 
ubiquitous drug availability, profitability and affordability from the 1970s onwards, 
the utilisation and acceptability of biomedical/pharmaco-chemical medicine for 
treatment increased. In these years, de-institutionalised and above all unregulated 
biomedicines became widely accessible through specialised laypersons. Awareness 
and expectations of biomedical means grew, but so did suspicion and mistrust (Whyte 
1992, 1997).
Simultaneous with this "privatisation" trend, and because of the state's inability to 
provide essential services, the church health facilities gained even more relevance 
whilst being able to keep autonomy from the predatory state. In contrast, the Ugandan 
and international NGOs were exposed to strong state hostility, so that they 
disengaged. By 1978 -  the beginning of the civil war -  health services had totally 
broken down. The political situation had also affected mission hospitals and lower- 
level health units, many of which closed down. After liberation from Amin in 1979, 
the situation was, however, reported to have deteriorated even further given the 
political vacuum and the direct impacts of the war on the health status 
(Scheyer/Dunlop 1985). It seemed that
Uganda's health care system had been reduced to a state where care delivered may 
have been worse than no care at all (USAID 1980, in Birungi 1994b: 61).
Overall, people had lost trust into government services and had increasingly resorted 
again to traditional medicine (Kironde 1985: 67; Enns 1985: 53).
During the 1970s, there were no longer any clear health policies, nor was there a 
health debate or a discussion of primary health care (PHC) after the Alma Ata
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conference in 1978 had taken place. Nor was there an integrated legal framework for 
government action. Rather, a confusing plurality of single declarations prevailed 
(Macrae et al. 1996: 1097). There were a small number of community-based health 
care organisations and activities dealing with health education and immunisation, 
which appeared to be loosely scattered around the country at the local level.77 They 
were funded by international donors and the churches, some of them being successful, 
others not (Brett 1992: 70). But the medical-curative bias continued to prevail, more 
so since it was difficult to put PHC issues on the agenda (LaFond 1995: 65).
After the overthrow of Amin, the new government's immediate response was to 
seek donor relief assistance, and the aid agencies stood in the forefront of health care 
provision. A few years later, the government's efforts concentrated on rehabilitation 
and recovery to the pre-1970 levels of delivery.78 On the basis of the existent local 
PHC organisations, vertical selective primary health care programmes were added, 
such as the Ugandan National Extended Programme on Immunisation (UNEPI) 
funded by UNICEF, and the Ugandan Essential Drug Management Programme 
(UEDMP). This strategy of rehabilitation was considered to be distinct from the long­
term goals of health system development and should rather constitute an interim phase 
on the basis of which more comprehensive and integrated health care could follow
70(Macrae et al. 1996: 1098). Policy choices reflected opportunistic motivation to 
attain political stability and support, and memories of the past were strong factors in 
shaping these policies. The intended return to previous expenditure levels for health 
care was not economically feasible given the population increase and the changed 
epidemiology (Scheyer/Dunlop 1985: 41), since Uganda was trying to run a health 
care system of the size of the one in the 1960/70s with only 10 percent of previous 
expenditure levels (LaFond 1995: 64). Despite or rather because of these government 
efforts, government employees in the mid 1980s still did not earn a living wage and
77 An idea of the extent of this can be inferred from the number of 30 founding members of the Uganda 
Community Based Health Care Association (UCBHCA) in 1986 (interview, UCBHCA staff 1999).
78 The aid agreement's share for health was 7.5 percent during 1979-85 (excluding the multisectoral 
assistance) (Kasekende/Atingi-Ego 1999: 629). For a detailed account of the capital expenditure, cf. 
Macrae et al. 1996.
79 A first step in this direction was the establishment of the UCBHCA in 1986, which was mainly 
funded by UNICEF.
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thus had to continue to have a second or third job. The result was a process of 
institutional collapse, in that the trend of rapid and uncontrolled "privatisation" and 
"informalisation" during the conflict period continued into the post-conflict period 
(Batley 1994a; Macrae et al. 1996). Home treatment, private practice by governmental 
health workers and the charging of informal fees in governmental health units became 
widespread. Whereas doctors generally practised in towns, the less qualified 
practitioners usually operated in the countryside (Iliffe 1998: 162). In fact, this waxing 
informal market was and is not a phenomenon unique to Uganda, but a general feature 
of health care services in Africa (Batley 1996, D. Leonard 2000).
These institutional-organisational adjustments went hand-in-hand with social 
adjustments, as the behaviour of government health workers and social relations at 
work had changed concurrently. Not only had the boundary between the public and 
the private sector become blurred, but also the distinction between moral and amoral 
categories (Whyte 1991, Munene 1995). Obbo (1991) notes that one of the most 
significant changes at the micro level was that professionals ignored standard ethics in 
order to survive. As a consequence, institutionalised biomedicine has been 
"indigenised", in that
The transaction of medicines has been adjusted to the more general pattern of 
social relations in the community. [...] People attempt to personalise the 
professional therapeutic relationship so that they are treated not just as patients, 
but as friends (Whyte 1992: 172).
Treated this way and preferably at the health worker's home, people hoped to be more 
likely to get good treatment.
A further structural change during those years grew out of the strong rise of 
voluntary sector organisations, which began to run their own health care services, 
especially from 1980 onwards, on a fee-for-service basis. By the mid-1980s, a large 
proportion of health services were provided by the voluntary sector, although their 
operations were still hindered by the state (Nabuguzi 1995). The expansion of the 
voluntary sector was also enhanced by the increasing trend of donors to fund and 
promote NGOs, as the government's legitimacy and capacity had become more and 
more questioned (Bennett 1994: 30). However, in the absence of clear government 
policies and given the strong dominance of donors, who were not co-ordinated by the
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government, this meant further fragmentation of the institutionalised health care 
system, which had already been disintegrated by the processes of privatisation and 
informalisation.
In sum, these institutional-organisational changes -  namely the informal 
privatisation and marketisation -  are not at all captured by a neo-liberal approach. In 
the case of Uganda, privatisation meant increased participation of private, non­
government actors, resulting in new roles and relationships between the state and non­
state actors. It was not a deliberate policy choice of pursuing "a wholesale divestiture 
of public assets" (Kumaranayake 1998: 2) that considers market failure as the lesser 
evil in comparison to state failure. Instead, this move from state to non-state provision 
was largely supply-side driven by government health workers, who were frustrated by 
a state that did and could not look after them anymore. Thus, independent of the 
policy regime, it was a spontaneous and decentralised response and reaction to state 
failure, or rather state absence in service delivery, which was itself governed by
finmarket forces. The institutional-organisational changes were also induced by the 
increase of NGO facilities, which can be explained by means of theories of voluntary 
sector evolution in a context of state failure (cf. Weisbrod 1977, Salamon 1995, 
Chazan 1992).
3.3. Health Policies, Policy Making and the Role of Donors after 1986
3.3.1. Reconstruction in the Late 1980s
While the first half of the 1980s was still characterised by chaos and civil war, major 
political, economic and administrative changes were introduced with the take-over by 
the National Resistance Army in 1986 and in the years that followed. In a state of 
"normalisation", there was again more room for a national policy thinking process. A 
number of systemic cross-cutting reform projects were initiated in the late 1980s, such 
as decentralisation (see Section 3.4), democratisation, structural adjustment, 
liberalisation, privatisation and civil service reform (cf. Lingnau 1996, Brett 1996b).
80 Batley (1996: 725) identifies other services that similarly underwent some form of informal or 
unintended privatisation, as the failure of public services often results in the private sector and 
communities stepping in to fill the gaps.
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The last reform initiative has been rather ineffective, thus blocking further 
improvements in public sector provision (Langseth/Mugaju 1996).
The Health Policy Review Commission in 1987 and the resulting White Paper of 
1989 confirmed the previous strategy of rehabilitation parallel to the development of 
further PHC (Okuonzi/Macrae 1995: 126). Macrae et al. (1996) argue that the health 
policies of that time still failed to realise the severity of the country's crisis. No 
changes in structure or funding were undertaken, so that investment still concentrated 
on physical construction and hardware for secondary and tertiary facilities. Without 
downplaying its positive outcomes, which also allowed for national reconciliation, 
this strategy led to many negative outcomes, such as deficits in programme 
implementation due to unaddressed institutional weaknesses in planning and 
management capacity, finance instruments and necessary reforms for adequate staff 
remuneration. Important health needs as well as nutrition, sanitation and water 
concerns were left out.
Another result of these policy choices was the division of labour between 
government and donors, in that the donors' vertical programmes were run parallel to 
the government health system (Okuonzi/Macrae 1995). Until the 1990s, donor support 
did not really focus on the development of a systemic policy or a unified national 
health strategy, but was rather concerned with the design and implementation of 
specific, single projects and programmes to pursue their own interests and agenda 
(Macrae et al. 1996: 1103). In light of the donors' dominance in agenda setting, this 
projectisation approach further reinforced the already existing fragmentation of the 
health system -  given the lack of government co-ordination -  and also led to 
duplication of effort and unfilled system gaps (MoH 1997, LaFond 1995).
3.3.2. Refinement in the 1990s and the Donors' Dominance
Another White Paper in 1993 attempted to mainstream the reform process into the 
national programmes to aim at the consolidation of existing services and reorientation 
of services towards comprehensive PHC. At that point, many more international 
advisers were involved in the process of macro health policy development, which was
o  1
now also shaped by the increasing use of conditionalities for funds. A very large
81 For a detailed analysis of Uganda's aid flows, cf. Kasekende/Atingi-Ego (1999).
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number of donors operate in Uganda, including the major international organisations 
(EC, UNDP, UNICEF, World Bank, WHO), bilateral agencies (CIDA, DANIDA, 
GTZ, KfW, DFID, USAID), and many non-governmental organisations as well as the 
churches with their national systems. In addition, there is a very exhaustive number o f  
programmes and projects with smaller financial volumes concentrating in only one or 
but a few districts.
The donors' dominance is evident in the macro level health care portfolio. In 
1995, 80 percent o f the health care budget was donor funded (Iliffe 1998: 155), the 
amount and sources o f which are shown in Figure 3.1. Apart from the strong 
dependence per se, the resulting division o f labour between donors and government 
funding, as illustrated in Figure 3.2 and 3.3 below, is equally problematic.
Figure 3.1: Donor funds by source for 1991/92 (in US$ million)
□  Multilateral 
■  Bilateral
□  NGO
Source: World Bank (1994)
Figure 3.2: Government and donor contribution to recurrent and development funds
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Source: Data for 1994/95, in MoH (1997: 12, own calculations)82
82 Cf. Smithson (1993) for similar high figures for the previous years.
78
Figure 3.3: Health expenditure channelled to the Primary Health Care level
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Source: MoH 1997, cf. LaFond 1995, Hutchinson 1999
Further, 77 percent o f the recurrent expenditure on PHC was donor-financed, 
whereas the government financed 80 percent of recurrent expenditure on hospitals in 
1994. Despite policy commitments, government spending still concentrates on 
rehabilitating higher-level curative services, while donors implement their PHC 
programmes through health units, through their own project structures or through 
Ugandan NGOs. Smithson argues that government resources are spent on services that 
do not attract donor support, which on the one hand reflects conflicting priorities, but 
on the other hand some rational complementarity. This results in an extremely high 
recurrent cost overhang, in that donor funding amounted to 55 percent of total 
recurrent expenditure in the early 1990s (1993: 10).
The dilemma is that the operation o f health care services, not to say the recurrent 
costs of future investment, cannot be maintained or absorbed by insufficient domestic 
resources (ibid.). At this point, the legacies o f the mid 1980s policy choices for 
rehabilitation and capital investment without sufficiently taking into account the 
future maintenance costs became apparent. Hence, this investment pattern has 
severely impeded sustainability, as the enormous donor dependence at the moment 
will continue for some time to come. LaFond concludes that:
Uganda's health system recovery now rests on a fragile base, dependent on the 
interests o f external funders (LaFond 1995: 69).
83 This includes all curative services below the hospital level.
1994 1995
9  G overnm ent 9  D onors
79
The donors' dominance is also evident in relation to the policy and planning 
process. As the external funding for health was much greater than the government's 
share (ibid.), health officials could not bargain with donors on an equal basis, so that 
donors were decisive in setting the agenda and in determining the framework and 
scope for interaction (LaFond 1995, Cannon 1996). The prevailing long-term 
collection of many diverse donor agendas and investment strategies further nurtures 
the fragmentation of the health system and distorts the planning processes. The fact 
that the donors compete among each other about the priority of approaches and 
determine the plurality or limitedness of approaches raises serious concerns of 
accountability, sovereignty and ownership as well as appropriateness (cf. 
Okuonzi/Macrae 1995, LaFond 1995). In particular, lack of ownership weakens the 
effectiveness of implementation. Even in 1997, the main problem of the planning unit 
within the MoH was its lack of information regarding where and with what budget 
donors operated, and what kind of programmes were being implemented (interview, 
MoH official, 1998).
The annual planning process for the District health care budget makes this 
dependency even more plain. The District draft workplan for health -  listing possible 
District activities -  is presented to the donors who then pick according to their agenda 
(interviews DMO officials, 1997, 1998; MoH official 1998; Weigt/DED District 
Health Planner, 1997). A resulting problem is that donor programmes are difficult to 
integrate with each other and with the district programmes due to the diverse donor 
particularities and conditions (interviews, DMO officials, 1997, 1998). That said, it is 
important not to forget the systemic constraints donors face within their internal 
bureaucracies and in relation to their funding channels.
3.3.3. Increased Stakeholder and Provider Co-ordination in the Late 1990s 
As donors came to realise that there was little impact and sustainability with the 
project approach, there was a gradual shift towards policy formulation based on a 
consultation and consensus process. Both government and donors support the idea of 
a ''Sector Wide Approach" (SWAP) to stop the fragmentation of the health care
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system.84 The SWAP is expected to lead to improved donor coordination and 
equitable financing of the health sector.85 The latest co-ordination approach is the 
participatory development of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). SWAP and 
PRSPs finally mark an important turning point in attempting to streamline the health 
care system.
Further review and policy updates led to the 1997 Ten Year National Health 
Policy, again with strong donor input and guidance, which was translated into the 
National Health Strategic Plan 1997/98-2001/2. Its main concerns are, inter alia, the 
organisation and management of the health system, community empowerment, human 
resource development, health financing, legal aspects of health, and the role of the 
private sector (RoU/MoH 1998a, 1998b). Specifically, strategic focus is put on the 
following:
• According priority to major disease problems through (community) PHC;
• Ensuring a "Minimum Essential Health Care Package" to all, while the poor 
receive sufficient protection when institutional and financial reforms are 
considered;
• Establishing further institutional changes to promote efficiency, effectiveness and 
quality of care;
• Integrating non-governmental and for-profit service providers into the national 
health programme; and
• Strengthening partnership between government and private service providers.
As insufficient collaboration between the public, private, and voluntary sectors 
has contributed to a reduced health outcome than would be expected from available 
resources (MoH 1998b), more focus is being increasingly put on the issues of private 
and voluntary sector integration and partnership. The government's role is 
conceptualised as an enabler with the specific objective of "institut[ing] effective 
means of promoting private sector partnership with full understanding of the nature,
84 The term SWAP refers to a framework within which all resources in the health sector are managed 
and co-ordinated in a coherent way in partnership between the donors and the recipients (Walt et al. 
1999: 273).
85 It is clear that this is a very difficult undertaking in itself given the large number of actors and 
competing goals as well as the high transaction costs and the power struggles involved in such a 
process.
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scope and scale of its contribution to health care in the National Health Care System" 
(RoU/MoH 1998a: 16) and "seek[ing] to ensure that other providers [...] deliver 
services where they are best suited to do so." (MoH 1997: 4). This growing 
consideration of the private and NGO health sector results from a general government 
policy in favour of privatisation but also from donor pressures to foster partnerships 
(Okello et al. 1997: l).87
In order to catch up with the reality of the privatisation and informalisation trend, 
the government approved various legislation to allow for, regulate and formalise 
private clinics. Likewise, the legislation concerning pharmacies and drugshops was 
revised (see Chapter 8). However, the policy notion of partnerships is wide and 
elusive so far (cf. Birungi et al. 1999). The division of labour among the various 
sector is an open question, as it is not clear what areas of health should be financed by 
the state and what could be left to the private sector (PCGM 1998: 3).
3.4. Re-decentralisation after 1986 and Today's Local Government System
3.4.1. The Establishment of the Resistance Council System 
The Distorted Structure...
Continuing the analysis in Section 3.2 of the local government developments, the 
recentralisation process began with the countrywide establishment of the Resistance 
Council (RC) system in 1986. The RC system consisted of a five-tiered hierarchical 
structure, whereby the lowest level of representatives (councillors) was elected by the 
village adult population, while the higher levels, up to the National Resistance 
Council (the parliament), were set up by indirect elections. The system's rationale was 
based on the notion of participatory, grassroots and popular democracy.88 
Nonetheless, an indigenous movement for democracy and democratisation from 
below lacked. In practice, the RC system was a top-down creation and pushed by the 
government in the context of state-led democratisation (Nsibambi 1994, Burkey 
1991).
86 The policy does not make the explicit distinction between private and voluntary sector organisations.
87 For an account on the emergence o f the policy on private sector involvement and partnerships, cf. 
Birungi et al. (1999).
88 Cf. Ddungu (1994) for the RC rationale and structure.
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There was political decentralisation in the form of direct and indirect elections of 
councillors, but this was not accompanied by financial and administrative 
decentralisation. Civil servants and chiefs were employed by the central government 
and hence still accountable to them, while the RCs and their Executive Committees 
equally claimed accountability from them, challenging the chiefs' power, though they 
could not remove them from office. This double accountability structure was 
incompatible with and disruptive to the accountability chain between citizens, 
councillors and civil servants that is required in a devolved system for local 
democracy and bottom-up legitimisation. The central government kept substantial 
powers and the substance of local government was further watered down due to 
insufficient transfers of resources. Thus, the local level had hardly any influence over 
health care services, since salaries and funding as well as directives and decisions 
came from the central government level.
... and More Distortions in the Implementation
The key structural problem of this system was that devolution was only partial, if not 
marginal. The civil servants remained beyond the RCs' control, impeding bottom-up 
administrative accountability (cf. Tidemand 1994: 42). For that reason, there was a
Q Q
great deal of conflict and rivalry between state officials and RCs. Moreover, RCs 
were overburdened with the tasks transferred to them. They lacked remuneration and 
control over state officials, and therefore they soon began to consider their efforts 
futile. As a result, they withdrew their participation and engagement (Burkey 1991: 
33). Given the strong chiefly authority, which became institutionalised in the previous 
decades (Mamdani 1996), "liberation" and empowerment towards the chiefs via the 
structural reforms of the RC system was only limited. Although the chiefs had to give 
away certain powers, the complicated relationship between the two was not 
significantly smoothened. These legacies could not easily be ironed out in the years to 
come. Finally, due to distorted accountability structures and insufficient financial 
powers, service provision could hardly improve.
89 While RCs had to struggle against chiefs, who often did not want to relinquish their powers 
(Nabuguzi 1994: 124), the civil servants complained about the RCs assuming powers beyond what the 
1987 Resistance Council Statute had foreseen. Further, the political culture of the previous decades 
strongly prevailed (Mamdani 1996).
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The RC system provided multiple opportunities for participation, but the over- 
representation of traditional elites and the better-off in higher councils impeded 
political renewal and reproduced the power relations at the local level (Tidemand 
1994). In the earlier years of the RC system, people at the community level felt a 
strong "commitment to national reconstruction" (Brett 1992: 28). Yet, as people saw 
no benefits from their efforts, support and enthusiasm at the village level decreased 
over the years and people withdrew from village meetings (Burkey 1991). 
Participation could hence not gain a positive connotation, and neither was it practised.
This rather critical picture of the RC system should not hide the fact that the 
system did constitute an important element in increasing the democraticness of the 
polity and contributed to the democratisation process. Most importantly, it ended the 
tyranny and arbitrary rule of chiefs.
3.4.2. Further Decentralisation after 1993: The Formal-Legal System 
Recognising the flaws inherent in the RC-system, the NRM took a new initiative and 
passed the 1993 Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute, which further 
devolved financial and administrative powers. The local government system was then 
constitutionalised in the 1995 Constitution. The 1997 Local Government Act (LGA) 
precisised the role of the local government and introduced some few, but crucial 
changes, the most important being the introduction of direct elections.
Transfer o f Competencies and Tasks
As corporate bodies, the Subcounty and District level enjoy the principle of general 
competencies, except for those tasks explicitly spelled out as being under the 
responsibility of the central government. Within this framework and the national 
priority areas, which includes PHC, local government has discretion in planning and 
providing health care as well as in allocating and spending resources. Table 3.1 
illustrates this division of labour. The District Medical Office has the highest 
executive authority over all health care issues within the District and is in charge of 
planning, providing, guaranteeing, supervising and co-ordinating all health care 
services. It is led by the District Director of Health Services (DDHS) (for an 
organisational diagram, see Annex 3, Figure 1).
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Table 3.1: Central and local government tasks
C entral Government Local Government
■ National standards ■ Medical and health services (including
■ Health policy hospitals)90
Control and management of epidemics ■ Preventive and promotive health care
Financial Powers and Transfer o f  Resources
The local government has the power to levy and spend its own revenues along the 
national priority areas and to form its own budgets. Districts receive 35 percent of 
local tax revenues, while Subcounties get 42.25 percent of the revenues collected in 
their areas. The rest is shared between the LC1, LC2 and LC4 level (16.25, 3.25 and 
3.25 percent respectively). Apart from local revenues, Districts receive conditional 
and unconditional grants from the central government as well as donor funds. The 
1997 LGA also provides for equalisation grants, the implementation of which has 
been slowly taken up.
District Personnel System
Decision-making power over personnel issues lies with the District and the District 
Service Commission is in charge of appointing, promoting, disciplining, etc. The staff 
that was previously employed by the central government now belongs to the District 
personnel system. The former central government staffs payroll is decentralised in the 
form of unconditional grants. Subcounties that employ additional staff have to pay 
them out of their available Subcounty budget. As regards the health sector, these are 
usually group employees (support staff) and nursing aids, but also some nurses and 
laboratory attendants.
Local Lesitimisation
The main modification introduced by the 1997 LGA are the universal and direct 
elections of Subcounty and District councillors and the District and Subcounty 
Council chairpersons. The District and Subcounty Council are the representative 
organs of the people with the competencies of planning, decision-making and
90 This excludes hospitals that provide referral and medical training.
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budgeting. The highest political head in the District is the chairperson of the District 
Council, to whom the administration answers. At the District and the Subcounty 
levels, there is an Executive Committee to perform the executive functions of the 
Council. It is headed by the Council chairperson and consists of five secretaries, one 
of whom is in charge of health and children's welfare. The councils can appoint a 
maximum of five committees to support the Council's tasks and functions, one of 
which is again concerned with health. In contrast to the LC3 and LC5 local 
governments, which enjoy body-corporate status, the 1997 LGA changed the role of 
the LC1, LC2 and LC4 into ''administrative units"; they have no more political 
authority on their own, as compared with the 1993 Statute. Figure 3.4 illustrates the 
politico-administrative structure of the 1997 LGA.
Intergovernmental Relations
A significant degree of power is still retained by the central government (Brett 1998b), 
foremost by the Resident District Commissioner (RDC), who is the intergovernmental 
link representing the president and the government at the District level and who is in 
charge of monitoring local government activities. In addition, line ministries "shall 
monitor and co-ordinate Government initiatives and policies as they apply to Local 
Governments, ... [and] assist in the provision of technical assistance to Local 
Governments" (Section 98 (1), LGA 1997). The role of the MoH consists in ensuring 
implementation of national policies and adherence to performance standards on the 
part of local governments. It will inspect, monitor, co-ordinate government health 
initiatives, and where necessary offer technical advice, support supervision and 
training within their respective sectors (MoLG/PS 1997). Yet overall, the legislation 
on intergovernmental relations is not sufficiently specified.
In sum, apart from the intergovernmental relations, in formal-legal terms, the 
local government system has been substantially devolved, in that tasks and 
competencies, resources and legitimisation mechanisms have been transferred to the 
local level.
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Figure 3.4: The LC-system in rural areas
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3.4.3. The Implementation Status in Kamuli District
The following implementation analysis, with particular reference to Kamuli District, 
looks behind the formal-legal fa?ade and reveals numerous shortcomings and gaps.91 
This section focuses on the macro-level, central government- and legislation-induced 
gaps and constraints, thereby setting out the politico-administrative context of service 
provision. District-made and Kamuli-specific problems will then be further discussed 
in the micro-analysis in Chapter 7.
Insufficient Resource Supply Versus Assigned Functions
The major problem of the local government consists in insufficient resources, so that 
assigned functions are not adequately matched financially. While the majority of 
services are provided through local government, this level got only about 30 percent 
of the national 1996/7 and 1997/98 budgets (ULAA 1996,1997). Likewise, 80 percent 
o f the total taxes are spent at the national level (Nsibambi 1997: 60). The reason for 
this imbalance is twofold.
One is the small revenue base at the local level given the peasant economy, which 
generates only small incomes. This problem is aggravated by low, unreliable and 
hardly constant tax collection. For example, the total local tax collection rate came to 
27 percent in 1996/97 (KDA budget, own calculations). Secondly, this inadequate 
local revenue base is not compensated by a sufficient amount of conditional and 
unconditional grants transferred to the District level. Only 25 percent of the total 
central government funds are transferred as unconditional grant, and almost two thirds 
of this transferred amount is spent on salaries and wages.94 Only 17.3 percent of the 
unconditional grants or 4.3 percent of the total budget for Districts is to be allocated to 
all other services such as PHC, agricultural extension, etc. (ULAA 1997). In the early 
1990s, 90 percent of the non-wage recurrent budget at the District level was funded
91 The starting point of this implementation analysis is 1995, when Kamuli District became financially 
decentralised. For studies on a variety o f decentralisation aspects in other districts, and for Uganda in 
general, cf. DANIDA 1997, Makara 1997, MISR 1997, MoLG/DS 1995, 1996, Mukyala 1997, 
Villadsen 1995, Villadsen/Lubanga 1996, Nsibambi 1995, Nsibambi 1997a, 1997b, Tukahebwa 1997, 
Birungi 1996, Mugaju 1999, Azfar et al. 2000.
92 This percentage refers to the recurrent budget only. For the total national budget, the figure only 
amounts to 14 percent (ULAA 1996, 1997).
93 This percentage, however, varies tremendously over years and is particularly low during election 
years. For example, in 1995/96, it stood at 22 percent; in 1998/99, it was 53 percent (KDA budgets, 
own calculations). Other districts vary from 46 to 82 percent (Azfar et al. 2000).
94 Equalisation grants are transferred as conditional grants.
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externally, so that District budgets had the mere function of a pay-roll (LaFond 1995: 
72, Smithson 1993: 11). This has considerably reduced, but the pay-roll still 
dominates the budget. As the central government runs a cash budget, it often cuts the 
monthly automatic release of grants, and this is the usual fate for health (interview, 
MoH official, 1998). Hence, from the District perspective, these grants are unreliable 
and hardly transparent (interviews, KDA officials, 1997, 1998; cf. ULAA 1997).
The problems of this funding portfolio are aggravated by the dominance of 
vertical central government/donor health care programmes that are to be implemented 
by the DMO.95 Not only does this donor dependency make intradepartmental co­
ordination and co-operation (and hence efficient resource use) very difficult; donor 
programmes themselves are not always appropriate as regards the specific District 
needs and often require adaptation (interviews, KDA officials, 1999). Donor 
disbursements are difficult to foresee and the flow of funds is not in accordance with 
District needs (interview, MoH official, 1998, Kamuli District officials and Kamuli 
NGO staff, 1999).96 The development budget has been devolved to some pilot 
Districts (but not to Kamuli), but the centre still handles 70 percent of the 
development budget (Azfar et al. 2000: 60, 63).
In sum, these constraints hardly allow for an adaptation to local necessities and 
priorities or for pursuing locally adequate strategies of social mobilisation or closer 
collaboration with LCs (interview, DMO official, 1997). Resources are wanting for 
District priority programmes, so that "programmes from within the District tend to 
die", which leads to widespread frustration among department heads (interviews, 
department heads, 1997). The District level is thus still too much the implementing 
agency of central government programs and does not have the scope to design its own 
programs. This equally hinders local ownership of the investment and planning 
process.
95 Hiscock et al. (1993) identified 16 separate PHC programmes in Uganda for the early 1990s.
96 Uganda's bank crisis also interrupted the flow of funds in 1999. Further, Districts do not hand in their 
accountability reports for previous tranches in a timely manner, which equally interrupts the steady flow 
of resources.
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Insufficient Personnel Sovereignty
In practice, the Districts' discretion in personnel matters is limited. Important 
personnel decisions (e.g., over department heads) are still discussed and agreed upon 
with the "mother ministry" (interview, KDA official, 1998). As a consequence, it 
seems that the District Medical Officer (now the DDHS) is de facto accountable to the 
MoH rather than to the District, since it is the ministry that initiates promotion and 
career development. Further, the lack of resources does not allow the District 
administration to recruit and employ staff according to the District's needs. A newly 
employed civil servant will not be on the pay-roll for decentralised staff, which is 
currently covered by the unconditional grants, but get on the District pay-roll, thereby 
increasing the financial obligations of the District. In 1999, there was a recruitment 
freeze of health workers (The Monitor 5.12.1997), even though 18 midwives and a 
number of nurses were needed in Kamuli District according to the staffing plans, i.e.,
07more than 25 percent of the staffing targets. Likewise, 17 posts of extension officers 
for forestry, agriculture and community development were not filled in 1997/98 
(interviews, department heads, 1997; KDA budget). However, apart from financial 
constraints, this gap also reflects the priorities at the District level (see Chapter 7).
Insufficient Local Lezitimisation and Accountability
The indirect election system, which was in place until the recent local government 
elections in April 1998, structurally impeded real representation of the local people at 
higher levels. This aspect and its implications are examined in greater detail in 
Chapter 7.
Unequal Intergovernmental Relationships
There is a common understanding both at the District and the central government 
level, even among the pro-decentralisationists, that the decentralisation process has 
occurred too fast and has lacked the necessary preparation and capacity building 
(interviews, MoLG official, MoH official, KDA authorities, 1997, 1998). Guidelines 
are elusive, in that they do not prescribe specific quantitative and qualitative targets, 
and are often ignored. It is recognised that the centre has been weak in managing
97 Whether this is a very serious issue is another question given that health units may be overstaffed in 
comparison with the low workload (see Chapter 6).
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decentralisation. There is little enforcement and supervision, since there are only few 
guidelines. Also little capacity exists to follow them up or to enforce them. At the 
centre, there is a feeling that the Districts can now do anything they want (interviews, 
MoH officials, 1998), while the District authorities complain about interference from 
the centre, be it through the Resident District Commissioner, the Ministry of Local 
Government (MoLG), or the line Ministries. In practice, the relationship is 
characterised by both top-down dirigism and dominance as well as co-operation, 
discussion, and support.
It is in the light of these challenges and constraints outlined in the previous four 
sections, in which today's health care system must be contextualised and understood 
in order to carve out the research question.
3.5. The Nature and Structure of Uganda's Health Care System: Key Features of 
the Public, Private and Voluntary Sectors
The Ugandan health care system comprises the MoH, District Medical Offices and 
government facilities, private and voluntary sector providers as well as "traditional 
medicine" practitioners. A continuing problem is that both government and non-state 
health services are mainly institution-based (as opposed to community-based) and 
biased towards curative care. For example, 63 percent of government recurrent 
expenditure goes to hospitals, where 54 percent of the qualified health personnel
Q O
work. Despite policy commitments, preventive and promotive services are seriously 
underfunded. Apart from interregional inequality, there is also an urban bias, as the 
majority of government clinics and hospitals, and particularly private clinics, are 
located in towns and the capital. For 1995, the national doctor-patient ratio was 
1:20,228, again with an urban-rural difference (Hutchinson 1999: 8).
3.5.1. Health Care Financing
The total amount of health care expenditure in 1998/99 was USS 294.6 million. The 
sources of these funds and the per capita spending are illustrated in Figures 3.5 and 6.
98 For medical doctors, this number goes even up to 80 percent (RoU/MoH 1998a: 16).
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Figure 3.5: Health care expenditure sources in 1997/98
a  Public (incl. Donor share) a  Private
Source: PCGM (1998b: 23)"
Figure 3.6: Per capita expenditure (in US$)
ere :
3.4 4.97
1994 1997
Source: LaFond (1995), PCGM (1998b)
B  Private 
H  Public
Private expenditure includes NGO donations and out-of-pocket payments in the NGO 
and private sector.100 The per capital allocation for health is considerably below the 
SSA per capita average o f US$ 19 (MoH 1997: 2), and also one o f the lowest on the 
African continent (World Bank 1994: 1). Furthermore, it is still below the minimum 
required to offer the minimum essential basic health care package, which stands at 
about US$ 14-17 per capita (The Monitor 24.10.1997).101 As o f 1997/98, the public 
share constitutes 9.9 percent o f total government expenditure, while the total national
99 It is not clear whether the public figure includes user fee revenues of government clinics. Some health 
economists do so, e.g. Schreyer (1997: 27).
100 However, the National Health Strategic Plan states that currently the total funding of the health 
sector is not yet fully established, particularly for private sources (RoU/MoH 1998a: 20).
101 Estimated costs for the World Bank essential health care package amount to US$ 10.08 per capita 
(MoH 1997: 47).
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health expenditure stands at 4.0 percent of the gross domestic product (PCGM 1998b, 
Ojo et al. 1998).
The health sector in Uganda has indeed experienced growth in total funding since 
1993 (RoU/MoH 1998a: 20), but there is still a need to find additional and alternative 
sources of funding for the health sector, whilst still guaranteeing access for all in order 
to provide a package that is mainly funded out of public sources.102 The tax base, and 
more importantly, the state's tax collection capacity are still low in Uganda, as in other 
developing countries (cf. Livingstone/Charlton 1998). Alternatives to taxing include 
user fees at government clinics (see below) and the establishment of prepayment 
community schemes, attempts of which are under way in some Districts (World Bank 
1994, 1998). It is also planned to establish pre-paid health care plans and insurance for 
the formal sector (Hutchinson 1999, MoH 1997).
3.5.2. The Public Sector
The state health delivery system consists of four levels of health care. Health centres 
and lower units, like dispensary-maternity units (DMUs) constitute the primary level, 
while the secondary level includes District and rural hospitals, and the tertiary level 
comprises general referral hospitals located in regional capitals. At the quaternary and 
highest level are the two national hospitals (Okello et al. 1998: 13).103 The lowest 
level, on which this empirical analysis will focus (including the District hospital 
outpatient department), offers treatment and drugs for common diseases, inpatient 
facilities, maternity services and antenatal care. Larger units ("health centres") also 
provide simple surgery (suturing, dressing, draining) and laboratory services. 
Likewise, these units provide PPHC, which comprises immunisation, family planning 
(FP), nutritional education, and STD/HIV/AIDS counselling, advice and awareness- 
raising, on both a static and an outreach basis.104
Since the 1990s, most health units charge a user-fee with wide pricing structures, 
mainly for curative services. But no standardised practice exists as to the setting of the
102 Government projections aim to keep the share of self-financing below 20 percent (MoH 1998a: 11, 
own calculations).
103 The new National Health Policy aims to transform this system by extending the primary level to a 
four-tiered health facility structure.
104 For a further elaboration on state PPHC services, see Chapter 4.1.
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fees, their collection and their use. The underlying policy on cost-sharing has long 
been in an experimental stage, since there was no clear statement from the national 
level until recently (Iliffe 1998, McPake et al. 1999, DHSP 1998).105 It was hence left 
to the Districts and Subcounties to decide about its implementation and the respective 
fee structures.106 In practice, the objective of user fees is to supplement government 
funding, to improve drug availability, and to provide additional staff incentives
1A7through allowances. Ultimately, this is supposed to increase utilisation. Even 
though user fees remain at the facility level, the amounts collected through user fees 
were very low in the initial years (1-7 percent of the total health unit budget), 
particularly in comparison to NGOs that collect 31-46 percent (data for 1991-1992, 
Okello et al. 1998: 18; cf. McPake et al. 1993: 1388). More recent figures cite 10 
percent for government units (for Kamuli District, see Figure 4.2), but this is much 
less than their revenue potential (World Bank 1998). Reasons for low revenue 
collection include widespread exemption of non-eligible patients, poor management 
and embezzlement of user charges. Further, the introduction of user charges did not 
necessarily lead to improved quality of care and availability of drugs, so that 
utilisation rates remained low and perpetuated the problems. In fact, utilisation has 
dropped since the introduction of user-charges (Hutchinson 1999: 11).
The administrative culture and practice of civil servants in general and health workers 
in particular is still characterised by absenteeism, moonlighting, corruption, 
embezzlement and diversion of resources (Mugaju 1996, Munene 1995). One reason 
for this is that health workers' salaries are still paid irregularly -  37 percent of health 
workers report so in a study of ten Districts (Azfar et al. 2000: 41). Despite salary 
increases, salaries remain low for making a living. The legacy of engaging in 
parallel income-generating activities continues as a practice, such as asking for 
informal charges, selling health unit drugs on a private basis and private practice
105 Just one week before the presidential elections in March 2001, Museveni announced the abolition of 
user fees at government health centres. In practice, patients continue paying user charges (personal 
communication, Rebecca Hodgson, 2001).
106 Only in 1996 did the MoH come up with tentative figures and ceilings for operations in government 
and NGO hospitals (interview, DMO official, 1999).
107 The user fee rationale was derived from the Bamako Initiative, which aims at universal accessibility 
to PHC by user-financing under community control (cf. Wang'ombe 1997; Bennett et al. 1995).
108 The staff is remunerated on a monthly salary basis and in addition receives a small top-up allowance 
from user charge revenues.
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(Asiimwe et al. 1997). Doctors, medical assistants and nurses spend a large proportion 
of their time on duty in their private clinics or on other business. There is hence a 
great overlap between the public and the private sector, which affects the functioning 
of the former (McPake et al. 1998). The inefficient use of resource is also documented 
in very low bed occupancy rates at the primary level ranging from 0.2—42 percent 
(Okello et al. 1994).
The main source for drug supplies for health units is the DANIDA-fimded 
Ugandan Essential Drug Management Programme (UEDMP), which was established 
countrywide in 1984. This drug supply system has been strongly susceptible to and 
has suffered from mismanagement and misappropriation both within the MoH -  
leading to unequal countrywide distribution of drugs -  and within the health units -  
leading to acute drug shortage at the local level (UEDMP 1992 in Birungi 1994b).
Overall, given the widespread absence of qualified staff, the unavailability of 
drugs and informal charging, government services raise serious concerns in terms of 
both quality and access. This assessment, however, must be seen relative to the 
performance of the other two sectors.
3.5.3. The Private Sector
Private sector provision has gained considerably in size and scope in Uganda. 35 
percent of those using formal health care facilities choose the private sector; this 
figure does not include the large utilisation rate of drugshops and informal private 
practitioners (MoH 1997: 20). As to the private sector's size, only estimations are 
available, not least because of the large number of non-registered clinics and 
drugshops.109
Private clinics provide mainly curative services and rather limited public health 
services, such as immunisation and FP (ibid.: 21). Okello et al.'s (1997) study of 
registered private clinics in Kampala, Jinja and Mbarara Districts found that less than 
12 percent of them offer preventive services. On the other hand, health-related 
information and health education, which is more of a public good, is more willingly 
given to patients. Adome et al. observe that in the informal sector
109 A survey in Kampala suggests that out o f an estimated 400 clinics, 50 percent are not licensed (MoH 
1997: 21). Further, it is estimated that about 63,000 "traditional medicine" practitioners operate nation­
wide (CIHI 1995: 20).
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Trained para-medical personnel are more open in their explanations when
interacting with customers, private patients and neighbours (1996: 17, cf.
McPake et al. 1998).
For developing countries in general, there is little knowledge of the quality of care 
provided by the for-profit sector (Brugha/Zwi 1998: 107), and this is also the case for 
Uganda.110 But quality is a critical issue particularly in an imperfect health care 
market. Because of the past, people have lost trust in government health units, and 
those who can afford private clinics prefer to pay a higher price to get better services 
with drugs being available (LaFond 1995, Okello et al. 1997). Yet lower income 
sections are less likely to use private clinics (Hutchinson 1999). Further, people 
appreciate that they are treated courteously and that waiting times are short (Okello et 
al. 1997: 23).
Section 3.2 illuminated the expansion and the privatisation and informalisation 
trend of the private sector. From 1989 onwards, official government policy has been 
that government doctors may practise in private clinics outside working hours, but not 
own private clinics. This has been widely ignored, however (Iliffe 1998: 161). In order 
to catch up with the reality of this privatisation and informalisation trend, the 
government approved various legislation to regulate and formalise private practice 
and the sale of drugs (see Chapter 8 for a detailed account). While the legislation 
requires private practitioners and drugshops to be licensed, it is estimated that the 
majority of clinics and drugshops are not (cf. Okello et al. 1997, MoH 1997). 
Moreover, most of the drugshops sell drug types that their licence does not cover and 
their prescription and dispensing patterns are dangerous (Adome et al. 1996, Whyte 
1991).
In sum, accessibility of private clinics and quality of care raise concerns, but it is 
unclear whether the private sector performs better or worse than the other two sectors. 
Likewise, little is known about its cost-effectiveness.
110 One study of two Districts found the private sector performing slightly worse in terms of the 
presence o f basic equipment and also reveals some small differences between private clinics and health 
workers’ home treatment (McPake et al. 1998: 34). For some qualitative evidence of drugshops1 
dispensing patterns, cf. McPake et al. (1998), Whyte (1991, 1997).
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3.5.4. The Voluntary Sector
For historical reasons, as outlined in Chapter 3.3, a large proportion of today’s 
hospitals in Uganda are run by the churches (42 percent) (Nabuguzi 1995: 205), while 
the churches' and NGOs’ share of lower facilities is about 25 percent (data from MoH 
1997; interview, UCMB official, 1999; own calculations). The services offered in 
hospitals and lower levels correspond to those provided at the different levels in the 
public sector. Whereas government hospitals are run as if they are only supposed to 
offer curative services, most NGO hospitals have a stronger emphasis on preventive 
and promotive services (RoU 1998: 2).
All NGO and church units have to obtain a licence, unless they have been in 
place for more than 20 years. Yet in order to be recognised as a church-based or NGO 
clinic and to get support, the health unit must also be registered under the respective 
medical bureau (Catholic, Protestant, or Islamic). The medical bureaux serve as 
umbrella organisations and offer services to their member organisations such as 
training and education, subsidised drug supply, institutional support and advice on 
management and medical issues. Likewise, they supervise and coordinate and attempt 
to identify needs and problems at the local level.
NGO financing comes from several sources: 10 percent from the government, 10- 
20 percent by local or external sources, and 70-80 percent from user fees (Glotzback 
1989 in Asiimwe/Lule 1993, also interview with UCMB official, 1999).111 The fee- 
for-service scheme is usually run on a not-for-profit basis, which is a condition to be 
registered at the medical bureau. User fees are charged on complex pricing structures 
according to the type of illness and treatment. The revenues are mainly used to 
purchase drugs, so that the likelihood for a patient to receive drugs in NGO clinics is 
greater (Okello et al. 1998). Little is known about the effects of user charges on 
access. It is commonly assumed that NGO clinics are more successful in applying 
exemption practices and levy fees according to a patient's ability to pay 
(Robinson/White 1997: 20). Yet evidence from a health project in Uganda suggests 
that user fees can act as a disincentive for poor people in using NGO facilities (de 
Coninck 1992 in ibid.). The empirical analysis in Chapter 5 will examine these
111 Another study of Okello et al. (1998: 18) reports that user fees contribute to 31- 46 percent of 
recurrent costs, many times more than in government units.
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assumptions to see whether NGOs are more successful in providing access to the 
poorest of the poor.
In a nationwide study, patients rated the NGO standard of care better than that of 
the government, although the difference is not statistically significant. Another study 
emphasises that NGO and church-based clinics generally have a better reputation 
(Adome et al. 1996: 11). Kafuko et al. (1993) find that there is not much difference 
between government and NGO clinics as regards the performance on national 
standard guidelines on rational use of drugs.
Pearson’s study (1996) shows that NGO hospitals are more cost-effective than 
governmental ones (as regards expenditure per outpatient visits and inpatient stays). 
Patient throughput by physicians is about five times higher in mission hospitals than 
in governmental ones (World Bank 1993: 126). Little data on overall efficiency is 
available on lower units, however. Expenditure on drugs was found to be higher, as 
more drugs were used per patient (Kafuko et al. 1993). That said, poor record keeping 
and drug leakage at the government units distort the analysis, making a straight 
comparison difficult (Okello et al. 1998: 17). Overall, the evidence is mixed and it is 
not clear whether the NGOs’ performance in providing curative health care is superior 
to the other two sectors.
Numerous Ugandan and foreign non-governmental organisations focus or 
specialise in specific areas of PPHC, including information/education/communication 
(IEC), sanitation, home improvement, FP, nutrition, STD, reproductive health, and 
HIV/AIDS awareness-raising and patient care. Their evolution must be seen in the 
context of the general growth of the NGO sector since 1986, when the political 
climate became more favourable for indigenous NGOs, leaving more room for 
collective action and self-help initiatives. Another reason for the rise is the donor 
trend and preference for increased financing of non-government organisations since 
the late 1980s in light of public mismanagement (Dicklitch 1998, Bennett 1994). 
Likewise, the rise of the NGO sector and self-help initiatives is a reflection of the 
apparent state failure and absence in providing PPHC services.112 As such, their role is 
often one of "filling the gaps", supplementing, and complementing (MFEP 1993). By
112 For the dynamics and role of the NGO sector, cf. MFEP (1993), Nabuguzi (1995) and Tripp (1994).
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1997, there were about 1,800 registered NGOs engaged in development activities, of 
which 8 percent operate in health care. This figure does not include an estimated 750 
community-based organisations, which do not have to be registered at national level 
(Riddell et al. 1998).
Given the sector's diversity, valid generalisations on the PPHC NGOs' 
performance are not possible. As regards institutional aspects, a very common 
drawback is that few NGOs are self-reliant -  they need external support to run their 
services. In fact, from 1986 on, they became much more linked to the state in its 
financial role. Their frequently close connections with local elites and patronage 
relationships with the state and donors blur their mandate and representation of civil 
society (ibid.). Hence, similar sustainability and ownership concerns arise as was 
outlined in the discussion of the government (cf. Section 3.3). NGOs are also 
criticised for their lack of accountability and transparency in relation to government 
and donors (Becker 1998, Cannon 1996, Kwagala 1997; interviews, KDA officials, 
1997, 1998). Another drawback to their operation is the structural difficulties of 
combining high professional skills with a bottom-up approach (Brett 1992: 70).
A health-specific networking and umbrella organisation is the Ugandan 
Community Based Health Care Association (UCBHCA), founded in 1986. In 1999, it 
had about 340 members (interview, UCBHCA official, 1999). Its main objective is to 
promote community capacity building, co-ordinate NGOs and contribute to PHC- 
policy formulation. Beneath the Executive Committee at the national level, members 
are grouped in District associations to co-ordinate and monitor PHC activities. 
However, many District organisations are very weak or not even existent as in Kamuli 
District. The main problem is the lack of funds intended to go down to the grassroots 
level and establish village health committees (interview, UCBHCA official, 1999). 
The UCBHCA is also the secretariat to the NGO panel that participates in 
implementing the DHSP/govemment programme of supporting NGO health activities, 
funded by the World Bank. For example, in 1997, about 100 CBOs and NGOs 
received support from the government to implement health services (Okullo 1998).
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3.6. Conclusion
This chapter examined the previous developments and the context of Uganda’s health 
care system in order to illuminate the prevailing legacies with which it is faced today. 
As a result of the informalisation and privatisation trend in the 1970s, private and non­
government actors got involved in the financing, provision and production of services, 
which also led to the fragmentation of the health care system. This changed and 
transformed roles, responsibilities, ownership as well as decision-making loci. The 
nature of the health policymaking process of the past decade explains why the 
inherited problems could not be quickly solved. Likewise, we have seen the 
shortcomings of decentralisation process and the way this affects health care 
provision.
The last section discussed the key features of the public, private and voluntary 
sectors. The government sector is still challenged with overcoming the problems that 
resulted from the turmoil of the previous years, that is low motivation, inadequate 
availability of qualified staff and drugs being some of the problems. While the private 
sector is highly utilised, little information regarding its performance is available. In an 
inherently imperfect health care market, it is doubtful whether the private sector 
provides superior services. Evidence of the voluntary sector’s performance is equally 
elusive. Altogether, it remains unclear which sector performs relatively better. 
Moreover, very little information is available on the functioning and impacts of the 
prevailing governance mechanisms, that is the nature of the market, the effectiveness 
o f regulation and the existence of network coordination, or the effects of interactions 
on organisational performance.
The task for the empirical analysis is therefore to compare comprehensively the 
three sectors along a set of performance criteria in order to provide a clear picture of 
each sector’s strengths and weaknesses (Chapters 5 and 6). The context outlined in 
this chapter must be taken as the starting point for understanding and explaining each 
sector's performance by means of an institutional and interorganisational analysis 
(Chapters 7 and 8). Before doing so, the next chapter will outline the case study 
setting in more detail.
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Chapter 4
The Case Study: Health Care Provision and Utilisation in Kamuli District
This chapter discusses health care provision and utilisation for Kamuli District in 
more detail. It provides the necessary background information for the comparative 
performance analysis (Chapters 5 and 6) and the institutional and interorganisational 
account (Chapters 7 and 8). Section 4.1 briefly outlines the health care expenditure 
situation and the role of donors in Kamuli District. This is followed by an 
organisational inventory of curative health care providers (Section 4.2). Section 4.3 
describes the sample of curative health care providers under study and discusses their 
organisational structure and functioning. In Section 4.4, the promotive and preventive 
health care (PPHC) providers will be outlined. These are not subject of the 
comparative performance analysis, but are part of the study of interorganisational 
relationships in Chapter 8.
The final section shifts to the subject of utilisation, which is, however, very 
closely interrelated with provision, in that the two affect each other. The focus on 
biomedical care will be located in the context of medical pluralism (Section 4.5.1) in 
order to understand people’s notion of biomedicine (4.5.2), health care seeking 
patterns in the biomedical sector (4.5.3), and people’s preferences and utilisation 
factors (4.5.4). The latter does justice to the claim of basing the performance criteria 
selection and operationalisation both on the actors' view and the observer's 
perspective, as argued in Chapter 2.
Kamuli District belongs to the kingdom of Busoga, the ethnic group living there 
being the Basoga. However, Kamuli is not comparable with its neighbouring 
Districts. Jinja town, for example, is one of the most pulsing development centres in 
the country. In Kamuli, 95 percent of the population live in rural areas, and the main 
activity is agriculture. For 1995, the national HDI average is 0.328, but Kamuli's HDI 
(0.335) is second lowest in the Eastern region, and there are only nine other Districts 
in the country with lower HDIs out of 39 Districts at that time (UNDP 1997). A 
number of health and health related indicators are worse than the national average, 
e.g. child mortality and the percentage of the population living within a 5 km radius 
of a health unit, which is only 50%, whereas the AIDS infection rate is lower (KPU
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1997). The doctor-patient ratio is 1:75,000, much lower than the national average. 
Kamuli’s physical terrain is characterised by small hills, woodland and bush, which 
gets more flat and open towards Lake Kyoga in the North. During the rainy season, 
many roads near swamp areas are not passable. Nevertheless, for example in 
comparison to the mountain region in Eastern Uganda, physical access to social 
services is much easier. It is also important to note that homes are scattered in the 
bush, that is, a village is not an agglomerations of homes.
4.1. Health Care Expenditure and the Role of Donors in Kamuli
Public per capita spending from District resources (including donor funds and central 
government transfers) stood at USh 9,684 in 1997-98 and at USh 12,381 in 1998-99, 
and at USh 1,156 for health in 1998-99 (KDA budgets, own calculations).113 The 
donor funds that were directly provided to the District for health care amount to USh 
322 million for 1997-98 and 250 million for 1998-99. The main share (47.6 percent) 
of the total external funds received originated from the District Health Services Pilot 
and Demonstration Project (DHSP), followed by the Sexually Transmitted Infections 
Programme (STIP) (15.9 percent), both financed by World Bank funds, and the 
German Development Service (DED) (8.0 percent) (ibid.). Other donors include 
USAID, UNICEF and the Spanish government. There is no information available on 
the volume of NGO funds in Kamuli District.
With the exception of the DED, donor support is of financial and technical 
nature; in other words, there is no expatriate staff operating at the local level. 
Programmes are implemented through the DMO structure or local NGOs, which are 
hence subject to the same institutional patterns and rules of the game as for their own 
activities. The DED, on the other hand, has been sending personnel since 1991 and 
engages at the operational level of government health units. The impacts of this 
intervention are of technical nature, namely better organisation of health units and 
improved knowledge of some health workers. However, an evaluation study indicates 
that the overall performance of government clinics has not been affected by this
113 1 US$ = 1,100 USh (Ugandan Shilling) (exchange rate for 1998/99)
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external support (Koppenleitner/Mpabulungi 1997). Therefore, the DED activities do 
not pose a methodological difficulty for this study.
4.2. Service Inventory of Curative Health Care Providers
Kamuli District has a total of 50 health care facilities of different affiliations with an 
average of two clinics per Subcounty (see Table 4.1). In Kamuli town, there are seven 
formal health care facilities and a huge number of drugshops within an area of 300 x 
300 metres (see Table 4.2). The hospital is located two kilometres from the town 
centre. Kamuli town and Kamuli District do not have a pharmacy which is entitled to 
sell class A and B drugs.
Table 4.1: Inventory of formal health care facilities in Kamuli District114
Facility type Number Affiliation
Government
(health centres and dispensaries)
27 MoH
NGO/Church clinics (dispensaries) 18115
3
11
1
1
2
Jinja Diocese 
Busoga Diocese 
Fellowship
Seventh Day Adventist 
NGO/community based116
Private clinics 4 -
Referral hospital,
Outpatient department (OPD)
1 Jinja Diocese
Source: Own inventory
114 Note that this categorisation into provider types does not necessarily correspond with people's 
notions about different providers.
115 This is the number of NGO clinics that were found on the ground.
116 One of these is registered only as an NGO, but in practice is run on a private basis.
117 The official DMO records are incomplete, in that they do not include the private clinics or all NGO 
clinics. This inventory does not include the many informal, unregistered private clinics (see below).
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Table 4.2: Formal health care providers in Kamuli town
Affiliation Number Highest Qualification
Government 1 2 Medical Assistants (MAs)118
Referral (NGO) hospital 1 5 Doctors
NGO/church clinics 2 MAs
Private clinics 4 MAs, Doctors
Drugshops + /-16119
In rural areas, government clinics are staffed with a medical assistant, while rural 
NGO clinics are run by a midwife or a double-qualified nurse-midwife. The clinic 
coverage is unequal; in some Subcounties there is only a government or only a NGO 
clinic. Not only are the health units unequally spread between Subcounties, but also 
within Subcounties.
Many health workers (medical assistants, nurses or others with lower
qualifications, retired or government-employed) operate unregistered clinics or
100provide services at home. Many of these private clinics, and drugshops as well (see 
below), are owned by DMO staff or government health workers (McPake et al. 1998). 
All of these providers dispense drugs, most of them administer injections, and some 
offer over-night admission. The providers are unequally spread, between and within 
Subcounties, depending on the quantity, quality and performance of the alternative, 
formal health units. In addition, there are many (unregistered) maternity homes in 
rural areas, most of which also provide curative treatment.
The DMO’s drugshop record of 1998 lists 43 registered drugshops. Inference 
from this study in three Subcounties suggests that the total number of drugshops 
amounts to at least 300 for the whole District.121 In combination with the unregistered 
rural private practitioners, there is a dense coverage of places where people can
118 Medical assistants are a specific category of health professionals whose training is shorter than that 
o f doctors.
119 These are located within an area of 300 x 300 metres; and 7 drugshops are situated on one street.
120 It is more difficult to identify these informal, unregistered private practitioners, because they usually 
practice from their home. Given the time and cost constraints, it was not feasible to carry out an 
inventory for the whole of the District.
121 That is, visible and established shops solely selling drugs, as opposed to hawkers, people selling 
drugs from home in a much more informal setting, or other shops that also sell some drugs.
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obtain drugs. At drugshops, patients would describe their symptoms and ask the shop 
assistant to compile a couple of drugs for a specific amount of money or they would 
ask for a specific drug they wanted (cf. Whyte 1991, see Chapters 5 and 6). Most of 
the drugshops also administer injections. Drugshops at smaller trading centres or at 
road junctions usually have a smaller range of drug types for self-medication and first 
aid, whereas the drugshops of medium to large trading centres are well stocked with a 
large variety. Often, these are also run by better qualified staff that provides some 
medical advice.
Thus, while the actual organisational spectrum in the private sectojr is wide, the 
differentiating lines are blurred. The (urban registered) private clinics on one hand 
and (registered or unregistered) drugshops on the other only constitute poles, and the 
spectrum of quality is equally fluid. Drugshops have taken up a niche in the market, 
and drugshop utilisation must thus be differentiated. It cannot be merely equated with 
home treatment or self-medication, as is often done in the literature (Wallman 1996). 
Home treatment and self-medication do include buying drugs at drugshops. Yet, 
when people spell out their symptoms, get advice or receive an injection, drugshops 
constitute a health care provider outside of home treatment, just like clinics. But 
again, this distinction is not clear-cut.
4.3. The Health Care Provider Sample for the Comparative Performance 
Analysis
This section outlines the selected sample of health care providers. The distance of the
three rural Subcounties to Kamuli town is relatively equal, but not in terms of ease of
access to Kamuli town by public transport. Most remarkable is Kamuli town with 8
facilitates (including the hospital) and one of the rural Subcounties with three clinics 
1 ^
in close proximity.
While the study covered all clinics in Kamuli town (public, private and NGO), a 
selection had to be made among the health care providers in the rural Subcounties in 
order to be able to focus this study within the given time and financial constraints.
122 It is not exceptional to find two units closeby.
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The same two Subcounties were selected where the action research had taken place 
during the first two research phases (one with a government clinic, one with NGO 
clinics) and a third one with the similar characteristics and the same distance to 
Kamuli town, which had both a government clinic and two NGO clinics. This 
Subcounty sample is representative of the distribution of formal, registered clinics. In 
a second step, a selection had to be made from among the drugshops and informal 
private providers, given their large number. By asking food or cloth shopkeepers, 
triangulated by observation, the most popular drugshops and informal private 
practitioners that were located near these formal, registered providers could be 
identified. This enabled a comparison between the providers that competed with each 
other. However, this selected sample is biased in that it does not include the more 
remote drugshops.
Table 4.3 highlights the core sample (dark shadowed), where the data collection 
methods included exit interviews, interviews with providers and an analysis of record 
books, where they were existent and made available. At the lightly shadowed 
providers, less detailed information could be gathered. Likewise, Table 4.3 
enumerates the alternative providers nearby to get a fuller picture o f the 
organisational inventory within the chosen areas.
With the exception of one, all drugshops under study were run by unqualified 
staff. In total, 9 out of the 15 rural drugshops had a licence.124 As for private clinics, 
drugshops are registered under a qualified person, while the clinic is often owned or 
run by unqualified staff. The drugshop observation study, which collected data on the 
drug sales and the prices, comprised six shops, all having been licensed at least once 
during the past two years.
123 Given their illegal status, rural private providers were often reluctant to provide their records if 
actually existent, which is why they were not included in the core sample of health care providers.
124 The sample rationale was to select the well utilised drugshops. It is hence not accidently that they 
were licensed, but this was not the selection criterion. None o f them belonged to DMO staff.
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Table 4.3: Organisational inventory in selected areas
Kamuli town Subcounty A
T.C.
Subcounty B
T.C.B1 
T.C. B2
Subcounty C
T.C. Cl 
T.C. C2
Study units 
Government
1 gov’t clinic
2 NGO clinics
4 private clinics 
1 NGO hospital
1 gov’t clinic 
5 drugshops 
1 rural priv. clinic
3 NGO clinics 
7 drugshops
no government
1 gov’t clinic
2 NGO clinic
3 drugshops
clinic
NGO/church
Mission hospital
no NGO clinic
rN-5
1 NGO Project
Private sector
Registered
clinics
P-l
P-2
P-3
P-4
none found none found none found
Unregistered 
clinics (rural)
rP-1 (MA)
2 clinics outside 
T.C. (MA)
T.C. Bl:
rP-2 (dispenser) 
T.C. Cl:
Drugshops D-l
D-3
n  7U-i D-14
15 drugshops D-8 D-15
1 drugshop
T.C. C2: 
D-16
(+/-2) D-4
D-5
D-6
5 drugshops
2 drugshops
T.C.B2:
D-9
D-IO
n nD-12
D-13
3 drugshops 
1 midwife
in-between the
T.C.s:
1 rural practitioner
2 maternity homes
uG = urban government clinic P = private clinics uN = urban NGO clinic
rG = rural government D = drugshop rN = rural NGO clinic
T.C. = trading centre priv. = private govt' = government
All o f the provider types offer curative treatment. This is the common ground that
allowed for comparison. For the discussion of the results, these provider types are 
differentiated into lower-level providers (drugshops; rural private practitioners,
125 By the DMO's as well as DED's judgement, the three chosen government facilities belong to the 
group of well working government facilities (interview, DMO official, 1999; DED reports 1997-99).
126 rN-4 and rN-5 were hardly functional, since the midwife in one clinic had died, while that in the 
other was on training for several months.
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usually unregistered; rural NGO clinics; government dispensaries) that are utilised 
first, and higher-level providers (government health centres; urban private and NGO 
clinics; hospital OPD). This meets with people's perceived distinctions of disease 
severity and the observed utilisation and referral behaviour (see Section 4), but this is 
obviously not a clear-cut division. The remainder of this section provides more 
detailed information on the providers' operations and management.
4.3.1. Services
In rural areas, the service range is most comprehensive at government health centres, 
whereas NGO clinics offer curative and reproductive health (RH) services, but no 
laboratory (with some exceptions) and dental services or minor surgery.127 Medical 
assistants running a private clinic provide curative and sometimes dental services as 
well as minor surgery. In town, the largest service spectrum is delivered by the 
Mission hospital (except that there are no FP services), followed by the urban 
government clinic. The private and NGO clinics are comparable in that all o f them 
offer curative care including treatment for sexually transmitted diseases (STD), some 
offer maternity and RH and some offer dental services.
4.3.2. Health Unit Management
Government clinics are affiliated to the Subcounty local government in which they 
are located, whereas church clinics are attached to the respective church Parish and 
the (regional) diocese. The government health units and the rural NGO clinics are 
managed in similar ways. They are led by an in-charge (I/C) and are guided and 
directed by the so-called health unit management committee (HUMC).128 The 
HUMCs' tasks are to supervise the running of the clinic and to participate in decisions 
on its management, such as user fee rates. User fees are set with the approval of the 
LC3 Council in the case of government clinics, while the NGO clinics do so in 
agreement with the regional headquarters.129 The HUMC composition of the various 
provider types is similar, but at the NGO clinics, their appointment or election takes
127 Catholic units, however, do not offer FP services.
128 The urban NGO clinics have no HUMC. Private clinics are managed by their owner(s).
129 The Ministry of Health and the diocese headquarters provide guidelines on user charge rates, but 
considerations o f cost recovery and the communities' ability to pay determine the final amount.
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place at a lower level (see Table 4.4, cf. Hutchinson 1999: 104 for government 
clinics).
Table 4.4: HUMC composition
HUMC composition Selection Process
Government
clinics
10 members
Chairperson, Vice, Treasurer,
3 opinion leaders, 1 women 
representative, LC1 chairperson near the 
clinic, staff representative, I/C (as 
Secretary)
Members are nominated by the LC3 
Executive Committee and seconded by 
the council. The LC1 chairperson o f the 
health unit's location is an ex-officio 
member.
NGO clinics
Protestant 7 members
Chairperson, Treasurer,
4 representatives per zone, 
I/C (as Secretary)
Members are elected by the Parish 
Development Committee.
Catholic 7 members
Chairperson, I/C (as Vice), Treasurer, 
Secretary, 3 community members
Members are elected by the Parish 
Executive Council.130
NGO Hospital Board of Governors 
includes church community members, 
the Superintendent, the DMO, LC5 
chairperson and the CAO
Members are appointed by the Bishop; 
District authorities are co-opted ex­
officio.
Source: government guidelines for HUMCs, interviews.
4.3.3. Financing and Funding
As Table 4.5 shows, the financing of the health care providers varies enormously. 
There are no insurance or pre-payment schemes in place in Kamuli District. In light 
of low user charge revenues, government services are primarily tax- and donor- 
financed. At some NGOs, salaries are donor-financed, whereas others, just like 
private providers, are fully reliant on user charge revenues. Given this varying degree 
of subsidisation, the providers’ starting positions for their operation are unequal. This 
has different implications upon user costs and drug availability, which will be 
examined in the following chapters.
130 Both for the Protestant and the Catholic clinics, these electing committees are elected by the Parish 
committee, which is again elected by the actively practising community (cf. Kassimir 1995).
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Table 4.5: Funding and financing sources
Staff salaries Staff allowances Drugs/medical
supplies
STD kits FP Operating costs131 Buildings
Government
clinics
■ ■
Decentralised and 
District staff: 
Decentralised funds 
District revenues 
Other staff: 
Subcounty revenues 
User fee revenues
UCR
Lunch allowances: 
MoH
mainly UEDMP, 
District funds, 
UCR
DMO/MoH DMO/MoH UCR
Subcounty revenues
MoH/donors and 
community
NGO clinics: 
uN-1, rN-1,2,4,5
uN-2
riN-3 (Catholic)
Donors
UCR
UCR
UCR
j,
.
partly UEDMP, 
partly UCR
UCR
UEDMP bought with 
UCR
some receive 
through the DMO
■ : ■ - :
DMO/MoH 
not offered
UCR
■ • : : :: •!: .• :■ -
UCR
UCR
urban: donors 
rural: donor and 
community
Church
Church
Delegated funds 
UCR
UCR UEDMP bought with 
UCR and 
delegated funds
DMO
"
not offered UCR Church
Private clinics UCR UCR some receive from 
DMO
UCR
(where offered
UCR UCR UCR
Drugshops Sales -
....................
Sales Sales Sales Sales
 -      ............
UCR = User charge revenues
131 Operating and maintenance costs include expenditure for cash and receipt books, paraffin, bed linens, the construction of rubbish pits or latrines and electricity.
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4.3.4. Cost-Recoverv through User Fee Revenues
Table 4.6 demonstrates the cost-recovery rates for the various providers. Government 
clinics have the lowest cost-recovery rate, followed by the rural Protestant clinics. 
Urban NGO facilities have a higher cost-recovery rate. One of them is in fact fully 
self-reliant, like the private clinics. Since July 1998, the hospital receives -  at least 
officially -  a monthly rate of about USh 11 million (= approx. US$ 10,000) as 
delegated funds from the MoH. These are used to lower user charges, to increase staff 
salaries up to government levels as well as to purchase drugs. Yet the hospital has 
still to recover a major part from its own user charge revenues. Before the granting of 
the delegated fund, the hospital had to recover 90 percent.
Table 4.6: Cost recovery rates
Provider type Provider Percentage of own revenues in relation to overall 
resource inputsa)
Government rG-1 28
rG-2 30
rG-3 16
Rural NGOs rN-1 46
rN-2 43
rN-3 90-100b)
Private clinics P-l, P-2, P-3, P-4 100
Urban NGOs uN-1 100
uN-2 58
Mission hospital Mission Hospital 45
Source: records, interviews (own calculations)
a) Resource inputs comprise staff salaries and drugs, but exclude supervision costs, funds for 
construction and rehabilitation of buildings, STD kits, and other medical supplies. Vaccination 
supplies are fully funded from external sources both at government and NGO facilities.
b) The Catholic clinic used to receive regular donations, but these fell to an estimated 10 percent of 
the total income (data from interview, nurse rN-3, 1999, own calculation).
4.3.5. Drug Supply
There are considerable differences in drug supply. Government health units obtain
Essential Drug Kits (EDK) from the Ugandan Essential Drug Management
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Programme (UEDMP) via the DMO. The kits are partly funded through the UEDMP, 
and partly purchased from the DMO's budget for those clinics that are not included in 
the UEDMP (interview, DMO official, 1999). Drugs are hence provided on a highly 
subsidised basis. The amount of EDKs per unit is controlled and set in the MoH once 
a year, on the basis of a health unit’s patient load. This provides an incentive to 
government health workers to forge patients' numbers in order to receive more kits, a 
practice that is still common in health units (cf. McPake et al. 1998). Furthermore, the 
UEDMP supply is not fully reliable (cf. Birungi 1994b). In Kamuli District, three to 
four clinics usually do not obtain their kits. This is partly due to insufficient 
accountability records on the use of drugs. In mid 1999, however, 12 government 
clinics, that is, 54.5 percent of all government health units did not receive their 
EDKs, including the selected rural government units.132
An additional drug supply source is the Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI)- 
Program funded by the World Bank. Pre-packed STI kits are delivered to the DMO 
and then to the health units, provided there is staff trained in STI management. 
However, these STI kits do not come regularly, so that STI drugs are not available 
during many months of the year (interview, in-charge uG-1, 1999 and DED- 
professionals). Finally, health units are supposed to use user fee revenues to buy 
drugs on the local market in order to supplement the drug stock or to fill gaps when 
essential drugs ran out133 (see Chapter 6.2.1 for the units’ practice).
The NGO and church units' sources of drug supply vary depending on whether a 
clinic is registered or not. Whereas non-registered clinics usually buy drugs from the 
open market, registered clinics receive subsidised EDKs from the Joint Medical Store 
(JMS) if  their patient load is above a pre-defined level. The JMS is assisted by the 
UEDMP and jointly run by the Catholic and Protestant medical bureaux. Church and 
NGO clinics can directly buy at the JMS, or, as in the case of the Catholic clinics, the 
EDKs are delivered to the DMO from where they are distributed to the clinics. The 
drugs that are not available through the EDKs are bought in Kampala or Kamuli 
town. The EDK supply through the DMO has also not always been reliable. One of 
the Catholic units did not get its kits three times in the past two years. Only when the
132 While this is partly due to missed deadlines of handing in records, as one in-charge admitted, this 
group also included those clinics that in the past have been very correct in their accounts.
133 Note, however, that there is no pharmacy in Kamuli District that could legally sell class A and B 
drugs.
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in-charge threatened to go to police to report the ’’loss" of the kits, did the responsible 
DMO officers quickly replace the money (interview Bulow, DED health worker, 
1999).
The rural Protestant clinics are not integrated into the UEDMP. Therefore, they 
buy the required drugs from the local drugshops about twice a month. The drugs 
stored are rather small in quantity and include few types, since the drug purchase is a 
function of the cash available from user charge revenues. Also, as the units buy small 
amounts, they cannot get them at lower wholesale prices. So far, the urban NGO 
clinics do not receive EDKs. One of them still buys its drugs at wholesale drugshops 
in Kamuli town, admitting that there is no drug management scheme as yet, so that it 
buys weekly or sometimes even daily if needed. This implies high administrative 
costs and the loss of wholesale cost reductions. The other one buys drugs on a 
wholesale basis and has a more efficient supply and management system. Yet drugs 
are not necessarily sold at lower prices at this clinic.
The private clinic practitioners usually buy drugs in Kampala or Jinja once a 
month from pharmacies on a wholesale price basis. 50 percent of the rural drugshops 
under study buy their drugs outside Kamuli District; the other 50 percent buy in 
Kamuli town at wholesale shops. The Mission hospital uses the delegated funds to 
finance its drug purchase (EDKs and additional drugs) from the JMS. Since the end 
of 1998, the expenditure of delegated funds was made particularly difficult by the 
District Administration, so that smooth and cost-effective drug supply was 
interrupted (see Chapter 8). An additional drug supply source is the STIP mentioned 
above, of which some few NGO clinics and the hospital are part.
In sum, reliable drug supply is best guaranteed in the private sector and in those 
NGO clinics that are not dependent upon the UEDMP. Likewise, health care 
providers have different starting positions as regards drug supplies and costs.
4.4. Promotive and Preventive Health Care Services (PPHC)
4.4.1. Government Services
Most governmental PPHC activities are institution-based, i.e., they are attached to the 
health units. They usually offer static and outreach immunisation, STD/HIV/AIDS 
counselling and awareness-raising, antenatal and postnatal care, and growth
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monitoring. Basic FP services are available in all units, while more sophisticated 
methods are provided only in Kamuli town. In addition, there are four HIV testing 
centres linked to government centres across the District.134
An important link between the health unit and the community is the health 
assistant (HA) who mobilises the community and attends outreach activities of health 
units. Other tasks comprise basic health education, household and sanitation 
inspection and sensitisation (e.g., on latrine construction). A health assistant is in 
charge of a whole Subcounty, with an average population of 23,000 in 50 zones and 
an average area of 12 x 12 km. A crucial drawback to the HA's activities is 
inadequate facilitation in terms of transport and field allowances. Continuous and 
regular contact with each community is thus limited. Accordingly, 80 percent of the 
respondents in the household survey reported that they had never had contact with the 
health assistant.
In the 1990s, based on the rationale of community-based health care (CBHC), 
various donor programmes supported the training of community-based health care 
workers who should provide basic health and nutritional education to the 
communities. The CBHC workers are elected by the community as volunteers, but 
there is a limited structure, management or coordination at the local level. The 
programmes seem to function at various degrees of effectiveness, but again a general 
problem is the lack of voluntarism in the absence of remuneration (Almeda, DED- 
report 1997/98; interviews, health workers and chairperson SCHC Subcounty B, 
1999). This prevailing "allowance culture" is problematic, in that it makes local 
institutions lose out.
Following the same CBHC logic, the 1997 Local Government Act foresees the 
chairperson of the Women Councils at the village level as the Secretary for Women 
and the Public Health Co-ordinator (Section 48, 2-i). However, these office holders 
had hardly been made aware of their roles and no training was provided in the 
Subcounties studied. Likewise, none of the household respondents was aware of such 
a function. In practice, this position has never been taken up. The lower LCs who are
134 These are run in collaboration with the non-governmental AIDS Information Centre Programme. 
Vector control is not decentralised and hence not under the responsibility o f the DMO (interview, 
DMO official, 1999).
135 Donors institutionalised the payment of allowances for field workers. This has created an allowance 
culture such that "voluntary" community activities are no longer carried out without payment.
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also in charge of mobilising for immunisation and other promotive health care 
activities undertake some of the tasks. Their activity level varies again from person to 
person depending on their motivation and voluntarism.
Although the communities are well aware of the institution-based PPHC 
services, they are under-utilised. Further, the government field workers’ presence on 
the ground is rather thin, and only 30 percent of household respondents had seen or 
had contact with any kind of village health workers (cf. Azfar et al. 2000 for a 
similarly low figure).
4.4.2. NGO Services
The Mission hospital provides some PPHC services at the facility level 
(immunisation, antenatal care, nutritional education). The NGO clinics at the lower 
level offer immunisation and antenatal care, and the Protestant clinics also provide FP 
services. The latter have established a village health worker programme to carry out 
outreach activities, such as growth monitoring, FP advice, nutritional education, 
sanitation, AIDS awareness-raising and immunisation. The Protestant clinics’ project 
and catchment area is one Parish (i.e. a Subparish of the church with about six to 
eight villages), which is usually covered by three to four village health workers. They 
work part-time and receive a small allowance. They are much more present than their 
government counterparts. Three quarters of the household respondents in the project 
areas had seen or had contact with the village health workers.
In addition, there are about 20 local NGOs in Kamuli District, more than half of 
which are engaged in PPHC field activities. Table 4.6 lists those NGOs under study. 
None of the NGOs in Kamuli has or is able to mobilise substantial local resources -  
they are all dependent upon external funding from both donors and government 
programs. There is no UCBHC District association and only three PPHC NGOs are 
registered with UCBHCA in Kampala.136
136 One of the NGOs found on the membership list at the UCBHCA headquarter had never been heard 
of in Kamuli.
Table 4.7: PPHC activities of local NGOs in Kamuli
Organisation
Health and AIDS
- AEGY
- KAASFA 
-KAMASO 
-IMAU
- NACWOLA 
- NASCRUD
Community, People 
Living with AIDS 
(PWAs)
AIDS prevention and related activities: 
condom distribution, counselling on medical care, 
treatment advice, guidance in advanced planning for 
economic survival; home care of the sick; food support 
to PWA; set-up of and advice to self-help groups
- Red Cross Kamuli 
Branch
Community, Red Cross 
members
Blood donor recruitment, health/drug education, first 
aid education, AIDS prevention
- Busoga Diocese Community FP sensitisation, distribution and sale; health education 
(sanitation, AIDS prevention, nutrition), growth 
mobilisation, immunisation
- UTHA Traditional healers Information exchange, improvement on traditional 
healing, drugs and herbs
-KAEA Community, adult 
literacy groups
Adult literacy (integrates AIDS awareness raising in its 
activities)
- KADIWODA Women groups, 
community
Economic empowerment of women
Related activities: AIDS awareness-raising, health
education
- CCF
- FFWP
Community Community development 
Related activities: health education
Other fields:
-UNFA
-KREDA
-SAFA
Community, farmer 
groups
Improved food and crop production and nutritional diet
- USSIA
- UWFCT
- Kiribawa
Women, women groups, 
community
Economic empowerment of women
- Maria's Care Youth, children Vocational training; orphan's care
Field agents work on a voluntary basis or receive a very small allowance, which 
is often their sole income source, apart from their garden activities. All NGOs lack 
transport funds or means for their community activities. Nevertheless, most o f them 
are very committed, and only a few NGO staff seemed to pursue a personal agenda. 
However, it is very striking that the household respondents knew virtually none o f the
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PPHC NGOs, other than the VHWs of the Protestant clinics.137 This was equally 
revealed by the focus group discussions (1997-99), most of which only knew one or 
two NGOs. In sum, it appears that the NGO presence is equally thin given the large 
intervention area.
4.5. Health Care Seeking Behaviour and Utilisation Factors for Curative 
Services
4.5.1. Medical Pluralism
Popular understandings of ill-health are strongly influenced by biomedical concepts. 
Nonetheless, what constitute "normal" physiological activities, and hence health or 
the absence of disease, may not feel "normal" for somebody who feels unwell (Allen 
1992: 219). In fact,
Clinical objectification of the human body is unlikely to be the only starting 
point for [people's] understanding [of] symptoms which might be ascribed by a 
biomedical professional to disease, and bodily malfunctions may be less readily 
separated from other forms of affliction (Allen 1998: 3).
Rather are there pluralistic conceptions of and linkages between health, affliction, 
causality and healing, whereby people question much more the why of suffering. 
Views and interpretation of illness (i.e., subjectively feeling unwell) vary enormously, 
as do the choices for seeking treatment.138 Accordingly, people do not wholly accept 
professional knowledge as the only means of making decisions regarding treatment. 
A starting point for health care seeking is whether the illness is considered to have an 
impersonal or an interpersonal cause. In the former instance, the cause of the illness is 
of accidental nature or a predictable result from the sick person’s behaviour. For 
example, it is recognised that certain, rather minor diseases just happen. The 
treatments chosen are home treatment, biomedicines ("Whites' medicine") for 
"White" illnesses or local herbalists for illnesses believed to be "African", but both 
types of treatments are pursued in practice (Allen 1992: 233, cf. Allen 1991). For 
illnesses with interpersonal causes, which make reference to personal and social
137 Apart from the Protestant clinics' outreach activities, only two respondents mentioned two NGOs. It 
is possible that we did not sufficiently prompt people to remember some of the local groups they have 
heard about.
138 Cf. Adome et al. (1996: 38) for a collection of examples of popular notions o f aetiology.
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relationships among dead or living people, one would have to find out why a person 
was afflicted and aim to solve the interpersonal problem. Alleviating the symptoms 
would only be a by-product of this process. The therapy choices consist of ancestor 
invocation, communication with wild spirits and accusations of sorcery (ibid.: 239). 
Yet it is important to note that people's perception of the disease can shift between the 
two spheres (Whyte 1997: 28).
Treating symptoms is most prevalent for the most common kind of affliction, i.e. 
sickness. As it is cheaper and simpler than treating causes, it is often the first strategy 
chosen for relief (ibid.: 25). But then, simultaneously or sequentially, in tandem as 
well as complementary, biomedical treatments are combined with other practices in 
order to eventually find a cure and increase the chances of recovery (Allen 1998, 
Janzen/Arkinstall 1978, Jitta 1996). Abundant drug consumption is often the result.
4.5.2. People's Notion of Biomedicine
The medical-pluralist notion reveals the numerous paths of health care seeking and 
treatment. Hence, the focus of this research on biomedical services only touches upon 
one section within that spectrum. Yet, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
biomedicines have become widely available and gained increasing popularity and 
acceptance. They have become a crucial component of self-treatment. A 
"commodification of health" took place, that is, "the tendency to treat health as a state 
which one can obtain through the consumption of commodities" (Nichter 1989 in 
Whyte 1997: 211). This has translated into a treatment-seeking pattern of "a pill for 
every ill" (Adome et al. 1996) and reflects the symptomatic approach of treatment. 
People desire health, yet they do not (necessarily) demand health care as it is 
delivered in the formal system (Whyte 1991: 141).
As in other countries, both providers and users have developed a strong 
preference for injections and antibiotics (Birungi 1994a and the literature indicated 
there). Pre-existing notions of treatment and medicines provide the basis for the 
"cognitive appropriation" of new drugs (van der Geest et al. 1990: 183). That is, in 
the process of cultural re-interpretation, people give meaning to drugs in relation to 
traditional therapy (Bledose/Goubaud 1988 in Adome et al. 1996, Le Grand et al.
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1999: 90). For example, during an "African injection", a common therapy in rural 
settings,
The skin is cut with a razor or a small knife, and herbal medicine in powder form
is applied. ... It is said to increase the effect of the medicine, because it is placed
where the pain is, thereby avoiding the slow process of digestion (Adome et al.
1996: 52).
Accordingly, injections are believed to be the most powerful means o f restoring and 
maintaining health (WHO 1991 in Birungi et al. 1994, cf. Le Grand et al. 1999). This 
is because the injected medicines are delivered directly into the blood stream, which 
is "best for diseases such as malaria and acute respiratory infections that 'move in the 
blood'" (Birungi et al. 1994: 4). Birungi (1998) also reasons that Uganda's high level 
o f morbidity (with malaria as the top cause of illness, followed by acute respiratory 
infections) encourages the overuse of injections.
Antibiotic injections are associated with strong improvements in STDs, measles, 
or pneumonia, and because of their strength they are equally applied for less severe 
diseases. Since antibiotics are more expensive, there is also the belief that they are 
better, and the fact that oral antibiotics are 'wrapped' in a container (i.e., the capsule) 
indicates to people that they must be powerful (Adome et al. 1996: 52). The 
preferences for polypharmacy is accordingly nurtured by the attitude that a powerful 
treatment should be composed of many different kinds of tablets and capsules, often 
crushed together (van der Geest et al. 1990: 184). Asiimwe/Lule (1993) argue that the 
many small private informal clinics and drugshops also pushed this culture in which 
patients associate good care with the provision of injections and other drugs 
regardless of medical appropriateness.
4.5.3. Health Care Seeking Patterns in the Biomedical Sector
A number of decisions are taken in relation to seeking treatment, which are 
summarised in Figure 4.1. The first "decision" is whether to report an illness. The 
Uganda National Household Survey of 1995/96 revealed an illness-reporting rate of 
about 30 percent for the lower income quartiles, i.e., about 30 percent of the 
interviewees reported an illness 30 days prior to the survey (Hutchinson 1999: 20). 
However, this does not imply that a person will seek treatment in each case of illness 
self-reporting or at a biomedical provider. Usually, there is an initial period of 
observation and treatment at home. The second decision is hence whether to seek
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treatment. Thirdly, as mentioned above, the patient and the family decide where to 
go. People would consult household members, near kinspeople and neighbours in 
order to decide which treatment to choose and in order to mobilise resources. They 
then shop around between different providers, also depending upon the financial 
implications of the treatment chosen (Birungi 1994b, Ogden/Bantebya-Kyomuhendo
1996).
Figure 4.1: Treatment seeking decisions
/  formal provider
se£k"freatments\ ^  informal provider 
don’t seek treatment
not ilT^
(from Chawla/Ellis 2000)
All of these decisions are a result of behaviour intention, which is again shaped by 
attitudes (expectations about the service as well as experiences of the past), social 
influences (social norms and support to go or to refrain going to a particular 
service)139 and self-efficacy (a person’s belief that he or she can use and get the 
desired service) (Vries/Backbier 1994 in Amooti-Kaguna/Nuwaha 2000). In other 
words, the factors influencing utilisation encompass qualitative, financial/economic, 
and cultural aspects, which make choice of treatment contingent upon availability, 
affordability and acceptability (Jitta 1996: 162). These are also strongly age and 
gender-specific (Aljunid 1995; cf. Neema 1999, Hutchinson 1999, Wallman 1996 for 
Uganda).
MoH sources suggest that only 50 percent of the population choose providers 
within the formal sector, and of those using formal providers, 40 percent use 
government, 35 percent use private, and 25 percent use NGO services (MoH 1997: 
20). The numerical superiority of government facilities for overall Uganda is thus not 
reflected in utilisation rates of formal curative health care providers. In the Kamuli
139 This includes intra-community factors, such as kinship or informal safety networks that offer their 
members support in case of need (Birungi 1994b, cf. Hentschel 1999).
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District household sample, use of non-formal providers is even higher, as Figure 4.2 
indicates. This seems to be due to the selection bias o f this sample towards the poorer 
households.
Figure 4.2: Utilisation rates
Source: Household survey
In Kamuli town and the peri-urban area around, people have a choice between 
various providers, which are all within more or less the same distance, so that the 
utilisation rates o f the different providers can be compared (see Figure 4.3) and 
particular in the formal sector (see Figure 4.4). This indicates again the predominance 
of drugshops and informal rural private practitioners and the marginal relevance of  
the government and the formal private sector.
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Figure 4.3: Utilisation of urban and peri-urban household respondents
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Source: Household survey, (peri-)urban respondents140
Figure 4.4: Utilisation rates in the formal sector o f (peri-)urban households
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Source: Household interviews
This utilisation rate indicates the high relevance o f drugshops in people’s health 
care seeking choices. In order to understand this utilisation behaviour further, a closer 
look into people's disease perception is necessary. In addition to the differentiation 
between impersonal and interpersonal causes or African versus White diseases,
140 DED evaluation data reveals an identical picture for Kamuli Town: in 57% of cases, drugshops and 
other informal providers were use, while in 43% of cases formal health care providers were chosen 
(DED data, own calculations).
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people also make a distinction between minor and severe diseases.141 As many 
studies report, the utilisation behaviour of patients depends upon the specific disease 
condition (Leonard/Leonard 2000 and the literature indicated there). On the other 
hand, this differentiation into minor and severe is not clear-cut and also influenced by 
health beliefs and health knowledge (Jitta 1996, Ndyomugenyi et al. 1998, Hentschel 
1999, Adome et al. 1996, Allen 1992,1998).
Problems that people perceive as rather minor (e.g., minor fever, cough) are 
treated at home or people would go to the nearby drugshop.142 They would ask for 
specific drugs or leave the choice to the drugshop attendant. Too often, people 
assume and hope that the health problem is only minor. This optimistic pragmatism -  
hoping to get by without expenditure -  appears to be necessary in light of the 
prevailing high illness rate and the higher costs of going to a clinic or to a higher- 
level provider in Kamuli town. In fact, 45 percent of the exit respondents interviewed 
at higher-level providers had first sought treatment at a drugshop or other informal 
private practitioner. However, people often first use drugshops to relieve the pain 
whilst trying to look for some money in order to go to a higher-level provider.
In case of a more serious problem where self-medication is assumed to fail or 
has actually failed, people would rather choose higher-level service providers (cf. 
Ogden/Bantebya-Kyomuhendo 1996). For example, one respondent said:
"The disease was very serious, so we knew we would waste our time and money 
in drugshops."
The following quote describes similar motivations:
We eventually go to the doctor should home treatment fail to bring relief 'soon 
enough'.... The expectation is that the cost of going to the doctor (in terms of 
time, if  not money) will be offset by the satisfactory results: we will get well 
(Ogden/Bantebya-Kyomuhendo 1996: 142).
Within this rationale of seeking treatment, the urban clinics constitute some form of 
later or last resort for the rural population if  the service provider options in the rural 
areas fail (cf. Girard/Ridde 2000: 3 for Northern Uganda). People will then spend 
more money and time on transport and user charges to use the alternatives in Kamuli
141 Indicators for the severeness of the disease include the length of the time the illness takes to be 
cured, response to oral therapy, whether the sick can still work or not, body temperature and loss of 
appetite (Birungi 1994 et al.: 9, cf. Jitta 1996: 158).
142 Cf. Ogden/Bantebya-Kyomuhendo (1996) for a discussion on the household as a locus o f health 
care and the nature of the home treatment process.
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town, where the range of services is larger and the staff is more qualified. This occurs 
largely on a self-referral basis, as many patients do not bother to go to the rural 
government clinic, but choose to go directly to an urban provider. This discrimination 
between different providers according to the patients' understanding of diseases has 
been observed all over the world (Hentschel 1999; cf. K. Leonard 2000 for Tanzania 
and Cameroon).
As a result of this disease discrimination, people "pingpong" and shop around. 
They use a number of different providers when seeking treatment, which could be 
noted among 40 percent of the household respondents, both the poorer and better-off 
ones. Likewise, only 60 percent of the exit respondents were familiar with the health 
care provider, whereas 40 percent of them were first-time users.143 Because of the 
informality of service provision, the absence of an insurance system (which may link 
a patient to a provider) and the low technology health production, exit and transaction 
costs of shopping around are in fact low. Many people pingpong around to find a 
place that suits them better than the previous ones visited, in terms of both costs and 
successful curing. Shopping around is very essential, because the patient often does 
not get cured the first time. Hence shopping around recovers the trial-and-error 
practice of many providers (see Chapter 6) and influences the treatment seeking 
behaviour the next time the same disease occurs.
4.5.4. Preferences and Utilisation Factors for Treatment Seeking 
Having provided a general picture of people's health care seeking behaviour and their 
disease perception, we can now look more closely at the specific preferences and 
priorities that determine people's choices of one provider over another. In fact, 
patients know where and within what quality range they can get treatment in rural 
areas. Similarly, K. Leonard (2000) notes that the sick (or in fact husbands and 
mother-in-laws) make active choices between the options.
People's reasons and criteria for choosing one provider rather than another were 
identified by asking focus groups and household respondents about their preferences 
among health care providers.144 More than three fourths of the exit respondents stated
143 McPake et al. report an even higher rate (75 percent) o f first time users (ibid. 1998: 18).
144 For similar studies that analyse patients' provider choice, cf. Lavy/Germain 1994 and the literature 
listed in Leonard/Leonard (1998: 7).
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an explicit and positive reason for having chosen the health care provider. The most 
frequent and important factors mentioned were quality, price, distance, and staff 
behaviour. Likewise, their understanding of quality services could be further 
understood. This includes:
• Successful and quick curing;
• Price, financial accessibility, cost security;
• Value for money;
•  Provision of credit;
• Positive experience made in the past;
• Qualified staff;
• Drug availability and quantity (in types) of drugs;
•  Physical access;
• Staff behaviour and commitment;
• Waiting time;
• Examination of the patient; and
• Trust and confidence in the service provider, friendship, and risk perceptions.145
NGO and private practitioners add privacy during examinations and 
confidentiality about diagnoses as another important aspect that affects people's 
choice.146 People's derived preferences and criteria are clearly oriented towards 
observable outputs, which refers to getting adequate treatment and drugs in a 
comfortable environment, while the outcome effect of curing and recovery is 
implicitly expected. Obviously, each person weights and applies these factors 
differently, depending on previous experiences, ability to pay and future expectations. 
Overall, however, the household survey revealed that quality of services is valued 
most -  and far above price -  in deciding where to go147: 82 percent of respondents 
ranked quality first versus 14 percent for price.148 Thus, quality is most decisive in
145 For similar preference identification, cf. Haddad 1998; for Uganda, Ndyomugenyi et al. 1998 and 
Okello et al. 1997; for methodological reflections, cf. Hentschel 1999.
146 Being a delicate aspect, particularly because of the high prevalence of STDs, privacy was not 
explicitly named by the communities. For the results of a discussion process on relative strengths 
among all NGOs in Kamuli District, cf. Mathauer (2000).
147 Respondents were asked which factors were most influential in choosing one provider rather than 
another.
148 This is similar to what K. Leonard (2000) for Tanzania and Chawla/Ellis (2000) for Niger find.
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determining acceptability and utilisation. Distance, closely followed by staff 
behaviour, comes last. It is clear that these verbally articulated preferences (attitudes) 
of what respondents consider as most important might not necessarily be as clear-cut 
in people's actual behaviour and choice when seeking treatment in light of the 
interaction between attitude, social influences and other (situation-specific) factors. 
Further, this ranking process is affected inter alia by the present financial situation 
and the location of a household. For example, if people live nearby a health care 
provider, distance is not considered and valued consciously.149 In contrast, long 
travelling times imply opportunity and travelling costs and increase the total costs for 
treatment. Likewise, not only are the absolute costs decisive, but also the income of 
the user as well as cross-price elasticity (cf. Griffin 1988, Aljunid 1995, Abel- 
Smith/Dua 1988). In many cases, people have to make trade-offs between these 
preferences, which will be further illuminated in the following two chapters.
The identification of people's preferences and factors for provider choice served 
to ensure that these are included in the relative strengths and performance criteria. In 
Chapter 2, these were anticipated as access, efficiency (of staff resource utilisation) 
and quality of care. In fact, these go hand-in-hand with people's views, but as 
expected, efficiency considerations are not mentioned, as they are not of concern to 
the consumers. Chapters 5 on accessibility, 6.1 on efficiency of staff resource 
utilisation and 6.2 on quality of care will further elaborate the understanding and 
operationalisation of these performance criteria by integrating people's indicators. 
The providers' performance will then be compared along each criterion and indicator.
149 The sample selection could not control for absolutely equal distances and incomes.
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Chapter 5
Unequal Accessibility to Health Care Providers
An organisation is superior in service provision if  it performs best in the main 
performance criteria of efficiency (of staff resource utilisation), quality of care and 
accessibility, the choice of which has been explained in Chapter 2. Efficient and 
quality services are of no use if people, especially the poor, are unable to use them. 
This chapter compares the accessibility of the different provider types.
It is important to note that accessibility is only an intermediate indicator for a 
health care system's ultimate objective of fair financing of health care in order to 
avoid impoverishment through seeking health care (WHO 2000).150 This also implies 
that the health care system provides access to a basic package of services to those 
unable to pay when in need, thus guaranteeing horizontal equity (equal access for 
equal needs).151 While absolutely equal access is unrealistic, it is nevertheless a goal 
to strive for in a health care system. The other objective of fair financing is to achieve 
greater equity in health, which is one of the major concerns in developing countries. 
This is based largely on the notion that health is an intrinsic value and everybody 
should enjoy it (WHO 2000, World Bank 1997a, DFID 1999). Poverty and ill health 
are correlated, i.e., the poor are in greater need of health care. It is therefore even 
more important to address fair financing.
Since this analysis compares provider performance and their output and since 
health outcome is not determined by a single health provider intervention, access to 
providers is the appropriate indicator to examine this aspect. Access is in fact a
1 Owidely used indicator for this subject. Hence, the providers will be compared on 
the basis of whether people have access and whether the poorest of the poor are 
equally able to access adequate services. The assessment will also use qualitative
150 Fair financing means that "the risks each household faces due to the costs o f the health system are 
distributed according to the ability to pay rather than to the risk of illness" (WHO 2000: 35).
151 Need can be understood as self-reported morbidity (Waters 2000: 600). While this approach is 
commonly used, it may not truly reflect inequalities, since the poorest may be less likely to 
acknowledge that they are sick, and when illness is reported, they may be less likely to decide to seek 
treatment (cf. Birdsall/Hecht 1997: 350).
152 Cf. Green 1992, Mills 1997b, Birdsall/Hecht 1997, Baker/van der Gaag 1992, Coulibaly/Diallo 
2000, Girard/Ridde 2000, Puentes-Markides 1992, Waters 2000 (and the literature indicated there). 
Note, however, that access to services in general registers less inequality than health status indicators 
(Birdsall/Hecht 1997).
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evidence of people's ability to pay, although a systematic study of people's ability to 
pay was beyond the focus and scope of this analysis. Ability to pay is a complex 
concept, as it is not congruent with utilisation or demand but is also related to the 
opportunity costs of payment strategies. For example, people may utilise a service 
whilst foregoing other fundamental expenditure on food or education, sell assets or 
get into debt (McPake et al. 1993, Russell 1996).
The focus is on financial access, but this is not to ignore that access is also 
determined by cultural and institutional factors, such as disease notions and the 
providers' behaviour, which affect a patient's decision of whether and where to seek 
treatment, if at all (Puentes-Markides 1992). (Financial) access is also gendered and 
determined by age (Ojanuga/Gilbert 1992; for Uganda, cf. Hutchinson 1999, 
Wallman 1996, Obbo 1991, Neema 1999).153 Further, McPake et al. (1993: 856) note 
that it only makes sense to talk of access to services when these are at least of some 
minimal level of quality. Functional access, namely the existence of the required 
adequate services, will be dealt with in the next chapter on quality of care.
Before comparing financial accessibility to providers, it is important to provide 
an overall idea of people's total expenditure and medical expenditure (Section 5.1). 
To assess financial accessibility to providers, particularly for the poorest, the 
following aspects will be examined:
• Payment procedures (Section 5.2);
• Total direct costs incurred by the patient to get a consultation (where available) 
and treatment (Section 5.3);154
• The extent of informal charges (Section 5.4);
• Exemption practice (Section 5.5);
• Deferral payments (Section 5.6);
• Physical accessibility (transport means and costs) (Section 5.7); and
153 Given the focus on comparing provider types, an intra-household differentiation between sexes was 
omitted.
154 Due to time and resource constraints, it was impossible to carry out an opportunity cost study that 
would include, for example, the value of lost labour time, whilst seeking treatment or attending a 
patient. However, waiting times were compared, which also constitute opportunity costs for people and 
hence a crucial factor in people's perception of service quality (see Chapter 6.2.4).
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• Utilisation rates and expenditure patterns at the various provider types compared 
between poorer and better-off people (Section 5.8).
Some of these aspects are also contingent upon the negotiation power of the 
patient, expectations of both the patients and the staff, and staff behaviour and 
incentives. Furthermore, there is also a relationship between various aspects of access 
and the received quality of care (Puentes-Markides 1992). This chapter will point to 
these connections and the possible trade-offs between accessibility and quality, which 
will be further elaborated in Chapter 6.2 on quality of care. The final section of 
Chapter 6 then concludes with the overall attribution of relative strengths. In 
discussing the results of the comparative performance analysis in this and the 
following chapter, the providers' incentives and disincentives will constantly emerge 
as a critical issue. How these incentives are shaped will then be examined more 
thoroughly in Chapters 7 and 8 by means of an institutional analysis to explain 
provider performance.
5.1. Household Expenditure on Health Care
Private out-of pocket household medical expenditure per month stands at USh 6,064 
for the total population of Kamuli, at USh 9,528 for the richer part and at USh 3,675 
for the poorer half of the population in Kamuli. In comparison, the national average 
amounts to USh 6,389 (1999 National Household Survey Data, in World Bank 
2001b). This must be set against the total household consumption expenditure of USh 
128,493 (total of Kamuli population), USh 77,238 (poorer half of the population in 
Kamuli), and USh 153,209 (national average). My household survey results from 
Kamuli indicate an average expenditure of USh 3,691 per household per month in 
1999. The poorer group spent USh 3,357; the better-off group USh 4,129. Figure 5.1 
shows where the household respondents spend their medical expenditure.155
The problem with out-of-pocket expenditure is that it is usually regressive if  no 
sliding scale is built in user charge rates and particularly if exemption is not
155 Household expenditure is normally distributed.
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adequately applied (cf. Fabricant et al. 1999: 179). This regressivity is also found in 
the 1999 National Household Survey data (4.2% o f the poorer half versus 4.8% richer 
half in Kamuli), but in relation to actual household expenditure, the health care 
expenditure share is likely to be much higher and hence much more regressive. 
However, in comparison with 1995 household data, the gap between the two groups 
has reduced (MFEP1995, Table 11.02). Nevertheless, the question arises how people 
mobilise money to cover the costs for health care expenditure. One study in Uganda 
found that 49 percent o f people make claims on kin or other households and borrow, 
whereas 15 percent use, sell, or pledge stores and assets; another 29 percent use a 
combination of these (McPake et al. 1992 in Russell 1996: 230). Girard/Ridde (2000) 
also report these strategies for Northern District, some o f which cause 
impoverishment.
Figure 5.1: Household out-of-pocket expenditure at the health care providers
Private clinics 
18%
Drugshops
49%
NGO sector 
24%
Gov't
9%
Source: Household survey
5.2. Payment Procedures
As said, there are no insurance or prepayment schemes in place in Kamuli District. 
All provider types charge a fee for service -  either a flat user fee before attendance or 
user charges at the end of the delivery process (see Table 5.1). The Hospital OPD and 
one private clinic use a combination of the two. Laboratory charges are paid at the 
point o f delivery at all places.
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Table 5.1: Official payment procedures for outpatient curative care
Government
clinics
Private and NGO 
clinics clinics
Hospital OPD
Time of 
payment
Before attendance: 
Registration fee 
(Drugs theoretically 
included in the fee)
After attendance: 
User charges
One urban private clinic: 
Before: Consultation fee
Before attendance: 
Registration fee
After attendance: 
Drug charges
User
fee/charge
pricing
structure
Flat rate 
(varies across clinics)
- Drugs: based on the 
amount and types 
(consultation fee 
included)156
- Registration: flat rate
- Drugs: based on the 
amount and types
The crucial difference at NGO and private clinics, mainly psychologically, is that 
people are examined before being asked for money. Payments are made in exchange 
for and upon receipt of treatment and drugs. On the other hand, this makes it difficult 
to pre-estimate the costs. Also, in contrast to government clinics where people pay 
informal charges at various points (see below), at the NGO clinics "you pay only 
once, there is no bribing" (FGD Subcounty B, 1999), i.e. once the provider 
announced the costs, it is a fixed payment. While there is more transparency in 
payment procedures, user charges themselves are less comprehensible and transparent 
to patients that use NGO and private clinics. But what really counts for people is that 
charges are set and fixed during the transaction.
User charges and payment procedures are not displayed at some government 
units, nor is this information or the drug prices displayed at the hospital OPD, the 
private clinics or at most of the NGO clinics.157 Thus, none of the payment schemes 
offers real price transparency in practice, and it is difficult for patients to find out the 
correct charges. The payment procedure has a strong impact on the perception of 
access. The "consultation before payment" scheme creates trust, even though the 
patients know that they must bring money, whereas at government clinics, the 
patients always feel insecure, since they do not know whether they will get drugs or 
not.
156 Private practitioners include a consultation fee, which is concealed by either adding a lump sum of 
about USh 1,000 on top of the drug costs or simply by having higher drug charges.
157 Bennett et al. (1995) note that consistent policy implementation requires fee schedules to be 
displayed at facilities.
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People resented the introduction of user fees at government clinics arguing that 
they do not get drugs and that they pay double, since they already have paid graduated 
taxes. Their demand on government provision is that it should be "free". Apart from 
dissatisfaction with services (see Chapter 6), the memories and standards of the 
earlier days of (officially) free government services still play a strong role in shaping 
today’s perceptions, at least among the older generation, even though informal 
payments had already been charged before the 1970s (Fallers 1965). Yet there is 
reason to challenge people's notion. The introduction of user charges is also related to 
the fact that local and national taxes provide a very limited basis for funding social 
services, given the low local tax levels and very low collection rates in light of 
people's unwillingness to pay taxes. Furthermore, it must be emphasised that there 
is nothing new about paying for health care. Church and NGO facilities have a long 
tradition of user charges, and neither do people usually mind paying at these places.
5.3. Financial Costs
This section compares and assesses the financial costs directly incurred by patients at 
the various provider types. Data was gathered through record book analysis, 
household and exit interviews, and focus group discussions.159 Costs incurred at the 
different provider types are displayed in Figures 5.2 and 5.4. The relative cost 
differences are similarly reflected in the data on costs for one particular disease (adult 
malaria episode) (see Annex 5, Tables 1-2, Figure 1). While case mixes may not be 
fully identical, they seem to be comparable among providers, which thus allows for 
cost comparisons.
158 Graduated tax rates are regressive, and collection methods are inconvenient in the context o f local 
circumstances, and they are collected by force, which in sum increases their very negative image even 
further (Livingstone/Charlton 1998, Mathauer 1997, 1998). This lowers the willingness to pay directly 
for government services.
159 Exit and household interview data are indicative and subject to verification and validity difficulties 
(cf. Annex 1.10).
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Rural clinics
Overall costs incurred at rural providers are presented in Figure 5.2, whereas Table 
5.2 indicates the official user fees at government clinics.
Figure 5.2: Costs at rural health care providers (in USh)
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Table 5.2: User fee rates at rural government clinics (in USh)
rG-2 rG-3
Adult: 1st visit 500 500
re-attendance 500 250
Child: 1st visit 200 200
re-attendance 200 100
Laboratory test 300 no laboratory
The government clinics' official costs per se are low in comparison to the other 
clinics. Yet the considerable differences between the data sources (record book 
analysis, exit and household interviews) indicate that people also pay informal 
charges, particularly in light o f the high number o f child patients in the sample, 
whose official user fee rate is lower than that for adults.160 These informal charges
160 Cost statements of exit interview data for the most part do not include informal charges, possibly 
because people felt uncomfortable talking about it near the clinic. Also, health workers seem to have 
refrained from asking for informal charges during the researchers' presence.
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serve to help the patient get attended to, get a lab test (fee-for-service payments) or to 
obtain (some) drugs (fee-for-commodity payments).161 These informal charges often 
exceed the user fees threefold, as Table 5.3 indicates.
Alternatively, or even additionally, patients are often told to buy (some of) the 
prescribed drugs at the drugshop instead of receiving them at the clinic (for drug 
availability, see Chapter 6.2.1). Thus, most people either have to pay informal 
charges or else pay for drugs later in drugshops. Only a third of household 
respondents (16 out of 51) that used government clinics did not incur costs in 
addition to official user fees.
Based on the local average prices, a drug purchase at a drugshop costs a 
modestly estimated USh 300 for a simple malaria episode (Panadol and Chloroquine) 
and USh 1,300 for a treatment including antibiotics and Panadol. Given the 
widespread polypharmacy practice, costs for drugs are much higher in reality, as the 
household responses reveal, averaging USh 2,158 (see Table 5.3).162 In sum, adding 
up user charges, informal payments, and/or costs for drugs may come to an 
approximate amount of USh 2,000 to 3,000 for rG-2 for example.
Table 5.3: Additional costs incurred at rural government clinics and respectively at 
drugshops due to non-availability of drugs at government clinics (in USh)163
rG-2 rG-3 O ther ru ral 
gov't clinics
Informal charges
Exit respondents 1,000-1,500 not reported -
FGD 2,000, 5,000164 not reported 1,000-2,000
Household respondents 1,000-1,500 500; 1,000 N/A
D rus costs at drugshoDS
Estimation by price list 300-1,300 300-1,300 - -
Household respondents 2,158 mean (n=19) N/A -
161 Cf. Killingsworth et al. (1999) for these payment categories.
162 Further research could analyse the average amount that people spend for the government clinics' 
prescriptions at drugshops.
163 These are rather indicative, given the small number of cases in which the additional payments could 
be traced.
164 This latter figure includes a bribe for inpatient services, which are higher than those for the OPD.
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Based on the drugshop observation study, the average amount spent per visit is 
about USh 500, excluding those clients who just came to buy some aspirin for their 
stocks at home. The average amount paid per visit was USh 942 (exit interviews) and 
USh 1,835 for illness episodes (household interviews).165 One special feature of 
drugshops is that a patient can buy any quantity of drugs, whether full dose or not, 
and decide upon the amount of money to be spent. In the exit interview sample, only 
25 up to possibly 40 percent of clients decided upon the amount to be spent, while in 
60 percent of the cases the drugshop attendant decided on the drug package and the 
amount.166 Yet, in those cases where the patient left the decision on the amount to the 
owner, the average charges double, amounting to USh 1,030 (drugshop observation) 
and to USh 2,072 (exit interview sample), due to the incentive to the drugshop
1 £ 7attendant to sell as many drugs as possible.
Figure 5.2 does not indicate a clear price order along sectors. However, since 
provider choice does not exist across catchment areas, comparisons of the patients’ 
costs are more meaningful within a Subcounty (see Figure 5.3). Combining this with 
the previous evidence of Figure 5.2, and Tables 5.2 and 5.3, in Subcounty A the 
government clinic may be the most inexpensive option if the patient does not have to 
pay informal payments and buy additional drugs. Otherwise, drugshops constitute the 
less costly alternative, particularly if the patient decides on the amount to spend. 
Rural private clinics are the most costly option. Yet the example of this government 
health centre shows that health workers demand informal payments almost up to the 
same level as private rural clinics, i.e., up to what the market will bear. In Subcounty 
C, the government clinic scores best, followed by drugshops. rN-3 is more costly than 
these two options, but still less expensive than private clinics.168 In Subcounty B, the
165 The differences are related to the different sample selection procedures o f drugshop users. For the 
exit interviews, I was interested in patients and excluded customers who bought some aspirin or 
Panadol for their home storage. In contrast, household respondents presumably only remembered the 
severe incidents. In those instances, the treatment and related costs were presumably decided mostly by 
the owner or based on a government clinic prescription.
166 In the drugshop observation study, almost two thirds of customers chose the types o f drugs. Again, 
this large difference is due to the different sample selection procedures.
167 Nonetheless, the owner would put together a drug package in accordance with his or her assessment 
o f the customer's ability to pay (cf. Whyte 1991).
168 Intra-Subcounty differentiation reveals enormous differences among drugshops: average charges at 
those near to the government clinic stand at USh 680, while those near rN-3 at USh 1,500. This shows 
again that alternative providers ask up to what the market will bear. It also qualifies the seemingly high 
prices at rN-3.
135
order is similar to that o f Subcounty A. The Protestant clinics are on the lower end, 
followed by drugshops, with private clinics being most costly.
Figure 5.3: Cost comparison within Subcounties
□  Drugshops
■  Rural Priv. Clinics
□  Rural Gov't
□  Rural NGOs
Subcounty A Subcounty B Subcounty C 
Source: Household interviews169
(Costs at government clinics include informal payments, but not additional costs for drugs at 
drugshops.)
Urban clinics
Figure 5.4 indicates that there are also considerable price differences among the urban 
providers.
Overall, private clinics' user charges are clearly located at the higher end o f the 
price spectrum, closely followed by those o f the NGO clinics.170 Controlling for the 
case mix, the hospital's charges are also low overall.171 The urban government clinic 
is also at the lower end. However, as for rural government clinics, the clinic's official 
fees (see Table 5.4) stand in stark contrast to costs reported in the household 
interviews. Costs are hence only low if  there are no informal payments or additional
169 There is no government clinic in Subcounty B, but household respondents in Subcounty B had used 
rural government clinics of neighbouring Subcounties or the urban one in Kamuli town.
170 The mean payments reported in Tibandebage/Mackintosh (1999) for Tanzania also reveal private 
clinics as being most expensive.
171 Average patient costs are high, because the hospital OPD deals with more difficult and severe cases. 
These require more laboratory examinations and more expensive drugs, which increase the bill.
136
Figure 5.4: Costs at urban health care providers
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drug costs at drugshops, but these may rise up to USh 2,500-3,500 (see Table 5.5). 
Again, costs are lowest at drugshops, where the patient usually decides upon how 
much to spend.
Table 5.4: User fees rates at urban providers (in USh)
uG-1 Hospital OPD 1 private clinic 
(exception)
Adult: 1st visit 500 500 2,000
re-attendance - - (consultation fee)
Child: 1st visit 500 500
re-attendance - -
Laboratory test 1,000 1,000 
(simple test)
Source: User fee schedules
Table 5.5: Additional costs incurred at the urban government clinic and respectively
1 7 0at drugshops due to non-availability of drugs at government clinics(in USh)
u(M
Informal charges
Exit respondents 1,000
FGD 1,500-5,000
Household respondents 500-2,000 (mean: 1,028; n=9)
Drug costs at drugshops
Estimation by price list 300-1,300
Household respondents 400-6000 (mean: 2,300)
Overall, the price spectrum is wide, with the higher end of the spectrum being 
ten times lower in the case of malaria treatment, for example (see Annex 5, Figure 1). 
The different user charges reflect the different ways of financing and unequal 
subsidisation of clinics as well as the different profit margins of non-state clinics. The 
implications of these different user charges in terms of accessibility in relation to 
other access factors will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.
172 As noted above, these must be taken as indications, given the small number of cases in which the 
additional payments could be traced.
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5.4. Informal Charging and Irregularities
Figure 5.5 provides some indication on the extent o f informal payments at the 
hospital OPD and government clinics by counting the number o f patients who had 
paid more than the official charges. In general, as the issue o f informal payments was 
perceived as delicate, it was difficult to get information on the extent and amount of  
informal charges. Some respondents were reluctant to reveal their informal payments, 
whereas others did not know whether they had paid informal charges.173 For example, 
one pregnant woman had been misled and was convinced that "those with 
pregnancies pay more money" (i.e., a higher user fee).
Figure
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At rural government clinics, the differences between the percentage o f exit and 
household interviewees shows that the former either did not want to tell us, or were 
not even aware that they had paid more than the official charge. Most probably, my 
and the research assistant's presence at rG-2 made the staff not ask for informal 
payments on those days. Yet the household interviews reveal that there is a high 
incidence of informal payments at government clinics, most often at the laboratory or 
the drug-dispensing window. Around 40 percent o f patients paid informal charges at
173 Killingsworth et al. (1999) note for Bangladesh that informal payments have naturally been 
integrated into the procedures. This is also the case in Uganda, and so the number of people who are 
not aware of paying informal charges is much higher.
5.5: Extent o f bribing
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government clinics, except rG-3.174 All focus groups except those in Subcounty C 
complained, and the discussions confirm the very high prevalence and the amount of 
informal charges paid. The following quote from a female household respondent 
illustrates this point:
"If you have money, you get treatment, depending on the illness. They [health 
workers at government clinics] continue to ask for money, so it must be 'chai' [= 
’tea’ meaning bribe]. For immunisation [which is officially free], it is 500 
Shillings, otherwise you don't get it" (my emphasis).
A common view of the focus group participants and the household respondents was 
that access to care (a consultation and drugs) depends upon the amount of money 
available at the time of illness. One focus group discussant stated that the amount of 
the bribe is negotiated. Health workers do not always necessarily explicitly ask for
17 ^bribes, but informal payments are also implicitly asked for and expected and 
enforced through rude behaviour (cf. Asiimwe et al. 1997b). Thus, people may prefer 
to avoid such negotiations, as these can be painful and abusive. The succeeding 
statements also suggest that health workers exploit emergency situations to increase 
the amount of informal payments:
"If the fever is high, it is 4,000. But we cannot refuse, because we get abused."
"The nurse touched the child and realised that it was very sick. She then rebuked 
me [for not having come earlier]. Then, a bit later, the child died in my hand, and 
they abused me. I really don't know why they were rebuking. They didn't examine 
the child, they wanted money."
As noted above, since user charges are often not displayed at government clinics, 
it may be difficult for patients to know the official costs and hence their bargaining 
position as regards the amount of the bribe. As we will see in Chapter 7, however, 
people refrain from arguing with the health workers due to fear for negative 
consequences. So, even if patients know the official user fee rate, they are unable to 
question the staff behaviour. Not only are informal charges problematic as regards 
financial access. The respondents' statements also revealed that the variance in
174 In-patients make up the largest share of paying informal charges. These figures are similar to those 
found in the study o f McPake et al. (1998, 1999) in two other Districts of Uganda. The Uganda 
National Integrity Survey o f 1998 found that 28 percent of health care service users paid a bribe, but 
also mentions that because o f underreporting, this figure may be actually higher. Health is thus the 
third most affected sector for corruption (CIETintemational 1998).
175 The local expression for this is: "Have you brought your kin with you?"
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payment increases insecurity and undermines trust and the perception of quality (cf. 
Hentschel 1999: 77 for other countries). In fact, many respondents did not choose 
government clinics because of the user charges and additional bribes that are 
unpredictable in the amount, while these payments still do not guarantee the 
provision of drugs. Although bribes are seen as illegitimate, people still consider 
them as a normal and inevitable part of the health care transaction, as in other 
transactions with the state, given the low salaries and unreliable salary payments (cf. 
CIETintemational 1998). Ultimately, however, in Uganda as in other African 
countries, informal charges and corruption are only a hurdle to access and do not lead 
to increased quality (ibid.; cf. Leonard/Leonard 1999: 10). A final point is worth 
noting. Given that informal charges are so widespread and normal and a "formal" part 
of the patient-provider transaction at government clinics, the question raises whether 
the term "informal" is still useful to grasp what is happening on the ground.
At the hospital OPD, none of the interviewees’ responses indicated informal 
payments. Yet there are some few irregularities at the drug-dispensing window. 
Even though patients had paid for their drugs, they did not get all types of drugs (for 
further elaboration, see Chapter 6.2.1). While these incidents are not informal 
payments in the strict sense (i.e., an additional payment to get a service), the result is 
the same, namely additional costs for the patient and additional income for the health 
worker.
It is much more difficult to identify irregularities at the other provider types. At 
those few private and NGO clinics, where patients do not get a receipt, it is very 
difficult to tell whether employed health workers inflate the bill to put the difference 
in their own pockets, as there is no fixed user charge. However, this is very unlikely, 
because employees would fear for their jobs. Although in no way comparable at all to 
the extent of the practice in government units, one nursing aid was found to engage in
176 In-patients, however, pay "chai" in the wards to make the staff more willing to look after them. 
Likewise, supposedly free blood donations are sold (focus group discussions, 1999, personal 
communication with DED health workers). In the past, one of the dentists, who previously worked in a 
government clinic, used to charge informal payments, until this was discovered (interview, hospital 
staff, 1999). One key informant pointed out that OPD staff may work with two receipt books, opening 
up opportunities for additional charges. While this is possible, it could not be confirmed.
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raising informal charges at a rural NGO clinic. According to her, she has not received 
any remuneration at all for her work for several months and therefore charged an 
additional USh 300 for antenatal care for her own pocket. Furthermore, during the 
"healthy person" test, where a healthy young adult visited all urban clinics and 
pretended the same combination of diffuse symptoms (cf. Chapter 1.4), it was found 
that one NGO and two private clinics had only pretended to have carried out a 
laboratory test for which the patient was charged, a common practice according to the 
DDHS (interview, 1999).177 The result is an inflated patient bill without reciprocal 
service. All in all, NGO staff and private practitioners also attempt to increase their 
income through additional patient payments, even though to a much lesser extent than 
government health workers.
5.5. Exemption Practice
Exemption is the cornerstone of any user fee policy. In light of the existence of (high) 
user charges, exemption mechanisms gain particular relevance for the poorest and the 
chronically sick who may find difficulties in paying the user charges and thus be 
excluded. Against this, it was found that only few clinics offer exemption for the 
poor, as Table 5.6 shows.
In the government clinics, there is a gap between policy and practice. Officially, 
government health units should exempt 25 percent of the patients (McPake et al. 
1999: 853). This group should include AIDS and TB patients and the very poor, but 
what constitutes this latter group is not specified (cf. Girard/Ridde 2000: 4). 
Exemption is supposed to be granted either upon presentation of a certificate from the 
LC1 chairperson or at the discretion of the in-charge or other staff.
177 The private practitioners were apparently certain in their diagnosis (clinical malaria). They took a 
blood sample, but did not deem it necessary to carry out a laboratory examination and just told the 
patient that the test was positive. The tests at the other providers on die same day (within two hours) 
had a negative result.
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Table 5.6: Exemption policy and practice
c? Practice■. . . ■ ■ .... ■ .
Exemption provided Who
patents exempted^
Government Yes (to 25%) Poorest, AIDS and 
TB patients
< 1% (poorest)
Rural Protestant 
clinics
No - -
Catholic clinic Yes Poorest, orphans, 
widows
6%
Rural private clinics No - -
Urban NGO clinic 1 Yes Poorest 2%
Urban NGO clinic 2 No - -
Private clinics No
1 exception
Exception: chronic 
patients (pay 
consultation fee 
once)
N/A
Mission hospital 
OPD
Yes Chronic patients (no 
registration fee)
HIV patients (free 
drugs)
N/A
Drugshops No - -
Source: Record books; interviews with health workers
"The patient tells you the story, then the staff exempts" (interview, nurse rG-3, 
1999).
"The medical assistant looks at the patients, he knows the poor ones" (interview, 
HUMC chairperson rG-1, 1999).
The following observed incidents during the exit interviews illustrate that this 
discretion is not applied with generosity:
A poor looking, sick woman had walked for approximately three kilometres to 
the health unit, where she then waited for one and a half hours to register, only to 
be told that she lacked USh 100 to pay the full user fee amount. She was sent 
away and told to come back on the following day with all the money.
A terribly poor, very old man, with only two pieces of rags on his body and no 
shoes, had been beaten up by his neighbours. He was in pain and wanted to get a 
medical report to report the case to the police. Nonetheless, he had first felt to 
organise and borrow USh 500 from the LC1 Secretary for Defence in order to be 
attended in the health centre.
As exemption records are rarely available, it was difficult to get an exact 
indication o f how many patients were exempted, but it is in any case very much
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below the policy guideline. In the urban government clinic, a nurse and a nursing aid 
estimated 3-5 exemptions within three months, out of 800 patients per month.178 
Likewise, despite the intentional bias within the household interview sample towards 
the poor, exemption either upon presentation of a certificate or at the in-charge's 
discretion was rarely found (cf. Girard/Ridde 2000: 4 for a Northern District).179 Only 
in Subcounty C, one household respondents had an exemption certificate; one other 
patient was exempted, because he was related to the staff.180 Equally, AIDS patients 
report that they do not get free services at the urban government clinic contrary to the 
official exemption policy. In violation to the official exemption regulations, it was 
found that government health workers' relatives beyond the nuclear family, 
councillors and other office holders get free services. Also, HUMC members often 
request free services (FGDs 1999; interviews, HUMC member rG-3,1999).181
There are several reasons for the gap between the exemption policy and practice. 
First, the policy itself is not clear enough to the staff. Second, as user fees and 
additional informal charging constitute important income sources, the staff is not 
interested in exempting patients.182 Since it is difficult to get services without the 
payment of informal charges, which are enforced by rude and abusive staff behaviour, 
patients dare even less to come to the clinic with no money in hopes of getting free 
services. As a result, few patients ask for exemptions, leading to self-exclusion. The 
same phenomenon is found in Tanzania (Tibandebage/Mackintosh 1999). 
Furthermore, if  a person presents a certificate to claim exemption, it is assumed that 
he or she may be treated in such an unfriendly manner as to deter him or her from 
coming back again. During the household interviews, some very poor households 
with sick members were found who did not seek treatment at all. Possibly, these
178 While this figure cannot be fully taken as face value, it indicates in any case that exemption is very 
rare.
179 This is consistent with other studies in Africa, for example Mackintosh/Tibandebage (2000), 
Fabricant et al. (1999).
180 The extremely low exemption rate is confirmed by exit and household interview data collected in 
1997 (DED evaluation data, own calculation). There is, however, one government health unit with 
widespread exemption, where people claim their inability to pay (interview, Bulow, DED health 
worker, 1999). A 50 percent exemption rate was found in another District (Koppenleitner/Mpabulungi 
1997: 31).
181 Cf. McPake et al. (1998), who mention the importance o f authority in gaining access.
182 Fabricant et al. similarly point out that if  health facilities are allowed to retain user fee revenues, 
health workers tend to maximise revenue by granting very few exemptions (1999: 192, cf. Russell 
1996).
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people were not even aware of the exemption possibilities, which Girard/Ridde also 
conclude from their study in Northern District of Uganda (2000: 4). Likewise, 
Bennett et al. observe in LDCs that people's ignorance of eligibility for exemption is a 
frequent reason for not utilising services or for not claiming exemptions (1995: 25).
Finally, it may be difficult to receive an exemption ticket from the LC1 
chairperson. On the one hand, poorer people are more reluctant to access the LC1 
chairperson. On the other, LC1 services are usually not free of charge (Mathauer
1997). It is possible that people have to pay for an exemption ticket, but the study of 
this aspect was not further pursued.
Exemption practice in the rural NGO clinics varied. In the Protestant units, it is 
not official, but it is expected that everybody pays at least something and then pays 
the rest later on. However, the records reveal 4-5 exemptions per month in two units 
(i.e., 7 percent and 12 percent, respectively, of the total patient number), which were 
mainly granted to staff relatives, but also former staff relatives, the reverend and the 
supervisor's relatives, in spite of the staffs disagreement. In contrast, at the Catholic 
rN-4 clinic, exemption is official and institutionalised for the needy, and 5-6 percent 
of the patients get exempted. Either the patient asks the Father who is stationed at the 
Mission for an exemption certificate, or the staff requests the Father for exemption 
permission. During the household survey, I came across one of the exempted 
families. The female household head reports that it was not easy to approach the 
Father to ask for assistance, and the respondent needed the aid of one of the Sisters 
there to get introduced to him. This suggests that access to even ask for exemption is 
difficult in itself, as with the LCls.
At urban clinics, exemption practice is little clear-cut across the sectors. The 
ultimate problem is self-exclusion, since most people without money would not 
utilise these clinics. At uN-1, where about 2 percent (based on the record books) of 
the patients are exempted, the nurse explained that
"We have no specified groups for exemption, we decide on the spot. If 
somebody comes on foot and looks bad and cannot pay, we exempt. Some AIDS 
patients are therefore exempted."
At uN-2, it was found that only staff family and friends were exempted, about 4 
percent of all patients. Nor do the private clinics exempt vulnerable groups (yet they
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do grant concessions; see Section 5.6). Only P-4 exempts the chronically ill patients 
from the consultation fee after the first visit. At the hospital OPD, chronic patients are 
partly exempted by not paying for registration, whereas AIDS patients pay the 
registration fee, but then get free drugs. That said, the latter reported that they are not 
always granted free treatment.
In sum, the exemption practice is inadequate in all three sectors. Even at the two 
NGO clinics that exempt the percentage is very low, so there is very little assistance 
in facilitating access of the poorest when they encounter financial shortages. Thus, 
NGO providers do not fulfil the expectations of the voluntary sector.183 These very 
low exemption rates in government clinics are not unknown in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Russell 1996). Evidence indicates that the implementation of effective and efficient 
systems of exemption proved to be difficult, whether this is based on means testing of 
income or on other forms of community involvement (Fabricant et al. 1999: 192). A 
general problem is to define "inability to pay" and in practice, it is difficult for health 
staff to assess a patient's financial situation (ibid., Russell 1996). For example, a man, 
that is poor, dresses poor, and has a poor health status, but who is a heavy drinker and 
has the money to go drinking, may not be perceived as poor by health workers and 
therefore not "deserve" exemption.184 Given this complex notion of who is poor, it is 
difficult to find clear-cut definition of patients eligible for exemption. Gilson et al. 
(1995) note that there is no documentation of an exemption policy in a developing 
country that succeeds in distinguishing consistently and cost-effectively between 
those able and those unable to pay (in Bennett et al. 1995: 24).
5.6. Deferment: Credit Provision and Partial Payment for Partial Treatment
In rural settings, income flows are seasonal and can be very irregular. In assessing the 
extent to which people have access, it is therefore equally necessary to look at the 
options of deferred payments. In fact, credit provision and partial payment for partial
183 Another important research question is whether those exempted obtain the same quality o f (clinical) 
care or whether they are treated worse.
1841 owe this point to Rebecca Hodgson.
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treatment, i.e., partial payment of the full amount results in the proportionate 
provision o f the drugs prescribed, play a very crucial role.
Rural clinics
As Figure 5.6 shows, all providers in rural areas except government clinics offer 
1credit. At the rural Protestant NGO clinics, about a third o f the patients are 
provided credit, but the rule requirement and understanding is that the patient pays at 
least something. More detailed data is available for one unit, where it was found that 
36 percent of patients obtain credit o f USh 450 on average, equalling more than 50 
percent o f  the full amount. It is estimated to be equally high for the other units, 
whereas the Catholic rN-3 clinic provided credit to only a sixth o f patients.
Figure 5.6: Percentage o f patients with credit provision at rural health care providers
Rural private clinics 25%
Drugshops 23%
Catholic dinic
Protestant dinics 36%a a
Rural gov’t dinics o%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Source: Record books
The rural Protestant NGO clinics provide a full dose on credit, even if  the patient 
does not pay the full amount. In contrast, at the Catholic clinic, i f  a patient who is 
unknown to the staff is unable to pay the full amount, he or she will be given only a
proportion o f the drugs and told to come back within a day or two and bring the rest
1
of the money in order to get the remaining quantity. This procedure is highly 
questionable, given people's symptomatic understanding o f biomedical treatment and
185 Another study found that some government health units in a District of Eastern Uganda offer credit 
(Koppenleitner/Mpabulungi 1997: 31).
186 The reason for less frequent credit provision could be that this clinic has to recover all costs 
(including salaries) from its user charges, therefore being less willing to provide credit.
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low treatment discipline, the latter of which is explicitly mentioned by the in-charge 
and focus group discussants.
Large shares of credit provided to the patients also result in large outstanding 
amounts of debts (about 11-25 percent of the theoretical income at Protestant 
clinics), which have serious sustainability implications. As patients succeed in 
mobilising about half of the user charge amount for their first visit, it is unlikely that 
they are unable to pay off the remaining sum. This indicates inadequate mechanisms 
to ensure debt repayments. The Protestant clinics are infrequently used, so that there 
is little interaction to enforce repayment. In contrast, debt repayment at the Catholic 
clinic is enforced via the parish community.
Credit provision is equally widespread at drugshops, where nearly a fourth of 
exit interview respondents got treatment on credit.187 A large proportion of 
respondents named credit as one of the main reasons to use drugshops. Yet given the 
lack of mechanisms to enforce repayment, credit provision is dependent upon being a 
"daily customer", that is, the drugshop staff wants to be familiar with the clients who 
request credit (as regards their residence and reliability to pay off debts). Other 
factors for consideration include the seriousness of the sickness. Because of the 
physical and social closeness of the drugshops to the community, the provision of 
credit is both a moral and economic obligation, in that both sides benefit. Moreover, 
credit provision has a strong effect on trust-building. It makes the client feel cared for 
and hence ties him or her to a specific shop. This may be reinforced by the increasing 
loss of trust in government services due to informal payments, lack of drugs and rude 
behaviour. But since the same government health workers often operate their own 
drugshops, and even though they behave better in private practice, the explicit option 
for credit is a push factor in itself for the high utilisation of drugshops.
Many drugshops report large amount of outstanding credits and bad debts. 
Drugshops therefore prefer to provide the customer with the amount of drugs 
according to the money paid and tell him or her to come back to get more drugs for a 
full dose. One drugshop attendant describes the dilemma thus:
187 That is, 5 out o f 22 cases.
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"The major problem with the village drugshop is that people are really poor, they 
do not know that this is business. They come and cry, so you treat, they get 
cured, and then they do not pay. That is why people get treatment according to 
the money they have which is not a full dose, so they do not get cured. 
Afterwards, they blame me that I don't treat. Nonetheless, I give tabs according 
to the money, otherwise the business gets lost" (interview, Subcounty C, 
1999).188
Another strategy is to prescribe less expensive drugs or an inferior treatment if the 
patient does not have sufficient money. In sum, by allowing people to buy drugs of 
any amount, drugshops offer the most flexible deferral payment options, but this 
clearly goes on the expenses of appropriate treatment patterns.
The number of utilisation cases of rural private clinics is small in the household 
sample, but it appears that credit provision and deferred payment are equally 
important at rural private clinics: a reason for people to choose them.
Urban clinics
In urban clinics, deferred payment practice varies much between and within sectors 
with different implications with regards to access (see Figure 5.7). The hospital OPD 
does not provide credit, so if patients are unable to pay fully for all prescribed drugs, 
they will obtain fewer types of drugs (usually the less expensive ones) in accordance 
with the money they have. They are then advised to buy in the drugshops in town. It 
must be emphasised, however, that no underdoses are given out.
188 Cf. Whyte 1991 for similar quotes.
Figure 5.7: Percentage of patients with deferred payment at urban health care
providers
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At the private and urban NGO clinics, credit provision and partial payment plays 
an important role, as about 30-40 percent o f all patients do not pay the full amount. 
Based on the record books, it was not possible to differentiate these two practices 
from each other.190 On the basis o f the exit interviews sample, inference suggests that 
only a fourth o f these patients (7-10 percent in total) received treatment on credit, so 
they would pay at least half the amount required and receive treatment on credit for 
the rest. Thus, the majority made a partial payment for a partial treatment.191 Again, 
as in rural areas, these clinics provide credit in order to offer an advantage over 
government clinics. One o f the private practitioners was particularly inclined to give 
credit, whereby medical ethics seemed to play an important role:
"Sometimes people fail to bring money. So you have to give concession to the 
poor. For example, this morning there were two who could not bring all the 
money. The bill was 4,500, but he only brought 2,000. Yet, it is useless to give 
an underdose" (interview, P-2, 1999).
189 The record books of P-2 did not allow for an analysis of this aspect. The estimated figure amounts 
to 3040 percent.
190 Some clinics have a book for creditors, but the private practitioners were very unwilling to hand 
them over. They wanted me to believe that all the partial payers had received treatment on credit.
191 This latter category also includes patients who received a series of injections over a couple of days, 
so that they had to come back to the clinic several times. In these cases, (partial) payment occurs in 
relation to each injection.
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P-4 is again exceptional in that he rarely provides credit. Presumably, he can afford to 
do so given the high demand for his specialist services.
Due to the lack of formal enforcement mechanisms, urban clinics have large 
outstanding bad debts. For example, at the two urban NGO clinics this constitutes 
about a tenth and a fourth respectively of the total amount of credit provided.192 The 
problem is that
"Some pay it back, others not. Some women continue coming and say that the 
husband is not around. But we do not have the machinery to enforce and collect 
the outstanding credit, so most of them do not bring the money. So that is the 
problem: you treat the child, while other charges are not paid. I have stopped to 
calculate the outstanding amount of credit, because this is too frustrating" 
(interview, P -2 ,1999).
Repayment is thus contingent upon social relations and enforced by threatening 
exclusion or a loss of reputation within town in case of non-clearance of debts.
Because of the problem of recovering debts, the NGO and private clinics prefer 
partial treatment for partial payment. This is the option for people who are not known 
to the staff at the urban private and NGO clinics. Furthermore, one of the private 
practitioners does not give out the prescription form, until the patient has paid the full 
amount. This serves to stop patients from simply going to the drugshops, where they 
can obtain the drugs for less money. Another practice is to provide symptomatic 
treatment with aspirin and Panadol until the patient comes with more money to get 
"real" treatment. Likewise, one practitioner explains:
"Poor persons don't get every treatment. We change to a treatment that the 
patient can afford. Sometimes, we accept to lose, but those cases are few" 
(interview, 1999).
Okello et al. (1997: 22) make the same observation in their private sector study in 
three major Ugandan cities. Again, one problem with the partial payment-partial 
treatment practice is that people may not return to get the rest of the drug dose, which 
may undermine curing and lead to drug resistance. This pattern is also gendered, in
192 For large credit amounts (mainly inpatient services and operations), one practitioner asks for some 
deposit, for example a gomez (a woman's dress), until the patient has paid the full amount.
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that men are more likely to return while women might not succeed in finding enough 
money to come back (interview, P-l, 1999).
There is a slight correlation between poorer people and those that receive credit 
or make a partial payment, yet it is just below the significance level.193 It seems that 
poorer people are more in need and make use of credit and partial payment options. In 
contrast, the better-off people are much more in a position to come with sufficient 
money for full treatment. According to the practitioners, it is mainly the poor who 
have outstanding debts. There is thus some degree of cross-subsidisation among 
patients from the better-off to the less better-off. Cross-subsidisation in the private 
sector is also found in other countries (Gilson et al. 1994: 17). Moreover, 
"concessions", that is, reduced consultation prices or reduced profit margins on drugs, 
are more likely to be provided to the poorer clients. As prices at the non-state 
practitioners are inflated by high profits from dispensing drugs, they can then be 
"generously" lowered for concessions.194 This has an important signalling effect to 
ensure that the poorer continue to perceive the clinics as accessible.
In conclusion, flexible deferral payment options are an important element in 
facilitating access, particularly in rural areas, where people do not have the constant 
incomes required in order to be forearmed against unexpected health care 
expenditure. Yet this raises the question why overall few poorer people utilise these 
higher-level clinics given the existing option of partial payment. Presumably, the 
overall amount to be paid during the first visit and the follow-up is still considerably 
high. Poorer people are unable to mobilise this amount of money within a short time. 
It appears that kinship and other group support mechanisms do not offset this 
dilemma. The large outstanding amounts of credits at the various providers may also 
be one explanation of people's pingponging (cf. Chapter 4.5.3).
193 Chi Square p-value = 0.11
194 Tibandebage/Mackintosh (1999) find the same in Tanzania.
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5.7. Physical Access
Physical accessibility is of great importance, since travelling and other 
inconveniences increase opportunity costs and the total costs for treatment. Physical 
accessibility is strongly gendered, as males usually travel further than females to get 
treatment and they are more likely to have the travel means and money (Aljunid 
1995: 338).
In Kamuli, the main modes of transport are by foot or by bicycle. Given the long 
distances and rough roads, it is often impossible for a sick person to cycle. It is also 
very difficult to transport a very sick adult patient who hardly can sit or hold him- or 
herself on the bicycle carrier. Table 5.7 shows the transport means chosen by people 
and the transport costs incurred to go to the health care provider. This provides an 
indication of physical accessibility.
All rural health care providers were reached by people's own means of transport, 
and no transport costs were incurred. Nevertheless, the problem of distance often 
impedes the caretakers in taking an adult patient to the government clinic. The record 
books showed that more than half of the patients (for both rG-2 and rG-3) reside 
within few kilometres of the health unit. Likewise, all rural church clinics are 
predominantly used by people who live nearby. Given the dense spatial coverage of 
drugshops, it is obviously much more convenient to go to nearby drugshops. 
Dmgshops also offer "remote diagnosis", i.e., a customer explains the symptoms of 
the patient that stayed at home.
The urban private and NGO clinics are predominantly used by people living 
within the (peri-) urban area town, but the others had high transport costs. In contrast 
to the other urban clinics, only about 3 out of 10 patients at the hospital OPD came 
from Kamuli town or nearby, whereas the others were more serious cases from rural 
areas, who had come to use the hospital as a last resort. The average transport costs 
were USh 2,200 for those who purchased transport. The pattern for uG-1 is very 
similar to this.
In sum, physical accessibility of urban clinics is a problem, as the high transport 
expenditure may increase the costs for the treatment by 50 percent. The arduous 
transport of a sick patient makes people even more reluctant to go to town.
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Table 5.7: Transport costs
Rural govt 
clinics
Rural NGO 
clinics
Rural
drugshops
Urban govt 
clinic
Urban NGO 
clinics
Urban private 
clinics
Hospital OPD
% of exit 
respondents that 
incurred costs
0% 0% 0% 29% 33% 28% 33%
Average costs 
(in USh)*
0 0 0 2,500 3,500195 2,864 2,200
N 20 14 21 14 18 39 15
* of those who incurred costs
195 There were two people who had come from very far and had much higher transport costs than the average, thereby increasing the mean.
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5.8. Utilisation Rates and Expenditure Patterns in Relation to Socio-economic 
Status
The remainder of this section analyses people’s utilisation of and expenditure at the 
various provider types in relation to their wealth status (poorest versus better-off) to 
judge the providers’ accessibility. Given the small number of cases for some 
providers in a two-layered comparison, this can only be indicative.196 Differences in 
expenditure between the two groups will be reported only when these are statistically 
significant. The quantitative data of utilisation rates by itself is limited because 
utilisation rates are not a one-dimensional reflection of the ability to pay or of 
financial access. The "patients' experience of access to health care facilities is shaped 
both by the level of payment demanded in relation to their ability to pay, and by the 
relationships that frame the transaction...", such as exemption, deferred payment, and 
the perceived quality of the service, including staff behaviour 
(Tibandebage/Mackintosh 1999: 5). Moreover, utilisation rates are contingent upon 
the alternative health care providers (McPake et al. 1993: 1385) and the respective 
distance to these. However, combining the quantitative evidence with the assessment 
of the previous sections and contextualising it with people's stated reasons for (non-) 
utilisation, one can get an idea of the providers' (financial) accessibility in relation to 
socio-economic status, without ignoring the fact that there are other determining 
factors (see Chapter 6.2).
Home treatment
Overall, there is a correlation between poorer people and incidents of home 
treatment.197 This is in line with Hutchinson (1999: 21), who derives from 1995 
national survey data that poorer people are more likely to self-treat. The reasons 
provided both explicitly and implicitly point at the lack of money for getting 
treatment and at the non-expectation of credit or exemption.198
196 This is also why household data is not further broken down into gender and age groups, but it is 
hypothesised that this would show even much stronger differences between the poorest (including 
women and girl children) and the better-off.
197 Chi Square p-value = .073; Gamma = -.593, Gamma p-value = .062.
198 Ten out o f 28 respondents stated that they had no money (including three people suffering from a 
hernia), ten used local herbs, while four assumed the problem not to be too serious and hoped that the 
pain would stop without treatment.
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Rural clinics
Whereas 70 percent of the exit interviewees belonged to the poorer group, there is no 
discriminatory correlation between wealth group and utilisation of rural government 
clinics or in average expenditure in the household sample, which is considered to be 
more representative, given the larger case number. This non-correlation may be due 
to two effects. Better-off people may be more inclined to use private clinics (see 
below). On the other hand, it may be easier for them to get access to the government 
clinic, as they are more likely to be friends with somebody (or be a friend of a friend) 
at the clinic, and therefore experience better treatment, thus enhancing their 
utilisation.
For the poorer patients, mobilising the amount of money for user charges (and 
for informal payments) needed to get access can constitute a problem in itself, to say 
nothing of the need for money to buy drugs at drugshops. Adding up user charges, 
informal payments and costs for drugs can amount to approximately USh 3,000 for 
rG-2. These costs come close to those in rural private clinics and urban clinics. Given 
the high illness-reporting rate, it is obvious that these costs are unaffordable to treat 
every ("minor") disease within a family, given the monthly household medical 
expenditure (cf. Section 5.1).
After the introduction of user fees at government clinics, utilisation rates 
dropped (cf. RoU 1993, in Nabuguzi 1995: 204, Hutchinson, 1999: 11; interviews, 
in-charges, HUMC members, 1999). While moral hazard may have been reduced, this 
is also because poorer people are financially deterred, i.e., the impact on utilisation by 
lower income groups is higher (cf. McPake 1993 in Aljunid 1995: 341). Likewise, 
Girard/Ridde (2000: 5) note for a Northern District that the percentage of non- 
utilisers increased. People then choose alternative providers, where they expect better 
quality for the money they pay and where they are offered credit.
One suggestion of a focus group participant sounds like a persiflage if it were not 
the real circumstances that people are facing. He argued that since people cannot 
afford to pay both the bribe and the cost-sharing at once, they should be offered 
credit. That way, they could first pay the bribe (to get attended) with their available 
money and then later pay the cost-sharing, once they have mobilised more resources 
(FGD, Subcounty A, 1998). Thus, in the absence of credit provision or insurance 
schemes, one reason for restricted access to government clinics on the part of poorer
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people is their inability to quickly mobilise a large amount of money. The result is 
exclusion and self-exclusion by those who do not ask for the exemptions to which 
they are entitled.199
I also came across people who had to sell a goat or even land in order to cover 
their health care expenses at higher level providers. In other words, they lost major 
assets whilst seeking treatment. Similar examples are given by Fabricant et al. (1999) 
for Sierra Leone, Mackintosh/Tibandebage (2000) for Tanzania, and McPake et al. 
(1998) for two other Ugandan Districts.200 During the household interviews, a couple 
of cases of very ill people were found who were stuck in their home and who did not 
go to a government clinic or a drugshop because of lack of money. The focus groups 
similarly expressed their resignation:
"If you have no money, you stay at home and just wait to die" (Subcounty A,
1999).
"People don’t have the money to go to expensive clinics, quite often, they are
sick, it continues like that until that person passes away" (Subcounty B, 1999).
In sum, the evidence suggests that the public health system excludes the very poor 
who may not always be able to pay even lower user charges (cf. Nabuguzi 1995: 
204).
For rural NGO providers, the overall assessment on access has to be 
differentiated among the various clinics. At rN-3, more than two thirds of exit 
respondents belonged to the poorer category, but there is seems to be no correlation 
within the household sample (the case number is very low). Yet, the interviews and 
the FGDs also revealed that one of the main reasons for avoiding this clinic are the 
high charges, which explains the overall low utilisation rates. Likewise, utilisation 
rates dropped sharply once user charges were introduced in 1998 (interviews, 
headquarter official, in-charge, HUMC member rN-3, 1999). Accordingly, household 
respondents and focus groups commented very negatively on the user charges, for 
example:
199 People with no money are reluctant to go to a health unit, also because they do not want to be 
abused by health staff (cf. McPake et al. 1998: 30; see Chapter 6.2.4).
200 A Ugandan health worker may argue, however, that if this person has a goat to sell, he or she is not 
actually poor (personal communication, Rebecca Hodgson, 2001).
201 Similar views are mentioned in Russell (1996) and Fabricant et al. (1999) for other countries.
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"When they treat somebody to your satisfaction, the amount is really high. You 
are scared to take another patient.”
These comments must also be seen in light of the previously free services and 
people’s misperception that ’’everything is given free from the UK" (interview, in­
charge rN-3, 1999).
There is no correlation between wealth group and utilisation for the rural 
Protestant NGO clinics in the household sample. Yet the poorer seem to pay less, 
as none of them paid more than USh 500 in the exit interview sample and USh 670 in 
the household survey, respectively. In general, utilisation is low, because people feel 
they get the same services at drugshops. This is because the midwives are 
occasionally absent (see Chapter 6.2.3), so that the units are run by a nursing aid. In 
this case, drugshop staff is not less qualified, and people get the services for even less 
money if they decide upon themselves how much to spend at the drugshop.
Rural drugshops are highly utilised by all groups, whereas there is a fairly 
negative correlation between the urban better-off and utilisation of drugshops, but it 
is not statistically significant. In the exit interview sample, only 7 out of 20 
respondents, however, came from the poorer group. Also, on average, better-off 
people in rural areas spend USh 639 more than the poorer ones in the household 
sample, the difference being significant. Similarly, poorer respondents in the exit 
interview sample had not spent more than USh 1,000.
Apart from other non-financial related factors, one of the major reasons for 
utilising drugshops is the uncomplicated financial access and credit provision, which 
is highly appreciated:
"At [D16], treatment and drugs are not expensive. But what is most important is 
that he gives credit. We don't see it as a place which gives best treatment, but he 
understands us best, because he gives credit" (FGD, Subcounty C, 1999).
”[D7] is faithful and trustworthy, he really cares for the life. Even if you do not 
have money" (FGD, Subcounty B, 1999).
202 Likewise, 3 out of 6 exit respondents belonged to the group of the poorest.
203 ANOVA p-value = .004; N [number o f drugshop visits] = 161.
Without differentiating between urban and rural areas, the better-off spend USh 411 more (ANOVA p- 
value: 0.012; N = 277).
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In contrast to government clinics, people get what they paid for. The decision on 
expenditure remains with the customer who can buy any minimal amount of drugs. 
Buying an underdose is one of people's responses which cope with money shortages 
and the inability to pay (see also Chapter 6.2.8 for the extent of underdosing). As 
drugshops are also more accessible in physical terms, people usually do not have to 
make trade-offs between price and distance. On the other hand, once the customer 
leaves the decision on the drug package and the costs to the drugshop attendant, 
average charges are very high, but they can be paid in instalments. In the household 
interview sample, more than a third of the sickness episodes cost more than USh 
2,000 and a sixth more than 3,000, going up to 10,000, which is three times the 
monthly household medical expenditure. These sums come close to those at higher- 
level providers.
That said, there are clear trade-offs as regards quality (see also Chapter 6.2). In 
many cases the "drug package" prescribed at the drugshop does not cure the patient. 
In the exit interview sample, 45 percent of the patients had first visited a drugshop 
before utilising a higher-level provider. Having spent a lot of money at the drugshop 
level reduces people's access to utilise higher-level providers, as one NGO health 
worker explained:
"People take pain killers, which just relieve the pain, but do not cure. They keep 
going to the drugshops for two weeks and end up paying up to 5,000, until they 
come to the health unit without money" (interview, in-charge rN -3 ,1999).
Yet one must strongly bear in mind the various reasons for going to drugshops in 
the short-term, namely the perceived (un)severity of the disease and the adequacy of 
drugshops in this case, but also the inability to mobilise enough money for treatment 
at and transport to a higher-level provider. This obstructs a long-term view in which 
people would realise that they lose out both financially and in terms of their health. 
By contrast, better-off people go more often or change sooner to higher-level 
providers, even for "minor" diseases, instead of wasting time and money at 
drugshops. In the exit interview sample, the ratio among the poor who first went to a 
drugshop against those going straight to a higher-level provider was 3:1, whereas it 
was 1:1 for the better-off people.
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Likewise, better-off people seem to use rural private clinics more often, although 
there is no correlation in the few cases of the household sample.204 As they all live 
very near the private clinics, distance may have been the major reason for utilisation. 
Yet better-off people pay on average USh 1,000 more.
Urban clinics
Utilisation differences between the poorer and better-off are particularly remarkable 
at the urban clinics.
At uG-1, the utilisation rate and expenditure pattern do not correlate with the 
wealth variable in the household sample, but in fact, none of the rural poor had 
utilised this clinic, and only 11% of the rural better-off.205 However, the qualitative 
evidence suggests that utilisation depends upon the on-the-spot cash availability. 75 
percent of the urban and semi-urban and two thirds of all household interview 
respondents, as well as 63 percent of urban exit interviewees, named lower user 
charges and current lack of money as the main reasons for utilisation of the urban 
government clinic. Thus, the poorer urban and semi-urban population uses this clinic 
only if they do not have more cash on hand for going to other more preferred, but
9 06more expensive and better places, such as private and NGO clinics.
In contrast, poorer people are less likely to use private clinics. In fact, in the 
household sample, almost two thirds of the variability between the two groups is 
explained by the wealth variable. 207 Likewise, three quarters of the exit interviewees 
at private clinics were better-off people. This correlation of the better-off being more 
likely to utilise private clinics is also confirmed by the national household survey of 
1995 (Hutchinson 1999: 21). It was also found that poorer exit interviewees spent 
considerably less on private clinics per illness episode; they usually did not spend 
more than USh 5,000 per visit208 The exit interview sample also indicates that urban
204 Seven households of the poorer category (13%) made nine visits, whereas eight households of the 
better-off group (17%) made 19 visits.
205 Likewise, 4 out of 14 exit patients belonged to the poorest group.
206 A similar argument is made by McPake et al. (1998).
207 Chi-Square p-value = .019; Gamma = 0.643; sig-p-value = .02
208 There was one case of a poor respondent; the injured woman paid USh 10,000 for several daily 
dressings.
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NGO clinics serve a rather better-off clientele, as none of the respondents belonged to 
the poorer group.209
Since utilisation of these urban clinics requires considerable financial means, it is 
clear that lower income sections from rural areas are put off by the charges, even if 
credit is provided. Adding the average transport costs and the average user charges 
amounts to USh 7,500 for the NGO clinics and to USh 8,360 for the private clinics 
(exit interview data). The latter costs for one illness are more than ten times the 
average monthly medical expenditure per capita of USh 623 in the poorer half of the
1 flpopulation. Even though the NGO clinics are slightly less expensive on average, 
the price difference between for-profit and not-for-profit clinics is blurred. In light of 
the high illness reporting rate, access is restricted and constitutes a financial 
challenge, which is also expressed in the focus group discussions:
"One goes to these clinics if one has money (FGD, Kamuli town, 1999).
Access to the hospital OPD requires considerable financial means, and 
accordingly the rural clientele judges the costs as expensive. Among the household 
sample, there is no difference between the poorer and the better-off in terms of 
utilisation, but among the exit interviewees, about a fourth only belonged to the 
poorer group.
Also, the poorer people (in the household sample) have much higher 
expenditures, but the difference is not statistically significant. This is possibly due to 
the different case mix between poorer and better-off people and because poorer 
people postpone a hospital visit until a disease has become very serious. People are 
very reluctant to go to the hospital and shy away from the costs, once they are referred 
by lower-level providers (interviews, health workers, 1999 and observation). In sum, 
fear of high costs is one of the main reasons why people avoid going to the hospital. 
It also explains why people too often arrive too late at the hospital when the disease 
has become an emergency.
209 In the household sample, there were very few using these clinics. Three households belonged to the 
poorer group, while another two belonged to the better-of; all of them lived in the urban or peri-urban 
area.
210 Average household size: 5.9 people (National Household Survey Data, in World Bank 2001b).
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In sum, this section reveals that there are considerable differences in utilisation 
and expenditure between the two groups, suggesting that poorer people are more 
restricted in their choice between providers. However, the implication of the finding 
that poorer people spend less on average at some of the providers (rural Protestant 
NGOs, drugshops, and private clinics) needs further detailed study. The question is 
whether lower expenditure results in underdosing or in a less severe degree of 
polypharmacy. At drugshops, it was found that there are a large percentage of 
treatments characterised by both (see Chapter 6.2.8).
5.9. Conclusion: Restricted Access for the Poorest and Ways Forward
This chapter showed that drugshops are most flexible and best as regards financial 
access for the poorest, since the decision on expenditure remains on the customer's 
side. However, this flexible financial accessibility suffers from quality trade-offs (see 
Chapter 6.2). It was also found that, since NGO clinics are increasingly under 
financial pressure to recover their costs just as private clinics are, user charges of 
urban NGO clinics have converged with those of private clinics. This fact was clearly 
expressed in the focus groups' statements, one saying:
"NGOs are like private clinics, so long as you have your kin [= your relatives
with money]" (FGD, Subcounty B, 1999).
Likewise, the government health workers have "privatised" government services 
by their informal charging strategies. In terms of the service transaction and payment 
procedure, the line between for-profit, not-for-profit and government clinics is hence 
blurred, and what we find is a process of hybridisation with private sector features 
dominating. This has negative impacts in terms of equity and access. So, as a result of 
this marketisation, access and the receipt of drugs are contingent upon payment and 
not based on people's ability to pay.211 This is the case for all provider types, though 
on a more moderate degree for rural NGO units. As said, I came across people who 
had to sell a goat or even land in order to cover for their health care expenses at 
higher level providers, i.e., they lost major assets whilst seeking treatment. One
211 This is also what Tibandebage/Mackintosh (1999) conclude in their study of Tanzania.
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household was found that had not attended any provider during the recalling period, 
and another 20 households had only used drugshops but no other facility type. Thus, 
the key question is not actually about equal access in proportion to one's income and 
ability to pay. It is more fundamentally about access at all, given the rare practice of 
exemption.
This chapter also indicated the possible quality of care trade-offs in the case of 
insufficient availability of financial resources, since people resort to partial treatment 
and non-completion of drug dose. Another problem of financing services through 
user charges is the perverse incentive of providers to over-prescribe. This has 
negative implications on access and quality of care. The next chapter will therefore 
close the circle by comparing the efficiency of staff resource utilisation and quality of 
care between the health care providers.
The remainder of this section will consider some ways forward. The crucial 
point is to ensure that finances are available for health services for the most 
vulnerable (Bennett 1991). First, it is necessary to improve the state's capacity to 
increase tax collection to generate some degree of redistribution. Second, 
"redistributive health care" must be considered as a "normal and legitimate" norm 
within the health care system (Mackintosh/Tibandebage 2000: 4).
Since over half of the rural population in Uganda lives below the poverty line, 
one challenge lies in defining the ability to pay (cf. Russell 1996). It is very difficult 
for the staff to assess a patient's financial situation, but as nobody should be denied 
treatment because of lack of money, a first step to improve access is to provide credit. 
Parish chiefs or the LC1 Public Health Co-ordinator (a position that was currently not 
found to be in existence) could carry out the debt enforcement and could be granted a 
specific proportion of the debt recovery (e.g., 10 percent). (Horizontal) equity may 
also be increased by means of price discrimination by location of residence (cf. 
Fabricant et al. 1999: 195). Another very crucially required change is to move from 
"registration" fees to (sliding) user charges for the provision of drugs and treatment. 
At best, the setting of such charges is based on local consultation processes 
(Mackintosh/Tibandebage 2000). While charging user fees for drugs reinforces the 
curative bias and people's preoccupation with drugs, it does take people's perspective 
seriously, since they are willing to pay for drugs (van der Geest 2000: 64; McPake et
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al. 1993: 1383). Above all it will promote again the use of government facilities and 
keep people away from drugshops, where the staff is usually unqualified. User 
charges could be increased on the basis of an open discussion of how to convert 
unofficial fees into official revenue. This contributes to reducing informal charging, 
which puts the patient in a very insecure position and hence deters his or her 
utilisation. Killingsworth et al. (1999) recommend for Bangladesh that such changes 
should be accompanied by a political consensus of intolerance for the most serious 
forms of rent seeking, which is also absolutely fundamental for Uganda.
The suggestion of raising user fees and increasing the rate of exemption must be 
carefully examined for Uganda. It may be promising to introduce incentives to the 
health workers to provide exemptions; for example, by a top-up allowance that is 
granted once the health unit exempts a specific percentage of patients. Patient (and 
household) eligibility must be clearly defined and established by means testing. 
Eligible patients should obtain vouchers or an exemption ticket from the local 
council, which entitles them to health care for a certain number of visits per year. The 
DMO's supervision should then check whether only eligible persons have been 
exempted by comparing the health unit's exemption records with the respective list of 
eligible persons. Ultimately, however, it is crucial to move towards redistributive 
prepayment schemes that should be combined with some co-payments in order to 
avoid moral hazard. More knowledge is required on how the poor cope in order to 
find the best strategy (cf. Russell 1996). All of these measures must be seen in 
combination with other structural-systemic reforms in order to be effective (see 
Chapters 7-8).
212 The principles of "monumokabi" groups (burial groups), which cover burial expenses by monthly 
payments o f all households, could serve as a starting point for emergency insurance systems. For 
further elaboration on community-financing schemes, cf. Jakab/Krishnan (2001) and Preker et al. 
(2001).
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Chapter 6
Relative Efficiency of Staff Resource Utilisation and Quality of Care
This chapter compares the different provider types along relative efficiency of staff 
resource utilisation and quality of care. The relevance of quality of care goes without 
saying, but is of particular concern given the informalised and privatised pluralistic 
health care provision. Likewise, efficiency is cmcial in light of the tight financial 
situation the Ugandan health care system is faced with. Cost-benefit analyses and 
cost-utility analyses should be the preferred type of health economic evaluation, 
where both costs and benefits are measured in monetary units in the former procedure 
and benefits in QALYs in the latter, thereby allowing for wider comparisons 
(Annell/Norinder 2000). Due to practical and methodological problems, however, a 
technical efficiency analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) are widely 
favoured by using intermediary outcome or output measures. Particularly for a 
comparative study of provider types, the analysis of technical efficiency and CEA are 
the conventional and most suitable approaches (cf. Drummond 1987, Pearson 1997, 
Sinanovic et al. 2000, Bitran 1995), since it is not possible to assess the cost-benefit 
ratio of each intervention at each provider type given the multiple factors influencing 
health. For our purposes and for reasons explained below, the efficiency analysis is 
confined to the utilisation of one input factor, that of staff resources.
Cost-effectiveness refers to minimum costs for a given output, whereas technical 
efficiency denotes maximum output for given costs (cf. Mills 1997b: 245, Green 
1990: 275). Thus, cost-effectiveness and technical efficiency -  or derivatives of 
efficiency analyses as in this chapter -  are about the "capacity of the individual, 
organisational unit, facility, operation or activity to produce measurable results in 
proportion to the resources extended" (Carley 1980: 64). Measuring inputs and costs 
of inputs is usually not that difficult213, whereas it is much more complicated for 
output, not least to define it. Moreover, measuring efficiency is challenging, because 
a number of factors (quality of care, case mix, input price, scale of operation) vary 
among the different providers and thereby affect the relation between inputs and 
health outputs (cf. Bitran 1995). A technical efficiency or cost-effectiveness analysis
213 Measuring opportunity costs is more complex, however.
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or a specific efficiency analysis, as it is chosen here, therefore require one common 
output indicator that measures efficiency for a given level of quality of care. That 
said, there is no single quality index from indicators of many different aspects of 
quality of care that would provide such a comparable output indicator.
Given this methodological problem, the relative efficiency of staff resource 
utilisation is separately analysed (Section 6.1) from quality of care (Section 6.2) as do 
other studies (cf. Bitran 1995, Sinanovic et al. 2000). But this is not to ignore their 
interrelation. For example, good scores on cost-effectiveness, technical efficiency and 
efficiency of staff resource utilisation do not necessarily say anything about quality. 
In order to increase quality, it may be necessary to increase costs, thereby possibly 
lowering the efficiency ratio. Only an overall discussion of the two aspects will then 
allow for making valid statements. Section 6.3 provides a summary and conclusion as 
to the overall attribution of relative strengths among the various provider types by 
taking into account the discussion on access in the previous chapter. Having a more 
comprehensive view of each sector's relative strengths, Chapters 7 and 8 can then 
attempt to explain performance and malperformance by means of an institutional 
analysis and a study of interorganisational relationships.
6.1. Efficiency of Staff Resource Utilisation
Technical efficiency, or the efficiency of staff resource utilisation, refers to the 
relationship of inputs (here staff resources) to direct outputs. Output is 
operationalised by means of the utilisation rate as the number of outpatients per 
month (cf. Pearson 1997, Flessa 1998, Sinanovic et al. 2000, Bitran 1995 for similar 
approaches). While this indicator is problematic in that, as McPake et al. (1999) point 
out, it suggests that patients can best judge the trade-off between costs and quality, 
one must equally consider that
If a service judged to be of higher quality from a professional perspective is not
used, the cost-perceived quality position of that service is insufficient for
effective health services to be delivered (1999: 862-3).
That is, the utilisation rate, which is a reflection of people's perception of quality and 
hence their choice, translated into health care seeking, is an important determinant of
166
cost-effectiveness and technical efficiency, as well as of efficiency of staff resource 
utilisation (cf. Chapter 4.5 for people’s utilisation factors).
The input side is operationalised as staff numbers and salary costs. Salary costs 
constitute the main input factors, amounting to about three quarters. Other inputs are 
not considered, for the reasons stated below, thus not allowing for a comprehensive 
cost-effectiveness or technical efficiency analysis, but only for an analysis of the 
efficiency of staff resource utilisation. Other input factors include drugs and medical 
supplies, as well as running and maintenance costs. Given the huge problems that 
surround drug supply and provision and the different degrees of subsidisation (see 
Chapter 4), input costs of drugs are difficult to quantify, and instead drug availability 
will be discussed in Section 6.2 on quality of care. There is usually a shortage of 
operational and maintenance items, and clinics work with the absolute minimum. 
Mainly being a function of patient numbers, these inputs into the health production 
function are (proportionally) equal among the health care providers. Further 
economising (i.e., arithmetically improving technical efficiency and cost- 
effectiveness) would severely affect the quality of services. Because of practical 
difficulties in determining these costs and because they are comparatively low, they 
can be neglected. Likewise, external monitoring and supervision costs appear to be 
marginal in comparison with the overall costs of salaries (and drugs). Similarly, a 
study of South Africa showed that these were around 1.5 percent of recurrent costs 
(Sinanovic et al. 2000: 3). Finally, for similar reasons, costs for electricity and 
furniture can be neglected.214
The efficiency analysis of staff resource utilisation is based on the following 
indicators:
• Patient throughput per staff:
[Number of outpatients per month] / [number of staff]
• Patient throughput per qualified staff:
[Number of outpatients per month] / [number of qualified staff]
214 Sinanovic et al. (2000) undertake a comprehensive cost-analysis including all furniture and 
equipment to compare different providers. However, while an additional closet, for example, increases 
the cost-side, and hence lowers cost-effectiveness, this seems to be of little meaning as regards cost- 
effectiveness.
167
• Staff salary costs per patient:
[Number of outpatients per month] / [Official staff costs per month]
The last indicator does not say so much about staff "cost-effectiveness" in its true 
sense given the varying input prices, and so rather reflects staff equity aspects, but it 
is still indicative.215 The data presented below refers to the period of September 1998 
to August 1999, and a longer time series where available helped to verify its 
representativeness.
Data on staff inputs was gathered by means of interviews with health 
professionals, HUMC members, NGO headquarter staff, DED health professionals, 
as well as DED reports, KDA budgets and other District documents, which allowed 
for triangulation. Staff costs only include salaries and lunch allowances, but exclude 
top-up allowances and costs for training. At private and NGO clinics, utilisation rates 
were calculated on the basis of record books, the data of which were confirmed by 
observation. Government clinics are known to record inflated patient numbers; 
however, the three government clinics in the core sample are well managed. My and 
the DED staffs observations showed that recorded patient numbers corresponded 
broadly with actual numbers (cf. Annex 1.10).
Rural clinics
Outpatient and case throughputs per (qualified) staff in rural clinics are presented in 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. Staff salary costs per patient are illustrated in 
Figures 6.3. Further evidence of another 11 government clinics is provided in Figure 
6.4.216
Overall, NGO clinics perform much better than rural government clinics in terms 
of (official) costs per patient. As regards patient throughput per staff and per qualified 
staff, performance cuts across the sectors. One of the NGO clinics scores moderately, 
whereas rG-3 performs relatively well. Figure 6.3 indicates that the government 
clinics' patient throughput varies a lot. In fact, the two selected rural clinics are 
located in the lower half. Despite variance in government utilisation rates, the major
2151 owe this point to Barbara McPake.
2,6 Figure 6.4 is based on DED records of utilisation rates at rural government clinics.
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factor and explanation seems to be variation on the input side. Some o f the clinics are 
well staffed, and in fact they have too many nursing aids. This is also the case for rG- 
2. Likewise, NGO clinics operate with few staff, but utilisation rates are equally 
moderate. The Protestant clinics suffered from the widespread view within the 
community that their services are restricted to Christians. These rumours were 
actively spread by drugshop owners and possibly contributed to the low utilisation 
rates. In sum, there are larger variations within sectors, but no clear distinctions 
between sectors.217
Figure 6.1: Average monthly outpatient throughput per (qualified) staff at rural 
providers218
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□  OPD case throughput / staff ■  OPD case throughput / qualified staff
217 During their study of 1992/93, Okello et al. found that outpatient throughput per skilled staff was 
larger in government dispensaries (smaller health facilities) than in NGO clinics (1998: 16).
218 Inpatients were weighted with the factor six (cf. Pearson 1997).
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Figure 6.3: Average staff salary costs per patient at rural providers (in USh)
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Source: record books/observation (OPD number), District budgets (staff salaries), 
interviews with Headquarters and health workers (salary costs)
219 Here, the cases include the maternity patients (deliveries, antenatal, postnatal and FP). Except of 
uG-2, the health workers are in charge of both curative health care and maternity patients, so that it is 
difficult to separate their OPD workload from that of the maternity. In calculating the number of total 
number of patients, deliveries were weighted with the factor six (cf. Pearson 1997).
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Figure 6.4: Average monthly patient throughput at rural government health units
rG -4 rG -5 rG-6 rG-7 rG -8 rG -9 rG -10 rG-11 rG -12 rG -13 rG-14
□  Patient throughput /  staff
Source: DED reports, 1998-99 
Urban clinics:
Figure 6.5 presents the scores of patient throughput per (qualified) staff for urban 
clinics. Staff salary costs per patient are illustrated in Figure 6.6.
With the exception of one NGO clinic, the non-state clinics including the 
hospital OPD have a considerably higher patient throughput, both in terms o f the total 
number o f staff and in terms o f (highest) qualified staff. The score is best for private 
clinics run by a doctor. As regards costs per patient, the NGO facilities (uN-1 and the 
hospital OPD) and one of the private clinics, which is operated by an employed 
medical assistant, score much better than do the government health centre. By 
contrast, the other NGO clinic is very cost-ineffective in comparison. This clinic has 
only opened recently, so that it may be less known to rural people as yet, thus 
explaining the low utilisation rates.
220 The other private clinics are run by the owners, so that it is difficult to ascribe an explicit salary in 
light of the very different incentive structures operating in private clinics.
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Figure 6.5: Average monthly outpatient throughput per (qualified) staff at urban 
providers
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Source: Record books, facility survey221
Figure 6.6: Average staff salary costs per patient at urban providers (in USh)
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Source: record books (OPD number), District budget analysis, interviews with 
headquarters and health workers (salary costs)
Some further qualifications for both rural and urban areas are necessary. First, 
salaries and allowances o f NGO staff are lower than those o f government employees, 
so that NGO clinics are not simply more cost-effective as regards staff salaries. Nor
221 Patient record books at P-2 did not allow for a precise analysis. The outpatient throughput is about 
400-500 per month.
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are employees' salaries at private clinics above government levels (see Table 7.1). 
Chapter 7 will further look into the staffing processes and thus provide explanations 
for the different levels of efficiency as regards staff resource utilisation.
Second, the occasional staff absences at rural NGO clinics and the very frequent 
staff absences at government clinics are not reflected in the above input side. In 
reality, staff input for these two provider types is much lower in reality. Since 
government clinics usually open for only three to four hours, i.e. half of the official 
time, and operate with a skeleton staff (see Section 6.2.5), total staff input at 
government clinics is much less than half the official one, (arithmetically) increasing 
the efficiency ratio. It equally indicates, however, that government clinics are often 
overstaffed in relation to the current utilisation rates. In other words, the patient load 
could be managed with much fewer staff than currently employed. In light of these 
qualifications on the input side, the above efficiency scores of staff resource 
utilisation must be seen rather as an estimation and approximate indication.
The time-use aspect raises two further points. First, people are aware of the fact 
that government clinics are only open during the morning and adjust their health care 
seeking accordingly. If the clinics were open all day, they could possibly attract more 
patients. This would also lower waiting times and improve service quality (see 
Section 6.2.4). While the inputs would go up, so would the output side, which may 
not necessarily change the efficiency score for staff resource utilisation. Secondly, 
dealing with many patients in a short time leads to quick examination at government 
clinics, translating into very "efficient", but possibly not effective time use. In 
contrast, more careful consultations would improve quality, but also increase inputs 
and costs. In sum, it is difficult to judge the efficiency of staff resource utilisation 
without further examining quality.
6.2. Quality of Care
The attempt to specify quality of care comprises all methodological difficulties in 
defining relative strengths, as outlined in Chapter 2.4. Quality perceptions are specific 
to the context and contingent upon people's preferences, expectations and 
experiences. Hence, quality is very relative. The way quality is perceived affects
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utilisation, and this is why it is very important to be aware of and take into account 
people’s notions in a quality comparison on the one hand. On the other, there is a 
biomedical, professional approach to defining quality of care. However, the setting of 
biomedical quality standards is equally influenced by feasibility and resource 
availability. In a context of scarcity as in Uganda, standards should target a certain 
minimum, but simultaneously not be too demanding and hence unrealistic. The 
Ugandan National Treatment Guidelines provide a useful orientation, which will be 
used for the analysis of biomedical quality of care.
Combining people's views and expectations (cf. Chapter 4.5.3) and biomedical 
requirements, quality of care will be conceptualised as the service delivery process 
comprising a (biomedically) adequate consultation and examination by appropriate 
staff who provides correct treatment (drugs) and who treats patients with dignity by 
behaving in a decent way. Accordingly, the following indicators of process and 
clinical quality of care are applied:
Process quality
• Drug availability (Section 6.2.1);
• Staff behaviour and commitment (Section 6.2.2);
• Adequate provision of privacy (Section 6.2.3);
• Waiting time (Section 6.2.4);
• Opening hours and presence of qualified staff (Section 6.2.5);
• Attendance of patients by qualified staff (Section 6.2.6);
Clinical quality of care
• Quality of consultation (Section 6.2.7);
- The provision o f  a clinical examination (6.2.7.1);
- Quality o f  diagnoses (6.2.7.2);
• Quality of treatment and prescription patterns (Section 6.2.8);
- Fit between diagnosis and treatment (6.2.8.1);
- Rational use o f  drugs (6.2.8.2);
- Use o f  clinically sterilised syringes (6.2.8.3); and
222 For similar approaches in quality assessments, cf. McPake et al. 1998, Koppenleitner/Mpabulungi 
1997, Kipp et al. 1994 for Uganda, Sinanovic et al. 2000 for South Africa, Mliga 2000 for Tanzania, 
Aljunid/Zwi 1997 for Malaysia, and Bitr&n 1995 for Senegal.
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Patients1 view
• Patient's satisfaction with service quality (Section 6.2.9)
This subchapter will show that the quality o f services differs significantly in many of  
the above aspects. The relationship with and the implications upon efficiency will be 
taken up in the concluding section.
6.2.1. Drug Availability
Chapter 4.3 showed that drug supply and costs/subsidisation differ tremendously 
among the various health care providers. This has implications for user costs, 
utilisation and drug availability. Drug availability, namely the provision o f drugs to 
the patient at a health care provider, is one o f the key elements o f the health service 
delivery process, and in people's view, it is one o f the most important features (cf. 
Whyte 1988, 1992, van der Geest et al. 2000). The previous chapter addressed the 
relation between the patient's ability to pay and the receipt o f drugs. This section will 
examine the degree to which people have received (all) drugs at the various 
providers. As Figures 6.7 and 6.8 indicate, non-availability o f drugs is only a problem 
at government clinics and the hospital OPD.
Figure 6.7: Percentage o f patients that received (all) drugs at rural providers
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□  Exit interviews ■  H ousehold interviews
223 The above indicators are not exhaustive, but they allow for a balanced assessment of quality of care.
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Figure 6.8: Percentage of patients that received (all) drugs at urban providers
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At government clinics, drugs are in principle paid for with the user fees. Yet uG- 
1 and rG-2 are indeed typical cases for government clinics with limited drug 
availability in comparison to the other providers (cf. McPake et al. 1999, Okello et al.
1998).224 Likewise, during all FGDs (except in Subcounty C), discussants emphasised 
that drugs are not available in the health units, unless one pays additionally and bribes 
health workers, or unless one has a relative or a friend that works at the government 
unit, which increases the likeliness o f getting drugs. Focus group discussants 
complained that
"If you don't have money, they only give drugs to a specific class of people, i.e.
the leaders and the rich, or those close to them."
"I was examined and diagnosed, but I have not got treatment, because I had no
money, even though I am in pain, b u t... I have no money."
"Someone died in [rG-2], because they had no drugs (FGDs, 1999).
Many patients received some drugs at the government clinics; however, during 
the exit interviews, I observed that underdoses are given out at these two clinics as
224 My or the research assistants' mere presence probably had an effect on the staffs drug dispensing 
patterns on that data collection day and explains the large difference between exit and household 
interview responses.
Moreover, the exit interview score for rG-2 is most likely lower, because the first half of the 
respondents were merely asked whether they had received all prescribed drugs. We then realised the 
necessity of actually checking their drugs, since some people did not know or simply told us because of 
fear or maybe shame that they had got all types of drugs, while they had not.
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well as at other health units (interview, Bulow, DED health worker, 1999; FGD, 
Subcounty B, 1999). At uG-1 and rG-2, patients were usually given some 5-10 
aspirin or a few Chloroquine tablets, whereas the more expensive drugs had to be 
bought in drugshops. In rural health centres, at least 40 percent of the patients went to 
buy drugs at drugshops and spent USh 2,158 on average per illness. In the urban 
government clinic, this percentage is even higher, with 9 out of 20 people going to 
drugshops and paying from USh 400 to 6,000 (mean: USh 2,300) on average. 
McPake et al. (1999: 885) found that patients had to buy a mean of 31.6 percent of 
the prescribed drugs. rG-3 is somewhat exceptional among the government clinics. 
There, patients usually receive the prescribed drugs if the in-charge, who strictly 
controls the drugstore for fear of drug leakage by the other staff, has made them 
available to the OPD staff when he is not around.
The negotiations of informal payments and the receipt of drugs are very abusive 
in tone, and government health workers exploit the patients’ imperfect information. 
This is exemplified in the following dialogue, which was witnessed by the research 
assistant, when a father went to the dispensing window in order to pick up the 
prescribed drugs for his sick daughter:
Nursing aid: "You think you can get all the drugs from here! You can go and buy
from the shop".
Father: "Okay, if you tell me what to buy, I can go and buy, because I want my
child to get better, other than giving me half dose."
Nursing aid: "If you think you must buy, you can go and buy."
This answer did obviously not help him and the father gave up.
This "referral" to drugshops presupposes people's knowledge and compliance in 
buying the missing items in accordance with their prescriptions, lack of which 
however negatively affects treatment correctness. Being well aware of the lack of 
qualified staff at drugshops and their malpractice, the health workers' behaviour is 
very irresponsible. Accordingly, government health units are perceived only as a 
place to get a prescription. The dissatisfaction with user fees at government clinics is 
thus not so much due to the amount itself, but to the lack of an equivalent service for
225 Since people are not usually told what to buy exactly, it is assumed that people buy the remaining 
drugs required by comparing the number of obtained drugs with the required number according to the 
prescription.
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the money (cf. Golooba-Mutebi 1999). So, besides other reasons, poor drug 
availability explains low utilisation of government clinics. The following statement 
was heard from many respondents: "Why not go directly to a drugshop [instead of 
first wasting money at the health centre]?" At drugshops, drugs are available based on 
the ability to pay, and so drugshops play the critical role in the health care system by 
making drugs (again) available.
There are several reasons for the limited drug availability at government clinics. 
On the one hand, the UEDMP supply is not fully reliable (cf. Chapter 4.3). So, when 
clinics did not received their kits, they have the option of giving out underdoses or no 
medication at all. The other major reason for inadequate drug availability is "drug 
leakage" at the health centre level, that is, the personal appropriation by health 
workers who then sell these drugs on a private basis.226 The remaining drugs are not 
sufficient in relation to the patient load. McPake et al.'s study estimates that 76 
percent (median) of drugs disappear into private channels (1999: 854). An informal 
monthly drug store check over a one-year period revealed that in half the clinics, the 
most essential drugs were existent in the store, including uG-1, rG-2, and rG-3. In the 
other half, even the most essential drugs were not available any longer only one 
month after the supply of kits (supervision reports, Muller-Stover, DED doctor,
1999). Thus, the stores were practically empty, which also indicates that these units 
do not buy them on the local market.227 The problem, however, with such a static 
indicator is that it does not measure drug flow and does not say anything about 
availability over time or about actual availability to people. Instead, it indicates 
different patterns and flows of leakage.
In order to supplement the EDKs and improve drug availability at the health 
centre level, government clinics are directed to spend 20 percent of their monthly user
226 There are various strategies for making drugs leak from the store without creating a gap in the drug 
store records. One easy way is to give out underdoses or no drugs at all, but record a full dose in the 
record books. Another option is to report ghost patients.
227 Another report studying drug availability in three government health clinics in Kamuli (including 
uG-1 and rG-2) found that two thirds of 19 selected essential drugs were available 
(Koppenleitner/Mpabulungi 1997: 40, own calculations). Similarly, Kafuko et al.'s (1993) analysis on 
rational drug use in six Districts within all regions reveals that for five conditions, 92 percent o f the 
drugs are in place.
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fee revenues on local drug purchases to buy the most essential missing drugs.228 
Some of the clinics do buy additional drugs, but in the three selected units, it is below 
the supposed level, namely 14 percent (uG-1), 5 percent (rG-2) and 8 percent (rG-3). 
The purchase volume is thus minimal, considering the local drug prices, and cannot 
fulfil the objectives of the user fee policy, namely quality improvement through 
increased drug availability. Overall, clinics act strategically and store some drugs for 
unforeseen supervisory visits by the DMO (or when visitors, including researchers, 
are around) and for those patients willing and able to pay additional charges. Hence, 
the resulting crucial question is whether the policy of using user fee revenues for 
drugs makes sense in the context of this high extent of leakage (McPake et al. 1999). 
In any case, it makes a cost-effectiveness analysis (including drug costs) useless.
At the Mission hospital OPD, there are also incidents where people do not 
receive all drugs, although at a much lower degree than at government facilities. 
The problem of non-availability of drugs that are out of stock must also be seen in the 
context of the supply difficulties caused by the District authorities (see Chapters 4.4 
and 8). However, following up the case of one exit interviewee revealed some 
irregularities. The respondent had paid the required amount at the drug-dispensing 
window, but was then told that the two drugs needed were out of stock. He was sent 
to the hospital's pharmacy (the drug store located at the other end of the hospital 
compound). There, he was given only one type of drug and again informed that the 
other type prescribed was out of stock and that he should go to the drugshops in town. 
He did not receive a refund (but he also did not ask for it). The attendant of the 
respondent (an active NGO volunteer), whom I knew and to whom I give much 
credibility, suspects that the drugs ended up in private pockets:
"Maybe the OPD nurses work together with the pharmacy. They cannot ask 
people for money and then not give them the drugs, because then people would 
question the payment. So, they send them to the pharmacy, where they then do 
not give out the drugs. You do not expect people going back to the window and
228 The paradox is that there is no pharmacy in Kamuli District that is licensed to sell class A and B 
drugs.
229 This must be differentiated from the cases in which patients are unable to pay the required amount 
(see Chapter 5.6).
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ask for a refund afterwards. The poor people from the village would not dare. 
They do not know about the procedures.”
In fact, a couple of outpatients were seen going to the pharmacy, obviously because 
they were told that drugs were not available at the OPD. On the other hand, one staff 
of the hospital management pointed out that
"Drugs are often stolen by the staff at the dispensing window, though they are 
not even government nurses. That is why for example antibiotics are given out at 
the pharmacy" (interview, 1999).
It was not possible to find out what really happened. Whether drugs are taken 
away or out of stock, the problem is that people are not given the drugs or a refund 
when they are sent to the pharmacy. Furthermore, there was one exit respondent who 
was told to buy some of the drugs at the drugshop. Comparing the amount of money 
he had paid with the drugs received and the hospital's drug prices, it seems that he 
had paid more than the drugs were worth. This patient was a poor peasant, came from 
far away, attended the hospital for the first time and was probably not familiar with 
the procedures. He did not receive the usual receipt and was hence not aware of being 
cheated. Altogether, drug availability can fall victim to the staffs informal income 
generation strategies, which are copied from government practice. NGOs do not exist 
in a vacuum or in a different sphere; rather the general environment of embezzlement, 
the allowance culture, and corruption influences their operations. Yet, these occur at a 
much lower extent than at government clinics and are more difficult to keep in secret 
(see Chapter 7 for further elaboration).
At the rural NGO clinics, there was no patient in the sample that did not receive 
drugs, and focus group discussions confirmed that drugs are available (cf. Okello et 
al. 1998: 19). Drug provision and availability to the patient is a function of drug 
supply and direct payment, that is, the patient's ability to pay. Therefore, only people 
who have money will actually attend those clinics. It is also one of explicated 
patients' rights at the Protestant clinics to receive drugs and proper treatment. At the 
urban NGO and private clinics, all respondents obtained drugs, except for three 
patients at the more expensive clinic P-4, who did not have enough money. At these 
clinics, drug availability is equally contingent upon the payment, with the negative 
implications upon access and quality of treatment.
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In sum, at all provider types, complete drug availability is ultimately a function 
of the patient's ability to pay. The consequences are underdosing and/or weakened 
treatment discipline if  a patient is unwilling to follow the prescription and to purchase 
what it says.
6.2.2. Staff Behaviour and Commitment
The attitude of health staff towards patients is a crucial element in health care 
provision. First, illness and medical care can threaten a person’s dignity and his or her 
ability to exercise control over him- or herself; adequate staff behaviour is hence a 
fundamental part of easing people's anxieties (WHO 2000: 14). Secondly, staff 
behaviour will have an impact on the patient's contribution to recovery. For example 
the patient must know afterwards how to take the drugs prescribed (cf. Hentschel 
1999: 77). Thirdly, an effective health consultation and examination requires 
interactive communication, in which the patient feels comfortable. Moreover, 
friendly staff behaviour is very important for people, because it shapes the (access to 
the) service transaction.
To assess staff behaviour, people were asked what they thought about the staff 
behaviour. These statements could be triangulated by my own observation and that of 
DED health professionals. People's socio-economic background and their different 
expectations and experiences affect their assessment of staff behaviour. Whether and 
how the staff asked for informal payments and whether drugs were obtained will 
therefore also be part of their assessment. Figures 6.9 (for rural providers) and 6.10 
(for urban providers) present people's assessment. These figures demonstrate 
considerable differences among and between provider types, with drugshops and the 
Protestant clinics scoring best in rural areas and private clinics scoring best in town.
230 Hentschel emphasises the importance o f a balance o f control between the staff and the patient 
(1999: 77).
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Figure 6.9: Satisfaction with staff behaviour at rural providers (means)
rG-2 
rG-3 
rN-1,2 
rN-3 
Drugshops
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Answers were prompted: bad (=1), fair (=2), good (=3), very good (=4).
(Means were tested for homogeneity, but were not found to be significantly different. 
This is also the case for Figure 6.10.)
Figure 6.10: Satisfaction with staff behaviour at urban providers (means)
uG-1 
Hospital OPD 
uN-1 
uN-2 
P-1 
P-2 
P-3 
P-4
Priv. Clinics Total
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Answers were prompted: bad (=1), fair (=2), good (=3), very good (=4).
(In the household interviews, case numbers for urban NGO and private clinics were 
very low, if  not zero, which is why no score is reported.)
Government clinics
Figure 6.9 and 6.10 reveals considerable differences between uG-1, rG-2 and rG-3, 
and these differences are confirmed by the available data o f another 11 government
H Exit interviews 
■  Household interviews
■  Household interviews 
^  Exit interviews
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clinics.231 This variability suggests a more differentiated view than the general bad 
reputation. In seven of these, the staff is unfriendly and rather rude. At the other seven 
units, staff behaviour is friendly.
With a score of 3.00232, rG-3 presents one of the positive examples, which is 
confirmed by my observation and focus group discussions. Patients are greeted and 
addressed in a friendly manner, the atmosphere is relaxed, and staff and patients chat 
together. People also mention that the staff is committed. At uG-1 and rG-2, in 
contrast, the average score is lower. People are dissatisfied with the lack of 
commitment, unfriendliness, abusing and rebuking, lack of drugs and long waiting 
times. The patient-staff relationship is cold and patients are not greeted or even 
looked at when entering the consultation room. Their body language shows 
discomfort if not fear.
It is particularly the poorer rural people who are confronted with abusive 
behaviour, which the following examples that a key informant witnessed at uG-1 
illustrate:
Rural women who come for ANC often receive the insult:
"You don't come dirty to the clinic, you just go out".
A patient was sent to the laboratory, but did not know where to go and therefore 
asked the nursing aid again, who answered: "Don't think that I am stupid. I told 
you where to go" (interview, key informant, 1999).
Rude staff behaviour lowers service quality, and at the same time, it serves as an 
enforcement mechanism for informal payments (cf. McPake et al. 1999). Given the 
existing consumer surplus, it is difficult to resist pursuing this rent-seeking strategy 
(see Chapter 7 for further elaboration). Poorer people fear the health workers and 
suffer most from their rude and insulting behaviour, since they are least in the 
position to pay the additional high charges to "buy" better behaviour. This practice 
also seriously undermines trust, and in combination with lack of money, rudeness and 
abuse lowers utilisation. However, if  people want higher level services but are unable 
to pay the charges in private and NGO clinics, they are forced to go to the urban
231 This assessment is based on the DED health professionals' impressions collected through several 
years' observation of staff behaviour and patients' predisposition when coming to the clinic.
32 This and the following figures are based on the household survey, given the higher validity o f the 
responses there (cf. Chapter 1.4).
233 Killingsworth et al. (1999) note the same for Bangladesh.
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government clinic and make trade-offs between staff behaviour and trust on the one 
hand and financial considerations on the other. Having a friend or a relative working 
at a government unit was mentioned as an explicit reason to go there, as it guarantees 
friendly treatment.
Bad staff behaviour goes hand-in-hand with low motivation, low commitment 
and lack of responsibility. Again, the poorest suffer most. The following experiences 
that very poor looking patients made at various government clinics attest this point:
Waiting in a crowd of other patients for re-consultation, a baby died soundlessly 
in his mother's arms. As it turned out, the child had been examined at the 
laboratory and had very bad blood pressure. The mother was then sent back to 
the line, without anybody taking care of the direness of the situation. None of the 
health workers comforted the mother when she started crying and mourning her 
child (witnessed by an expatriate visitor).
Just shortly after the closure of the OPD, at about 2 o'clock, a young father 
arrived on his bike transporting a small boy, who was unconscious from malaria 
convulsions. Nobody looked after the two; the father was sent around several 
times between the OPD and inpatient wards. A nurse finally attended to him in 
the IP ward, presumably because she saw us observing the incident.
A very old and very sick man from the village came with a younger male 
attendant. He could hardly walk and sit or get down on the bench. He was 
breathing so badly that he fell from the bench and started groaning heavily. The 
medical assistant was not yet on duty by then, but this is not a reason for the 
nursing aid not to look after the patient. In fact, only when the witnessing 
research assistant looked after the two, did the nursing aid take notice and send 
the patient to the laboratory.
In another clinic, it is known that the medical assistant comes to work drunk, and 
probably due to his restricted clinical assessment, children were known to have died 
who otherwise could have been saved with the correct treatment. Patients are left on 
the wards without treatment for days and there is not even a note with the diagnosis 
(personal communication, DED doctor, Miiller-Stover, 1999). The list of such 
examples is lengthy. They illuminate that ethics and responsibility are not present. In 
contrast, at rG-3, respondents described the staff as motivated, committed and caring 
for the patients.234 Thus, the variance among the health units suggests that bad staff 
behaviour is not inevitable. Good leadership and the in-charge's exemplary behaviour
234 This positive assessment is also associated with the more adequate level of drug availability and the 
absence of informal payments.
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can set the rules for interpreting and implementing institutions and thus create an 
atmosphere in which friendly behaviour and commitment is standard.
Rural NGO clinics
At the Protestant rN-1 and rN-2 clinics, both the exit and the household interview 
sample produce a high score on staff behaviour satisfaction (3.56). Patients are 
treated in a very friendly manner. The staff chats with patients, the atmosphere is 
relaxed and patients feel relatively comfortable. People appreciate prompt attention 
and the staffs committed and caring attitude. Satisfaction with staff behaviour is 
strongly interrelated with payment issues, as one household respondent emphasised:
"They ask you in a friendly way how much [money] you have".
However, HUMC members mentioned that there had been two health workers in the 
past whose behaviour was not satisfactory, causing a fall in the number of patients. 
Personality factors and training in a government institution (versus a Mission training 
institution) were seen as the main reasons for their bad behaviour.
In contrast, rN-3 is rated rather low (2.10). People’s negative assessment of staff 
behaviour is influenced by their dissatisfaction with user charges, particularly due to 
previously free services. Except for the Sister in-charge, the nurses were described as 
being rude, unfriendly and not committed and only talking politely to those who were 
well dressed. One female focus group discussant regretted:
"The behaviour of these people is as if they were trained to behave badly. ... 
They are quarrelsome. ... When you are pregnant and you go there, you are 
abused, they rebuke you before being examined. You can be walking towards 
her and the nurse says: 'Hurry up to come. Don't you know that time is passing!"'
The in-charge herself admits:
"We have the tendency to abuse patients and ask them: W hy didn't you come to 
a health unit earlier?’" (interview, 1999).
Another reason for dissatisfaction is that nurses do not attend immediately when they 
are called at their home, which is right next to the clinic. One respondent complained 
that they once did not wake up at night: "You just stay at home or you die there". 
Overall, apart from the Sister in-charge, motivation and commitment among the other 
nurses appear to be rather low.
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Drugshops
Most of the drugshop staff are very friendly and caring. In fact, people's assessment is 
highest for drugshops (3.41). People appreciate the staffs good language, their 
greeting, commitment, immediate service and attendance, as well as the absence of 
rebukes and abuse. Another reason for people’s satisfaction is the provision of credit. 
These are all aspects that people feel do not exist at government clinics. However, a 
third of the respondents relate the good behaviour explicitly to their business and 
money-mindedness, and almost a tenth (8 out of 86) of the respondents that made 
statements on drugshops did not consider the behaviour to be good. The reasons 
given were, for example, money-mindedness, denial of access at night because of a 
patient's lack of money, or being put on hold in favour of those customers with larger 
purchases.
Rural private clinics
Overall, the rural private clinics are rated well, given their observed commitment and 
kind behaviour. But there are exceptions. For example, one expensive private 
practitioner, a senior medical assistant who is also employed in government, was 
reported to be committed only to the well paying patients and to put off clients who 
had little money. He could afford to do so in light of his other income sources -  apart 
from his government job and his garden activities, he is a councillor (as is his wife), 
and another family member is an MP.
Urban non-state facilities
NGO and private clinic users are generally satisfied with staff behaviour, resulting in 
a very high household score (3.5). Everything that people miss at the government 
health units is mentioned positively at these clinics, specifically kind behaviour, 
immediate attendance, drug availability and absence of abuse and rebukes. NGO and 
private clinics depend upon a high patient load. Thus, friendliness and kindness are 
obvious elements of their services: "It is business, for which we pay", many 
respondents said.
235 3.53 for uN-1; there were no cases for uN-2 in the household sample.
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Staff behaviour is also well assessed (2.92) at the hospital OPD. However, there 
is a difference in staff behaviour at the OPD and the wards, as inpatients are often 
only cared for, when they give bribes. The ethic of various doctors must also be 
questioned in light of the following incidents that were witnessed by DED health 
professionals:
A nursing aid reported the aggravation of a patient's state at the home of the 
doctor on duty (on the hospital compound). He told her, 'Tm having my lunch. 
You come later. Don't bother me." When a present medical assistant and another 
DED staff reassured the nurse that her immediate call was correct, he said, "You 
really think that my lunch is not more important....!?"
A woman was having difficult labour. The doctor on duty was called from his 
home (on the compound) to look after her. He had to be asked twice and it took 
him two hours to come.
Further, in the past, doctors on duty in the inpatient wards have been absent (usually 
going to their private clinics), one was often drunk in the evening and therefore 
postponed emergency operations until the following day. Irresponsibility is also found 
among the nurses and midwives. Staff on duty was sometimes found to be asleep, to 
have gone for a walk, or to simply have been careless (interview, hospital staff, 
1999). It is difficult to prove that the death of a patient was due to irresponsibility; 
nonetheless, it is known that post-operative patients or mothers in labour are not 
sufficiently supervised at night (personal communication, Krotz, DED-surgeon, 
1999). Nevertheless, as expatriates note, who work in both the hospital and 
government clinics, the hospital staff has in general a better work morale and is more 
committed and motivated than their counterparts at government units. Furthermore, 
these happenings sharply declined when the hospital administration was fully taken 
over by Sisters; for example, the drunken doctor has been dismissed right away.
In sum, NGO and private clinics, as well as the hospital OPD, perform much 
better as regards staff behaviour, commitment and reliability, apart from some 
incidents at the hospital. Finally, it is also clear that many people choose a provider 
because a friend, neighbour or relative had recommended them. Consequently, social 
relations and trust become increasingly important factors for the functioning of health 
care and for people's choice of provider in that they lower the risk-perception and the
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fear that surrounds the process of seeking health care. Birungi (1998), in her study on 
injection practice in Busoga, makes a similar point.
6.2.3. Adequate Provision of Privacy
Just as friendly staff behaviour of staff is key, so is the provision of privacy to respect 
the patients’ personal sphere and to treat them with dignity. Granting privacy to the 
patients is part of the national standard rational drug use indicators (Kafuko et al. 
1993).
Government clinics are the only provider type that does not offer privacy, and 
this is also a reason for insufficient clinical examinations taking place (see below). 
Usually, the windows and doors of the examination rooms are left open, while the 
other patients waiting in the queue sit on a bench in front of the windows, if  not on 
the windowsill itself. In rG-3, patients are consulted in the open space on the veranda. 
Rarely does a health worker examine a patient in the examination room. There is 
usually neither visual nor auditory privacy, so that people do not like to undress or 
talk about ’’embarrassing" problems. The lack of privacy is not related to the 
conditions of the premises; instead, it appears that health workers aim again at 
aggravating services in order to force people with serious illnesses and greater need 
for privacy to go to their private clinics and homes.
In contrast, at the Protestant clinics, privacy and confidentiality are central 
components of their explicit "patients’ rights". Likewise, the other NGO and private 
clinics and the hospital OPD examine in privacy. Clearly, the non-state clinics have 
recognised their relative strength in providing privacy:
"Why are we surviving? People need privacy and dignity, which is not provided 
in government clinics. People have nowhere to go, they want privacy, as some 
conditions cannot be attended to in the hospital, venereal diseases for example. 
So they come to the private clinics to be examined" (interview, P-2 practitioner,
1999) 236
236 For people’s notions of "private diseases" (STDs), cf. Kaharuza et al. (1996).
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6.2.4. Waiting Time
Waiting times constitute important opportunity costs and a critical factor for people 
in deciding where to go and in judging quality o f care. Figure 6.11 presents the 
different means of waiting time.
Figure 6.11: Average waiting time until registration/attendance (in minutes)
Source: Exit interviews
Apart from one private clinic, waiting times are longest in government clinics, 
especially in those with a higher patient load. This is because o f the health workers' 
habit o f waiting for an "adequate" number o f patients to assemble before starting to 
attend. People would arrive early in the morning, also because they fear that they may 
not be attended to if  they come late in the morning. For example, the dentist at uG-1 
only works up to a certain time. Everybody thereafter is asked to come on the 
following day. Similar practices may prevail at other units as well. Intentionally 
making people wait, while the staff is around, is strongly resented by people. 
Moreover, the total waiting time is much longer, because the service delivery process 
itself is very time-consuming and resembles an assembly line. After registration and 
consultation, the patient has to queue for the laboratory examination, wait for the 
results, a second consultation, and possibly an injection or drug dispensing. Hence, a 
patient can spend the whole morning at the clinic, while the actual time spent with 
one health worker is very short. Making people wait serves to reduce quality and 
opens up rent-seeking opportunities for people who are willing to pay in order to
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jump the queue. However, the waiting time must not necessarily always be 
considered negative. In rG-3, patients sit and wait for about half an hour on the 
veranda, where consultations take place (the majority are mothers with children), 
while the MA gives health education talks.
The waiting time is not problematic in those government and NGO health units 
with a low patient load where patients just drop in. Okello et al. (1998: 19) also report 
statistically significant shorter waiting times in NGO clinics.237 Yet at the Catholic 
clinic, people complain that if the staff is not in the clinic but at their residences (on 
the compound, though), patients have to wait a long time for them to come over. By 
contrast, at the urban private and NGO clinics, waiting time is a function of the 
patient load and the time spent per patient, particularly at P-4. People also have to 
wait quite a long time at the hospital OPD (on average 39 minutes), and again, as at 
government units, patients have to queue at the various stations. This is one reason 
why many avoid the hospital OPD.
In sum, the argument that quick attendance (resulting in low opportunity costs) 
made in favour of non-state clinics does not fully hold true. However, for patients, the 
difference between government and other clinics is that patients are not intentionally 
made to wait at the latter.
6.2.5. Opening Hours and Presence of Qualified Staff
The availability of qualified staff to attend to patient is self-evidently one of the most 
important elements in providing adequate health care. This section compares the 
opening hours and the average presence of qualified staff in the selected units (Tables 
6.1 and 6.2), based on observation and key informant interviews.
237 Azfar et al. (2000) found the average waiting time in government clinics to be 71 min. and 18 min. 
in non-governmental organisations.
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Table 6.1: Staff presence at rural providers
rG-2 rG-3 rN-1 rN-2 rN-3 rN-4
Highest qualified staff MA MA Midwife Midwife Midwife- 
nurse 
1 Nurse 
1 Midwife
Midwife
Opening hours 9:30-13.30 10:00-15:30 7:00-18.00 7:00-19:00 8:00-13:00 7:00-20:00
Presence of qualified staff seldom seldom not always;
noton
weekends
usually; 
not on 
weekends
not always not always
Table 6.2: Staff presence at urban providers
uG-1 uN-1 uN-2 Hospital OPD P-1 P-2 P-3 P-4
Highest 
qualified staff
MA MA MA Doctor MA
Doctor
Opening hours Officially: 
24 hours 
In practice: 
10:00-14:00
8:00 until 
evening
8:00-19:00 8:00-17:00 9:00 until 
evening 
24 h presence 
of a nurse
8:00 until 9:00-18:00 
evening
9:00-18.00
Presence of 
qualified staff
10:30-14:00 9:30 until 
afternoon
9:00-18:00 8:00-17:00 9:00 until 
evening
9:00 until 9:00-18:00 
evening
10:00 until 
evening
Source: Observation and interviews
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Government clinics
Opening hours of rural government health units are the most restricted, and the hours 
are not compatible with people's farming activities. The presence of qualified staff is 
even worse. In 5 out of the 13 rural government health units, on which information 
could be gathered, the MA is usually present and works in the OPD only one day (i.e., 
about three hours) per week at maximum. In six units, the MAs come two to three 
times a week, while only in two cases is the MA said to be usually on duty. This 
means that at most times, lower staff -  nurses and nursing aids -  runs the OPD. 
Nurses, who are actually not qualified to examine and treat patients on their own 
either, are equally often absent, and some government facilities lack entirely a nurse, 
so that ultimately nursing assistants with no qualifications take over. A quantitative 
study in two other Districts revealed that unqualified staff contributed 71 percent of 
working hours (McPake et al. 1998: 858).238
Rural NGO clinics
The Protestant clinics (rN-1, 2, 4) are usually open for the whole day (10 hours) as 
well as on weekends. The midwives' presence on duty varies, one of them usually 
being present, whereas the other two are more often absent. In their absence, 
especially on weekends, nursing aids attend the patients, although they have received 
only little training on the job. rN-3 is open during the morning, and patients have to 
call the staff at their residence (on the compound) in the afternoon. Respondents 
indicate that it is very difficult to be attended by then. This clinic must at least be 
granted some credit for the fact that patients are not treated by nursing aids, but this 
also implies that a patient may have to wait very long.
Drugshops
According to business opportunities, most of the drugshops open early in the morning 
(8:00/9:00) until the late evening (21:00). Drugshops at the owner's or the attendant's 
residence are much preferred, since patients can even come very early in the morning 
or at night. However, some respondents reported that night services are not available
238 McPake et al. (1999) report that staff rotate to guarantee daily staff presence whilst simultaneously 
allowing for the health workers' private activities, yet this rotation scheme presumably includes 
unqualified staff.
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for people who are known to have little or no money. As said already, most drugshop 
attendants are insufficiently qualified, and nurses are only rarely found there.
Urban clinics
At urban NGO and private clinics, opening hours are more convenient and longer 
from around 8:00/9:00 until the late afternoon or evening, so long as there are 
patients.239 In all non-state clinics, qualified staff is usually present during the day, 
since they try to foster a reputation of always being present.
In sum, government clinics come off worst both in terms of opening hours and 
presence of qualified staff, whereas urban NGO and private clinics, as well as the 
hospital OPD, perform adequately.
6.2.6. Attendance bv Qualified Staff
The presence of qualified staff does not imply that they attend to patients. For 
example, in a couple of government health centres, the MAs are present, but they do 
not work in the OPD.
As Figures 6.12 and 6.13 show, a large proportion of the respondents were not 
attended by the clinic's highest qualified staff, but were looked after by unqualified 
staff. Not surprisingly, the percentage is alarmingly low at drugshops. At rural 
government clinics, only half of the patients were attended to by the medical 
assistant.240 Adequate clinical quality of care is therefore doubtful. By contrast, 
patients at urban clinics are more likely to be attended by qualified staff, but again 
uG-1 scores worse than the others.
239 Longer operating hours and more flexible clinic schedules were also advantages found in Malaysian 
private clinics (Aljunid/Zwi 1997: 92).
240 The percentage from the household interview sample is higher. This is because people often take a 
male nurse for a medical assistant, whereas the respondents' answers during exit interviews could be 
verified through direct observation.
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Figure 6.12: Qualification of attending staff at rural health care providers
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Source: Exit and household interviews
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Figure 6.13: Qualification o f attending staff at urban health care providers
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Source: Exit and household interviews
6.2.7. Quality o f Consultation
6.2.7.1. The Provision o f a Clinical Examination
It goes without saying that a correct clinical examination is a central component of 
the health care production function. For an approximation, people were asked 
whether they had been physically examined (see Figure 6.14). With the exception of
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those attending drugshops and rural private clinics, the majority o f respondents 
affirmed the question. uG-1 is remarkable, because about 15 percent o f the exit 
interviewees reported that they had not been physically examined at all.241 This is 
about twice as much as the percentage o f other urban providers. Whether or how 
people were really examined is unknown, so these answers cannot be taken at face 
value. However, drugshops and uG-1 stand out, which indicates that there are some 
differences in the actual examination.
Figure 6.14: Percentage o f patients being examined, patient's perception
100%
□  Exit in terv iew s ■  H o u seh o ld  in terv iew s
At government clinics, it is known that patients are seldom fully clinically 
examined (interviews, DED health workers, 1999). Examination instruments such as 
the blood pressure monitor, the stethoscope or a thermometer are usually locked 
away. Instead o f receiving a careful clinical examination, people describe their 
history, symptoms and their view o f the disease. This, together with the laboratory 
results, if  a laboratory examination is deemed necessary (and where a laboratory is 
available), constitute the basis for the diagnosis and the treatment prescription. It also 
appears that health workers avoid body contact with and do not like touching a 
patient. A professional's medical analysis o f the adequacy o f the examination at 
government clinics revealed that three quarters of the examinations were incomplete
241 Exit interview responses are considered to be more valid because of the shorter recalling period.
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(Koppenleitner/Mpabulungi 1997: 35).242 There is no corresponding data available 
for the private and NGO sector.
As a substitute, respondents were specifically prompted about a number of 
standard examination procedures and elements. This list was informed by health 
professionals and included lying on the bed, (partial) undressing, use of stethoscope, 
blood pressure check, laboratory examination, temperature check, touching, and 
examining eyes, throat, and ears. The results are presented in Figure 6.15.243 Even 
though clinical examinations at the NGO and urban private clinics are likely to be 
equally incomplete or inadequate, this indirect analysis found that they still made 
more effort to examine patients than government workers did. Given the higher 
extent of qualified staff in town, examination in the private and NGO clinics and in 
the hospital OPD is in general more thorough. The level of examination at drugshops 
is lowest, but it is surprisingly high in relative terms, which indicates that drugshops 
actively seek to take their niche among the health care providers. Some drugshop 
staff carries out some superficial examining (e.g. touching, use of stethoscope) from 
my lay assessment. It seems that this kind of examination is often only of symbolic 
rather than of clinical value and serves to give the patient the impression of receiving 
an examination rather than contributing to ascertaining the diagnosis.244
It is difficult to explain the absence of physical examinations. Possibly, the 
prevailing professional culture is that the patient's mere description of symptoms 
suffices for the diagnosis and the treatment decision and that using an examination 
instrument is a sign of professional weakness and insecurity (personal 
communication, DED health professional, Kristen, 1999). In addition, a less careful 
and thorough examination saves time. It is again a manifestation of the prevailing low 
commitment and motivation and serves to lower the workload and the quality of
242 This figure includes the results from Tororo and Jinja District, but Kamuli was found to be at the 
lower end.
243 It is important to point out that this quantitative account of examination procedures is only a rough 
approximation and does not say anything about the correctness of an examination. Hence, the figures 
must be assessed in relation to each other. For disease incidents that did not require each examination 
element the maximum score o f 100 percent was readjusted.
244 This is similar to what Barbara McPake observed in nursing aids during ANC examinations at 
government clinics (personal communication, 2000).
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care.245 Clearly, the non-state sectors' efforts are a reaction to people's preference for 
being examined.
Figure 6
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
H E x it interviews B H s h d . Interviews 
(100% = maximum quality level)
6.2.7.2. Quality o f Diagnoses
Short and incomplete examinations often result in wrong diagnoses and hence wrong 
treatment. Supervisory visits at government units revealed a high proportion of wrong 
diagnoses. On one day, the majority o f diagnoses at one health centre were wrong, 
basically due to the failure to clinically examine the patient (personal communication, 
DED-health professional, Miiller-Stover, 1998). A systematic clinical analysis found 
that only a third o f diagnoses were complete and correct (Koppenleitner/Mpabulungi 
1997: 35). At the extreme are the following observations at various government 
health centres. These incidents cannot be excused by lack o f knowledge, but only be 
explained by mere lack of commitment and carelessness on the part o f health 
workers:
245 However, I have nowhere witnessed informal payments specifically given to acquire a clinical 
examination (cf. K. Leonard 2000).
.15: Relative examination quality (in %)
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A boy reported tooth ache and was sent to the queue at the dentist's room, 
whereas he actually suffered from an abscess in the cheek, as was discovered 
later.
During an immunisation session, it was found that about half of the children 
were ill. The staff did not notice this, so that there were no consequences on the 
immunisations and neither were the children treated (personal communication, 
Muller-Stover, DED doctor, 1999).
Very little information is available for the other providers. One government medical 
assistant strongly complained about the poor knowledge of the NGO health worker in 
the nearby NGO unit, as she had asked very basic questions about diagnosing that she 
was supposed to know. However, the referral rate of rural NGO clinics is very high, 
which reduces the opportunities for wrong diagnoses. At urban NGO and private 
clinics, conclusions about the correctness of the diagnosis itself can be drawn from a 
comparison between the diagnosis and the prescribed treatment.246 These appeared 
questionable in at least 10 percent of the cases and revealed serious mistakes. The 
actual figure is probably much higher. There were also cases in which patients at 
private clinics had become severe hospital cases due to incorrect diagnoses and 
treatment. For example, a patient was treated for abdominal pain at a private clinic 
until he had to be admitted at the hospital where the diagnosis was changed to 
appendicitis. In contrast, the hospital OPD is most of the time run by a doctor, with 
the result that diagnosing is very good (interviews, DED health professionals, 
Kristen, Krotz, Muller-Stover, 1999).
In sum, the data set does not allow for a clear judgement, but it seems that all 
provider types except the hospital OPD perform inadequately as regards diagnosing.
6.2.8. Quality of Treatment and Prescription Patterns
6.2.8.1. Fit between Diagnosis and Treatment
In addition to inadequate diagnosing (leading to inadequate treatment), another 
problem is the misfit between a supposedly correct diagnosis and therapy. Table 6.3 
shows both the percentage of treatments that corresponded to the diagnosis and the
246 This was carried out by DED health professionals.
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percentage of adequate treatments. The sample is too small to draw firm conclusions, 
but it appears that there are no significant differences between the higher-level 
providers as to the fit between the diagnosis and therapy or the appropriateness of the 
treatment. At both government clinics and urban NGO and private clinics, treatments 
are flawed due to inadequate doses, overdoses and incorrect medications. One health 
worker at an urban NGO clinic admitted that because they lack inpatient facilities, 
they are unable to follow the correct six-hourly injection schedules, which is why 
they switch to suboptimal treatment (interview, nurse, 1999). Some private 
practitioners admit that they do not always fully follow the standard treatment 
guidelines for STDs, since this would be unaffordable for some patients.247
Given the low staff qualifications and the fact that drugshops prescribe and 
dispense drugs according to their stocks, the relatively high score of drugshops -  not 
very much below that of the other providers -  is surprising. Yet, as a large proportion 
of customers come with minor diseases and ask for one specific drug, there are 
relatively fewer opportunities to make severe mistakes.
Table 6.3: Treatment quality
Government
(N=50)
Drugshops
(N=63)
Urban NGOs 
(N=63)
Private clinics 
(N=46)
Hospital OPD
Appropriate
treatments248
44% a) 36% 47.5% 44% N/A
Fit between 
diagnosis and 
treatm ent
medium b) 45% 64% 73.3% 
(clinics run by 
MAs: 60%)
very goodb)
Source: Patient books analysis , observation at drugshops
a) Data was gathered during a clinical assessment by observing the consultation process 
(Koppenleitner/Mpabulungi 1997: 35).
b) Assessment by supervisory doctor: "very good" meaning that performance is better than at the other 
providers; and "medium" meaning not worse or better)
No comparable data is available for the rural NGO clinics and the hospital.
247 This is also found at South African private practitioners (Sinanovic et al. 2000: 5).
248 This category denotes a completely correct treatment in terms of dosis, length and adequacy of 
drugs.
249 Patient cases were taken from the months of June and July 1999. Starting from the 1st of the month, 
every 10th case was analysed.
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6.2.8.2. Rational Use ofDruzs
The quality of treatments is furthermore flawed by irrational drug use, which includes 
polypharmacy as well as misuse, especially of antibiotics and injections. These and 
the use of unnecessary, expensive drugs are the most frequent problems induced by 
both providers and consumers in developing countries (Le Grand et al. 1999). In 
other words, these are practices for which people have a particular preference (cf. 
Chapter 4.5.2). It is also the result of the practitioners' focus on the sale of 
pharmaceuticals (cf. Leonard/Leonard 1998:1). Polypharmacy and irrational drug use 
are problematic due to resulting drug resistance and increased side- and counter­
effects. Underdosing is another problem and a result of deferral payment patterns, as 
it was demonstrated in Chapter 5. National standard guidelines foresee the use of 
antibiotics in less than 20 percent of the patients and suggest the average number of 
drugs prescribed per patient to be less than 1.6 (Kafuko et al. 1993). For this study, a 
treatment was defined as "polypharmacy" if unnecessary drugs in relation to the 
diagnosis were provided. Table 6.4 and Figure 6.16 show how the different provider 
types perform.
Table 6.4: Rational use of drugs
Government Drugshops
(N=63)
Urban NGOs 
(N=63)
Priv. clinics 
(N=46)
Hospital OPD
% of treatments 
characterised by 
polypharmacy
medium8* 36.7% 33.4% 33.2% lowest in 
District8*
% of treatments 
that involved 
antibiotics
62% b* 57.1% at least 50%251 at least 50% ^1 lowest8*
Source: Same as for Table 6.3.
a) Assessment by supervisory DED doctor
b) Data is based on direct assessment by observing the consultation process (Koppenleitner/ 
Mpabulungi 1997: 37).
No comparable data is available for the rural NGO clinics and the hospital.
250 For a detailed analysis of drug and antibiotics use and injection practices in government and NGO 
clinics, cf. Kafuko et al. (1993). Birungi et al. (1994) provide detailed insights into the injection 
practice in Busoga, but this is not differentiated along the provider types.
251 Because of data gaps, the exact score cannot be calculated and thus constitutes an estimation based 
on the records.
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Figure 6.16: Average number of drugs prescribed252
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Source: Exit interviews
Again, there seem to be no differences between the providers in terms o f the 
extent o f polypharmacy or the use o f antibiotics, except the hospital. Also, none of 
the providers came close to the national standard o f 1.6 or less drugs prescribed per 
patient on average. These findings are also fully in line with the results o f Kafuko et 
al.'s (1993) study. However, the extent and intensity o f polypharmacy varies within 
and across sectors. There are some government medical assistants with a 
parsimonious approach, such as uG-1 and rG-3. Other clinics are characterised by an 
extreme degree o f polypharmacy.253 This is even more problematic, since many o f the 
prescribed drugs are not in stock at the health centre or not made available to the 
patients. So, people are told to buy unnecessary drugs. The same variance can be 
found in the private and NGO sector.
252 This data is rather indicative, also because of the small case numbers.
253 For example, in one government clinic, a "normal" gastro-enteritis was treated with six drugs 
(personal communication, Schmeidl, DED doctor, 1997), which is unnecessary.
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There are many reasons for this pattern of (over- and mis-) prescription. The 
practice in government clinics of listing symptoms and treating them separately is due 
to insecure diagnosing and lack of knowledge.254 The staff attempts to be on the safe 
side by treating a number of possible diseases and symptoms with several drugs. 
There is obviously little knowledge about side-effects and the interaction of drugs. 
Apart from the medical problems, it is also a waste of drugs and makes the patient's 
purchase at the drugshop more expensive, which again has severe implications on 
financial accessibility. On the other hand, polypharmacy and overprescription is 
caused by the economic behaviour of government health workers, in that it allows 
them to easily take away even more drugs from the store and to forward them into 
private channels. In those few health units where patients are given all prescribed 
drugs, polypharmacy quickly results in drugs running short.
A spot check into the patient book at two rural NGO units similarly revealed 
polypharmacy, but it is considerably lower than at the urban none-state clinics. The 
lower extent of polypharmacy may be explained by the fact that Protestant clinics 
seek to be perceived as accessible in financial terms, but also by higher ethical norms 
(see Chapter 7.4).
While there are marked differences as regards the degree of irrational drug use 
among drugshops, their practice is overall dangerous for people's health. Clearly, the 
providers' treatment choice is not related to medical necessity, but based on financial 
consideration. Drugshops are not allowed to sell antibiotics, but the drugshop 
observation study showed that 57 percent of treatments comprised antibiotics. This is 
due to the fact that in many cases people decide on the types of drugs and demand 
explicitly "strong" drugs, and specifically antibiotics.255 As said, many customers 
come and ask for one specific drug, which explains why the percentage of treatments 
characterised by polypharmacy (37 percent) and the average number of drugs is not 
higher than at other clinics. Yet, once the patient leaves the decision to the owner, a 
large number of drugs are preferred. More so, there is an incentive for the drugshop to
254 This practice is common all over, not only in developing countries (Krause et al. 1999: 295). That 
said, it was shown in Tanzania that health workers have a fairly good theoretical knowledge, as a test 
showed, whereas they did not apply their knowledge in practice (K. Leonard 2001). This indicates that 
other factors are more decisive than knowledge.
255 Cf. Adome et al. (1996), who also find high percentages of antibiotics use, which is fully 
indefensible from a medical point of view.
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sell as many drugs as possible. In this case, polypharmacy is much more intense. For 
example, I came across an old woman suffering from backache, who was given seven 
different drugs and had to pay USh 5,700. Treatment characterised by polypharmacy 
can thus become very expensive. In almost a fourth of the cases, the drugshop 
workers ended up compensating a large number of different drugs with underdoses to 
give way to people’s preferences for many different types of drugs while 
simultaneously coming to an end with people’s set amount, unless customers 
explicitly demand a full dose. However, the following focus group statement reflects 
the general practice:
’’We are not educated, we do not know whether it is full [dose] or not. They just 
write '3x1'. So, you are given some drugs, but not the right full dose. They break 
it in half and tell you: ’Take in the evening and morning'" (FGD, Subcounty C, 
1999).
Another general problem is that drugshop workers would simply sell another similar 
drug if the one required and prescribed by the health centre were currently not 
available. Accordingly, focus group discussants complained:
"Since you do not know, you cannot argue with them."
"When you go sick, they prescribe according to their stock."
The trial-and-error practice of drugshop attendants is also apparent from their 
requests to clients to come back to report about how the drugs worked.
At urban NGO and private clinics, polypharmacy is equally widespread and the 
average number of drugs prescribed is highest. Further, as regards malaria treatment, 
practitioners very often start at a too high an intervention point with too heavy drugs 
in contradiction to the national treatment guidelines, which suggest beginning with 
Chloroquine. One practitioner almost consistently started with a Quinine injection for 
malaria treatment, which serves to satisfy patients' preferences for injections; two 
others begin straight away with Fansidar. While this results in high client 
satisfaction, it is against the long-term medical interest of the patients.
256 It is questionable whether this is always necessary. In any case, it is in strong contrast with the 
practice in the hospital and the government clinics.
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As at government clinics, non-state providers practice polypharmacy to be on the 
safe side, due to insecure diagnosing. At the same time, it fulfils the demands of 
clients. But above all, since selling and dispensing drugs is an important part of the 
urban clinics' cost-recovery strategy, there is a strong incentive for polypharmacy. For 
example, one practitioner unnecessarily gave the sedative Phenagan to almost all his 
patients, which mainly serves to increase his bill. Partly, respondents are aware of this 
practice; for example, one focus group explicitly stated:
"Private clinics are very expensive. They seduce clients to buy drugs that may 
not be necessary" (FGD Subcounty B, 1999).
Exploiting the information asymmetry between the medical professional and the 
patient is a general feature of private clinics. But the deferral payment options (credit 
provision and partial payments for partial treatment) serve to cushion the high costs 
that result from polypharmacy. It must be noted, however, that there are differences 
among the providers, which are possibly due to differences in knowledge of side- 
effects, but also in professional ethics. In fact, the therapy of one private provider is 
characterised by a very low extent of polypharmacy (7 percent). Especially when the 
patient does not have much money, he explains that
"You give only very few drugs to the patient, and you have to convince the 
patient that your management is good" (interview, P -2 ,1999).
Due to resource and time constraints, no detailed medical-professional analysis could 
be carried out for the hospital OPD. The qualitative assessment by DED professionals 
suggests that treatment is usually parsimonious with a much lower degree of 
polypharmacy, but it also depends upon the attending staff. The average number of 
drugs prescribed, however, was found to be relatively high.
In sum, the quality of treatment and prescription patterns do not differ strongly 
among government, private and NGO clinics, nor do the reasons and incentives for 
these practices vary tremendously. Due to poorly developed medical ethics and the 
lack of qualification, drugshops score at the lower end of the spectrum, whereas the 
Mission hospital OPD obviously stands at the higher end. Also, it became evident 
that in addition to medical implications of irrational use of drugs, there are equally 
financial ones. Irrational use of drugs does not only waste drugs, thereby impinging
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upon treatment cost-effectiveness and drug availability, it also increases the patient's 
health care out-of-pocket expenditure and hence affects financial accessibility 
depending upon the providers' drug prices.
6.2.8.3. Use o f  Clinically Sterilised Svrinzes
Another concern of quality of care is the prevailing injection and sterilisation practice 
in Uganda. 43 percent of injections are accompanied by complications, caused by bad 
injection administration (Birungi 1994 et al.: 28). In this section, the providers’ 
practice is examined as regards (un)sterilised (reusable) syringes. Table 6.5 shows 
that -  cutting across provider types -  the majority of providers allow their patients to 
bring their own home-sterilised injection equipment. While the sterilisation standards 
at health units may not be satisfactory either, there is no doubt that home sterilisation 
(boiling the syringe in a saucepan) is equally problematic from a biomedical 
perspective.
Table 6.5: Use of home-sterilised syringes
Provider type Patient allowed to bring own syringe
Government clinics Yes
Rural NGO clinics Yes
uN-1 Yes
uN-2 No
Hospital OPD No (use of single-use syringes)
P-l Yes
P-2 N/A
P-3 N/A
P-4 No
Drugshops Yes
There are two reasons for this practice. First, in the last two decades, people have 
consistently lost trust in the government health units, which was furthermore 
accelerated by the AIDS pandemic (Birungi 1998). People do not like to get injected
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with a syringe that was sterilised at the clinic, but rather prefer to get a new syringe or 
to bring their own sterilised injection equipment to keep control over the sterilisation 
process. Birungi (1994b) conceptualises this as the "domestication" of injecting and 
sterilisation. Second, whether the shortage of syringes is real or artificially created by 
leakage, health workers cannot give out new (reusable) syringes for consecutive 
injections within a treatment schedule, unless the patient pays for it. Yet this would 
overtax the patient's ability to pay. Subsequently, it became common practice to give 
(or sell the patient) a new syringe for the first injection and then allow the patient to 
bring back the home-sterilised syringe for the remaining injections. The practice at 
rural NGO units is the same. As they have to pursue a cost-recovery strategy for their 
medical supplies, the main reason for this practice is to adapt to people's ability to 
pay. Drugshops also do not bother about home-sterilised equipment.
The "domestication" of (injecting and) sterilisation is strongly embedded, and no 
provider is able to ignore it. In fact, even among urban clinics, the use of home- 
sterilised syringes cuts across all sectors, which indicates that neither the private nor 
NGO clinics possibly enjoy full trust in light of the AIDS pandemic. The hospital 
OPD and uN-2 have formal guidelines for patient care and do not inject with home- 
sterilised syringes. One of the private clinics does not accept home sterilised 
equipment either and maintains professional standards, but this implies high user 
charges. Overall, incentives are contradictory in the private and NGO sectors. On the 
one hand, medical ethics would dictate professional sterilisation (or single use 
syringes), but on the other hand, the use of home-sterilised syringes makes these 
clinics more accessible. In addition, as home sterilisation is a widespread and 
accepted practice, rigidity could put off patients.
6.2.9. People's Satisfaction with Service Quality
While the previous two sections were informed by a biomedical view on quality of 
care, this subsection looks into people's attitude and satisfaction with medical 
treatment. It is important to note that
Quality (and qualifications) of staff as perceived by users can be quite at odds
with an objective assessment of their medical knowledge, accuracy of
consultation and efficient dispension of drugs (Hentschel 1999: 76).
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People's assessment on the treatment is associated with cure and examination, 
but it is also mixed with perceptions o f and feelings about staff behaviour, drug 
availability, costs and hence accessibility, which were examined in the previous 
sections and which illuminated already a great deal about people's perceptions. 
People's responses on how much they were satisfied with the medical treatment they 
obtained thus reflect a more general view on service delivery.
In interpreting the data, the crucial point is to take into account that people 
consciously chose a specific provider in the majority o f cases, i.e., their choice is 
provider-specific and not sector-specific. Furthermore, socio-economic and 
educational levels, expectations and experiences, gender, age, etc., shape people's 
individual bundle of criteria that they apply to assess the medical treatment obtained. 
Obviously, these also vary from respondent to respondent (cf. Haddad et al. 1998, 
Ogden/Bantebya-Kyomuhendo 1996). Figures 6.17 and 6.18 illustrate the people's 
views and reveal considerable differences, whereby household scores are considered 
to be more valid given that people may feel less comfortable to make negative 
statements nearby a provider.
Figure 6.17: Patient satisfaction with the service quality at rural providers
rG-2 
rG-3 
Rur. Gov't 
rN -1 ,2  
rN-3 
Drugshops
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Answers were prompted: bad (= 1), fair (= 2), good (= 3), very good (= 4).
■  Exit interviews
□  Hshd. interviews
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Figure 6.18: Patient satisfaction with the service quality at urban providers
NGOs
■  Exit interviews
□  Hshd. interviews
1 1.5 2  2 .5  3 3 .5  4
Despite these considerations, the following general remarks can be made. The 
lower (household) scores o f uG-1 and rG-2, as compared to those of the NGO clinics, 
are in line with the previous assessment of quality o f care.257 In contrast, people 
appreciate the performance o f rG-3, which, as a matter o f fact, has a higher score than 
the drugshops in the same catchment area. This also shows that the satisfaction with 
medical treatment of one provider is relative to the existing alternatives (NGO clinics, 
drugshops) nearby. Yet in general, drugshops score very high, and one o f the reasons 
for satisfaction mentioned is that they lead to a cure in many cases. Not surprisingly, 
in town, the hospital and the private and NGO clinics are assessed best. Overall, these 
results correspond to the assessment of clinical quality o f care aspects.
6.3. Conclusion
This final section summarises this and the previous chapter to assess the providers' 
overall performance as to access, efficient staff resource utilisation and quality o f  
care. The following points are the most salient:
• Chapter 5 revealed the differences in financial access, with drugshops being most 
accessible and private clinics the least accessible for the poorest. However, it was 
also shown that at all provider types, access is contingent upon people's capacity 
to pay, as is the provision o f drugs.
257 Okello et al.'s study in 1992 equally reports better scores for NGO clinics, but the difference is not 
statistically significant (1998: 16).
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• In rural areas, there is no provider type that stands out as to efficient staff resource 
utilisation (patient throughput per staff). In urban areas, in contrast, the private 
clinics, one NGO clinic and the hospital OPD clearly perform much better as 
regards the efficient use of staff resources than government units do. This must be 
put in relation to quality of care, since a lower efficiency ratio may be related to 
higher quality of care. Yet, as we have seen in the previous section, government 
clinics do not perform better in terms of quality of care.
•  Process quality (staff behaviour and commitment, privacy, efforts in examination, 
attendance by the highest qualified staff, drug availability) at non-state providers 
is much better than at government units, though there are some exceptions (rG-3 
performing relatively well). This seems to be a typical finding. Bennett et al. 
(1999: 12) note that long waiting times, poor staff attitudes, availability of drugs 
and equipment at government facilities are problems in many sub-Saharan 
African countries, and D. Leonard (2000) equally concludes that NGO and church 
providers perform superior.
• However, in terms of clinical quality of care (quality of diagnosis and treatment as 
well as rational use of drugs), all providers, with the exception of the hospital 
OPD, scored unsatisfactorily. The differences are rather small, with the drugshops 
at the lower end. Here, the question becomes one of which provider is the least 
bad.258
In sum, since NGO and private providers overall deliver better quality, their 
efficiency score (of staff resource utilisation and assumingly in relation to other 
inputs) is even more favourable.
From this, it follows that it is vital to address clinical quality of care by 
supervising health units more closely and by educating both health workers, drugshop 
attendants and communities on the rational use of drugs. This can considerably 
improve the rational use of drugs, as both Kafuko et al.'s (1993) and Adome et al.'s 
(1996) studies have shown for Uganda. In addition, improving drug prescribing
258 For similar findings, cf. Sinanovic et al. (2000) for South Africa, whereas Mliga (2000) found that 
government facilities scored better in treatment appropriateness.
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practice could save enormous amounts of national expenditure for drugs; Le Grand et 
al. mention estimated savings of 50-70 percent of programme expenditure for Africa 
(1999: 91; cf. the literature indicated there).
The search for relative strengths has not produced a clear answer on which sector 
or provider type has overall relative strengths as regards all criteria. Instead, the 
providers perform better on some criteria and indicators, but worse on others. This is 
also partly due to the trade-offs among criteria. While urban non-state clinics scored 
well on drug availability and process quality, their disadvantage lies in their limited 
access for poorer income sections. Furthermore, the distinctions between the provider 
types are much smaller than expected. This is because the funding and financing 
mechanisms are very similar and partly identical among the various provider types. 
For all the NGO clinics, whether fully cost-recovering or not, the current funding and 
financing pressures led to a convergence toward the private sector. A similar 
marketisation has taken place in the government clinics, though for different reasons. 
Thus, in terms of the service transaction and payment procedure, the distinction 
between for-profit, not-for-profit and state clinics is blurred.
In rural areas, people can choose between government clinics and/or rural NGO 
clinics, drugshops and private practitioners. Clear-cut divisive features are the costs, 
drug availability and staff behaviour, whereas differences in medical quality of care 
are less obvious. Given the low commitment and hence resulting low quality of care 
in government clinics, drugshops are not much worse than government clinics. Since 
they are also more accessible, and given that people can decide on the amount to 
spend, they are the least worst option for poorer people, even though people are not 
enthusiastic about them:
"We don't trust the drugshops, they don't have qualified staff, and they refer to 
the clinics. [....] [However], you don't ask about their qualification. If you get 
better and cured, you continue to go, so you don't ask" (FGD, Subcounty A, 
1999).
Neither do people see much difference between rural NGO clinics and drugshops, as 
one focus group spells out:
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"In the drugshops we get the same drugs as from NGOs, so why should we go to
NGOs?"
Moreover, if the NGO clinic is run by a nursing aid, because the qualified staff is 
absent, there is indeed not much of a difference. Hence, from a patient’s point of 
view, a clinic's relative strengths are related to the patient's present financial situation 
and the perceived severity of the disease. For a poor patient, drugshops have relative 
strengths for minor diseases and constitute a form of first aid post. Given the low 
coverage of higher-level providers in rural areas, drugshops have come to fill out this 
large niche. In case of a more serious disease, poorer people may or may not have the 
choice between unsatisfactory, less expensive government clinics and better, but 
more expensive services at urban NGO or private clinics. In other words, poor people 
have to make clear trade-offs between price and quality.
The two chapters have also revealed that performance is only relative, as the 
term relative strengths suggests, depending upon the alternatives and the pressures 
put on the clinics to deliver. For example, since government rural clinics perform 
very poorly on drug availability, staff behaviour and informal payments, there is not 
much effort required on the side of non-state clinics to provide better services. The 
low standard at government clinics and drugshops weakens competition and the 
incentives to provide high quality services at other providers. Thus, the attribution of 
relative strengths is situational and temporary.
As said, the differences found are smaller than expected. Notwithstanding this, 
the evidence suggests that the institutional and organisational differences between the 
provider types account for these performance differences (with the exception of the 
institutions relating to access, where we have noted the convergence of the funding 
and financing mechanisms). The next task is therefore to analyse the intra- 
organisational institutional mechanisms and the incentive environment (Chapter 7) 
and the interorganisational relations, namely governance mechanisms and interactions 
(Chapter 8), that shape each organisation's performance. This will also illuminate the 
entry points for institutional redesign and reform and the ways forward to improve 
performance.
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Chapter 7
Explaining (MaMPerformance: Institutional Deficits 
in Accountability. Financial Responsibility and Staff Equity
The previous two chapters revealed that there are significant performance differences 
between the three sectors and also that none of them performs satisfactorily over all 
criteria. This chapter aims to explain the differences in performance and relative 
strengths of each provider type and to understand the high level of malperformance, 
since this is the crucial step to identifying strategies to improve health care services. 
Chapter 2.2 indicated that compliance mechanisms are decisive for organisational 
performance, but the fundamental question is how they function in reality in each 
specific context. So the functioning and operation of compliance mechanisms and 
other intra- and interorganisational institutional mechanisms need to be examined 
more closely. Institutions set up norms and rules (both formal and informal), and 
compliance with these is ensured through incentives and sanctions. These, in turn, 
shape and influence the behaviour of individual organisational actors and hence the 
functioning of organisations, determining performance or malperformance (Brett 
2000c: 18; cf. Batley 1996).259
This chapter analyses the intra-organisational institutional mechanisms of 
accountability, financial responsibility and staff equity for the public sector (Section 
7.2), the private sector (Section 7.3), and the voluntary sector (Section 7.4). The focus 
is on the empirical shaping of these institutions and on their actual functioning within 
the local context, or in other words, the relationship between the formal and the real. 
The public sector analysis -  implicitly including the study of District-made local 
government problems -  is the most comprehensive of the three sections, since it will 
also provide the basis to understand the functioning of state regulation and co­
ordination to be examined in Chapter 8. Before going into this institutional 
comparison, the theoretical framework behind this analysis will be further outlined 
(Section 7.1).
259 Cf. Ostrom et al. 1993, Preker et al. 1999, D. Leonard 2000, Bennett et al. 1994, Mills 1997b.
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7.1. The Theoretical Framework
Institutional mechanisms can be understood as a set of institutions with a specific 
function. Specifically, intra-organisational institutional mechanisms refer to the rules 
that govern the relationships among organisational actors within an organisation as 
well as between the end-users and the organisational actor. These mechanisms are the 
focus of this chapter. Extra-organisational, or rather interorganisational institutional 
mechanisms, namely governance mechanisms, will be analysed in the next chapter. 
The intra- and interorganisational mechanisms are closely interrelated, but for 
analytical purposes, they are separately discussed. Competition constitutes both an 
intra- and interorganisational mechanism and will be addressed in this chapter.
While technical-organisational aspects -  including the production function, 
knowledge and management -  are not irrelevant, they are of much lower importance 
for performance and they are usually independent from the type of provider.260 This 
chapter therefore aims to explain the outcomes identified in the last two chapters by 
examining the institutional mechanisms that shape the incentives of individuals 
working in an organisation, and how institutions influence their behaviour and affect 
organisational performance (cf. Esman/Uphoff 1984, Israel 1987, Powell/DiMaggio 
1991, D. Leonard 2000, Brett 2000c).
One of the key institutional problems in health care is the principal-agent 
relationship, in which
The principal needs the efforts and expertise of the agent, but has only limited 
ability to monitor the agent's actions or evaluate whether the final outcome was 
satisfactory (Preker et al. 1999: 7).
The interests of the two differ, because agents will be tempted to increase costs or 
reduce efforts, whereas the principal will want good services for the lowest costs 
possible (cf. Brett 2000a: 16). The principal-agent problem is particularly severe in 
relation to the patient-provider interaction, given the information asymmetry within
260 For example, although NGO personnel and government staff obtain their training from the same 
medical schools, government workers still perform worse (Leonard/Leonard 1999: 1). The 
organisational-technical aspect -  medical knowledge or other factors -  therefore do not constitute the 
decisive factor for (mal-)performance.
213
the delivery of health services.261 To reduce principal-agent problems and to make 
providers perform effectively, there must be mechanisms whose function is to 
establish accountability, financial responsibility and staff equity. The following brief 
account of each will also explain why these aspects are crucial for performance.
The accountability mechanism ideally allows the principals (users and funders, 
who may be identical) to oblige the agent (the service provider) to be responsive to 
their concerns. First of all, this requires a shared understanding by principals and 
agents of what constitutes an acceptable level of performance (Brett 1993: 278). 
Second, it needs the existence of appropriate incentives for the agent and institutional 
arrangements that allow for monitoring and sanction of his or her behaviour; in other 
words, principals must have leverage over agents (cf. Brett 1993). It is important to 
note that participation, on its own, is insufficient to ensure accountability. As we shall 
see, different accountability mechanisms operate for each sector. The central question 
then becomes how these mechanisms function, what impacts they generate and in 
which way they are subverted by other informal institutions.
While service providers want to maximise their income, users want good 
services for lowest costs. A specific component of accountability is financial 
responsibility, which should ensure the most favourable balance between costs and 
outputs, namely efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Financial responsibility is strongest 
in a perfect market, where a "hard budget constraint" is imposed upon private 
providers, "who are only paid for what they can sell" (Brett 2000b: 24). Usually, in 
the public and NGO sector, the mechanism for financial responsibility is less strong. 
Although both sectors are confronted with a budget constraint, the search for the best 
output-lowest cost solution requires strong control by stakeholders and users. In their 
actual institutional shape, the mechanisms that establish financial responsibility and 
accountability are often identical, for example "patient exit" fosters both 
accountability and financial responsibility.
In order to ensure that providers apply their expertise and efforts to the benefit of 
the patient, appropriate incentives, specifically personnel equity, are required. This 
refers to the relationship between staff remuneration and obligations. Ideally, this is
261 Other principal-agent relationships exist between the District Medical Office and government health 
units, between citizens and politicians, and between politicians and civil servants (see Section 7.2.2).
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balanced in order to constitute what Munene calls "supply side accountability" as a 
reciprocal process between the employer and the employee, where the former fulfils 
his or her obligations towards the latter and vice versa (1993: 2). Incentives and 
disincentives, rewards and sanctions affect staff behaviour and hence organisational 
performance. Yet there can be a severe tension between achieving financial 
responsibility and meeting staff interests if  the personnel incentive structure does not 
balance the rights and rewards against obligations and efforts (Munene 1995: 134). In 
the case of an imbalance, the staff may reduce efforts or withdraw from the 
organisation, with hierarchical controls and sanctions being unable to stop this. 
Remuneration and incentives do not only have to be financial and material; 
complements or supplements include professionalism and professional satisfaction or 
satisfaction by fulfilling other norms, such as altruism and/or religious beliefs. The 
principle of professionalism is that "individuals will perform well, since they have 
been both trained and socialised into a profession with a distinct ethos and set of 
professional standards", so that they do not abuse their discretion (Leonard 1993 in 
Moore 1996: 3, cf. Paul 1994).
An issue we will return to repeatedly in this chapter is that of perverse 
incentives. This is a situation where the set of incentives is such that the provider 
benefits most by performing badly. Perverse incentives are a by-product of health 
care markets. Yet, as Mackintosh/Tibandebage (2000: 8) point out, the health 
workers' response to these incentives is not given, but depends on the prevailing local 
culture and other institutions. Action upon perverse incentives comes into being when 
the agent is in a position to disregard control and accountability mechanisms and/or 
when the formal incentives offered to the provider do not take account of his or her 
needs and motivations, so that the provider exploits the prevailing opportunities to 
increase personal benefit. When ethical and professional norms have broken down, 
health workers may be particularly predisposed to respond to perverse incentives.
As already mentioned, it is important to study informal institutions if we are to 
understand and contextualise health care services. Social networks, social norms and 
values, and the nature of leadership set up the context of organisational and 
administrative culture, or what Tibandebage/Mackintosh (1999) call "institutional 
culture". It constitutes an established set of accepted institutions and norms that
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ultimately influence service delivery (cf. Atkinson et al. 2000). In fact, informal 
institutions may be able to subvert formal ones, weaken prevailing incentives or 
moderate institutional mechanisms that are assumed to transform into greater 
responsiveness and quality of care (ibid.: 631). This may also account for a situation 
where the assumptions behind the sector conceptualisations are not met (cf. Chapter 
2).
Finally, a crucial methodological question is how to prove the effectiveness and 
impact of institutional mechanisms upon organisational (mal-)performance. In other 
words, are the performance differences found in the previous two chapters due to 
different institutional set-ups and the prevailing (proper and perverse) incentives, as 
the theoretical framework suggests? The underlying logic applied is to examine 
whether and how the institutional mechanism of accountability, financial 
responsibility and staff equity function and how the operation of informal institutions 
may divert the formal mechanism. This should then permit to explore how the 
providers' incentives and behaviour are shaped by institutional mechanisms and how 
this accounts for perverse incentives, and hence provider (mal)performance.
7.2. The Public Sector: Severe Institutional Deficits
Chapter 2 has outlined the strengths of the state, above all its power to alter 
distribution and to ensure equity through state provision. However, state failure, 
which is particularly severe in a developing country context like Uganda, since the 
public sector assumptions are not fully met, results in deviations from the public 
interest and affect service provision. Based on a detailed illumination of the deficits 
in the daily functioning of local government, the gaps in the institutional mechanisms 
of accountability, financial responsibility and personnel equity are to be revealed. 
Chapter 3 analysed the formal-legal structure of local government and identified the 
implementation deficits due to factors that were beyond the control of the local level. 
This chapter looks at how the local government substance is affected by problems
262 The statements on civil servants, especially in relation to the administrative culture, are general and 
not valid for every individual government worker. Some civil servants are very dedicated.
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formed at the District level and below. While these micro-level gaps are the major 
factors for (mal-)performance, the wider national context must also be kept in mind, 
such as the financial constraints (cf. Chapter 3), lack of good governance and the high 
level of corruption (Watt et al. 1999), which equally impinge upon the health care 
system.
7.2.1. Financial Responsibility
Financial responsibility is best achieved under market competition. However, 
government clinics and health workers are not exposed to competition and health 
units are not forced to recover costs, so there is little impact when patients exit to use 
other providers. The DMO perceives the other non-state providers as competitors, but 
there are no incentives or other (quasi-market) elements within the public sector that 
make health workers compete. Thus, the problem of financial responsibility calls for 
an analysis of the way intra-administrative processes affect resource inputs decisions 
and the actual resource use at the level of the health unit.
7.2.1.1. Salaries
The main share of salaries for DMO and health unit staff (i.e., formerly central 
government staff) is financed by the central government through unconditional grants 
based on historical budgeting. The District's payroll covers the salaries of all other 
staff and of additionally recruited staff. As a result of this division of financing, the 
District is reluctant to employ new staff given its precarious financial situation 
(though it should be noted that this reluctance is also an expression of its spending 
priorities, see below). Since the Subcounties’ financial situation is even tighter, they 
often have to recruit low-qualified staff at lower salaries to compensate for staffing 
gaps at health units. Likewise, the health units are unable to employ (more expensive) 
qualified staff because of their small user fee revenues. Consequently, staff input 
decisions cannot be made flexibly in accordance with local needs, whereas staff 
dismissals are restricted by civil service regulations. Moreover, the use of staff 
resources is inefficient given the failure of staff to turn up to work (cf. Chapters 6.1 
and 6.2.5). In sum, there is no mechanism that ensures financial responsibility as 
regards salary inputs.
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7.2.1.2. Drugs
The main share of drugs, the Essential Drug Kits, is not funded by the District, but 
externally (central government and DANIDA). In theory, drug quantities are 
adequate, but supply is unreliable. Whether UEDMP drugs are embezzled at higher 
DMO levels or whether they leak from the unit (cf. Chapter 6.2.1)263, the health units 
often falsify records to account for the drugs (cf. McPake et al. 1999). The DMO 
purchases additional drugs, but the experiences of DED health professionals was that 
the DMO storekeeper was sometimes found to deny the full package of drugs to the 
health units giving the excuse that the health workers will only steal them. In-charges 
suspect that the storekeeper prefers to keep these drugs for his own private drugshop. 
Furthermore, written request forms are also easily "lost" by the storekeeper 
(observation by DED health workers, 1998). Management of drug inputs is hence 
inefficient, as is their use, so again, there is no mechanism at the local level that 
ensures financial responsibility. This is allowed to happen in the absence of a 
functional accountability mechanism and disciplinary action (see below).
7.2.1.3. User Fees
User fees rates are set at the Subcounty level and retained by the health units, which 
have spending autonomy over the revenues within the MoH guidelines. This provides 
more incentives for the generation of revenues in contrast to a system in which health 
units have to remit them to higher levels. This notwithstanding, revenues are very 
low, so spending on drugs, recurrent operational items and maintenance always falls 
short. Moreover, in-charges sometimes take out money for personal purposes, 
undermining the opportunities for efficient resource use. In other Districts, the user 
fee management was equally found to be under the discretion of the in-charges 
(Golooba-Mutebi 1999: 167). Furthermore, even though the District health budget 
allocates funds to the DMO to distribute the kits, the health clinics themselves often 
have to fetch the kits, and they rely on their user fee revenues to pay for transport to 
and from the DMO.264 For the more distant health units, some of which have 
extremely low user fee revenues, these transport costs quickly amount to a week's
263 The District Secretary for Health admits that usually half of the missing kits "get lost on the way" 
(interview, 1999).
264 This has already been the case during the early 1990s (Munene 1993).
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revenues (interview, Biilow, DED health professional, 1999). It is speculation to say 
what happens to the funds that the DMO does not spend as budgeted. But in any case, 
effective and efficient spending of user revenues is undermined this way.
In sum, the current funding mechanisms do not allow for autonomous resource 
input management, fully guided by local needs. Likewise, resource use is inefficient 
given the high degree of mismanagement. Hence, financial responsibility at the 
District or Subcounty local government level is poor and contributes to low technical 
efficiency.
7.2.1.4. Budgeting Versus Actual Expenditure Patterns
In addition to the main inputs (salaries and drugs), the government health units are 
supposed to obtain further funding from the District and the Subcounty budget. 
However, the District authorities' budgeting and spending patterns reveal a number of 
irregularities and are not service-oriented.
For example, members of the District Executive Committee were paid 
allowances during the months of its non-existence before the 1998 local government 
elections. In the 1999/00 budget, a huge amount (USh 0.355 million = US$ 300,000), 
including an enormous amount of allowances for electricity, housing, fuel and house 
servants for the LC5 Chairperson, has been allocated to the LC5 vote. The vote 
amounts to 14 percent of the funds under local discretion and 40 percent of the local 
revenues, even though the 1997 Local Government Act (LGA) only allows for 15 
percent of local revenues. In comparison, the amount budgeted for health funded 
from the local revenues is only half of that.265 The situation is further compounded by 
the fact that more than half of the discretionary resources (local revenues plus 
unconditional grants after pay-roll subtraction) are spent on the Administrative 
Headquarters and the Finance Department (KDA, Financial Committee Minutes 
1998/99 own calculations). These practices leave little money to spend on 
development activities such as agriculture, health care, education or community 
development.
The District councillors' attempts to scrutinise and revise downwards the inflated 
votes for the LC5 office or the administration headquarter were blocked by the
265 Because of central government grants ear-marked for health, the total share of the District budget 
spent on health is much higher, of course.
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Speaker of the District council through a combination of poor information flow and 
suppressed debate during the Council meetings (see the next section). As there are 
no representatives of the service departments on the Finance Committee and as the 
Committee is dominated by the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and the Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO), "the needs for health care get easily overridden by the 
interest of this Committee" (interview, member of the Executive Committee, 1999). 
District authorities usually utilise private clinics or go to Jinja and Kampala to seek 
health care, which may explain why they show little concern with the low quality of 
care in government clinics. This qualitative evidence is in line with Azfar et al.’s 
(2000) study of 10 Districts across all regions in Uganda where no correlation was 
found between household preferences and public official's knowledge of these 
preferences or resource allocations decisions.
Not only is there limited money budgeted to the social service departments, but 
the approved money, little as it is, does not fully reach the departments due to 
embezzlement within the District administrative headquarter (interviews, civil 
servants; cf. Munene 1993 for the education sector):
"So far we only got 7-8 millions [out of 12], there was connivance. The District 
authorities [the CAO and CFO] realised that by now they are overdoing it. Also 
the former CAO was chewing the money, but the new one is not better" 
(interview, DMO official, 1999).
The proper running of activities is hence made difficult for the social service 
departments. Likewise, District councillors do not receive their constituency 
allowances. With embezzlement being so obvious at the highest District level, it 
becomes institutionalised at the department level. For example, field extension 
workers complained that they are denied their allowances from the District 
department and the Subcounty level. Corruption and embezzlement is systemic and 
endemic to the public services (Watt et al. 1999: 46). It is institutionalised to an 
extent that it is openly acknowledged; for example, the following request was found 
in the District Council minutes:
"The chairperson appealed to the DMO to stop lending [money to DMO staff], 
because of the reimbursement delays for the accountability to be made. When 
somebody borrows, let the Committee know" (October 1998).
266 For example, budget proposals are given out at most one day before or even on the same day o f the 
Council meeting, which undermines the capacity of the councillors to examine the proposed spending.
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At the Subcounty level, the financial situation and the spending priorities are 
similarly problematic. The Subcounties' actual revenues amount to USh 30,000,000-
40.000.000 for the financial year 1997/98 (Subcounty budgets, own calculations). 
After subtracting 57.75 percent for the LC1, 2, 4 and 5 shares, the payroll, capital 
investment, the inflated LC3 chairperson vote and other payment obligations, about a 
tenth of the Subcounty budget is left for the allocation to the Subcounty's prioritised 
development activities. As at the District level, the Subcounty Council is given a fully 
worked out budget proposal, while the Executive Committee and the Subcounty chief 
attempt to impede amendments by councillors. This budget allocation results in USh
200.000 bids (about US$ 180) per year for agricultural extension, sanitation 
mobilisation, and community development respectively. Likewise, financial support 
to the Subcounty's health unit(s) is minimal and amounts to an average of USh
500.000 (i.e., 1-2 percent of the budget total), but actual spending on health care is 
often 0 percent.267 In the Subcounties under study, the approved budget for health was 
not spent, but misappropriated by the Subcounty authorities (interviews, Secretary for 
Health, Subcounty A and Chairperson Health Committee, Subcounty B and C, 1999). 
Again, as at the District level, health does not constitute a focus for councillors.
Subcounty chiefs lamented how difficult it is for them to stop the Executive 
committee members "eating money" (that is, the use of public funds for personal 
reasons). If they did so, one Subcounty chief argued, they would create enemies and 
may face accusations of "wanting to eat all by himself'. He would therefore also 
serve himself in periods of scarce cash (interview, Subcounty Chief A and B, 
Secretary for Women LC3 Subcounty A, 1997).268 This is confirmed by a ten District 
study, which reports that over 60 percent of Subcounty officials admitted the presence 
of corruption in the Subcounty (Azfar et al. 2000: 37). The Subcounty Council and 
the Health Subcommittee put little pressure on the Subcounty chief to make him 
accountable, and as a result, the actual allocation of the Subcounty funds is barely 
transparent. Often, it is only at the end of the financial year, if at all, that the 
Subcounty Health Subcommittees find out whether any money and how much has
267 Data from seventeen 1997/98 Subcounty budgets and seven 1998/99 budgets, own calculations. In 
nearby Tororo District, Subcounty spending on health has also been low, amounting to up to 4% 
(Kostansjek 1997).
268 In Subcounty A, out of the Subcounty's budget of USh 35,000,000, an estimated USh 1,500,000 -
2.000.000 per year are misused for private purposes. This does not include "legal'' misappropriations 
in form of additionally granted allowances (cf. Golooba-Mutebi 1999: 225-7 for similar examples).
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been spent on health care. These problems must be set in the context of Subcounties 
not yet being able to take up their responsibilities as autonomous corporate bodies in 
planning and acting for their citizens' needs. Districts are centralised from within, and 
hence, other than implementing the District's and central government's programmes, 
Subcounties currently constitute an agent of law and order and little more.269
In sum, there is no effective mechanism of financial responsibility, since 
decisions over resource inputs are taken too far from the operational level, and are 
thus unrelated to local needs, and in addition, they are captured by private interests. 
For both the Subcounty and District level, Brett's (1993) point about how the 
predatory Ugandan state denies itself the income required to provide essential 
services is clearly demonstrated in the case of Kamuli. Further, the absence of a 
financial responsibility mechanism explains the low level of technical efficiency and 
inefficient utilisation of staff resources at government clinics in particular and the low 
performance in general. Why this is allowed to happen and why misuse of resources 
at the health centre is not stopped will be discussed in the next section.
7.2.2. Accountability
In order to secure adequate outputs in relation to inputs, a functional accountability 
mechanism is required. The 1997 LGA and MoH guidelines have established a 
number of nested formal relationships and institutions, which are depicted in Figure
7.1. Their objective is to make civil servants and health workers accountable to 
politicians and politicians accountable to citizens. Furthermore, providers are 
supposed to be accountable to users.270
269 This is often the case in other countries as well (for example for India, cf. Mahal et al. 2000).
270 Audit control systems may equally play an important role as a disciplining device external to the 
local government, but these aspects were not further examined (cf. Azfar et al. 2000: 70).
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Figure 7.1: Formal accountability chains in the public sector
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Health unit monitoring and supervision is supposed to be carried out by the 
Health Unit Management Committee (HUMC), the Subcounty Health Committee 
(SCHC), the Subcounty Administration, and the DMO. All of these bodies should be 
accountable to the directly elected councils at the Subcounty and District level, which 
in turn should be accountable to their constituents. Exit and voice are additional 
means to increase accountability, but only if their signals are linked to intra- 
organisational institutions that translate into the right incentives for organisational 
actors to perform (Paul 1992: 1054). In this context, exit means that patients stop 
using a provider or that employees leave an organisation. Voice means that patients 
express their dissatisfaction directly to the provider, or to some other authority to 
which the provider is subordinate or through other types of actions and protests in 
order to bring about change to an objectionable state of affairs (Hirschman 1970: 4, 
30). Looking into the functioning of these supervisory and bottom-up relationships 
and mechanisms reveals numerous deficits.
7.2.2.1. The Health Unit Management Committee and the Subcountv Health
Committee: Lack o f  Community Involvement and Community Leverage 
Community involvement is understood to mean the participation of community 
members in decision-making and management of health units in order to create local 
ownership and foster transparency, thus contributing to overall better performance 
(cf. Bennett et al. 1995: 24). Participation is also a mechanism to allow the provider 
to find out the needs of the beneficiaries. Brett (2000c) emphasises that 
participation only makes sense when partnered with accountability, that is, when 
people have some leverage over the provider. The HUMC and the SCHC constitute 
two mechanisms for community involvement in decision-making and management of 
health unit issues but, as we will see, they have no leverage and control over the 
health units.
HUMC members are appointed by the Subcounty Executive Committee and 
seconded by the Council. The HUMC monitors the health unit operation, and its tasks
271 The District Health Committee is too far away from the community level to constitute a 
participatory mechanism, which is why it is not discussed in this subsection.
272 An empirical evaluation of the impacts of beneficiary participation in a variety o f countries is 
provided in Finsterbusch/van Wicklin (1987). For the problems and limits o f participation, cf. Brett 
(1996a, 2000c).
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include financial management, drug management and pursuing community 
complaints. Yet the HUMC's main problem is their operational and organisational 
weakness. None of the HUMCs of the studied government clinics met on a regular 
basis or were properly functioning. For example, the previous HUMC of rG-3 has not 
sat for the last two years. Meetings fail, because the HUMC members are not satisfied 
with their remuneration (cf. Golooba-Mutebi 1999: 158). Neither are members 
willing to do any additional work, such as consulting communities or occasionally 
visiting the health unit. As most members are not health professionals, they lack the 
knowledge needed for effective health unit management and hence are hardly 
acknowledged by the in-charge. They are not involved in decisions on user fee 
expenditure, which are usually taken solely by the in-charge. Often being unaware of 
their actual roles and responsibilities, they are in a weak position in relation to the in- 
charge and have a pro-forma existence, which leaves the latter unsupervised.
The flawed HUMC composition process contributes to its distorting their role as 
a supervisor. For example, according to the chairperson of the Health Committee in 
Subcounty A, the LC3 chairperson and Executive Committee members appointed 
those people who had supported them during election campaigns, without involving 
the Council or the Subcounty Health Committee in the seconding of the HUMC. 
HUMC members, as local councillors (see below), belong to the better-off socio­
economic group, which confirms that formal structures for community participation 
do not provide for processes of liberation and empowerment. Instead, the HUMC has 
reproduced existing power relations. This pattern of elite capture is also found by 
Azfar et al. (2000), who note that access to committee memberships depend on
'yn'i
income and education. Also, many HUMC members are friends with the in-charge 
and given this "supervisory capture", control and supervision duties are not exercised. 
Another dilemma is that most people are reluctant to tackle problems of 
misbehaviour that would endanger somebody’s position by criticising them due to 
fear of revenge. Hence, the HUMCs fail to investigate and publish failure of health 
centres. One Secretary for Health explains that
273 My institutional analysis of a World Bank nutrition programme in Senegal in 2001 also revealed 
that the better-off and higher educated capture these committees.
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"If you look at the problem and try to solve it, they accuse you of witchcraft. We 
do not feel comfortable [when addressing the management problems in the health 
unit], so we rather leave it."274
Finally, HUMC members virtually do not establish links with the community and 
thus do not contribute to identifying local health (care) needs and demands. They are 
often uninterested in consulting local people and do not consider this to be their task; 
rather they see themselves as mobilisers for health education (cf. Olsen 1997 in 
Hutchinson 1999: 104). Asked about the community's involvement in planning or 
decision processes of health care provision, none of the 37 focus groups, held in 
1997, mentioned the HUMC or the Subcounty Health Committee, so it appears that 
people do not perceive them as a means for participation and consultation. This is 
very similar to what is found in Zambia (van der Geest et al. 2000) and Brazil 
(Atkinson et al. 2000) and is due to the fact that HUMCs are appointed at too high a 
level and thus too far away from the community. As a result, people receive little 
information about them.
Table 7.1 shows that exit and household respondents are hardly aware of the 
existence of HUMCs and that there are virtually no consultations by the HUMCs, 
which was confirmed by focus group discussions. Asiimwe et al. (1997a) also 
mention the community's low awareness of the HUMCs in their study of two 
Districts. As HUMC members hardly ever visit the community, they do not provide a 
platform for community concerns. Further, they lack contact and interaction as well 
as support from the SCHC, the DMO and the Secretary for Health. In sum, the 
HUMCs do not have the power, leverage and knowledge necessary to effectively 
supervise and enforce health care performance.
274 Golooba-Mutebi also reports an event in a neighbouring District where a health worker threatened a 
HUMC member with assault, if she did not stop interfering in the management of the health unit (1999: 
161).
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Table 7.1: Respondents' knowledge of and contract with government HUMCs275
Exit Respondents Household
respondents
Aware of the existence of HUMC 54% 44%
Knows somebody on the committee 10% 11%
Knows of a HUMC member visit or a 
community consultation
6%21b 0%
The Subcounty Health Subcommittees consist of four to five councillors that are 
elected by the Subcounty council. They are in charge of health care issues, 
particularly planning, within the Subcounty. However, it was found that they play 
hardly any role in supervising and controlling the health units. In many cases, they 
lack the skills and competencies for assessing and planning, and in Kamuli, they lack 
both operational and political strength, so that they have little leverage over health 
workers and no say in budget matters.277 Thus, health care planning at the Subcounty 
level is in its infancy. Again, the committee members primarily perceive themselves 
to be mobilisers for health education messages (cf. Kostansjek 1997 for Tororo 
District), even though they rarely visit the communities.
Altogether, the provisions made for community involvement (through 
community representation and consultation) in the management of health units are 
not utilised due to the weaknesses of the committees. The communities have no 
leverage over these committees. As a result, these structures do not contribute to 
improving the accountability of health workers towards their patients. The next 
section inquires whether intra-administrative control constitutes a more effective 
accountability mechanism.
275 These figures are gendered, in that women are much less aware of the existence of HUMCs and are 
more unlikely to know anybody on the committee. The differences between the exit and household 
survey results are related to the more urban population in the exit interview sample.
276 These were two urban respondents, out of the total of 33 respondents.
277 This may also be a question of Kamuli belonging to the last group of Districts having undergone 
decentralisation. For example, in Tororo District, which was decentralised two years before Kamuli, 
the SCHCs were found to be better functioning (Kostansjek 1997).
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7.2.2.2. Inadequate Administrative Control bv Subcountv Authorities
The Subcounty Secretary for Health could, in principle, play a key role in supervising 
government health workers. In practice, this hardly takes place. Like the HUMCs, 
these officials often have no health background and are not respected by the in­
charges. Alternatively, supervision chains are often interrupted due to personal 
relationships with health workers, undermining the threat of disciplinary action by the 
officials.
The following constellation in one of the Subcounties may be an extreme 
example, but it is not untypical. The Secretary for Health is a junior medical assistant 
who is in charge of a very badly run neighbouring health unit. He is hardly ever 
present on duty there, since he operates his own unlicensed private clinic and another 
drugshop. Likewise, little time remains for him to perform his tasks as the Secretary 
for Health. Given his own absence from duty, he has little moral authority in 
supervising the staff presence at other clinics. Furthermore, he lacks the professional 
authority, since the in-charge he is supposed to oversee is a senior medical assistant.
For Subcounty authorities likewise, it is difficult to exert control upon health 
units, because the main share of salaries and other resources is financed by or 
channelled through the DMO. Accordingly, health workers are accountable to the 
District administration and the DMO as the (potential) locus of supervision and 
disciplinary power. As a result, the Subcounties have no leverage over the District 
employed health workers. The Subcounties' irregular salary payments to their 
employees also weaken the accountability link and are very demoralising. Neither do 
higher-level political bodies support the Subcounties' concerns. For example, a 
member of the Town Council Health Committee lamented:
"The in-charge has more loyalty to the LC5. The LC5 says: "It is done that way",
so then there is nothing to bother about" (interview, 1999).
7.2.2.3. The Role o f  the DMO: Supervision Gaps
The first gap within the chain of support supervision of health workers results from 
the frequent absence of the in-charges. This gap is being aggravated by the DMO's 
inadequate supervisory practice. DMO staff visits the health units on a regular basis -  
the rural clinics under study were visited monthly in 1998. Yet the frequency of 
supervisory visits says nothing on their actual impact. First, these supervisory visits
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focus on hygiene, sanitation and other infrastructure aspects, but much less on issues 
of health unit management, the collection and spending of user fees, drug leakage, 
quality of care (such as polypharmacy and irrational use of drugs) or the behaviour 
and attendance of staff.278 Second, it appears that there is little concern and effort to 
improve the performance of health clinics. Supervisors have few incentives and little 
motivation to carry out these tasks, especially if there are no field allowances 
available. Local people seem to have little confidence with those in charge of 
supervision, or in any case do not count on them; for example, one FGD said:
”... the health centre receives drugs regularly, but the drugs end up in the private
clinics. And since the drugs look the same, it is difficult fo r  us to prove it"
(Subcounty A, 1999, my emphasis).
The problems of drug leakage and staff absence are well known to the District 
authorities. Likewise, irresponsible behaviour and misbehaviour have been reported 
to the DMO, but no action was taken. As neither the DMO nor the respective in­
charges query staff absences (with few exceptions), it is mainly up to the individual 
decision of the health worker whether and when he or she is on duty. In sum, intra- 
administrative control and monitoring are weak and do not contribute to improving 
accountability, and while the DMO is limited in the resources available, this is not a 
sufficient explanation for the poor quality of supervision.
7.2.2.4. Lack o f  Political Accountability and Insufficient Local Lemtimisation
Dominant Executive Committees and Weak District and Subcountv Councils 
The DMO's poor performance is also the result of weak intra-administrative 
accountability between civil servants and politicians. Although the District Health 
Subcommittee is much more informed and concerned about the problems of health 
units when compared with their counterparts at the Subcounty level, its influence 
upon the DMO is limited and its monitoring role ineffectual. This is because civil 
servants are still not used to holding themselves accountable to politicians and have
278 However, an intervention study in Uganda showed that reinforced supervision o f health workers' 
prescription patterns may improve rational use of drugs and the quality of prescribing (Kafuko et al. 
1993).
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difficulties in subordinating themselves to the political leadership (interviews, various 
department heads, 1997-99, cf. Hutchinson 1999: 120 for other Districts).
This goes together with the weak position of the LC5 and LC3 Councils. At both 
the District and Subcounty level, it was observed that the chairperson and the 
Executive Committee are very dominant, being rather detached from the Council and 
allied to the administrative authorities. The administration and the Executive 
Committee have taken over the Council's role in the allocation of resources. As 
mentioned already, budget decisions are taken by the chairperson and the Executive 
Committee in a top-down manner; concomitantly the Council's role has been 
downgraded to mere seconding. Further, the District and Subcounty Councils are 
helpless vis-a-vis the self-granting practices of the administrative leadership. Council 
meetings are run in a way that provides few opportunities for councillors to put across 
their views.279 As a result, there is little accountability and responsiveness to the 
Council, and the relationships between the Council and the Executive Committee are 
the reverse of what they are supposed to be, distorting another element within the 
accountability chain.
The weakness of the Councils is also in part the result of the present non-party 
system in Uganda. While it is beyond the scope of this study to focus on this point in 
great detail, it is worth noting that the non-party system makes it very difficult and 
costly for councillors to build alliances and to aggregate local preferences in council 
decisions and actions. Similarly, the non-party system allows councillors to escape 
judgement on their performance, since they may always claim that they alone are 
powerless to bring about change in a personalised political system. Instead, the 
(election) system fosters individualised, localised patronage patterns, and as we shall 
see in Chapter 8, this is not counteracted by the involvement of NGOs.
Representation and Consultation Deficits
Councillors and in particular Executive Committee members are characterised by a 
higher socio-economic and education status (cf. Tidemand 1994, Azfar et al. 2000, 
Tripp 2000). While this observation is true for many countries, it is problematic in a 
situation where these elites are not forced to perform because of the lack of
279 This concurs with Golooba-Mutebi's observation that councillors are mainly addressed by being 
blamed, warned, reminded and ridiculed and that they do not dare ask questions (1999: 123, 251).
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functioning accountability mechanisms. In Kamuli District, the socio-economic status 
of the elite was increased through holding public office, according to people's view. 
Given the self-granting practices and the increase in assets of those who "eat", this is 
probably true. However, the election of better-off people is not only the result of their 
greater ability to make themselves heard or to buy votes, it is also a reflection of a 
strong acceptance of hierarchy, patronage, authority and leadership, i.e. culturally 
induced subordination (Mathauer 1997: 30).280 This is reinforced by the parochial 
open queuing system in electing the lower two LC levels (and before 1997 at all five 
Council levels). The lack of secrecy influences people's voting behaviour, and during 
an open election, I observed people running back and forth between candidates, 
assumingly in line with the "big men's" voting behaviour.
People's expectation of local councillors is not that they should simply represent 
the community, but also that they should be "bringing us something back", and 
"bringing something back" is more likely to be guaranteed by the better-off people. 
Rather than having a political agenda, Subcounty (and District) councillors win 
elections by spending large sums of money for sugar, soap and other gifts during the 
campaigning, thereby reinforcing patron-client relationships (cf. Golooba-Mutebi 
1999: 244). As in other African countries, devolution is thus impeded by the 
prevailing patterns of patronage (Leonard/Leonard 2000). Since political power is 
linked with economic power, poorer people have limited access to council positions, 
which is highly problematic, as their concerns are not represented. For example, the 
better-off use private clinics, or else enjoy courteous treatment at government units, 
so they are unaware of what poorer people have to cope with when seeking treatment 
at government clinics. The capture by the better-off of the political system also 
explains why spending priorities are not poverty-oriented and why health receives so 
little attention. In fact, as Abraham/Platteau (2000) note, this elite capture is common 
to much of rural Africa.
One of the main roles of councillors is to consult with their constituents 
regularly (LGA 1997, Third Schedule, Section 8). However, none of the 15 
communities to whom we talked to in focus group discussions during 1997 (before 
the direct Subcounty and District council elections took place in 1998) felt
280 The quotes provided by Golooba-Mutebi (1999: 132, 235) on people’s understanding o f their 
leaders also illuminate this point.
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represented and neither did anyone report having been consulted on any matter. Only 
four village councils (LCls) out of the 15 communities had put forward an issue to 
the LC2, and in two cases, the community received feedback and their issue was 
settled. It seems that people do not bother to forward their concerns, since their case 
usually goes no further than the LC2 level. By contrast, many respondents mentioned 
that they address LC1 and 2 Executive Committee members on an individual basis 
for an individual issue. Furthermore, the feeling of not being represented was 
reinforced by the fact that most villagers do not know who their "representatives" are 
at higher council levels. As a result the communities perceived the higher Executive 
Committees as a part of the administration and not as their representatives.
After the direct elections at Subcounty and District level had taken place in 
1998, the relationships have changed somewhat. The majority of male (94 percent) 
and seven out of ten female household respondents knew their Subcounty councillor. 
But only a seventh of the household respondents and 2 out of 12 focus groups 
reported that they have ever been consulted by them since the 1998 elections.281 
Accordingly, people are quite disappointed and frustrated with their Subcounty 
councillor:
"That man after having moved around for votes never came again. We have never 
approached him, because he never came back. Ever since he was elected, he does 
not give information back" (FGD, Kamuli Town, 1999).
"These people are just enjoying themselves, they just eat the money in their chairs. 
They told us they will do a, b, c, for the widows and the orphans etc., but since 
then, they have never come" (FGD, Subcounty C, 1999).
Likewise, 88 percent of household respondents had never forwarded a community 
concern to their Subcounty councillor, whereas a third of the communities, with 
which we had a focus group discussion in 1999 have done so.282 In the few cases 
where they did, only half of the cases received feedback. A common strategy of 
councillors was to put them off, more so since LCs prefer to concentrate on activities 
for which they can charge a fee, such as settling disputes. It was also found that
281 Without having carried out a systematic analysis, it appears that the contact between District 
councillors and their constituents is even less frequent.
282 The difference between the two figures can be explained by the lack o f information flow to the 
individual community members. Nevertheless, the score is low overall, and this is also related to the 
low degree of collective action and the individualised community life, which communities themselves 
complained about.
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almost a seventh of the household respondents had contacted a councillor for an 
individual problem.
Distortions at the Lower LC Levels
Local participation and legitimisation is distorted by two contradictory logics within 
the LC system. The 1997 LGA introduced direct elections of Subcounty councillors 
for direct representation of the communities. Yet, the prevailing practice is that 
people still have to forward their issues through the LC1 and LC2 level before an 
issue will be dealt with at the LC3 level. This constitutes a dead-end in some 
communities, where there is no functioning LC2 Executive Committee anymore or 
where the LC2 councillors are not interested in calling a meeting.
LC1 and LC2 meetings have lost their relevance, and none of the studied 
communities had regular general meetings anymore (cf. Golooba-Mutebi 1999: 118), 
which runs contrary to the 1993 Local Governments (RC) Statute and 1997 LGA. 
Local people blamed their councillors for not calling meetings anymore, but another 
reason was the lack of interest of community members. A general demoralisation and 
demotivation on both sides has taken place, and as a result meetings are only called 
for special issues (such as security and external projects). Golooba-Mutebi (1999) 
also mentions the lack of remuneration of lower LCs as a central reason for the 
absence of council meetings. This demoralisation must be seen in light of the 
creeping erosion of what the LCs were intended to be in the RC system, which was to 
be the people's representatives and the initiators of local community projects. The 
introduction of direct elections has not triggered a new dynamic for local 
participation, since the same organisational culture prevails.
Moreover, the 1997 LGA has downgraded the LC1 and LC2 levels to mere 
administrative units that serve (and often are instrumentalised) only as mobilisers for 
administrative tasks and for programmes and projects initiated from above. The 
mixture of LC roles, being both part of "political society", and mobilisers around 
government goals, along with their duties as assistants in tax collection (in theory at 
least), administrators and arbitrators283 leads to a role conflict, since LC1 councillors
283 Another main component of their work is to mediate and arbitrate local disputes in Resistance 
Council courts (cf. Resistance Council Committees' Judicial Power Statute 1988, Burkie 1993, 
Tidemand 1995).
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have to serve and answer to both the state and the community. There is hence no 
separation between the executive and the judicative. In contrast to the rhetoric about 
and the original rationale behind the Resistance Councils system as a popular and 
participatory bottom-up system, a top-down mobilisation system had emerged, 
weakening the representational dimension. Further, in Kamuli as in other Districts, 
LCs shy away from taking on administrative responsibilities for fear of becoming 
unpopular within the community. Lacking the support of LCs, Parish chiefs have 
even more difficulties in performing their administrative tasks of tax collection. 
Thus, the LC1 is no longer perceived as a level of relevance or with leverage 
(Mathauer 1997: 26).
Accordingly, none of the focus group respondents of 1997-99 (before and after 
local elections) felt that they have a platform to express their concerns about health or 
other services. For example, one group said that they have no voice option because 
they cannot go to the LCls, whom they do not trust. Since the HUMC also fails to 
establish a link to the community, there is no functional mechanism at the local level 
through which people can exert leverage. Finally, the "recall mechanism" -  the vote 
of no confidence -  is rarely practised, even at the lower levels, and does no longer 
constitute a tangible accountability mechanism as a potential threat to councillors. 
Things become more difficult still when it comes to recalling a councillor above the 
LC1 level, as this requires co-operation across Parishes and Subcounties. Finally, 
there is always the fear that taking a stand will prove harmful in the long run (see the 
next subsection):
"It is not easy for us to recall leaders because we fear to be singled out" (FGD,
Subcounty B, 1999).
7.2.2.5. Hierarchical Administrative Culture and Suppression o f  Voice 
Deficits in local participation, legitimisation and accountability are also caused and 
reinforced by the prevailing "administrative culture". This refers to the sum of 
cognitive, evaluative and affective attitudes within the administration, manifested in 
the organisational culture, and along the citizens' attitudes towards the administration
284 Likewise, Golooba-Mutebi (1999: 132) states that LCs do not have authority, or do not use their 
authority.
285 This was already the case in the early 1990s (cf. Burkey 1991).
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(cf. Jann 1983 for this categorisation). Both aspects shape the nature of interactions 
between civil servants and citizens, and the administrative culture is consequently a 
decisive factor for policy and service outputs. It is argued that for service provision to 
be effective, a responsive, co-operative, transparent and flexible style of 
administration is required (Simon 1993, Simon et al. 1997). The following account of 
the administrative culture at the local government level shows that the reality in 
Kamuli is far from being conducive to and supportive of the formally existent 
accountability mechanisms.286
Administrative Culture o f  Civil Servants
The previous sections demonstrated the non-functioning of intra-administrative 
accountability mechanisms due to particularism and insufficient public interest, 
resulting in institutionalised embezzlement. Further, another characteristics of the 
prevailing administrative culture is a form of personalised hierarchy that is based on 
top-down command and use of threat to enforce compliance with the actions of 
higher authorities, even when those actions are not legal. A high power index and 
insecurity index prevails. Lower cadres often fear questioning and objecting to the 
higher authorities, and as the administration goes unchallenged, lower cadres are 
often denied their salaries or allowances. Likewise, given the "long-standing 
hierarchical traditions and habitual deference to persons of higher social status" in 
much of Uganda (Golooba-Mutebi 1999: 236), lower LCs cannot imagine to dare 
recall their higher counterparts. The existing conflict avoidance strategy also explains 
why decision-making is captured by a few people, namely the Executive Committee 
or the Financial Committee. Due to fear for negative consequences, lower civil 
servants keep quiet. For example, a DMO official reported that they received less 
than two thirds of their supposed vote due to connivance among the District 
authorities and explained:
"We could only quietly make noise, and there was a private contact with 
newspapers.... Decentralisation is really the problem: If you make noise, they look 
at you privately [resulting in dismissal]" (interview, 1999).
286 Jann's (1983) and Hofstede’s (1987) conceptualisation and operationalisation of administrative and 
organisational culture informed this analysis.
287 The power-distance index is composed of the indicators of many hierarchical levels and unequal 
relationships, and the insecurity index means avoidance of conflicts and uncertain situations (Hofstede 
1987).
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Similarly, a SCHC chairperson lamented the fact that the Secretary for Health never 
attends SCHC meetings and does not look after the health units. He then elucidates 
why they do not express their dissatisfaction:
"We have not raised this issue with the LC3, because it would be too delicate" 
(interview 1999).
This fear foils monitoring activities, intra-administrative accountability and 
transparency. Accordingly, NGO staff describes civil servants of both higher and 
lower cadres as driven by self-interest, who show little concern, commitment and 
engagement for the community. As a result, bribery, embezzlement and "eating" 
development funds have become a normal part of office life.
Citizens' Administrative Culture
The administrative culture of local people is characterised by fear of the public 
administration, especially in regard to the agencies of law and order. This goes hand- 
in-hand with feelings of insecurity and resignation due to lack of knowledge about 
administrative procedures. People are well aware that money is "eaten", but do not 
see a way of opposing it. A common rhetorical statement was: "How can you make 
your boss accountable?" It was found that people's demands go unspoken, largely due 
to the persistent fear and mistrust that "the administration police might take us". The 
insecurity and fear for what will happen if one takes a negative stand is exemplified 
in the following quote:
"Some people fear that complaining will create grudges and hatred. The 
administrators call you wise. .. .Maybe those people will not help you once you are 
in a problem" (FGD, Subcounty B, 1999).
As access to health care can be a matter of life and death, these experiences or 
perceptions have made people particularly wary about expressing their dissatisfaction 
to government health workers. Their anxiety of complaining is about getting an 
empty injection, wrong or no treatment, not being served the next time, being even 
more abused, or, as one group said, "having one's life terminated when being sick". 
Asking this group what they meant, they said:
"We really cannot say, but we just think that the staff can do anything bad to you" 
(Kamuli Town, 1999).
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Likewise, another group thought:
"It would be easy to say something, but we fear to complain, as we don't know 
what could happen" (Subcounty A, 1999).
Whyte makes a similar point:
An open accusation might mean that you or your relatives will not receive help 
when you need it (1997: 207).
As a consequence, people often remain passive, withdraw and wait for what there is 
to come. Two percent of respondents mentioned that they would complain and use 
voice in case of being dissatisfied, but the consensus is that it is useless to express
I ^ o o
one's concerns. Most often, people keep quiet and exit by using another place. This 
pattern is in line with Hirschman's note that the availability of exit often drives out 
the use of voice (1970: 76). Moreover, the ability to use voice is related to income, 
education and other attributes; so for the very poor, the use and the cost of voice can 
be too burdensome (Paul 1992: 1051).
In sum, the prevailing administrative culture contributes to the formal 
institutional mechanisms being distorted by individual interests. It also shows again 
that decentralisation has only resulted in a process of power reproduction of local 
elites.289
Overall, the various institutional mechanisms discussed in the previous 
subsections, which are supposed to ensure accountability, are deficient, resulting in 
the severe performance gaps of government health care provision as described in 
Chapters 5 and 6. People's (in)ability to pay and their need for privacy are not taken 
into account. Likewise, drug leakage, rude staff behaviour, absence when on duty and 
irrational use of drugs have become the norm. This is the result of the prevailing 
institutionalised pathologies within the local government system. Loewenson's (2000) 
account for Zimbabwe similarly points to the dysfunctional participation and 
accountability mechanisms that explain malperformance in the public sector (cf. 
Mills 1997b, Bennett et al. 1999).
288 Mackintosh/Tibandebage (2000) also note for Tanzania that people are afraid to make complaints.
289 We will see in Chapter 8 that the administrative culture also accounts for the struggle of civil 
society to operate as such.
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7.2.3. Incentives and Staff Equity
This subsection will study in more detail the prevailing incentives -  the rewards and 
sanctions -  that government health workers encounter, and how these shape their 
behaviour and performance in a system where nobody expects consistency with the 
formal institutions.
Health workers have long suffered from salary irregularities, as payments could 
take months or even years, if they came at all. That said, as the staff payroll became a 
top priority within the allocation of resources at the local government level in the 
second half of the 1990s, the situation has improved at least for the District staff, 
though there are still cases where health workers do not receive their salary. For those 
health workers based in distant health units, it is very hard to take action regarding 
absent or irregular salary payments, both in terms of getting to the District 
headquarter by public transport and being heard by the District authorities when 
presenting the complaint. As a result, health workers would rather resign instead of 
forwarding their complaints.
Salaries of decentralised and District staff are slightly higher than those of 
employed staff in the NGO and private sector, as Table 7.2 indicates.290 But despite 
considerable pay increases, salaries remain still low, especially in comparison to the 
earnings of self-employment in the private sector. In contrast to the District staff, 
Subcounty staff (nurses, laboratory assistants and mainly nursing aids) is more likely 
to be paid irregularly or not at all and not always provided with a work contract. 
Health workers who are employed by a health unit or by a Subcounty have to put up 
with even lower salaries and irregular payments. When these health workers have 
finally required experience and on-the-job training, they have often given up the hope 
of being paid and leave, after which the Subcounty recruits new staff along the same 
pattern (interview, Bulow, DED-health worker, 1999).
290 This corresponds to the findings of a recent World Bank study o f health care provision in Uganda 
(personal communication, Ritva Reinikka, 2001).
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Table 7.2: Monthly staff salaries/incomes earned in the public, private and NGO 
sectors (in USh)291
G overnm ent P rivate  clinics NGO clinics
R u ra l
M edical assistan t 220,000
+ 66,000 lunch allw.
450,000 (estimated)292 -
N urse 90,000-120,000*
+ 66,000 lunch allw.
N/A 80,000-100,000
N ursing aid 40,000-60,000, D, SC 
20,000 H/U
N/A 15.000-20,000 rN-1, 2
40.000-60,000 rN-3
U rban
M edical assistan t 220,000
+ 66,000 lunch allow.
Total income: 
1-3,000.000 
Net income:
> 700,000 (MA) 
ca. 1-2,000.000 (Dr)
227,450 hosp.
155.000 uN-1
200.000 uN-2 + 
55,000-60,000 allw.
N urse 90,000-120,000*
+ 66,000 lunch allw.
Emnloved:
100,000-110,000
70,000
90,000-120,000 hosp. 
no data for uN-1 
160,000 uN-2 + allw.
N ursing aid 40,000-60,000 Emploved:
30,000-60,000
70,000 hospital 
no data for uN-2
Source: DMO 1998, Interviews, estimation based on record books (1999)
D = paid by the District H/U = paid by the health unit SC = paid by the Subcounty
allw. = allowance
* Nurses who belong to the decentralised staff category receive a lunch allowance of USh 66,000.
This situation not only creates frustration and demotivation, but also forces 
health workers to find alternative income sources and enhances them to give leeway 
to perverse incentives, resulting in informal charging, the illicit selling o f drugs, or 
being absent from duty to pursue other income-generating activities. Based on very 
modest estimations, a medical assistant can earn a weekly government salary with 
only 2.5 days private practice. As salary increases for doctors and medical assistants 
could never come close to the incomes earned in the private sector, the incentive for 
rent capture and drug leakage for private sale remains, as one focus group put it:
291 Different salaries within one staff group are due to different staff qualifications (registered versus 
enrolled nurse) or different sources of funding (District, Subcounty or health unit).
292 McPake et al's estimation amounts to USh 1,000,000 gross income. Given the price structure in the 
rural areas of Kamuli District, this would seem to be lower amounting to USh 600,000 for medical 
assistants with an estimated net income of USh 450,000. No data is available for the drugshops' income 
in Kamuli. McPake et al. found that (rural) private clinics are 2.6 times more profitable than drugshops 
(1998: 18).
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"Since the law allows medical workers to run private clinics, it becomes difficult 
for them to concentrate at their government work and not take away drugs" 
(Subcounty B, 1999).
Despite the low salaries, public sector employment is still attractive, as it brings with 
it other benefits -  free health care for the family, job security, retirement schemes, 
access to further training, prestige, an institutional base and often housing -  which 
increase the overall value of the benefit package (cf. Martineau 2000, Bennett et al. 
1994: 8), not to mention the fact that employment in the public sector offers 
opportunities for informal charging and resale of drugs.293
As in many other Sub-Saharan countries, the personnel system in Uganda's 
health care system fails, because pay and promotion are not linked to performance 
(cf. Asiimwe et al. 1997b). Health workers are paid a flat salary, and this creates the 
perverse incentive to reduce their workload as much as possible in order to have more 
time for other income-generating activities. Moreover, there are no clear promotional 
schemes (interviews, civil servants, 1997-99; cf. Kwagala 1997: 28), which affects 
staff motivation, and so another performance incentive is lost.294 User fee revenues 
are supposed to constitute a financial incentive for good performance by being partly 
spent as staff top-up allowances. In reality income increases from user fee revenues 
are minimal (see Table 7.3) and are easily overtaken by informally charging half a 
dozen patients.295 Opposite to the user fee rationale, the logic of informal charging is 
based on the delivery of bad services, which can then be improved by under-the-table 
payments to the health worker. As informal charging generates more income, the 
perverse incentive for bad performance or selling drugs dominates.
293 Cf. Asiimwe et al. (1997b), who provide estimations for the income of these activities in a District 
in Western Uganda.
294 In other Ugandan Districts, promotion was also found to be based on nepotistic considerations, gifts 
and payments (Azfar et al. 2000).
295 Another problem is the unequal distribution o f user fee revenues by not taking into account the 
staffs attendance, which causes conflict among staff.
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Table 7.3: Allowances paid in government clinics (in USh)
uG-1 rG-2296 rG-3
Medical assistant 32,000 (IC); 22,000 19,000 14,000 (IC); 12,000
Nurse 19,000 19,000 10,000
Nursing aid 15,000 15,000 6,000-8,000
Source: Interviews with health workers and record books (1999)
Overall, the rates of official remuneration are not satisfactory, since -  in the view 
of health workers -  their obligations are not adequately balanced by the employers' 
efforts to cater for their needs. This explains malperformance, like staff absence, drug 
leakage for personal sale and informal charging. These strategies are a means to 
restore the contract between the employer and employee and hence seek to re­
establish equity (cf. Munene 1993: 23).297 In rural areas, staff absence and late 
showing is also related to the lack of accommodation on the compound of the health 
unit. At one extreme, we found a nurse who cycled about 20 kilometres each way 
from his home, about three days a week. In this way, health workers do not only feel 
neglected in material terms. Mackintosh/Tibandebage (2000) make the crucial point 
that nurses and nursing aids may also feel abandoned by doctors or medical assistants 
who are supposed to be responsible for patient care. Being left on their own, nurses 
may resort to ignoring patient needs or abusing patients (as the examples in Chapter 
6.2.2 illustrated) as a way of dealing with their own helplessness and frustrations.
The various strategies of health workers -  nurtured by the prevailing perverse 
incentives -  must also be seen in the context of inadequate supervision and control. 
The DMO very rarely imposes sanctions on misbehaving health workers, and there is 
no real threat of being sacked (cf. Asiimwe et al. 1997b). DMO officials may also 
sympathise with the unsatisfactory remuneration of health workers and possibly feel 
that this current incentive situation does not justify sanctions for inefficiency. Further, 
Martineau points out that warning systems and disciplinary measures take a long time 
to be activated in many health care systems, so when they get activated they get
296 Total monthly average allowances amount to USh 300,000, figures are estimated on the basis o f the 
staff formula.
297 This contract is particularly strained when health workers have to use their own money for transport 
in order to pick up drugs from the DMO (cf. Munene 1993: 11).
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disassociated from the event (2000: 3). While this issue was not followed up 
systematically, this also appears to be the case in Kamuli. Another problem of rural 
health care provision in developing countries is the difficulty of replacing qualified 
health workers in remote areas, which may make them immune to disciplinary action 
(Cornwall et al. 2000: 2). In addition, the personnel system is politicised and 
nepotistic, and possibly, this even increased with decentralisation. The District 
Service Commission is often overridden by the Subcounty, in that the latter dismisses 
or keeps staff against the DSC decisions. The decentralised personnel system has 
hence not contributed to strengthening performance.
As mentioned earlier, professionalism may contribute to upholding standards, in 
that professional standards and professional values nurture motivation and guide 
performance (Moore 1996). However, the many examples of misconduct (cf. Chapter 
6.2) indicate that commitment and professional values are low. This is because the 
situation of health workers has not been adequately resolved. When the civil service 
pay scales were restructured, medical workers received low priority.298 In a status­
conscious society, such as Uganda, the loss of income as well as status over the past 
years has been extreme. There was an enormous gap between the prevailing ideal of 
professionalism among doctors and health workers and what their actual situation 
afforded. Neither did the state fully support the doctors' professional aspirations any 
longer, and as a result, Iliffe notes, they have lost much self-respect (1998: 165). 
These less tangible changes need to be bome in mind, when judging the health 
professionals' behaviour and their giving way to perverse incentives.
The question then arises as to what can be realistically expected under these 
circumstances. Actions are predominantly shaped by perverse incentives and by the 
interests of health workers, namely the maximisation of their income and personal 
benefits, which results in the failure of government health care delivery. Health 
workers directly and intentionally contribute to lowering state performance in order to 
create opportunities for rent-capture and work actively to divert patients to the private 
sector. Financial responsibility mechanisms fall victim to the staffs strategies of 
reinstalling personnel equity, as they perceive it. In so doing, they can be certain that
298 For example, a lay magistrate’s salary rose to about USh 450,000 in 1994/95, three times more than 
that of a medical officer (Iliffe 1998: 167).
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government officials turn a blind eye. In sum, this account of the public sector in 
Kamuli goes also closely together with Mills’ analysis for developing countries:
In terms of low technical and operating efficiency, many of the explanations lie in 
the nature of the public bureaucracies and the lack of incentives they provide for 
efficient resource use. Decision-making is highly centralised, and planning and 
management structures are often weak (1997b: 250).
7.3. The Private Sector: Weakened Exit and Lack of Voice
This section will analyse the degree and nature of competition, and related to this will 
be a discussion of the sorts of prevailing market imperfections and failures, and how 
this impinges upon financial responsibility, accountability and the health providers' 
incentives. As outlined in Chapter 2, the functioning of markets also depends upon 
the presence of certain institutions that often lack in a developing country context, the 
most important ones being state regulation, professional associations and insurance 
markets. The role of state regulation and professional associations will be examined 
in the following chapter, while there are no insurance schemes in Kamuli.
7.3.1. Financial Responsibility
The degree of competition and the nature of the market vary according to the location 
of the providers in the different Subcounties. In general, however, contestability is 
high, since it is easy for any new provider to enter the market (cf. Chapter 8). Given 
the large number of drugshops and their closeness to each other, competition among 
drugshops is fierce, which keeps prices low and strengthens financial 
responsibility.299 As the providers compete with each other, price levels and pseudo 
quality of clinical care constitute crucial factors. Their efforts are equally reflected in 
the business names of drugshops, for example "that people have good luck", "Life 
Guard" or "Family Life Clinic". In relation to other provider types, drugshops mainly 
compete by price, but also by providing credit. Rural NGO providers accuse 
drugshops of competition by slandering:
299 Price differences between rural drugshops are small with only the less frequently prescribed drugs 
being priced differently. Profit margins are highest on antibiotics.
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"The nurses at [rN-1] are good, but drugshops talk evil words about us, for 
example they say: ’The clinic is for the church only, they only treat church people, 
Moslems cannot be treated there”'(interview, HUMC member rN -1,1999).
Private clinics are scattered in rural areas, so their main competition comes from 
drugshops, whereas in town competition among private clinics is strong given the 
higher number of health care facilities. In relation to all other health care providers, 
urban private practitioners compete on the basis of quality or rather by signalling 
quality. However, competition by quality does not necessarily lead to improvements 
in clinical care, as it is difficult for a layperson (the patient) to judge quality (cf. 
Kumaranayake 1998: 6). Further, as private providers compete for what patients 
want, they give way to the patients' unhealthy preferences; in fact, high quality 
providers who maintain standards may be competed out in rural areas. Among private 
practitioners (and NGOs), price levels or signalling lower prices are important 
competitive elements. Moreover, it is very difficult for a patient, who just came from 
the village, to understand the complicated price structure, which depends upon the 
seriousness of the disease, the drugs prescribed and the laboratory examinations. 
There is greater price transparency at drugshops in comparison to the private clinics, 
since it is much easier to compare drug prices.
In contrast to the public sector, private practitioners and drugshops have decision 
power over the input side -  both in terms of staffing and salaries. Bennett et al.'s 
assessment of other developing countries equally holds true for Uganda, namely that 
most private practitioners have "a comparative advantage in terms of staffing, as they 
[are] tied neither to government pay scales nor to staffing norms, and tend to have 
lower labour costs" (1999: 16). Altogether, the competitive environment and the price 
mechanism foster technical efficiency, and as was demonstrated in Chapter 6.1, staff 
resource utilisation is most efficient among the private health care providers in 
Kamuli town. However, rural private practitioners are subsidised by the informal 
drain of public resources, such as drugs and staff time (cf. Chapter 6.2.1 and 6.2.4), 
because a very large proportion of government medical assistants, nurses and 
midwives practice privately. In contrast, none of the medical assistants and doctors 
that run a formal private clinic in Kamuli town are employed in the public sector, so 
there is no informal subsidisation by the public sector in these cases. Some Mission
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health workers are employed in the private sector to increase their salaries. There are 
equally linkages, forward integration and personal overlaps between drugshops and 
the public sector, resulting again in the subsidisation of the former through staff time 
and drug leakage from the public sector.300
Furthermore, given the prevailing informational asymmetries in favour of the 
private providers, the latter can give way to perverse incentives. These translate into 
supplier-induced quality of care inefficiencies, such as inadequate or incomplete 
diagnosis, unhealthy and costly antibiotics and injection misuse, polypharmacy or 
unnecessary laboratory examinations, which also increase the patient's costs. Apart 
from the first point, these problems are also demand-induced in that they constitute 
explicit consumer preferences. In this way, although the availability of alternatives or 
substitutes increases competition and lowers prices, if  there are too many drugshops 
in one area, quality does not increase, but it rather creates market failures and 
perverse incentives, in that commercial tendencies are fostered by adapting to 
people's preferences resulting in malpractice. These dangerous incentives have also 
been noted in other developing countries (Mackintosh/Tibandebage 2000: 8; cf. 
Bennett et al. 1994: 10). It must be emphasised, however, that private practitioners do 
have an interest in actively demonstrating process quality, such as friendly behaviour, 
provision of privacy, careful clinical examination, as well as the provision of some 
health education.
Trust plays an important role within the service delivery transaction and is 
enhanced through repeated interactions. Both the patient's and the provider's 
behaviour and choices are strongly embedded in social relations. The patient trusts 
the provider to cure him or her, whereas the latter will offer credit or concessions 
only if he or she is sure that the patient will pay at a later stage.
So, although the exit option is in principle available in a market with many 
providers, the need for both patients and providers to establish a social relationship 
with concomitant levels of trust, which are necessary to obtain credit, reduce the 
actual use of exit. At drugshops, 57 percent of the exit interview respondents were
300 There was one case of horizontal integration found, but assumingly there are more. In this case, the 
drugshop owner (with no medical training) sends the clients in need o f a laboratory test directly to the 
laboratory attendant at the government clinic, where they do not go through the official registration 
process. The latter examines and charges them on a private basis and sends the patient with the 
laboratory results back to the drugshop.
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not first-time users, and the majority of those mentioned familiarity with and 
confidence in the drugshop as the reasons for utilisation. In other words, market 
competition is mixed with what Hyden (1989) conceptualised as the "economy of 
affection". Consequently, the exit option as a correction for failure in delivery and for 
strengthening competition is under-utilised, which then weakens competition. Yet 
exit does not change the prevailing dispensing practices and does not reduce the 
above-mentioned inefficiencies. It can be assumed for Kamuli that one finds what 
Hirschman (1970: 26) calls "competition as collusive behaviour", namely a situation 
where each drugshop gamers some of the dissatisfied customers from other 
drugshops, while losing some of its previous customers to yet others.
In sum, as expected, there are considerable market imperfections and failures 
that weaken competition and thereby undermine financial responsibility. That said, 
the mechanism of financial responsibility is still much more functional in the private 
sector than in the public sector, which is also reflected in the better scores for staff 
resource utilisation efficiency and staff salary costs per patient (cf. Chapter 6.1).
7.3.2. Accountability
The accountability mechanism of the private sector is identical to that of financial 
responsibility, namely market competition, but it is again weakened by market 
imperfections, as discussed above. The market also fails in that those unable to pay 
are inherently excluded from taking part in market operations, and the market is 
unable to solve this access problem by itself. As said, the use of the exit option is 
limited and hence does not contribute to strengthening accountability, but neither is it 
supplemented by its alternative mechanism, that of voice. People do not express their 
dissatisfaction with private clinics directly, believing that "this is a business, where 
we cannot interfere." The large hierarchical gap between the layperson and the expert 
as well as the prevailing culture of subordination (cf. Section 7.2) also explains the 
reluctance to use voice. At drugshops, voice is hardly used either, and only 2 percent 
of the exit interviewees said that they would address again their issue to the drugshop 
owner in case they are dissatisfied. Although people are not satisfied with the poorly
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qualified staff working in drugshops, they are seen as the least worst option or as an 
option that is better than having no nearby provider at all.301
Neither would people use voice and air their views at their local council, 
because, as mentioned in Section 7.2, they are generally reluctant to forward views, in 
the light of previous experiences or negative expectations that such an effort is in 
vain. Only in one extreme case, when a private practitioner had been accused of 
having killed several people due to lack of care, did the community call for the 
Subcounty authorities to intervene. Ogunbekun et al. (1999) point out the problem for 
Nigeria that consumers of health care are not organised into pressure groups, so that 
each patient is left to him- or herself when faced with malpractice. This is equally so 
in Uganda and constitutes a problem in relation to both the private and the public 
sector.
Internally, private clinics function as firms, and such an intra-firm principal- 
agent relationship between the employer and worker may give way to moral hazard 
and shirking. This raises the question of how employees are held accountable. Given 
the small number of employed health workers and the employees' interest in 
performance in order to get their salaries, shirking is much less of a problem than in 
government clinics. In addition, the owner closely supervises them, and in contrast to 
the government clinics, there is always the threat of being dismissed.
7.3.3. Incentives and Staff Equity
The prevailing incentive for performance is profit maximisation, such that private 
practitioners have an interest in attending to many patients and selling a large quantity 
of drugs, with the latter constituting the main source of income. But since private 
sector actors rely upon a good reputation in terms of quality and access, there is again 
a limit to unethical behaviour and charging excessive prices.
The private clinic owners’ income is much higher than the salary of government 
health workers (cf. Table 7.1), and their efforts are clearly remunerated financially. 
The employed health workers (nurses, nursing aids, laboratory staff) do not earn more 
than their counterparts at government clinics, but they do receive other staff benefits 
such as free health care for the family, a (small) lunch allowance and sometimes a
301 In cases of dissatisfaction, people either remain silent, choose to exit, usually to other drugshops or, 
depending upon the disease, go to higher-level providers.
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housing allowance. More importantly, their salary is usually paid regularly and on 
time, which provides a secure income. Finally, the work environment is much more 
pleasant. Overall, performance is rewarded, while non-performance is sanctioned, and 
as salaries are flexible, it is easy to pay additional rewards.
The prevailing incentives within drugshops are very much the same as for 
private clinics. The drugshop owners' income is obviously much lower than that of 
private practitioners, thus not comparable, since drugshops can only charge for the 
sale of drugs. As the employees' salary depends upon the level of profit, there is a 
strong incentive for making large sales by meeting people's (unhealthy) preferences. 
Clearly, this is a perverse incentive.
Altogether, the market imperfections and failures and the low use of exit and 
voice weaken accountability and explain why the private practitioners' actions are not 
sufficiently guided by patients' real needs. As we have seen in Chapters 5 and 6, this 
results in a series of problems: high user charges; prescription patterns adjusted to the 
ability to pay (instead of being based on medical considerations); polypharmacy; and 
other forms of irrational use of drugs. There is therefore a pressing need for (better) 
regulation in the private sector, and it remains to be seen how state regulation and 
supervision impact on the operation of the private sector (see Chapter 8.2-3).
7.4. The Voluntary Sector: Deficits in Participatory Accountability Mechanisms
It was noted in Chapter 2 that the critical element of the voluntary sector is its value­
drivenness and solidaristic concerns. Thus, the normative desire to maintain the 
solidarity with the group motivates performance and fosters competence (cf. Brett 
1993: 276). Yet this is an ideal-typical conceptualisation and cannot be presumed for 
each voluntaristic organisation and employee, but requires critical and empirical 
validation. Further, the crucial determinant of performance is not only the compliance 
mechanism of solidarity, but the internal institutional structure and institutional 
mechanisms of the organisation. D. Leonard (2000) ascribes the NGOs' superior 
performance to their internal set-up. That is, accountability does not follow 
automatically from solidarity (Brett 1993: 278), but altruistic motivations may reduce 
the inclination of providers to exploit information asymmetries. As with the public
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and private sectors, it is necessary to carefully examine the functioning institutional 
mechanisms for accountability, financial responsibility, personnel equity and the 
nature and extent of solidarity.
7.4.1. Financial Responsibility
The assessment of financial responsibility must be differentiated according to 
whether the clinics have to recover their costs through user charges or whether they 
receive external support. The former group (uN-1, rN-3, hospital OPD302) operates 
like private clinics, as they have to compete for patients. Competition serves to keep 
input costs low, while the non-profit motif contributes to keeping prices at a cost- 
recovery level (even though prices are still high in relation to people's ability to pay, 
particularly at uN-1). In fact, for a clinic to register as an NGO facility under a 
religious medical bureau, the clinic must follow Christian principles and operate as a 
not-for-profit provider. Being exposed to market competition appears to be the major 
reason why drug supply management is more efficient in these clinics than in the 
subsidised ones.
The subsidised (Protestant) clinics (uN-2, rN-1 and 2) have to compete for 
patients if  their utilisation rates are to satisfy their donors. Nevertheless, pressure on 
minimising inputs and improving outputs is weaker and there are no strong incentives 
for efficient drug supply management. The donor plans to gradually withdraw 
financial support and aims for the clinics to become self-reliant. This increases the 
pressure to recover costs and strengthens financial responsibility. Just like private 
practitioners, rural NGO clinics compete in terms of quality with other providers, 
although they have trouble in signalling their quality strengths. In town, NGO 
providers compete in terms of price and quality both with each other and with the 
private clinics. In cases of dissatisfaction, the people who exit usually go to the 
Mission hospital, although repeated social interactions and relations, embeddedness 
and the option of credit provision weaken the exit mechanism, as they do for the 
private sector.
302 The Mission hospital receives delegated funds. However, in return in-patient user charges had to be 
similarly reduced.
249
Decisions on inputs -  drug management, staffing, medical and technical supplies 
-  and user charge rates are decentralised to the facility level to a considerable extent. 
With regard to salaries, however, the NGO clinics do not have the same degree of 
discretion over staff salary rates, as does the private sector, since this is (co-)decided 
with the regional headquarters and influenced by the salary guidelines of the medical 
bureaux. But given the close contact and interaction between clinics and the 
headquarters, room for discretion is greater than in the public sector. The use of 
resources (staff time, drugs, user charge revenues) is, as we have seen in the previous 
two chapters, adequately and purposefully managed, with some small irregularities. 
Yet these irregularities are in no way comparable to the public sector practices.
Overall, financial responsibility is thus quite strong, which is also reflected in the 
better patient-throughput scores (cf. Chapter 6.1). As Mliga (2000) reveals for 
Tanzania, it is also found in Kamuli that NGO clinics have much stronger incentives 
to provide good quality care to their patients, when they must balance income and 
expenditures in order to remain open. That said, NGO clinics, especially in town, still 
give way to people's unhealthy treatment preferences, as do government and private 
clinics, resulting in supplier-induced inefficiencies (cf. Chapter 6.2.8). The following 
two sections will provider further insights into why information asymmetries are less 
exploited by health staff and why the degree of embezzlement of resources is minimal 
in the NGO sector.
7.4.2. Accountability
There are various accountability and supervisory mechanisms in place that are 
supposed to ensure performance. Their rationale and structure (see Figure 7.2) is 
similar to that of the public sector and includes health unit management committees 
and headquarter staff in charge of administrative and technical supervision. Further 
stakeholders are the medical bureaux and donors. Finally, as said, NGOs have to 
compete on the health care market, so patients who choose to exit affect the clinics. 
This section will examine the functioning of these institutions.
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Figure 7.2: Formal accountability chains of rural clinics in the NGO sector
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b) These two structures do not exist for the rural Catholic clinics.
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7.4.2.1. Weak Health Unit Management Committees and Voice: Gaps in Community
Involvement
HUMCs are elected by the church community leaders; for the Catholic Church this is 
the Parish Executive Council (Catholic clinics), while for the Protestant church 
election come through the development committee of the Busoga diocese’s project 
area. These bodies are in turn indirectly elected by the Parish church structure, in 
which committees at various levels represent the Christian community up to and 
including the diocesan level. The HUMC's duties are similar to those of the HUMCs 
of government clinics, namely monitoring the clinic, overseeing the financial 
management and providing a link with the community.
However, this supposed structure is not borne out by findings on the ground. 
Only two HUMCs (rN-1 and 2) out of the five rural units under study were 
functional, meeting on a regular basis with the members and looking after financial 
matters.304 The other HUMCs did not function, since members were reluctant to meet 
without receiving a (large) allowance. As a consequence, meetings usually failed to 
take place or had a low attendance. This is a reflection of the strong "allowance 
culture" prevailing in Uganda, which has also penetrated to the voluntary sector and 
has suppressed or even suffocated voluntary action for the community. The 
willingness of the HUMC members to work voluntarily also seems to be related to 
levels of personal commitment. As was also found for the government clinics, the 
HUMC members of the NGO clinics often belonged to the better-off socio-economic 
groups.
NGO health workers are recruited by the NGO headquarters, but in legal terms 
they are employed by the church community, which is represented by the 
development committee. However, according to one headquarter staff, the link 
between health workers and the church community is very weak:
"The health workers take things for granted and for given; they work year after 
year, they think they can disappear when they want or they can eventually relax" 
(interview, NGO headquarter official, 1999).
303 The two urban NGO clinics do not have a HUMC. At uN-2, a monthly patient exit audit is therefore 
carried out by external staff to find about the patients' satisfaction (interview, health workers uN-2, 
1999).
The hospital is guided by a Board of Governors, whose main task is to decide upon the overall 
developments and future strategies. Its functioning has not been assessed.
304 These were also the clinics that were found to be operating well. Yet it seems that a HUMC's non­
functioning was the result o f the clinic being improperly run rather than the other way around.
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With one exception, staff-HUMC relationships are smooth, and the HUMCs are 
accepted by the staff, listened to and not pushed aside. Nonetheless, the HUMCs are 
rather weak when it comes to problem-solving. For example, one of the studied 
HUMCs has not been in the position to ensure the duty presence of the in-charge, 
who operates her own private maternity home. That said, in cases of severe 
malperformance, there are examples where action has been taken to dismiss staff.
The health workers and supervisors assume that the communities forward their 
views to the LCls, to the (community-based) village health workers (at Protestant 
clinics), to the Parish Priest or to the nearest HUMC member. Table 7.4 shows 
people's awareness of and interaction with the HUMCs of NGO clinics and reveals 
marked differences between the Protestant and the Catholic clinics. These must be set 
against the corresponding scores of government HUMCs (cf. Section 7.2.2 and Table
7.1).
Table 7.4: Knowledge of and interaction with HUMCs of NGO clinics
Protestant clinics 
Household Exit
Catholic clinic 
Household Exit
Respondent is aware 
of existence of HUMC
96% 80% 50% 33%
Respondent knows 
someone on HUMC
39% 42% 0% 14%
Community was ever 
consulted
43% 25% 0% 0%
At the Protestant clinics, the household and exit respondents' awareness of and 
consultation by HUMC members is much more widespread than at government 
clinics, where 0% of household respondents said that they had ever been consulted. 
Likewise, the focus group discussions confirmed that people are aware of the 
HUMCs. The higher score for the Protestant clinics is also due to the existence of the 
so-called "Gampe" people ("give me news"), who support the HUMCs in their role of
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finding out about community views and needs.305 By contrast, the Catholic clinic 
does not score better than the government clinics. Apart from a higher degree of 
mobilisation in the Protestant project areas, the lower score of the Catholic clinic may 
in part be due to the fact that many of the household respondents lived between the 
government and the rN-3 catchment area and therefore were not targeted by the 
HUMC as were possibly the other areas of the clinic.
Nevertheless, even when HUMCs are functional, they have rather little contact 
with the community, and the focus groups mentioned that the HUMCs do not really 
constitute a platform for voice. This is because people usually did not know how 
HUMC members were elected and stated that they had not elected these people. As a 
result, they did not feel participating in the accountability structure. Likewise, the 
focus groups hardly commented about the HUMC, which apparently were of little 
relevance to them. This is in line with Kassimir's assessment of the election of church 
leaders:
The election process does not guarantee a participatory leadership style; leaders of 
SCCs [Small Christian Communities] can be very directive even authoritarian, 
copying... what they have seen in the parish priest or in politics (AMECEA 
Documentation Service 1997 in Kassimir 1998: 71).
Because of time and resource constraints, it was not possible to analyse people’s 
participation in the Parish councils and the parish communities. Kassimir points out 
that although lay members maintain loyalty with the church, they seek other forums 
for participation, and church leaders have not succeeded in fostering community 
mobilisation and socialisation (ibid.: 72,76). This is confirmed by the focus group 
discussions during 1997-98, when one of the questions was what kind of 
organisations and groups operated in their community. None of the communities 
mentioned church-related groups.306
People usually exit in cases of dissatisfaction, just as they do at government 
clinics, but none of the respondents mentioned the use of the voice option. I only
305 Another task of Gampe people is to inform the community about what is going in the clinic and to 
encourage them to utilise i t  As they came into being two months prior to the data collection period, it 
was too early to assess them systematically, but it seemed that they have a positive impact.
306 Another reason for this result may be that they were not sufficiently prompted during the focus 
group discussions.
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heard of three cases of past abuses by health staff, where the communities expressed 
their concerns and took action. Yet, since staff-patient and VHW-community contact 
is much more informal and friendly and much less hierarchical, it is easier for 
patients to express their views and preferences. Despite this informality, the 
relationship to NGO VHWs is characterised by feelings that are similar to those 
reflected in the citizens' administrative culture (cf. Section 7.2.2):
"Since the VHW was not elected by the village, we fear to complain about her."
"The village people fear to be named wise [which is why they do not forward their
complaints]" (FGDs, Subcounty B, 1999).
In sum, the NGO clinics have undertaken more efforts to increase participation and 
responsiveness and they do score better than the government clinics, but still, they do 
not fulfil all the claims made on their behalf.
7.4.2.2. Adequate Supervision
Headquarter staff and field supervisors oversee NGO clinics for both clinical and 
administrative matters on a fairly regular basis, ranging from once a month up to once 
every three months. Headquarter staff also monitors whether field supervisors carry 
out their job. My impression was that NGO supervisors make more of an effort than 
their government counterparts. Also, the supervisory style is non-threatening, 
personal, co-operative and supportive which is assumed to have a stronger and 
positive effect on compliance. The supervisors are motivated, though lack of funds 
mean that in practice the supervision of Protestant clinics takes place half as often as 
planned.
The medical bureaux play an important role within the supervision system. 
Ultimately, they are the supervisors of the supervisors and their final sanction is to 
refuse or withdraw the NGO's accreditation under the medical bureau. Through the 
regional dioceses, they provide support supervision. UCMB, for example, checks the 
Mission hospital's drug stocks, drug dispension and prescription patterns as well as 
the financial management. The bureaux also provide guidelines on the fee structures 
(interviews, hospital staff, health co-ordinator, UCMB official, 1999). As umbrella 
organisations, they offer services to their member organisations such as institutional 
support or advice on management and medical issues, and training and education.
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Altogether, this assists the clinics in staying on the right track. In that sense, the 
medical bureaux in Uganda, as in other African countries, have, through self­
regulation, taken over some of the tasks otherwise undertaken by governments (cf. 
Gilson et al. 1994: 22).
In sum, compared to the DMO's internal supervision practices at government 
clinics, NGO supervision is more intense and effective. This is similar to Tanzania, 
where it was found that missions offered much stronger supervisory systems than did 
the government and that staff control had a direct impact on quality (Mliga 2000). In 
addition to intra-NGO supervision, the state is supposed to supervise and regulate 
NGO clinics, which will be illuminated in Chapter 8.
7.4.2.3. Donor Supervision: The Threat o f  Exit and Withdrawal 
Regular evaluation and the constant threat of withdrawing funding are the key 
mechanisms of donor control over NGOs and their clinics. Donors are able to exit 
from an NGO given the fierce NGO competition for funding. That said, monitoring in 
remote areas is difficult, and it is costly to obtain independent information (Brett 
1993: 294).
In Kamuli, the Protestant clinics are under direct donor control, even though they 
have considerable autonomy in running their services. Donors visited about twice a 
year to check up on the management, performance and utilisation rates. This direct 
donor dependence puts pressure upon the Protestant units to perform, as job 
employment is directly affected:
"If the money is not doing properly what it is supposed to do, the donor will cut 
money. In that case, we would lose our job. So this is why we are concerned" 
(interview, MA, 1999).
In contrast to the government clinics, NGO staff has no incentive to forge patient 
numbers, since high utilisation rates would result in high user fee revenues and hence 
sufficient income to run the clinic on a self-reliant, cost-recovery basis. This may 
accelerate the donor's financial withdrawal, and clinics therefore fare best by 
demonstrating their efforts in the most transparent way.307 Too low utilisation rates, 
on the other hand, may result in closure of the clinic.
307 Utilisation rates are not yet very high and hence do not yet make donor withdraw.
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7.4.2.4. Conducive Organisational Culture: Ethical Norms and Loyalty
As said in this section's introduction, we have to examine critically whether the NGO 
clinics under study constitute solidaristic groups that generate behaviour "dedicated to 
the common good and uncorruptedby... personal... interests" (March/Olsen 1989, in 
Brett 1993: 276).
The religious affiliation of NGO clinics provides the starting point for their 
solidaristic concern. In general, the NGO health workers feel responsible towards the 
church and to the Parish community. NGO health workers were asked what they 
thought were the differences between NGO and government staff. According to my 
judgement, the statements below have much credibility and indicate that religious 
beliefs constitute a central component within the organisational culture of NGO 
clinics and play an important role in enforcing performance:
"[The clinics] work under church principles. Every practitioner is told about the 
mission to follow those guidelines." (interview, nurse uN -2,1999).
"Staff knows that they are working for the church. There is a moral standard" 
(interview, supervisor of uN-2,4,1999).
"This is an NGO clinic. We have ethical standards to fulfil" (interview MA, uN-2, 
1999).
The medical bureaux, the dioceses and headquarters provide an ethical code of 
conduct that includes behavioural guidelines. This translates into and strengthens a 
specific organisational culture, which is most pronounced in the leadership of the 
Mission hospital. The adherence (or at least a stronger adherence than at government 
clinics) to ethical standards is also reinforced by prevailing competition and rivalry 
over legitimacy and acceptability with the DMO. In this environment, NGO clinics 
attempt to distinguish themselves from the government clinics, ultimately 
strengthening their group identity.
Training by the NGO headquarter provides another opportunity to raise and 
strengthen ethical standards. Moreover, during the recruitment process, headquarters 
pay much attention to the staffs previous work record, their behaviour and their 
motivation to work for a church clinic (interviews, NGO headquarter officials, 1999). 
In sum, the church facilities succeed in nurturing and sustaining a considerable degree 
of loyalty to their organisation among their employees. This helps explain why
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perverse incentives do not dominate in the way that they do in government clinics and 
why the overall levels of opportunistic behaviour among NGO staff are low.308 While 
evidence is less clear for reciprocity as the basis for solidarity -  i.e., the work for the 
Church may pay off in another way -  it does seems that this also affects the staffs 
behaviour. Moreover, the Sisters' motivation in the Catholic facility and the Mission 
hospital appear to be based on altruistic concerns.
Yet, although solidaristic motivations may make the agent more reluctant to 
exploit the informational asymmetry within the principal-agent relationship, solidarity 
on its own is not sufficient to guarantee performance. Performance requires effective 
accountability mechanisms to ensure that solidarity is applied in the interest of the 
principals. So, only in combination with the relatively effective supervisory structures 
do these ethical codes succeed in upholding standards and establishing loyalty to the 
clinic by the clinic staff, thereby weakening withdrawal and their use of exit in the 
form of shirking or demanding informal payments. Performance is also ensured 
through mechanisms of exit and voice by clients, as these signals, though rarely used, 
are more likely to be translated into action; for example, incentive structures will be 
adapted or supervision will put particular attention on the respective problem. This 
explains why staff absence, drug leakage and informal charging hardly occur, with 
few exceptions at the hospital, where supervision is more difficult.
Overall, we find that the sum of accountability mechanisms, even though not 
perfect, are more functional than in government clinics. Nevertheless, the supervisory 
system does not adequately address the deficits in clinical quality of care.
7.4.3. Incentives and Staff Equity
Salaries for rural NGO staff are slightly lower than at government units (cf. Table
7.1), however, these figures do not include the provision of uniforms and (partly 
better) housing on the clinic compound, which are highly valued by health workers. 
Urban NGO clinics pay salaries similar to the public sector (with one exception), but 
no lunch allowances are paid. In general, the remuneration includes an output-related
308 This is not so much the case for nursing aids, who are not recruited by the headquarter. They do not 
obtain adequate remuneration, and their motivation seems to be guided by their interest in getting some 
training and job experience, after which they could look for better employment opportunities (usually 
at drugshops).
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component, in that the salary classification is not only based on qualification but also 
related to experience and utilisation rates. The urban units also pay allowances from 
the user charge revenues, the amount depending on the clinic's performance. Most 
importantly, salaries are usually paid on time, with occasional delays, and in further 
contrast to the public sector, NGO staff can trust that salary arrears are cleared.
In order to generate additional income, a number of Mission hospital nurses and 
midwives practice on a private basis at their home or sell drugs in the village. But 
given better supervision, the health workers are always on duty during their shift. 
Several hospital workers are also employed in the private sector (having night shifts 
at the hospital and day shifts at a clinic or a drugshop, or vice versa), which in some 
cases has been agreed with the hospital administration. However, in other cases the 
administration was not informed. Even though this does not explicitly take time away 
from hospital duties, such double employment is problematic, in that it is difficult for 
staff to manage double shifts over long periods of time.
It is also important to take into account the non-material benefits. The working 
atmosphere is more pleasant and agreeable at NGO clinics, and staff relations overall 
were described in positive terms in contrast to what government health workers feel 
about their staff relations. The staff at the Protestant clinics attends refresher courses 
and as a result feel more confident in handling patients and providing quality care. 
Whether these aspects are based more on measurable outcome or mere perception, it 
does result in work satisfaction, which can only improve performance. Religious 
motives and beliefs among the Sisters at the Mission hospital seem to be much 
stronger than those of the other staff, but it still appears that in general, reciprocal 
motivations and loyalty to the church's principles contribute to assessing one's 
obligations in balance with one's benefits.
Finally, the NGO clinics relate rewards to performance (through salary rates and 
allowances) and tie sanctions to malperformance (decentralised control over staffing, 
dismissal and disciplinary measures). While NGO health workers are in principle 
guaranteed their salary, there is always the underlying threat that the clinic must 
perform if it is not to be closed down -  an incentive that is absent at government 
clinics.
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In sum, the most crucial institutional feature to ensure and enforce performance 
is the system of close supervision. Even though it has gaps, it is still more effective 
than the government’s internal supervision. It succeeds in overcoming the non­
functional HUMC structure and in providing a supportive framework for maintaining 
ethical standards. As a result, NGO facilities perform high in terms of process quality 
and are the best at taking into consideration people's ability to pay by offering 
exemption and extending credit (cf. Chapters 5 and 6).
7.5. Conclusion
This chapter showed how the (non-)functioning of institutional mechanisms accounts 
for organisational (mal-)performance and how the performance differences among the 
provider types, as revealed in the previous two chapters, are clearly reflected in the 
differences in establishing financial responsibility, accountability and staff equity. 
(Only as regards access have we found institutional convergence, cf. Chapter 5).
In the public sector, malperformance is largely explained by lack of functional 
accountability mechanisms resulting in deviations from the public interest. Lack of 
supervision and disciplinary measures lead to a situation where perverse incentives 
dominate, allowing the staff to pursue their "privatisation" of public resources. This is 
related to the distorted local legitimisation process and the non-functional 
accountability chains between citizens, politicians and civil servants, which in turn 
undermines the capacity for financial responsibility. Further, the prevailing 
administrative culture characterised by people's fear to use voice cements this 
situation. In sum, the state operates a system on the basis of assumptions -  
professional standards, accountability and financial responsibility- that it cannot hold 
and is instead characterised by institutional degradation. This explains the serious 
deficits in relation to the three performance criteria of access, efficiency in the 
management and utilisation of resource inputs, and quality of care.
The problems of health care provision and the lack of accountability must be 
seen in light of the general gaps and problems of decentralisation and local
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councils.309 In fact, the Kamuli District administration’s service delivery in other 
fields (education, agriculture, water and roads) has been equally inadequate and 
unsatisfactory for the communities (cf. Mathauer 1997). Malperformance of the 
public sector in the health care sector in Kamuli is thus in no way surprising, and part 
of a broader pattern that is in line with findings in other Ugandan Districts as well as 
other African countries, both for the health care sector and for other services.310
Thus, the crux of making effective local government a meaningful reality (and 
not only in formal-legal terms) is to strengthen the accountability of politicians and 
civil servants towards their citizens through a careful institutional capacity 
strengthening approach. In particular, this should support the functioning of the 
various committees, planning processes and intra-administrative procedures. In so 
doing, the informal institutions including the political-administrative culture have to 
be fully taken into account. Also, exit options must be strengthened, for example by 
providing vouchers to the poorest community members to allow them to use 
alternative providers. Voice options can be improved by making HUMCs and District 
and Subcounty Health Committees more functional (through training), by making 
HUMCs more representative (through direct elections) and by supporting NGOs that 
function as pressure groups for health care matters.311 Furthermore, the LC system’s 
inherent dysfunctional logic at the LC1 and LC2 level requires reform. It is also 
fundamental to inform the communities about their voice options and about 
administrative procedures in order to reduce the prevailing information and power 
asymmetries from which they suffer and which ultimately keep them quiet. This is 
what the action research undertaken in Kamuli District aimed at, leading to some 
encouraging results as regards the feasibility of improving accountability (cf. 
Mathauer 1998).
The private sector's malperformance is based on inefficiencies that are caused by 
market imperfections and failures and related thereto perverse incentives, which lead
309 This is not to say that devolution has not led to improvements in planning, capacity, participation 
and the provision of services (cf. Chapter 3, cf. Kisubi/Mugaju 1999).
310 For Uganda, cf. Batley (1996) for education, health, solid waste disposal; Golooba-Mutebi (1999) 
for health, education; Azfar et al. (2000) for health, education; Simonet (2000) for health in Zimbabwe; 
Mackintosh/Tibandebage (2000) for health in Tanzania; D. Leonard (2000) for health and veterinary 
services in a number of African countries.
311 Cf. Howard-Grabham (2000) for ways o f increasing accountability through community mobilisation 
approaches.
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to supplier-induced inefficiencies and exclusion. Exit does not have a strong impact 
on improving services, and further the embeddedness of clients and providers in 
existing social relations undermines the use of the exit option, thereby weakening 
financial responsibility and accountability. This explains the low performance in 
clinical quality of care and access.
Market imperfections equally account for performance gaps in the voluntary 
sector. Moreover, the NGO facilities are not characterised by strong community 
involvement, in contrast to what was expected. However, strong internal supervision 
and supervision by the medical bureaux as well as solidaristic motivations help 
maintain norms and ethics and succeed in ensuring a satisfactory level of process 
quality of care and a relatively better level of efficiency. That said, the institutional 
mechanisms in this sector fail to address the inadequate quality of clinical care (by 
giving way to people's unhealthy preferences); this is partly due to the clinics' need 
for user fee revenues.
For the private and voluntary sector, this institutional account is not yet 
complete. Interorganisational relationships and governance mechanisms -  the 
institutional mechanisms operating interorganisationally -  equally affect 
performance, which will be examined in the next chapter. Only then can we evaluate 
the causes of performance and malperformance and identify entry points for the 
improvement of the private and voluntary sectors' performance. A final assessment on 
institutional pluralism and provider performance can then be provided in Chapter 9.
262
Chapter 8
Deficient Interorganisational Relationships and 
Their Impact on Organisational and System (Mal-IPerformance
This chapter continues the institutional analysis of the previous chapter. 
Organisational performance and malperformance will be further explained through 
examining the interorganisational relationships and the way they influence 
organisational performance and the performance of the system as a whole or how they 
cause malperformance.
Interorganisational relationships are of relevance as regards system concerns. 
First, non-state providers come to deal with diseases of public health significance 
(such as communicable diseases). Second, the achievement of disease control 
objectives requires non-state providers to be integrated in the national health system 
(cf. Brugha/Zwi 1998: 108). Further, Uganda’s multi- and intersectoral health care 
system is prone to duplication and fragmentation given the atomistic structure of the 
non-state sectors. The country’s health policies seek to address these issues; one of its 
major objectives is to integrate non-state providers by "establishing appropriate 
instruments to facilitate the private sector " (RoU/MoH 1998b: 12). The policies also 
aim to make "the private sector [including NGOs] a major partner in Uganda's 
national health development by encouraging and supporting its participation in all 
aspects of the National Health Programme" (ibid.) (cf. Chapter 3).
Following the analytical-theoretical concepts for studying interorganisational 
relations (cf. Chapter 2), the first part of this chapter is concerned with governance 
mechanisms -  competition, regulation and enabling, and network co-ordination, 
which govern and steer interorganisational relations and which thereby affect 
organisational performance and system concerns. Competition, which also operates as 
a compliance mechanism, has been dealt with already in the previous chapter, so the 
focus in this chapter will be on regulation and network co-ordination and how 
effective they are. To explain why the governance mechanisms function the way they 
do, one must examine the prevailing incentives and interests of the various actors 
involved, including the presence of informal institutions that may subvert formal 
institutions, as well as the actors' capacities to regulate and to engage in network 
coordination. Understanding the functioning of governance mechanisms allows us
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then to derive their effectiveness, namely their impact upon performance and their 
appropriateness.
Section 8.1 provides some further methodological considerations. Regulation of 
the private practitioners, drugshops, and NGO clinics will be examined in Sections 
8.2-4, respectively.312 Section 8.5 will analyse network co-ordination as a governance 
mechanism and its impact. As outlined in Chapter 2, regulation can be broadly 
understood as the state’s actions to manipulate prices, quantities, distribution and 
quality of services by using hierarchy or enabling measures (Maynard 1982 in 
Kumaranayake 1998: 8). Regulation is the predominant instrument applied to address 
market imperfections and failures, such as information asymmetries, exclusion and 
supplier-induced inefficiencies. In principle, regulation is about introducing 
incentives that need to be structured in such a way that it is in the interests of the 
regulator to regulate effectively and the providers to comply (Bennett et al. 1994: 12). 
Network co-ordination can be defined as a manifestation of ’’rules of the game 
negotiated and agreed by” interdependent actors within more or less stable patterns of 
social relations (Rhodes 1997: 7). Like regulation, network coordination aims to 
achieve integration and to address efficiency, in that coordination as to space, time 
and content optimises the use of resources and in that resources are pooled. It also 
addresses prices and thus access, quantities and related thereto location as well as 
coverage and last not least quality standards (cf. Chapter 2).
The second part of this chapter deals with interorganisational interactions, which 
also affect organisational performance and the performance of the system as a whole. 
In Section 8.6, the focus will be put on partnerships between the public sector and 
NGOs -  both curative health care facilities and PPHC organisations -  and their 
beneficial impacts.313 Note that in contrast to Chapter 2, this chapter does not 
maintain the analytical separation between incentive-based schemes as a governance 
mechanism and partnership as a form of interaction, since in practice the one goes 
together with the other.
As it turns out, partnership arrangements entail many pitfalls. Section 8.7 
therefore analyses the prevailing incentives of the organisational actors involved, the 
interaction structure and the interaction culture between the local administration and
312 State supervision of government clinics was addressed in the previous chapter.
313 Apart from business relations and double employment, there are no interactions between the private 
and the voluntary sector. Furthermore, the private sector is virtually not addressed through co­
ordination and partnership initiatives.
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the voluntary sector to explain the actual interactions found at the local level. Section 
8.8 examines the functioning of the referral system. Section 8.9 concludes and 
sketches out some of the key interorganisational aspects that require reform in order 
to optimise organisational and system performance.
8.1. Methodological Considerations
The structure of this chapter implies that regulation, incentive-based schemes, 
network coordination and partnerships exist independently of and unrelated to each 
other. In practice, they overlap and are intertwined. Incentive-based regulation, for 
example, often goes hand-in-hand with network co-ordination and partnerships or 
contracting (cf. Bennett et al. 1999). The chosen chapter structure thus serves 
analytical purposes to clearly identify the crucial issues.
For the study of interorganisational relationships, a network analysis was 
undertaken that focused on processes and structures. The core questions to each 
provider comprised the following: With which other organisation(s) does it interact? 
What is the nature of this interaction? Which resources are exchanged? Following an 
action research logic, the NGO clinics and community-based NGOs were also asked 
how interactions could be improved.314 The network analysis examined interactions 
from 1995 to 1999 and was part of an action research that aimed to promote 
intersectoral co-operation and co-ordination. Further insights about the relationships 
between the NGOs and the local government/administration were gathered during the 
"action phase", specifically the networking workshops that followed the research 
phase.
The impact of interorganisational relationships will not only be assessed as to 
access, quality of care and efficiency, but also as to the extent to which 
interorganisational relationships foster integration and synergies, and increase output 
(cf. WHO 2000), as well as other inductively derived aspects. The assessment is 
qualitative and is also based on the perception of the various actors involved. Less is
314 For the sake of obtaining a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of interactions, this 
network analysis also included the District departments o f education, community development and 
agriculture, in addition to the DMO, as well as other community based NGOs beyond PPHC (cf. 
Chapter 1.4).
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known about the performance level of PPHC providers (and other community-based 
NGOs), since it was impossible for time and resource constraints to undertake the 
same rigorous analysis of relative strengths for PPHC services as it was done for 
curative services in Chapters 5 and 6. Further, there are large methodological 
difficulties in studying output and outcome, given the "production technology" of 
PPHC services. However, a qualitative assessment, the results of which are not 
reported here (cf. Mathauer 1997) indicates that the majority of PPHC NGOs deliver 
services at a decent level of quality, at low costs, and they reach the rural 
communities (not necessarily the poorest people, however). So, at the bottom line, 
they produce no harmful services. Hence, although they may not have optimised cost- 
effectiveness and technical efficiency and may not reach the poorest of the poor, their 
service delivery does serve the people’s needs, so that it is worthwhile to foster their
<J1iT
existence and support their services. So, even without knowing the exact 
performance level, an impact study of interorganisational interactions is important 
and will reveal crucial insights into why organisations and systems perform or fail 
and how organisational performance can be promoted.
8.2. Regulation and Supervision of Private Clinics
8.2.1. The Formal Regulatory Framework
The private sector legislation was updated with the 1996 Ugandan Medical and 
Dental Practitioners Statute (UMDPS).317 Figure 8.1 sketches the actors involved in 
regulation, supervision and enforcement and how their interplay is supposed to work 
in theory.
As spelled out in the 1996 UMDPS, a self-regulatory Council -  the Ugandan 
Medical and Dental Practitioners Council (UMDPC) -  was established in late 1998. It
315 This qualitative assessment is based on the 15 focus group discussions with LC1 Executive 
Committee members, 37 community focus group discussions, 15 focus group discussions with NGO 
target groups (1997-98), 12 community focus group discussions in 1999, numerous interviews and 
discussions with NGOs (see Annex 2 for the list of interviews and discussions) and some field visits 
and field observations of PPHC activities, e.g. the National AIDS day, AIDS awareness-raising 
stepping stone activities.
316 There is one questionable exception to the NGOs' overall beneficial impacts. The Catholic church- 
associated NGO does not promote condoms for AIDS prevention; instead they advocate faithfulness 
and try to make people believe that condoms are useless for the protection against AIDS.
317 Following the rationale of the UMDPS, similar legislation was also passed for allied health workers 
and nurses.
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is composed o f seven members, who are appointed by the Minister o f Health upon 
the recommendation o f various interest groups (faculties o f medicine and professional 
associations). There are no provisions on the control o f the council, except that 
members may be removed for inability to perform their functions. The Registrar 
assists in carrying out the Council's functions, including the maintenance and 
enforcement o f professional medical and dental ethics as well as educational 
standards, and the exercise o f general supervision and disciplinary control over 
medical and dental practitioners in order to ensure quality.
Figure 8.1: The formal regulatory and supervisory system o f private clinics
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Likewise, the Council should "disseminate to the medical and dental 
practitioners and to the public, ethics relating to doctor-patient rights and obligations" 
(UMDPS 1996, Section 4). Market entry -  to guarantee that only qualified 
practitioners operate -  is regulated by various licensing and registration provisions. 
However, quantity and prices are not regulated but are left to market forces, which 
raises serious concerns about access and supplier-induced oversupply, as we have 
seen in Chapters 5 and 6. Neither does the Statute regulate the location of providers 
in relation to each other, the result of which is unequal coverage (cf. Chapter 4). 
Finally, the legislation does not say anything about disease notification.318 Hence, 
major market imperfections and failures remain unaddressed.
The District Medical Offices have agreed to assist and to carry out certain 
functions for the Council, most importantly, to supervise the quality of care at private 
clinics (interview, UMDPC official, 1999). The Statute does not mention the role of 
Subcounty chiefs, Secretaries for Health and health assistants, but in interviews, the 
latter two mentioned that they are in charge of supervision of private clinics. 
Likewise, the 1997 Local Government Act (LGA) suggests a role of the Subcounty 
chief in administrative supervision:
It shall be the duty of a C hief... to carry out general administration in conformity 
with Government regulation... and to ensure implementation of District and 
Government policies ... (LGA 1997, Section 70, (3b), (5)).
8.2.2. Regulation in Practice
Based on the agreement between the UMDPC and the DMOs, the latter inspects 
private practitioners, but it only does so in the initial stage of the licensing process to 
provide approval. Yet this inspection concentrates on infrastructural matters rather 
than on quality of care issues. Apart from this inspection, none of the registered, 
formal clinics had ever been visited by the Council or the DMO. Okello et al. (1997: 
16) notes the same failure in other parts of Uganda.319 This can be attributed to the 
fact that the agreement between the UMDPC and the DMOs is only of an informal 
nature and not binding. Because of this non-interference, some private clinics are
318 Disease notification is in general very poorly developed in developing countries (for the reasons, cf. 
Aljunid 1995: 344).
319 Similarly, in Tanzania, providers complained o f formalistic inspection that ignored support as 
regards clinical issues (Mackintosh/Tibandebage 2000: 10).
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registered in the name of a doctor but actually run by a medical assistant who is not 
adequately monitored or supervised by the former -  a problem that has also been 
observed in Zimbabwe (Hongoro/Kumaranayake 2000). Further, the UMDPC's and 
the DMO's records of private clinics are incomplete and only half of the (formal, 
visible) clinics in town had a license in 1999 or 2000. As a consequence, policy 
planning and regulation of the private sector is made virtually impossible. In that 
respect, Uganda is not different from other developing countries (Bennett et al. 1999: 
14). The licensing and registration process is also undermined by the illegal practice 
of imposing a trading licence fee upon private practitioners by the Town Council 
authorities in order to raise local revenues. Even though illegal, private 
practitioners find it difficult to refuse to make this payment but it obviously makes 
them even less willing to adhere to the government legislation in light of the latter's 
double standards. Needless to say this trading licence has no regulatory impact.
The DMO does not take action against the dual employment of government 
health workers in the private sector. Since a number of DMO staff owns private 
clinics (or drugshops) in rural areas, licensing private clinics is not in the DMO's 
interest, as this would openly acknowledge their double-employment and ask for a 
clear government statement on this matter. Ignoring the problem, thus, appears to be 
the more convenient strategy. The DMO bothers even less about the large number of 
rural informal clinics and nursing or maternity homes that are run by nurses, 
dispensers, midwives or medical assistants who are no longer employed in the public 
sector. Likewise, it is also remarkable that the DMO does not even have an interest in 
licensing the "official", visible town clinics owned by doctors and medical assistants 
who are not simultaneously employed in the public sector. While the legislation 
clearly regulates market entry through qualification requirements, this is, in practice, 
of no relevance, and the market is quite contestable.
The main problem in private clinics is the high frequency of polypharmacy and 
overuse of antibiotics and injections (cf. Chapter 6.2.8). According to the law, private 
practitioners should write a prescription and send the patient to a pharmacy. Yet they 
argue that they are forced to dispense and stock their own drugs in the absence of a
320 Clinics do not constitute a business and are therefore not subject to trading licences (announcement 
in New Vision, 10-05-1999).
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pharmacy in Kamuli District that sells class A and B drugs. Regardless, we know that 
drugshops in Kamuli sell all classes of drugs illegally. The true reason is that clinics 
mainly profit by dispensing and selling drugs, particularly as people are unwilling to 
just pay for advice and a "paper" (the prescription) (cf. Okello et al. 1997: 13).321 In 
sum, law enforcement in relation to licensing and quality standards is inappropriate 
due to lack of supervision and monitoring. Ensuring adequate clinical quality of care 
is obviously very tricky, and the DMO fails to regulate and supervise not only the 
private sector, but also the government clinics (cf. Chapter 7.2). Accordingly, private 
sector actors accuse the government of applying double standards (Birungi et al. 
1999: 10) -  a similar complaint of non-state providers in Tanzania, for example 
(Mackintosh/Tibandebage 2000: 13).
Instead of actively seeking out low-quality providers, the current strategy is to 
wait passively for complaints, as can be derived from the 1996 UMDPS (Section 34). 
This is problematic, since it seems that the large majority of people are not aware of 
the existence and functions of the Council. On the question of what people could do 
in case they are dissatisfied with services, none of the exit and household respondents 
and focus group discussants mentioned the Council. Over 50 cases of alleged 
malpractice were reported to the Council from many parts of the country (but Kamuli 
is not mentioned), and "the majority have been investigated and appropriate action 
taken" (MoH 2001).322 Up to August 1999, two cases of malpractice in Kampala were 
brought to media attention. Given people’s known reluctance to complain, based on 
their fear, and in light of the LC deficits (as discussed in Chapter 7.2.2) and people's 
lack of trust in the judicial system, the UMDPC's strategy of passively waiting for 
complaints is inadequate, more so given the absence of consumer groups and a weak 
civil society. However, even in countries with a longer history of private sector 
regulation, the complaints system is not effective. In Thailand, which has a very long 
history of private sector regulation, only 10 to 20 complaints a year are received by 
the Medical Council regarding the behaviour of physicians (Roemer 1991 in 
Kumaranayake 1998: 28). Likewise, in Zimbabwe, the number of complaints is
321 However, stricter enforcement may only result in vertical integration, i.e., collaboration with a 
pharmacy or a drugshop. I came across one example of a private clinic being linked to a drugshop in 
Kamuli town. There are presumably more cases, but they are difficult to detect.
322 The source does not mention a time span, but it seems to refer to the time since the establishment of 
the Council.
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slowly increasing, but as of yet, no case has been successfully followed through 
(Hongoro/Kumaranayake 2000: 376).
8.2.3. The Reasons for Inadequate Regulation and Implementation 
The regulatory provisions are inadequate in that they do not cover all problem aspects 
of market failures and imperfections; that is, they do not regulate user charges, stop 
excess provision, or address poor quality of care and patient rights. So, Uganda's 
regulatory inadequacy is very similar to that found in Tanzania and Zimbabwe 
(Kumaranayake et al. 2000). Without having examined this empirically, the theory of 
regulatory capture offers a strong explanation, according to which the actual design of 
regulation is the result of an inherent political process and demands by various 
interest groups (the most strongest of which are doctors) to maximise their benefits 
(cf. Kumaranayake 1998: 13, 16). For example, doctors are strongly interested in a 
law that does not set price ceilings or establish strict systems of quality monitoring.
Where the law does spell out regulatory guidelines, the effective implementation 
is diluted for a number of reasons. Kumaranayake et al. (2000) name the critical 
aspects to be studied in order to understand the effectiveness of regulation. First, the 
Council lacks information on private clinics and these informational asymmetries 
make supervision difficult. Second, the Council is extremely underfunded and thus 
wants the resources to supervise (interview, UMDPC official, 1999; cf. Okello et al. 
1997).323 Third, the Council -  qua regulator -  is not supervised by a higher authority, 
and there is little pressure exerted upon it and no incentives provided for it to 
perform. Likewise, the Ugandan Medical Association (the professional association 
for doctors) has not been in a position to discipline their members during the past 
years. They only maintained a skeleton programme of meetings, and the attempts to 
continue education of doctors failed for lack of funds (Illife 1998: 165). Fourth, the 
DMO and the Subcounty Secretaries for Health do not assist in the supervision of 
private clinics, which is explained by the institutional weakness of the local 
government structure. Given the prevailing resource shortfalls at the District level, 
the DMO does not have the capacity in terms of personnel and funds to inspect and 
register the large number of private practitioners in rural areas, but there also appears
323 This is a common problem in African states; cf. Ngalande-Banda/Walt (1995) for Malawi, 
Mackintosh/Tibandebage (2000) for Tanzania, Kumaranayake et al. (2000) for Zimbabwe and 
Tanzania, and Hongoro/Kumaranayake (2000) for Zimbabwe.
271
to be no interest in supervising the private sector. The DMO can afford not to fulfil its 
duties since there is no intra-administrative accountability that ensures performance, 
as was shown in Chapter 7.2. Instead, the DMO repudiates its responsibility by saying 
that the private clinics "are kind of independent" and that their supervision relies 
upon the public (interview, DMO official, 1999). In other words, it is the task of the 
political leadership and the councillors to perform this supervisory function.324 
Leaving this task to the politicians is problematic, as they proved to be weak and 
hardly accountable to the people (cf. Chapter 7.2). Fourthly, the communities have a 
strong interest in these clinics, so the Subcounty authorities and politicians would 
find it difficult to close down the unlicensed ones, especially in light of the failing 
government health services.
The non-existence of supervision is also due to a lack of professional authority. 
It is difficult for the District Medical Officer to monitor professionals who are at the 
same level as they are or even senior doctors and specialists. In addition, the DMO 
would be questioned about the legitimacy of its supervision, since it is widely known 
that government clinics perform much worse than private clinics in terms of 
attendance by qualified staff, ethics and commitment. There is a general problem with 
doctors supervising other doctors. The phenomenon of regulatory capture affects the 
legislative process, but it also refers to the inability and unwillingness to effectively 
implement regulation because of the close relation between regulator and regulatee 
(cf. Kumaranayake 1998), and this problem is also found in Kamuli District. For 
example, a doctor may hold the position of the District Director of Health Services 
(DDHS), and some time later he or she may quit and run a private clinic. 
Furthermore, as Bennett et al. (1994: 6) note, if  there are competing priorities 
between different state actors (at the national and local level) involved in the 
implementation of regulation, the effectiveness of the proposed regulatory 
mechanisms is severely reduced. Clearly, the DMO is little interested in regulating, 
particularly as it is in charge of so many tasks.
Even more, there is a perverse incentive not to regulate. This is because of the 
double relationship between the DMO and the private sector, in that the DMO is 
supposed to regulate private clinics, but it also competes with them. As the DMO is
324 As mentioned in Chapter 7.2, there was one example of public action that resulted in a private clinic 
being closed down. Yet after some time, this practitioner managed to open another clinic that was 
formally under NGO-ownership. This example reveals the lack of control.
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primarily judged by the performance of the public sector, it may prefer to welcome 
private sector failure. So, implementation is weak, because the key factors critical to 
the government's ability to regulate -  financial resources, information, capacity and 
appropriate organisational structures -  barely exist. The same institutional 
weaknesses the state suffers from in providing services (cf. Chapter 7.2), which make 
private health care provision attractive, also undermine its capacity as a regulator.
Hence, the existing regulation does not have the desired effect on the behaviour 
of both regulator and regulatee, in that private practitioners do not comply with the 
regulations and the regulators do not fulfil their tasks. Cornwall et al. (2000: 2) 
emphasise that private practitioners are aware that the existing regulations are 
unlikely to be effectively enforced. This is also the case for Uganda given the many 
examples of open illegal practice. Needless to say, the current regulatory provisions 
do not successfully remedy the problems that initially called for regulation. Overall, 
regulation is inappropriate and not comprehensive, so that an undesirable gap exists 
between the law and the reality (cf. Birungi et al. 1999: 10). Likewise, the existing 
legislation is insufficiently implemented and enforced. Uganda is thus similar to other 
developing countries that also lack the capacity to enforce regulatory controls (cf. 
Brugha/Zwi 1998: 107; Moran/Wood 1993) and fits into Bennett et al.'s conclusion of 
a comparative study of developing countries:
Governments had failed in their duties and had neither monitored professional
councils nor taken action to encourage them to regulate more effectively (1999:
14, cf. Kumaranayake 1998: 31).
8.2.4. Wavs Forward: Incentive-Based Regulation
In situations where hierarchical regulatory measures are doomed to failure and where 
regulation produces high transaction costs (cf. Kumaranayake 1998: 14), incentive- 
based approaches have more potential. However, despite the rhetoric on public- 
private partnership, this is barely realised in Uganda, as private clinics have not as yet 
enjoyed any substantial support from the government. Only one clinic reported that it 
receives FP methods occasionally. DISH (a USAID funded health programme) 
provides one of the few support activities and carries out quarterly support 
supervision on STD management at the private clinics that are run by medical
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assistants.325 Some privately employed nurses have been invited to training seminars, 
though these invitations were aimed mainly at filling empty spaces and were based on 
personal contacts, rather than on the DMO's systematic assessment of training needs. 
Private doctors outside government employment themselves are so far not integrated 
into the government’s continuing medical education (CME) schemes. A CME 
implementation work plan for private practitioners is still in its developmental stages 
(MoH 2001). Finally, there are no incentives for disease notification.
The reasons for these gaps are several. First, because of competition, there are no 
linkages between private practitioners. Each health worker category is separately 
organised in different associations at the regional level above the District (Birungi et 
al. 1999: 10). Thus, information exchange, organisation among themselves and the 
aggregation of demands are more difficult. Second, private clinic practitioners 
described the relationship with government as non-existent or poor. They are seen as 
for-profit providers, and hence government officials argue that they cannot receive 
public funds for their aim to make profits (ibid.: 9). So, due to the previous isolation 
of the two sectors and spheres, in practice the government does not yet adequately 
recognise the private sector. Thirdly, there is a lack of interest to find out about the 
concerns of private practitioners, as well as a lack of an institutional framework at the 
District level (and previously at the national level) for the public sector and the 
private practitioners to interact with each other. For example, a doctor suggested 
semi-annual meetings with the DMO to discuss private clinic issues, but the latter has 
not taken this up. It seems that there is a general unwillingness at the local level to 
deal with and acknowledge the private sector. Under these circumstances, awareness 
of the problem or a consensus on how to establish supportive relationships cannot 
develop.
In sum, what is necessary is to begin to build a trusting relationship between 
government, professional organisations and the private sector, on the basis of which a 
"culture of regulation" (Mackintosh/Tibandebage 2000: 13) can develop. Moreover, 
training of staff on treatment guidelines has improved treatment practices in 
government and NGO clinics in Uganda (Kafiiko et al. 1993). Based on a review of 
studies from Asia, Africa and Latin America, Brugha/Zwi (1998) also advocate that
325 As in other countries, measures to facilitate the private sector tend to be donor-driven and financed 
(Bennett et al. 1999: 14).
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this approach be applied in the private sector, which would equally contribute to 
overcoming their isolation. At the same time, it is crucial to strengthen accountability 
mechanisms at the local level and to set up incentives for the regulators to regulate 
and clear sanctions when they fail to do so. In order to get rid of the perverse 
incentives to not regulating, the functions of regulation and provision should be more 
clearly separated. In addition, whether through regulation or incentive-based schemes, 
location and prices must be addressed in order to improve geographical coverage and 
accessibility. To implement such regulatory provisions, the contribution and 
participation of the local administration would be useful. Finally, more research is 
required on the potential role of professional associations.
8.3. Regulation and Supervision of Drugshops
8.3.1. The Formal Regulatory Framework
The boost of drugshops and the informalisation of health care services in the past 
decades were described in Chapter 3. The related problems, namely unqualified staff 
and the irrational use of drugs caused, could not be ignored anymore, so that the 
legislation was finally updated in the mid 1990s.326 This legislation addresses a wide 
range of pharmaceutical issues, but this section focuses on drugshops. Figure 8.2 
outlines the formal regulatory system and the actors involved in supervision
The legislation specifies the staff qualifications and premises requirements for 
obtaining a licence. It restricts the drugshops’ use and sale of drugs to class C drugs. 
The National Drug Authority (NDA), a body corporate, whose members are 
appointed by the Minister of Health, is in charge of supervision and enforcement. The 
NDA has the power of entry into and investigation of drugshops and the right to 
inspect the records of all drugs procured by the seller. Some of these functions are 
delegated to the Assistant Drug Inspector (ADI) at the District level. These provisions 
and the entry regulations aim to ensure quality standards but, as Adome et al. point 
out, the legislation does not deal with ethical practice (1996: 20).
326 These are the 1993 National Drug Policy and Authority Statute; the 1995 National Drug Policy and 
Authority (Certificate o f Suitability o f Premises) Regulations; and the 1995 National Drug Policy and 
Authority (Issue of Licences) Regulations.
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Figure 8.2: The formal regulatory and supervisory system of drugshops
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Nor does the legislation address prices or the location of drugshops except to forbid 
their location within a radius o f 1.5 km kilometres from any existing retail pharmacy 
(unless already in existence before the legislation) (NDA Regulations on Premises 
1995, Section 36). It is up to the discretion of the DDHS or the ADI to decide upon 
the location (interview, NDA official, 1999). After a licence applicant has obtained 
the approving signature o f the LC3 chairperson, the DMO endorses the licence 
application. The 1997 LGA does not say anything on the role o f the Secretary for 
Health, the health assistant or the Subcounty chief, but what has been said in relation 
to private clinics equally applies here. The latter issues (legal) trading licences to the 
drugshops, which could provide the ground for further administrative control.
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8.3.2. Regulation in Practice
It appears that the DMO’s discretion is not used to steer the location of drugshops, as 
we find 16 ±2 drugshops in the centre of Kamuli town (i.e. within a square of 300 x 
300 metres) and about 5 or more drugshops in larger Subcounty trading centres. 
While competition in general has positive effects, this oversupply leads to a struggle 
for survival for the business. This lowers the standards of quality and medical ethics, 
in that drugshop attendants give leeway to people’s unhealthy preferences, such as 
polypharmacy, combined with an underdose, injections and antibiotics.
Another large problem is that the majority of drugshops are not licensed and not 
run by qualified staff. The DMO record of 1998 listed only 44 out of the estimated 
300 to 400 drugshops. Few drugshops have applied for a licence since then. The 
DMO staff intentionally ignores the problem of inadequate qualification, as I 
witnessed when I looked at some applications that a DMO official showed me.
For example, one applicant for a drugshop licence had indicated that the nearest 
pharmacy and drugshop are in the next District capital, even though the DMO official 
knows that there are another four (non-licensed) drugshops within the same trading 
centre and many more in and on the way to Kamuli town. The endorsement of the 
DDHS on this application read: "He is the only one in the area. Let's give him a 
chance." The ADI assured me that this drugshop would be closed down if there were 
no qualified health worker found there. Yet, as the official knew, the applicant (an 
unqualified drugshop seller) had already been operating in the trading centre for 
years. There might have been bribing involved. But in any case, this suggests that 
there is no real interest in preventing the mushrooming of drugshops that are run by 
unqualified people. It may be the case that the DMO is satisfied with any licence 
application in order to improve the records of licensed drugshops, and moreover, 
rent-seeking is easier during the licensing process when the applicant approaches the 
DMO officials rather than the other way around.
The Subcounty authorities issue a trading licence to the drugshops. Even though 
this trading licence does not have a regulatory function in and of itself, the authorities 
could also assist in taking on regulatory tasks during the licensing process, for
327 This is a nationwide problem, as there were only 2495 drugshops registered in 1999 (MoH 2001), 
i.e., an average of 60 drugshops per District.
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example by identifying drugshops that are run by unqualified staff. Yet the Subcounty 
chief does not benefit from a drugshop being properly NDA-licensed, and hence there 
is no incentive to be concerned, other than about the trading licence that is an 
important source of local tax revenue. Nor are there any incentives for the Secretary 
for Health and the health assistant to follow up drugshops -  this would only increase 
their workload.
The NDA-licensing process is easily subverted through rent-seeking (interview, 
NDA official, 1999). Drugshop owners also report that it is very difficult and takes a 
long time to procure the licence. They mentioned very different rates for the licence 
and the ADI's services in procuring the licence in Kampala. Despite validity concerns, 
the differing amounts (USh 60,000 -  110,000) that the drugshop owners paid to the 
ADI point to the informal payments.
One drugshop owner reported that he had paid USh 40,000 as a deposit to get the 
"go-ahead" from the ADI, and five months later, when the interview took place, he 
still did not have a licence. According to another DMO official, this was not a first 
instalment for the license, but a bribe:
"The drugshop owner gives the Drug Inspector 10,000-30,000 Shillings and then 
says: You keep that money until I have got the full amount'. Now, has this person 
got a receipt? Do you think that the Drug Inspector is keeping the money for you? 
The Drug Inspector just takes that money and then keeps quiet. Drugshops pay to 
keep a friendly relationship" (interview, 1999).
In addition, supervision is not rigorously carried out, and as is the case in other 
countries, inspection tends to be prone to corruption (cf. Kumaranayake 1998). The 
drugshop attendants indicated that (unlicensed and licensed) drugshops pay some 
tribute in form of money, a lunch or a soda to the ADI on a more or less regular basis. 
This practice is well grasped with de Soto's (1992) concept of "informal costs" that 
serve to maintain the illegal status of their business or other wrongdoing. These costs 
can add up to about half of the official costs of the licence. That said, the following 
view is not untypical either for drugshop owners:
"The ADI is not corrupt, he does not ask for money, but you just give him, for 
example last time it was 5,000. At times, he greets us, so we give him a soda. This 
is for friendship; not paying does not have any effect, but it just creates a 
relationship, which is important, if  any problem comes into the business.... If there 
is no relationship with the ADI, there can be a problem. We are not supposed to 
give injections, but the community wants it. The ADI knows about it" (drugshop 
owner, Subcounty B, 1999).
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As a result, the licensing system fails to uphold quality. For example, it is sufficient 
to simply put the name of a qualified person on the license (who earns money by 
providing the name), while the shop is run by a businessperson.
Another severe problem is the sale of class A and B drugs in drugshops that are 
licensed to dispense only class C drugs. People can buy any drugs over the counter 
without a prescription. Likewise, people are sent with a government clinic’s 
prescription to the drugshops in order to receive antibiotics and other class A and B 
drugs, which are often not made available at the health unit (cf. Chapter 6.2.1). This 
demand in the villages is openly acknowledged by the ADI. Yet Kamuli District 
provides a paradoxical situation, since there is no pharmacy. So, if the law were fully 
enforced, people would not get access to drugs at all, and accordingly
Many people cannot see the sense of forbidding the sale of drugs by retailers
who are the only dependable suppliers of life-saving medications in their
community (Adome et al. 1996: 20).
8.3.3. The Reasons for Inadequate Regulation and Implementation 
Given the 300 or so drugshops in the District, it is very difficult for one officer to 
carry out these regulatory and supervisory tasks given time and transport constraints. 
Further, the officer in charge does not face any sanctions from the DMO, and we have 
also seen that the DDHS does not stick to the regulatory provisions either as regards 
the licensing process. Neither is the officer in charge rewarded for doing a 
particularly good job. He would also lose out rent-seeking options if all drugshops 
adhered to the legislation. Yet there is not only lack of incentives but rather a 
perverse incentive structure. The current practice of drug leakage at the District and 
health unit level can only persist precisely with the existence of the high number of 
drugshops that provide drugs that are otherwise not available. Were the drugshop 
legislation fully enforced, many fewer drugshops would exist, thus endangering the 
system of drug embezzlement, which constitutes additional income sources and from 
which the DMO staffs and health professionals benefit. At the same time, it is 
questionable whether the communities would still keep as quiet as they do at the 
moment if they had no options at all to obtain drugs at the local level.
328 The widespread availability of class A and B drugs at drugshops is also due to leakage in the drug 
supply system at higher levels and the difficulties in controlling drug flows. Retail pharmacies, for 
example, do not ask whether a buyer has the respective licence for the types o f drugs he or she buys 
(cf. Birungi 1994b: 64).
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Rigorous enforcement of the legislation would imply that the DMO officials 
would also sanction a large number of government health workers, who sell drugs in 
their drugshops or through home treatment and who feel they can stay in the public 
sector only with some additional earnings. Their informal income contributes to 
stopping the public health system from further (or again) breaking down. It also 
suggests that there is an unspoken consensus and understanding among DMO 
officials that they should not be too strict. As with ineffective private clinic 
regulation, the officials' failure is not sanctioned in light of the inadequately 
developed intra-administrative accountability, which was discussed in Chapter 7.2.
Moreover, the scope of disciplinary action by the ADI is severely limited, since 
the communities and the lower LCs back up the drugshops. It is difficult for the ADI 
to simply close down a drugshop if it does not fulfil the requirements, since the LCs 
would support the owner in reopening the shop:
"It is impossible to close drugshops down; even LCs support them, because they 
cannot oppose them if  they want to get votes. Also the Parish chiefs are dormant, 
they have no power anymore, they cannot enforce anything, as LC2s have 
overtaken" (interview, DMO official, 1999).
"The problem is especially with drugshops owned by LCs or their friends or 
relatives, so they defeat you. You come there to check, and then they quickly 
close the place for that day. But you cannot go there everyday to check" 
(interview, DMO official, 1999).
These two quotes illustrate again the fundamental structural problems within the LC 
system (cf. Chapter 7.2). Tom between the double functions as representatives and 
assistants to the law and order administration, LCls and LC2s ultimately side with 
the community in order not to create enemies in their local environment. Further, the 
power struggle between the LC2s and Parish chiefs is unresolved. In addition, the 
links and personal overlap between economic power (the better-off and partly "big" 
people at the Subcounty and District level) and political power (LC councillors and 
members of the Executive Committee) makes those who have the capital to open a 
drugshop unassailable, and hence regulatory efforts futile. Furthermore, the ADI 
may fear outbreaks of resistance by communities if he dares to close down a 
drugshop, which may culminate in the harassment of the official, as happened in a 
neighbouring District (Birungi 1994b: 70).
329 One example is the medical assistants in the rural Subcounties who run their own private clinic 
and/or a drugshop. At the same time, they hold important Subcounty Council functions (cf. the 
examples in Chapters 6.2.2 and 7.2.2).
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Finally, if there were cases of malpractice, it is questionable whether the 
community would take action, unless very severe incidents occurred. The reluctance 
in reporting malpractice on the part of a specific person is nurtured by the prevailing 
hierarchical administrative culture and local belief in witchcraft:
"People fear to report a death or a severe case. Also people fear revenge when you 
put somebody in problems, which is why people try to hide things" (interview, 
DMO official, 1999).
In sum, neither the community nor the councillors or the civil servants are interested 
in adhering to the regulatory provisions. So, both for private clinics and drugshops, 
the Ugandan regulatory practice corresponds to Kumaranayake's conclusion:
Despite the existence of a basic level of regulations in LMCs [low and middle 
income countries], the degree to which regulations are enforced and effective is 
low (1998: 27).
Hence, the state not only fails to produce services, but also fails to regulate. This 
notwithstanding, the services of informal health care providers constitute a crucial 
means of survival and a necessary part of the system in light of the inaccessibility of 
other providers. In this context, as Birungi et al. (1999) point out, what is right and 
wrong is difficult to define.
8.3.4. Wavs Forward: Incentive-Based Regulation
The NDA is in charge of promoting rational use of drugs through appropriate 
professional training and of establishing and revising professional guidelines and 
disseminating information to health professionals and the public (1993 National Drug 
Policy and Authority Statute, Section 6 (h), (i)). Yet few incentives are offered to 
drugshops to ensure performance apart from an annual educational seminar on the use 
of drugs, which is organised in each District and to which most of the licensed 
drugshops are invited. However, it is the unlicensed drugshops that need these 
seminars the most. As a result, local and informal adjustments take place, as the 
health assistant of Subcounty B stated:
"It is those with money that establish these shops. They are left to operate 
because they are providing services to the community. So instead, we [e.g. the 
HAs] advise them on how to give proper treatment (interview, 1997).
What is required, first of all, is to stop blaming and ridiculing informal health 
care providers (cf. Birungi et al. 1999: 11) and adequately recognise and formalise
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their role in the system. This could involve more comprehensive drug education 
programmes for both drugshop owners, but also for communities as the consumers in 
order to shape their preferences, which proved to be successful in pilot districts of 
Uganda and other countries (cf. Adome et al. 1996 for Uganda; Kumaranayake 1998: 
31 for Zimbabwe; Prof. Kaemthong Indaratna, personal communication 2000, for 
Thailand). In addition, consumer organisations, legal action and complaints 
procedures must be strengthened (cf. Kumaranayake 1998). For example, the NDA 
could intensify its efforts to disseminate information about its role in case of 
malpractice. Furthermore, there is need to introduce incentives for the ADI to 
perform regulatory and supervisory tasks. At the same time, drugshop owners must be 
better informed about the regulatory process in order to be able to resist rent-seeking 
practices. Ultimately, the effectiveness of any reform is contingent upon a functional 
and accountable local government and local administration so that people regain trust 
in the rule of law. Moreover, once the formal government health system improves and 
attracts patients, people's resort to drugshops will decline.
8.4. Regulation and Supervision of NGO Providers
8.4.1. The Formal Regulatory Framework
In contrast to the private sector, the NGO-public sector relationships are shaped 
much more by incentive-based schemes and by the provision of financial and 
technical support, so that the regulatory and supervisory practice overlaps and 
interlinks with support interactions. Yet, for reasons of analytical clarity, these issues 
are discussed separately (see Section 8.6).
NGO clinics are subject to the same regulations as private clinics (see Figure
8.1), but there is an exemption clause for clinics that have operated for more than 20 
years, which is the case for some of the NGO clinics in Kamuli District. As 
elaborated in the previous chapter, the NGO sector is also self-regulated through the 
churches' medical bureaux and the respective NGO headquarters, but their operation 
is not linked to the structure and implementation of the state's regulatory practice.
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8.4.2. Regulation and Supervision in Practice
Given the exemption clause, the main role in accreditation is performed by the 
churches' medical bureaux. Other regulatory instruments are self-assessments through 
annual reports (Bennett/Ngalanda-Bande 1994: 47) and monthly reports to gather 
information on utilisation rates, immunisation and disease patterns for the MoH's 
Health Information Management System.
The rationale of the DMO's supervision is mainly based on its support 
interactions (see Section 8.6), in that they legitimise supervision to check whether 
financial and technical support has been used properly. The DMO's supervisory 
activities vary by facility type. The NGO clinics are visited three to six times a year, 
only the Mission hospital is not supervised. The DMO's supervision visits are not 
announced to or co-ordinated with the NGO headquarters. In the past, this has 
resulted in both the DMO and the NGO headquarter teams coming on the same day 
for supervision, which is ineffective for the supervisors and the supervised clinic and 
which results in resources being wasted. The DMO's main areas of concern are the 
conditions of the premises, hygiene and whether a qualified health worker runs the 
clinic, while less emphasis is placed on other aspects of clinical quality of care. But 
as at private clinics, the question is how the DMO can reduce the irrational use of 
drugs, since it has found no successful approach to address that problem in its own 
clinics. In addition, neither the LC3 authorities nor Health Committees of the 
Subcounty or the Town Council interact with the NGO clinics. In sum, this in line 
with Bennett/Ngalanda-Bande's observation (1994: 45) that quality regulation is weak 
in Uganda.
Even though the DMO's supervision may have an impact on cleanliness and 
hygiene, it results mainly in NGO clinics generally trying to work harder and in the 
internal supervision being carried out very carefully and rigorously. This is because of 
the unpleasant style of the DMO's supervision, as revealed in the following 
statements:
"When they find something wrong, they blame us. In government health units, it 
is often the nursing aid that runs the OPD [outpatient department], though if this 
happens with us, then we get yelled at. The DMO staff is very rude to us" 
(interview, NGO administrator, 1999).
"The language between us and the DMO is not good, we get easily rebuked. 
Otherwise, if there is no good performance, we would not get drugs donated by 
the DMO" (interview, NGO health worker, 1999).
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As for the private sector, support supervision has to be intensified and improved in 
order to address issues of clinical quality of care.
8.5. Network Co-ordination
A mere top-down regulatory approach is not considered as the (only) appropriate one. 
If it is impossible to achieve the desired result with competition or regulation, the 
state may undertake co-ordinative efforts or establish partnerships arrangements and 
incentive based schemes (for the latter, see the next section). Co-ordination refers to 
(mutual) adjustments of services and development activities in terms of space, time 
and/or the intervention (as regards the approach, the message or the technology). For 
that matter, the actors involved "exchange information about problems, preferences 
and means and trade off goals and resources" (Kickert et al. 1997: 9; cf. Chapter
2.3.1).
The health policies, as outlined in Chapter 3.3, emphasise co-ordination with and 
integration of the voluntary sector (as well as the private sector). Yet there are few 
policy guidelines to specify or to support this, nor is there an institutional framework 
for doing so. The only section in the 1997 LG A on this subject states that
"The District Executive Committee shall monitor and co-ordinate the activities 
of non-governmental organisations in a District" (Section 18b; accordingly 27j 
for the Subcounty level).
It can be inferred that in particular the District Health Committee and the DMO are in 
charge of the co-ordination of non-state health care providers. Yet this section in the 
1997 LGA is vague and does not provide further guidelines as to how to do so. Nor 
do the 1990 NGO Regulations provide further direction.330 What was true for the 
early 1990s is still the case for the late 1990s:
The NGOs... complain about the lack of clear national health policy 
guidelines... [T]he government has never defined the role of NGOs and only 
'hopes' that [they] will automatically fall into the National Health System 
(Asiimwe/Lule 1993: 12, cf. Giusti 1998: 12).
330 Note that church facilities do not fall under the 1990 NGO Regulations. But if  there were any 
specifications, they could have implications upon the church clinics.
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It is thus impossible to assess the current practice of network co-ordination against a 
legislative reference or a policy norm. Policies and legislation on co-ordination and 
co-operation with NGOs are just beginning to develop.331 Given the general 
competence and financial powers of local governments, there is, in principle, 
considerable scope for interaction.
There is no branch of the Ugandan Community-Based Health Care Association 
in Kamuli District to co-ordinate PPHC activities between the DMO and NGOs, the 
only institutionalised form of co-ordination at present being the quarterly planning 
meetings. The DMO gathers the majority of the health NGOs, but some of the smaller 
and weaker NGOs, or those that have had a conflict with the DMO, are not invited. 
Private practitioners are not included, either. The meetings aim at exchanging 
information, co-ordinating field-based PPHC immunisation activities in order to 
avoid service duplication at a specific location, and putting together the District 
health plan. In contrast, co-ordination (or at least information exchange) at the 
Subcounty level depends upon the commitment and interest of the health assistants in 
reacting to the NGOs* contact initiatives, whereas the Subcounty Health Committee 
or the Secretary for Health play no role at all in co-ordination.
The DMO meetings achieved some improvements in spatial coverage for 
immunisation, FP education and AIDS awareness-raising activities, which ultimately 
increases efficiency in resource use. The main achievement of the planning meetings 
has been information exchange; little as this is, it should be considered as an 
important step forward. Despite these efforts, service duplication continues to 
prevail in some areas, so that resources are wasted, particularly in the field of AIDS 
awareness-raising, which is concentrated in the southern Subcounties. Resources are 
thus still used in a suboptimal way. Another problem is that the DMO’s goal during 
these meetings is to get access to ideas from the NGOs by promising them funding.
331 Cf. Riddell et al. 1998, Mo A 1998; interviews, MoLG official, MFEP Aid co-ordinator, DENIVA 
official, and co-ordinator of the National NGO-Forum, 1998.
Given the policy gap and lack of guidelines, initial guidelines on how to establish co-operative and co- 
ordinative interactions were formulated at a networking workshop attended by Kamuli District 
Administration (KDA) officials and the Kamuli NGO Forum members during the action research 
process in 1998 (see Chapter 1.4).
332 That said, there is still a lack of information and communication and this has a very direct and 
negative impact on the functioning of the system as a whole. For example, the Mission hospital 
administration regretted that it does not get informed or warned about epidemic outbreaks, which then 
come as a surprise, making it more difficult to react at the hospital level.
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The NGOs resent this, but it does at least improve the government's programme 
design by spreading NGO innovations.
By means of individual co-ordination agreements, the DMO attempts to impose 
a spatial division of labour that is favourable to the DMO by allocating NGOs the 
more distant and inconvenient catchment areas, although their transport means and 
funds are even more scarce than the administration's. Some individual NGOs in the 
field are successful in co-ordinating the content and timing of their community 
development interventions, thereby increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
resource inputs. However, until recently, they have not succeeded in co-ordinating 
themselves on a wider scale, and attempts prior to 1998 to establish a Forum failed 
(see Section 8.7 for further elaboration).
Thus, co-ordination so far does not constitute an effective governance 
mechanism for managing service provision in a pluralistic system, particularly since 
it excludes the private sector. But it is important to keep in mind the constraints of 
further co-ordination, namely the sheer number of NGOs and their heterogeneity in 
terms of size, degree of professionalism and formality, funding, affiliation, approach, 
and so forth, as well as donor dependency (Bennett/Ngalanda-Bande 1994: 48). 
Often, donor conditions do not allow for autonomous decisions or adaptations to the 
local level. In such a situation, transaction costs for co-ordination are particularly 
high, so that it may be difficult to see and value the benefits of co-ordination gained 
through more effective and efficient services for the community (see Section 8.7 for 
further elaboration as to why co-ordination attempts are underdeveloped).
8.6. The Potential and Pitfalls of Partnerships
There is a lot of rhetoric regarding partnership, yet its actual meaning is wide and 
elusive. There is not much more than donor programme specifications, and policies 
and guidelines on co-operation with NGOs are just beginning to develop, as 
mentioned. Here, the starting understanding of partnership is a "mutually beneficial 
relationship between consenting agencies, nurtured over time and leading to 
measurable results" (World Bank 2001a) and it comprises co-operation, co­
production, enabling and contracting out.
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8.6.1. Partnership Arrangements
The most recent and formalised form of enabling is the provision of delegated funds 
by the MoH to the Mission hospital since July 1997 on the basis of a service 
agreement between the KDA and the hospital. These funds are supposed to support 
hospital expenditure for salaries, drugs, equipment and renovation. In Kamuli, the 
provision of the delegated funds was linked to a contract that obliged the hospital to 
reduce user charges. Provided that non-state hospitals operate according to the 
regulation guidelines outlined for the whole country, government cannot directly 
interfere with their running (cf. MoH/PS 1998). The MoH has also begun to introduce 
PHC funds (as conditional grants) in order to increase the local government 
expenditure on health care. The Mission hospital and some of the Catholic clinics are 
included in this scheme, at least in theory. In the Subcounties studied, none of the 
NGO clinics had received any funds from the Subcounty budget, not even in those 
Subcounties where there is no government clinic.333
Apart from tax concessions on the imports of drugs and other medical 
equipment,334 most of the NGO facilities receive financial and/or technical support 
from the DMO primarily for PPHC activities (see Tables 4.4 and 8.1). This includes 
STI kits, FP methods, training, vaccines, a refrigerator, cold boxes and other 
immunisation equipment. In case an NGO does not have a refrigerator, a nearby 
government clinic would store the vaccines for the NGO based on an informal 
agreement.
The other community-based PPHC NGOs also receive funds for transport and 
field worker allowances for specific activities (e.g. AIDS awareness-raising, 
nutritional education), IEC material, condoms for distribution, FP methods, and 
training. Occasionally, they can borrow the DMO's video equipment or the DMO's 
vehicles, but they must provide fuel and pay the driver.
333 This is, however, not surprising, since not even the government clinics have benefited from 
Subcounty funding (cf. Chapter 7.2.2).
334 Cf. MFEP (1993) and Adiin Yansaah (1995).
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Table 8.1: Agreed financial and technical support for NGO clinics
Funds EDK FP Vaccines335 Allowances336 STI kits Training
rN-1, 2, 4, 5 * (some clinics) ✓ ✓ <✓ * (some clinics) ✓
rN-3 PHC funds: 
2.4m (plan)
✓ not carried out ✓ N/A * (irregular) ✓
uN-1 ✓ not carried out N/A ✓
uN-2 ✓ not carried out ✓ ✓
Mission
hospital
Delegated funds: 
12 million/month
PHC funds: 
8m/year (plan)
not carried out ✓ ✓ * (3 to 4 kits) ✓
Source: interviews with DMO officials and NGO staff, and DMO work plan 1998/99 
* = support provided
335 This usually includes immunisation equipment, such as cold boxes, a refrigerator and paraffin.
336 Allowances are provided for health education and outreach immunisation.
288
The financial and technical support is partly provided on the basis of the NGOs1 
requisitions and partly institutionalised on a quarterly basis, as long as accounting 
records are handed in. Most of the technical and financial support originates from 
programme-specific resources (usually donor programme funds such as DHSP, STIP, 
UNEPI, UEDMP or UECP). The funds are channelled from the central government 
through the Districts, which then allocate the funds to the NGOs.337 They usually 
have to apply with a project proposal to spell out the objectives, the activities (e.g. the 
number of meetings with community groups, the number of households followed up) 
and the expected costs. This arrangement is similar to a cost-volume contract over a 
couple of months (cf. Mills 1997a).
The DHSP, which is funded by the World Bank, spells out technical, 
management and financial as well as epidemiological and geographic criteria for 
proposal selection, but they are vague. Moreover, it is questionable whether the 
District panels have the capacity to assess the NGOs, particularly in light of the lack 
of information about NGOs as a result of the previous low levels of interaction. In 
fact, I never heard of any meeting of the DHSP District panel or the District AIDS 
Commission (the programme being funded by UNDP) that were part of the 
programme implementation of these donor programmes and that aimed at integrating 
NGOs in the resource allocation process. In any case, these structures do not seem to 
be fully functional. Instead, it appears that the DMO makes the decision on which 
NGO proposals to fund and which ones not. As a result, the allocation of funds is 
open to manipulation and inappropriate use. Thus, although NGOs compete for 
funds, this contest appears to have no effect on quality and the costs of their services 
offered. Friendship and closeness to DMO staff and bribing come into play when it 
comes to the allocation of these funds (see below). This is even more the case for 
other technical support. For example, some NGO clinics receive EDKs while others 
still wait to be included in the programme.
Other forms of partnerships and collaboration among PPHC providers comprise 
information exchange and the transfer/referral of groups. For example, an NGO 
provides the DMO access to its organised and established beneficiary groups in the 
villages, which benefits both the DMO and the NGO. The former saves mobilisation 
costs, the latter is perceived as bringing additional services to its community groups.
337 This is a very common World Bank approach.
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A rather rare form of collaboration is co-production. For example, the DMO and an 
NGO jointly undertook a Knowledge-Attitude-Practice study on AIDS awareness, 
and health education is jointly carried out by an NGO and DMO staff or Subcounty 
staff, such as government health workers or health assistants. All of these forms of 
interaction differ in terms of the degree of formalisation and collaboration, yet the 
differences are fluid.
The Mission hospital and its affiliated NGO is engaged in AIDS awareness- 
raising, excluding condom promotion or FP. This is not in line with the government 
approach and therefore is the source of constant friction between the two sides. FP 
and condom promotion are areas of frequent conflict between the government and 
church-related NGOs in other countries as well (cf. Green 1992: 85). In consequence, 
this NGO is not invited to the quarterly planning workshops and is also denied any 
other financial or technical support for such AIDS awareness-raising activities that 
are in line with the government approach. Other than this example, no other conflicts
M Oabout approaches were identified.
8.6.2. The Benefits of Partnership Arrangements
The benefits and effects of these incentive-based schemes and support are numerous. 
This notwithstanding, discussions with NGO members revealed that many 
opportunities of collaboration are not realised, so that the full potential of interactions 
and the synergies and benefits related thereto are not exploited (for an account of 
these, cf. Mathauer 1997). Based on interviews, field documents and field 
observations, the following qualitative effects were noted as a result of partnership 
arrangements.
The provision of delegated funds enabled the Mission hospital to reduce fees 
substantially by 30 percent for adults and 50 percent for children. Financial and 
technical support for preventive services (immunisation, FP) allow the NGO clinics 
to increase spatial coverage and to extend and to bring services nearer to the people, 
which otherwise would not be offered by these clinics or would be offered with a 
higher user charge in the case of FP. This is, in principle, in the interest of the 
government in its efforts at ensuring the delivery of affordable and accessible
338 Co-production comprises one or several joint actions (production steps) of problem analysis, 
planning, financing, implementation and reviewing (cf. Bebbington/Farrington 1993, Ostrom 1996).
339 But this may also be due to the fact that NGOs adapt themselves to the dominant government 
approach in order not to lose out on funding.
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services. In addition, the support makes the NGO clinics undertake more efforts, as 
they are criticised for the slightest wrongdoing, and yet they want this support to 
continue. The support for STI management (in the form of training and the supply of 
STI drug kits) improved the skills and treatment and hence quality of care. This 
reduces what is often referred to as "voluntary sector failure", such as lack of 
professionalism (Salamon 1995). Similarly, the financial and technical support to the 
PPHC NGOs allows them to make use of their strengths, namely their elaborate 
member group structure, their strong community links, a participatory approach and 
their focus on empowerment. Also, they could not have had the same geographical 
coverage without these additional resources.
The few cases of group transfer and referral clearly fostered service integration 
and allowed for cost savings. For example, group transfer and referral saved on the 
costly process of social mobilisation and group identification; hence the number of 
field trips and transport costs could be reduced, in that a provider is able to begin 
working with an already organised group. This increases efficiency and effectiveness.
Finally, in the few cases of co-production, resources could be pooled and 
allowed for a better use of each organisation's relative strengths. Thus, again it 
increased effectiveness and efficiency.340 This also allowed for mutual control. And 
again, it enabled each side to carry out activities that they otherwise could not have 
undertaken alone (cf. Mathauer 1997: 43-45 for examples).
In sum, these interactions have a beneficial and developmental impact, even 
though they are of low profile, formality and intensity. They allow the NGOs to offer 
services that they otherwise could not have delivered to the same extent in terms of 
geographical expansion, quality, quantity and accessibility. The empirical evidence 
hence confirms the existence of what Huxham (1996) calls "collaborative 
advantages" and the importance of these synergistic forms of interaction. Such 
interaction benefits have been observed in other developing countries as well 
(Bennett et al. 1999, Ostrom 1996, Robinson/White 1997, Tendler 1997). This said, 
although the support contributed to service extension, the prevailing incentive 
structure of these partnerships arrangements did not affect quality aspects except as
340 Ostrom (1996) also provides examples o f co-production in which each side could make use o f its 
relative strengths.
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regards the effects of training activities (cf. Bennett/Ngalande-Banda 1994: 45). In 
addition, there are no monitoring and control mechanisms in place to check upon 
quality standards; or if they are, they are not functional. Therefore, as 
McPake/Ngalande-Banda (1994: 28) emphasise in their review of country 
experiences of contracting-out health services, these types of arrangements have to be 
based on trust, given the inevitability of imperfect information. It also became evident 
that the prevailing partnership arrangements cannot be readily and more precisely 
categorised as incentive-based schemes because their actual regulatory impact is 
marginal and because the facilitation provided is hardly specified in terms of the 
expected outcomes.
8.6.3. Face-to-Face Interaction in Practice: The Pitfalls of Partnerships 
While the interactions between the public and voluntary sector produce benefits, a 
closer look reveals that they also suffer from many pitfalls. All the NGO facilities and 
PPHC NGOs experienced difficulties in obtaining the promised support. Some NGOs 
reported that their transport allowances for health education had been withheld. The 
NGO staff that participated in the National Immunisation Days was entitled to 
allowances for their outreach activities, but these were not always paid on the basis of 
flimsy explanations. Several NGOs planned to show AIDS awareness video clips, but 
the DMO often did not lend out its video equipment, even though it was not needed 
by the DMO at that time. Again, unconvincing excuses were given, and it seemed as 
if the obstruction was intentional. Virtually all NGOs reported at least once that the 
promised funds were not paid out by the DMO. In addition, the acquisition of these 
funds was usually very time-consuming and bureaucratic, not least because the civil 
servants in charge were often not found in their office. These bureaucratic constraints 
were already reported for the early 1990s (cf. Asiimwe/Lule 1993, MFEP 1993, 
Gilson et al. 1994). Even though some external factors beyond the District level 
account for the non-availability of funds, the non-payment is largely to be blamed on 
the District.341 These problems are very similar to findings in Senegal, where the 
MoH withheld the NGO funds that were provided by the World Bank's Integrated 
Health Sector Development Programme (Mathauer 2001).
341 External factors comprise embezzlement at the central government level (interview, MoH official, 
umbrella NGO official, 1999), financial constraints due to the government's cash budget, and the bank 
crashes in 1999, which equally affected donor funding.
292
Another delaying and obstructive tactic of the CAO and DMO was to lose or 
forget about NGO requisitions (e.g., for vaccinations and FP), so that the NGOs 
eventually gave up on the request. It was also found that some NGOs had to pay back 
about 25 percent of their funds to some of the District authorities, either directly at 
the DMO, or in a more informal way and in instalments, as follows:
"After the Deputy CAO had found out about our funds provided through the 
local administration, he stopped at our office and said: 'I'm broke, you help me’, 
so eventually I had to give him something" (interview, NGO staff, 1999).
Donor funds for NGOs have become a very lucrative income for civil servants. As a 
result, many NGOs stop calling for the funds they are entitled to. Withholding 
allowances or other forms of support promised to NGOs demoralises the staff, lowers 
their performance and, in the worst case, impedes their task fulfilment. Furthermore, 
difficulties and obstruction encountered in relation with PPHC services, which are the 
main focus of support, can also negatively influence the provision of curative 
services, since the service integration, utilisation and credibility of the facility are 
affected.
While the Mission hospital has always encountered delays in obtaining its 
delegated funds, the new administrative head that came into office in 1999 was 
particularly obstructive and made the transfer of funds very tricky and complicated:
"For each requisition, you go several times to get the three signatures, and so it 
depends on the CAO's, CFO's and DDHS' presence in the office. And for the 
cheque again: you go there three to four times for chasing the same issue. So, we 
go there fifteen times in a month if you have two to three requisitions."
"... And then they toss you up and down and tell you: 'This [application form] is 
not correct, you rewrite this and come tomorrow'. The following day, there is 
something else which they don't like."
"We now made a requisition for [USh] 6.5 million to buy drugs, but probably we 
will not get it, even last time, it was very difficult. He [CAO] asked W hy do you 
need that much? Last time, you asked only for 6 million'" (interviews, hospital 
administrators, 1999).
The CAO has been very creative in coming up with various barriers every other week, 
and it seemed as if he spent a lot of time thinking about how to make things difficult. 
In return, the Mission hospital administration then had to sit down and reflect on how
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to react.342 Because of the CAO's unjustified bureaucratic requirements, the hospital 
once had to travel three times to Kampala (instead of the usual one trip) to buy drugs, 
the costs for which amounted to a tenth of the actual drug purchase. It also led to a 
delay of two weeks, during which the hospital had run out of lifesaving drugs. During 
this time, the hospital account stood at the equivalent of two monthly payments of 
delegated funds, since none of the requisitions had been accepted. Thus, the CAO 
violates the guidelines on delegated funds by interfering in the spending autonomy of 
the hospital and by not providing his signature for certain requisitions. Likewise, the 
District authorities have refused to transfer the PHC funds, so that the money rests in 
the account.
During the negotiation of the service contract between the administration and the 
hospital, the latter had to make large informal payments to some of the District 
authorities (interview, key informant, 1999). The hospital also had to pay something 
to get the District officials' signatures for the hospital's requisitions, as the following 
hints suggested:
"Here, you have to go with money to get things.”
"You do not get money without giving them something. They always tell you:
You are not co-operative' [which is a synonym for. bribing]" (interviews, key
informants, 1999).
Likewise, government auditors requested their share. Meanwhile, the relationship is 
tensioned, since the hospital resists paying such bribes (interview, key informant, 
1999). The hospital is clearly obstructed and the "partnership" creates more problems 
than assistance. It must be noted that these difficulties encountered by non-state 
providers are not unique to Uganda, as such examples of interference are also found 
in other countries (cf. Russell et al. 1999: 773).
In sum, this section revealed that partnerships have their pitfalls and produce 
negative impacts. Most of the NGOs have experienced and suffered from irregular 
and unreliable government support, which undermines secure planning, smooth
342 Once the CAO sent the ADI and an auditor with the hospital staff to control the drug purchase at the 
Joint Medical Store (JMS) in Kampala. The hospital administration reacted in the following way:
"I just left and dumped them at the store; they wanted to get a ride to town [the centre], but I told them: 
'No, you are on duty1. So they stayed there the whole day without lunch, they were hungry. They went 
from room to room and computer to computer to check what the JMS gave us. In the evening, I told 
them: You are still on duty, now we load down the drugs and you check the state o f the drugs and 
whether they are alright.' Eventually though, I let them go, since they said: This is really too much. It is 
okay with the drugs.' It seems they won't do that again (interview, hospital staff, 1999).
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operation and the implementation of activities. A large part of the problem of 
unreliable government support is rooted at the District level, in that the District 
authorities do not comply with the agreements and obligations, rendering such efforts 
at co-ordination futile. At the same time, by granting support, the DMO is in a 
position to play off the NGOs against each other, thereby creating competition and 
division.
Finally, these funding arrangements also create dependency and affect the NGOs' 
autonomy and innovation potential -  a problem, which Gilson et al. (1994) and Green 
(1987, 1992) observe in other countries as well. Ultimately, what we find are unequal 
relationships, in which one side dominates and manipulates the other. This negatively 
impinges on organisational and system performance. Hence, it must be questioned 
whether the term partnership is actually appropriate for what happens in practice. The 
next section will look at the reasons why these partnerships fail. Each side's 
incentives and the rationales behind them will be analysed by drawing upon various 
context factors, such as the funding situation, the nature of the local state, power 
structures between state and NGOs, and the NGO policy environment.
8.7. Explaining Interaction Patterns: Perverse Incentives and an Impeding 
Interaction Culture and Structure
8.7.1. The NGOs' Set of Incentives to Co-operate343
In the context of withdrawing donors, NGO facilities are struggling to recover costs, 
whilst still keeping prices at an affordable level. The medical bureaux have hence 
long called for stronger recognition of their work and for support in order to reduce 
the cost-recovery pressure (interview, UCMB official, 1999). Likewise, most PPHC 
NGOs are highly dependent upon external resources, so that the majority of them 
have a strong interest in interacting and co-operating with the local administration. 
The financial and technical support strengthens the NGO's presence in the field and 
makes their services more comprehensive, and the synergies and beneficial impacts
343 The historical developments of NGOs and church facilities and hence the historical legacies within 
the present relationships are different. That said, the nature of the daily interactions appears to be very 
similar. Thus, the discussion will be o f the two in combination.
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of co-operation contribute to organisational performance. This increases the NGO's 
standing, reputation and legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Furthermore, there are 
incentives that operate on a personal level, as the financial support is most often spent 
as allowances for field volunteers, which is an important income source for many of 
them.
Usually, NGOs initiate the contact with the administration in their search for 
support and co-operation, but this often results in one of the following patterns. Either 
the administration rejects the NGO's requests on the grounds that strong donors 
support them or NGOs (mainly PPHC organisations) are considered ’’beggars'' and 
treated as such, which puts them in a weak bargaining position. This is because the 
relationships between NGOs on the one hand and the DMO and the local 
administration on the other are characterised by unequal power structures, so that the 
latter are in a position to manipulate the NGO activities.
In fact, while partnership arrangements that are negotiated on an equal basis 
would be the desirable form of interaction, in practice, NGO are often merely 
instrumentalised as cheap implementing agents for state programmes and clientelised 
-  a problem that is common elsewhere (Dicklitch 1998, Kasumba 1998, MFEP 1993, 
Therkildsen/Semboja 1995 for Uganda; cf. Bebbington/Farrington 1993 and 
Hulme/Edwards 1995 for examples in other countries) and one I also observed in 
Senegal among PPHC actors. As a result, some of the NGOs attempt to avoid any 
interaction with the state in order to keep their autonomy and are reluctant to provide 
any information, for example, on their donors or financial position. This has also 
been observed in other Districts (Kwagala 1997, Birungi et al. 1999).
The PPHC NGOs do not defend themselves against the District administration's 
practices of withholding money or requesting a 25% share of funds. Instead, fear o f 
personal consequences makes them remain quiet and passive (interview, NGO 
headquarter official, 1998) and reflects closely the features of the administrative 
culture of citizens (cf. Chapter 7.2.2). One NGO field worker explains why NGOs 
keep silent about the administration's trimming of NGO funds:
"This sharing of the money is the order of the day, it is now just normal. The 
official puts it back in his safe, as if it were official money. It is like a law. If you 
do not give the money, next time, you are left out; you are put from the list. This 
is what happened to [another NGO].
We do not have a voice.... We could go to the LC5 and tell him, but then, one is 
afraid, because those people might lose their job. And then you have an enemy, 
which is bad, it is a danger, they might use these African herbs and kill you. So
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you are afraid and you just keep quiet....In the end, you make up receipts, our 
bosses make us [the field workers] sign for field allowances and for work which 
we did not do. This is how it happens... These people at the administration just 
put it in their own pocket."
The Mission hospital and a church-affiliated PPHC NGO resist these informal
payments given the Diocese's backing and the hospital's size and importance in the
District. In relation to the hospital, the District authorities have therefore been much
less successful in their manipulation attempts. Across all 20 NGOs in Kamuli, it
appears that those NGOs with more educated staff that has experience beyond
Kamuli District and the larger, more established NGOs are more likely to resist. In
general, these patterns of interaction seriously undermine trust in the government. As
in other countries, NGOs feel tom between the attempt to retain autonomy versus the
need for resources and support and thus some interaction with the administration (cf.
Bratton 1989, Fowler 1991a, Robinson/White 1997). This is particularly the case for
smaller and young PPHC NGOs, which have fewer contacts with national NGOs or
donors. Applying for some funds through the local administration is hence less
complicated. Despite the considerable trouble that NGOs encounter they perceive the
possible benefit as higher. Section 8.7.3 will address the question of why the NGOs
of Kamuli are currently unable to address the problems encountered with the
administration through the local democratic process.
8.7.2. Perverse Incentives for the Administration Not to Co-operate 
The starting problem is that the role of NGOs has yet to be clarified; in fact, NGOs 
are still not fully acknowledged and accepted as equal service providers (cf. MFEP 
1993). So far, there is little guidance onNGO-DMO interaction. Second, the DMO is 
not assessed or monitored on its performance or its interaction and co-operation with 
NGOs (or the private sector), just as the DMO's performance is poorly controlled in 
general, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter. There are thus no incentives or 
rewards for the local administration or the DMO to co-operate and interact with the 
NGOs in a legal, legitimate and effective way to produce synergies for the ultimate 
benefit of the communities. Given the accountability deficits, the incentives for non- 
co-operation or self-interested co-operation are dominant, so that donor funds or
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MoH and District resources for NGO activities can be turned into a lucrative income 
source for the highest District authorities to add to their salary.344
Moreover, given the small budget of departments (cf. Chapters 3.4 and 7.2.1), 
there is a reluctance to share funds with NGOs. As local governments are extremely 
dependent upon central government and donor funds and as NGOs are "inserted" into 
public provision by donor pressure and conditions, the lack of co-operation can be 
explained as competition for scarce resources. This forced "partnership" leads to 
resentment and therefore obstruction and unwillingness of the local 
administration/government to co-operate.345 For example, the loss of NGO 
requisitions and applications for funds within the administration constitute a 
conscious attempt to sabotage the NGOs’ activities. Accordingly, an NGO health 
worker stated:
"You really get the impression that they want to give you a hard time. Also, they 
make you wait on purpose" (interview, 1999).
As the donor funds for NGOs are based on the assumed NGOs' performance, the 
DMO staff may prefer the NGOs to perform badly in order to undermine their ability 
to attract funds:
"They want a report from us to make us show what we are doing. They actually 
cannot accept that we are working so much. They think that we have money. 
That is why they do not help us. The reason for this reluctance and bad 
relationship is their fear that our clinics might get famous. They do not see that 
we are actually serving the people. There is envy" (interview, NGO health 
worker, 1999).
The same rationale explains why information about programme funds and how to 
apply for them is concealed from NGOs, so that they are hampered in getting access 
to them.
Similarly, the administration’s resentments and its attempts at obtaining informal 
payments explain its obstructive behaviour towards the Mission hospital. The higher 
authorities have an interest in making the Mission hospital fail. They try to undermine 
its reputation by accusing it of poor management and poor patient care. Several key 
informants claimed that some individuals of the District leadership wished for the 
collapse of the Mission hospital in order to obtain discretion over the MoH delegated
344 It appears that NGO funds are treated as money that can be easily "eaten" more legitimately than 
government funds.
345 Bebbington/Farrington point out that programme resources allocated for NGOs have always been a 
cause for resentment, leading to administrative contractual relationships (1993: 46).
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funds for a District-owned hospital that the District is in the process of building. But 
since the District is doing this without the support and agreement of the MoH, the 
lack of funds have stopped its completion. The District's efforts are a prime example 
of Niskanen's (1971) theorising, who notes that office holders always try to increase 
their budget. In the case of the delegated hospital funds, this would also enormously 
increase opportunities for embezzlement. These motivations explain why the 
administration has never shown any concern about the regular power cut at the 
hospital every second or third night that result in emergency operations being carried 
out with a torch.346
In sum, there has been little political commitment to partnership at the local 
level. It must also be noted, however, that this obstruction was primarily fostered by 
the CAO who, as a leader, set a standard and institutionalised a norm. Although the 
prevailing incentives are perverse and not supportive of partnerships, the outcome is 
in no way deterministic. Ultimately, the level of obstruction is limited. While 
competition and resentment motivate attempts to make NGOs fail, there is the danger 
that if NGOs failed completely or if the administration's obstruction became too 
obvious, funds for NGOs would be withdrawn, so that no money would be 
channelled through the administration anymore.
8.7.3. Impeding Interaction Culture and Structure
The interaction culture, which both shapes and is shaped by the incentives 
illuminated above, refers to cognitive, affective and evaluative attitudes among the 
public, private and voluntary sector actors in relation to each other.347 The interaction 
culture provides a norm of behaviour that is reproduced in the context of the 
prevailing incentives. Today's interaction culture in Uganda also entails the legacy of 
the previous animosities and suspicion between the state and the NGOs and the 
churches respectively (cf. Riddell et al. 1998, Dicklitch 1998, Kasumba 1998).
346 Because of power shortages, power supply rotates each evening through the different parts o f the 
town, whereas certain parts of the town are always supplied with electricity as a result of bribing the 
Ugandan Electricity Board. However, a direct hospital line would not constitute a complicated 
technical undertaking and it would not interrupt the power saving rotation scheme within the other 
parts of town.
347 The term is derived from the concept of "administrative culture" (cf. Chapter 7.2) and can be 
considered as a component of the administration’s organisational culture and the citizens' 
administrative culture. Similarly, Weichselgartner (1996) identifies the administrative culture as an 
important condition for "co-operative administrative action".
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The majority of NGO staff perceives civil servants as egoistic, greedy and not 
socially oriented. From their point of view, the relationship is poor, and the language 
is often rude and abusive. On the other hand, the NGOs’ reluctance to reveal their 
funding sources is negatively assessed by the administration, which perceives them as 
rigid and non-transparent, but it must be noted that NGOs have become more 
transparent over the past few years. This has led to misperceptions and 
misunderstandings over time and both sides speak badly about each other. As a 
consequence, there is a tremendous information gap between the two.
Apart from unwillingness, effective communication between the administration 
and NGOs is undermined by organisational-cultural barriers due to differences in 
size, structure, organisational ethos, professional qualification and salary (cf. 
Wellard/Coperstake 1993: 301). The information gaps also result from the lack of an 
interorganisational structure that allows for and fosters regular contact, information 
exchange and discussion, and interaction. In Kamuli, however, there had never been a 
culture of coming together in light of the past animosities between the state and 
NGOs. Nor does the prevailing interaction culture foster integration of NGOs into the 
District planning process or take their contributions into account. These patterns 
are very similar to what I observed in Senegal. In consequence, awareness about 
possible entry points for co-operation and more so willingness to co-operate is 
difficult to develop.
8.7.4. A Weak Civil Society: Lack of Impact upon the Local State
It remains to ask what role the local civil society plays in demanding accountability
and addressing the pitfalls of partnership. Civil society can be understood as
The realm of organised social life that is voluntary,... autonomous from the state, 
and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.... It is distinct from society in 
general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to 
express their interests... (Diamond 1994: 5).
The role of civil society is inter alia to contribute to creating channels for 
articulation, aggregation and representation of interests, redefine the rules of the 
political game along democratic lines, make demands on the state, and ultimately
348 Other Districts have progressed more in this respect (Bagambisa 1995, Kwagala 1997, Riddell et al. 
1998, Azfar et al. 2000). However, Azfar et al.'s point is crucial to understand the administration's 
behaviour, namely that district administrations may fear that the disclosure of information on NGO 
contribution or donor funds may lead to cuts in block grants (2000: 62).
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make local government respond to the citizens' needs (Schmitter 1993, Diamond 
1994, White 1994).
However, most local NGOs in Kamuli are understood and understand 
themselves mainly as service providers and they have not exerted control and 
demanded accountability and transparency over the financial and technical support 
that is not provided to them. Thus, the NGOs have not been able to take up the role of 
a local civil society. This is also confirmed by Kassimir's (1998) study of the Catholic 
church and its role in social mobilisation in Uganda and Waliggo's (1995) and 
Dicklitch's (1998) analysis of the role of NGOs in the Ugandan democratisation 
process. In fact, NGOs suffer from a lack of transparency and accountability within 
the local administration, just like the individual citizens, and they do not succeed in 
balancing out the lack of local legitimisation. This is because it is very difficult to 
address their concerns and make them public through the democratic process given 
the deformations of the LC system both in structure and process, as described in 
Chapter 7.2. Further, die NGOs are told to stay non-political and warned not to 
interfere in politics or link up with councillors.349 In addition, the no-party regime 
limits participation to the local council system to an individualised and localised 
approach rather than one based on collective action and issue-orientation (cf. 
Mamdani 1994: 553; Carbone 2001).
NGOs are also constrained in addressing their concerns with the authorities, 
because the District and Subcounty administration have not allowed for their 
participation or even passive attendance in the local discussion and policy making 
process in that they have not fostered attendance of local NGOs in the Technical 
Planning Committee or the Sectoral Committees of the District Council. This lack of 
structural entry points reduces the NGOs' options and capacity to take up the political 
roles of civil society. Finally, NGOs have not succeeded in organising themselves 
(until 1998) due to low social capital, that is, mistrust, competition, lack of mutual 
recognition and power struggles about leadership among each other (cf. MFEP 1993: 
22), thereby weakening their position and their ability to speak with one voice.
In sum, the prevailing nature of interactions has hindered the NGOs from 
operating as civil society actors, and their interactions have had a limited positive
349 The rationale of NRM-supporters is the attempt to avoid political parties using NGOs as their 
mouthpiece and their organisational link to the communities (interview, umbrella NGO official, 1998).
301
impact on the local state in terms of accountability and transparency. Instead, the 
partnership arrangements and support measures have provided opportunities for the 
administration to seek illicit rents and bribes and to manipulate the relationships 
according to their own interests. It must be noted, however, that the degree of 
interaction and co-operation varies between Districts according to the beginning of 
their decentralisation process, donor engagement and the strength of local civil 
society. Another important factor is visionary leadership. Thus, the degree of co­
operation and partnership is rather poor in Kamuli in comparison with some other 
Districts.350 The findings of Kamuli District hence seem to be comparable only with 
more deprived and isolated Districts.
Yet the relationships have changed with the establishment of the NGO Forum in 
1998 in Kamuli District as a result of an action research that aimed at promoting 
intersectoral co-operation (Mathauer 2000). This will be further discussed in Chapter 
9, which examines the scope for "constructability" to overcome these institutional 
barriers.
8.8. Interorganisational Relations and Their Effect on the Functioning of the
Referral System
A functional referral system is one of the most important pillars in any multi-levelled 
and multisectoral health care system. The referral system inherently consists of 
interorganisational (and interpersonal) relations; hence effectiveness is linked to the 
nature of these relationships as well as the way it is co-ordinated. In the past, as a 
consequence of the general decline of health care services, the referral as well as the 
transfer system had also broken down (Okello et al. 1994: 603; cf. Omaswa et al. 
1997). This section addresses the question of how today’s referral system operates and
- j r  1
in which way it is affected by the interorganisational relationships.
In theory, referral is guided by medical judgement, i.e., patients first report to a 
lower level unit; then they are referred to higher-level units if need be. In practice,
350 Interviews, co-ordinator of the National NGO Forum, 1998; Jochen Becker, DED NGO liaison 
officer, 1998, 1999; NGO headquarter staff, 1999; and personal communication, Mary Mulusa, World 
Bank, 2001.
351 There is no transfer system in Kamuli due to a lack of resources. Inter-District referral (for patients 
living in areas that are closer to the health facilities of a neighbouring District) and referral to the 
tertiary level will not be considered here.
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referrals are made to facilities and not to individuals, whereby the diagnosis and the 
treatment of the referred patient are not passed back to the referring facility. What 
Leonard/Leonard (1999) described for Tanzania, namely that the referral network is 
depersonalised and creates few incentives for lower-level providers to refer, is also 
the case for Kamuli. Pride is another reason to refer only reluctantly, leading to 
serious quality of care deficits, especially when a patient's state suddenly deteriorates 
and the treatment required exceeds the resources and competence of the lower facility 
(interview, Almeda, 1998; Kristen, 1999, DED health professionals).
Referral discipline appears to be better in the NGO clinics, because NGO health 
workers face sanctions if they are found to refer too late. In contrast, private 
practitioners do not refer as promptly, since their profit maximisation interests 
dominate.352 Nevertheless, formal private clinics are more responsible in referring 
cases than informal ones or drugshops are, due to the higher degree of 
professionalism and medical ethics, as well as their better knowledge. The formal 
clinics are always afraid of losing their reputation; thus they refer rather than risk 
having a patient die in their clinic.353 In contrast, apart from lack of knowledge and 
their desire for profit, lower-level informal providers have to worry about being 
accused of a mistake, so that their informal and illegal status stops them from 
officially referring and from providing a referral note. They would just tell their 
patients to "go to town" or "go to the hospital". Moreover, since patients get abused 
by higher-level staff for having gone to or stayed to long with lower-level providers, 
they are not interested in getting a referral note, either. However, the referral note is 
crucial to provide the higher-level provider with the necessary information about the 
course of the disease and the previous treatment. This said, when informal 
practitioners see that they cannot manage the case, some of them do refer early and in 
so doing increase their reputation as responsible providers.
The functioning of the referral system is furthermore undermined by the high 
degree of self-referral by patients who, after having used drugshops, go straight to the 
urban clinics instead of utilising rural government clinics. 86 percent of the exit
352 Similarly, for Tanzania, Mackintosh/Tibandebage (2000: 8) note the private practitioners' 
reluctance to refer when cases were beyond their competence.
353 The hospital suffers from the private clinics' practice o f referring patients very late, when he or she 
is just about to die. If the patient dies, it is blamed on the hospital (personal communication, Krotz, 
DED doctor in the hospital, 1998).
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respondents at higher-level providers had done so.354 As Leonard/Leonard point out, 
the extent of self-referral may be the result but not the cause of non-functioning 
referral networks (1999: 17). Moreover, poorer people fear the high expenditures at 
higher facilities (including the costs of transport to Kamuli Town) and the anonymity 
there, so that they often do not follow the providers' advice and referral; they rather 
turn to and beg another local provider to obtain treatment. As a consequence, 
patients often arrive at the hospital in a very critical state when it may be too late. It 
must be noted, however, that the delegated hospital funds helped to reduce user fees 
considerably and therefore contributed to re-establishing the referral system.
In sum, the referral system is underdeveloped and reflects the fragmentation of 
the health care system, the lack of communication and interactions, and the bad 
relationships between the providers. This is aggravated by regulatory failure and lack 
of supervision.
8.9. Conclusion
This chapter has shown that regulatory provisions are insufficient and that the state 
also lacks the institutional and financial capacity to implement them. Market 
imperfections and failures are not addressed adequately, so that poor clinical quality 
of care, unequal coverage and difficulties in financial access persist. The private 
sector has not been fully integrated into the national health system and planning, 
which prevents the public-private mix from being streamlined and promoted. The 
potential of making use of the private sector to provide PPHC services has not been 
tapped into at all.
State regulation and supervision of the NGO sector equally fail to address 
clinical quality of care. Network co-ordination of PPHC services is practised in an 
initial stage, but its co-ordinative impact is still marginal, other than as regards 
information exchange. In contrast, partnerships arrangements are more advanced. Yet
354 In calculating this figure, it was not taken into account that direct public transport to Kamuli is 
available in some places, and hence going to Kamuli may be as (in-)convenient as going to a rural 
clinic by bicycle. This figure may thus be a slight overestimation. Yet, Leonard/Leonard report similar 
high figures (1999: 32).
355 This is in principle similar to what Withworth et al. (1999) found in south-west Uganda as regards 
people's referral behaviour for ophthalmology clinics.
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these partnerships have serious pitfalls, in that the actual interactions are impaired by 
the administration's obstructive behaviour. This is the result of its perverse incentive 
structure in the context of the accountability gaps of the local government. The 
interaction pattern of the administration is also shaped by and shapes the prevailing 
impeding interaction culture and thus explains the large number of missed 
opportunities for further interactions. This obstruction undermines the NGOs' 
organisational performance as well as the performance of the system as a whole, so 
that Uganda's health care system does not achieve the level of performance it could 
with its available resources. Furthermore, the prevailing partnerships patterns prevent 
NGOs from taking up civil society functions, namely articulating and representing 
interests, demanding accountability and making local government respond to the 
people's need. In sum, the findings suggest that the smoothening rhetoric of 
partnership is inadequate and counterproductive in the long- term, as it hides the 
pitfalls. Instead, the government and donors should recognise that the relationships 
are unequal and antagonistic. Being more clear about the starting point and the 
context will in the long term allow for more realistic arrangements and more 
appropriate support to overcome these problems.
Many of the deficits in Uganda as regards both regulation and partnerships are 
also encountered in other African and Asian countries. So for Uganda, as for other 
countries, the indirect roles of the state (regulatory and enabling) are weakly adopted 
(Batley 1999b: 762; cf. Russell et al. 1997 for Zimbabwe). In fact, since none of the 
governance mechanisms or the partnership arrangements functions properly and 
effectively, the question is whether Uganda employs the right mix of governance 
mechanisms and partnership arrangements, or whether these failures are related to 
capacity deficits in applying and implementing them and whether the latter is 
fundamentally due to unmet assumptions and preconditions for the governance 
mechanisms to function. The answer to this question is even trickier, since it 
simultaneously requires an answer to a second question about the right sector mix, 
which must equally take into account the deficits of intra-organisational institutional 
mechanisms.
The evidence suggests that the answer to the first question is to move both ways. 
First of all, government must clarify the role of the private and voluntary sector as 
well as its own role. It also calls for a shift in the mix of governance mechanisms as
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well as for strengthening the capacities to apply them. This constitutes, secondly, a 
step towards meeting the preconditions and assumptions for the functioning of the 
governance mechanisms.
For the provision of curative services, healthy competition must be fostered, 
which necessitates comprehensive and effective regulation and its implementation as 
to quality of care, location and prices. This requires an approach that promotes the 
state's institutional capacities to regulate, supervise and monitor. In addition, adequate 
incentive-based schemes must be developed in order to address those aspects that are 
difficult to rectify through hierarchical regulation. At best, these incentive-based 
schemes are developed together with the other two sectors in a co-operative way. As 
regards PPHC services, a focused shift towards network coordination has to take 
place. This implies enhancing both the capacities of actors to network as well as the 
actors' willingness and awareness. The partnership arrangements have proved 
beneficial, but in order to exploit their full potential, these arrangements must further 
evolve into contracts that specify the services and the quality more explicitly than 
they have done so far. This should take place on the basis of a fair and equal 
negotiation process and also requires a great degree of trust (cf. Mills 1997a). 
Likewise, the competitive element within the application process for funds needs 
strengthening, while it must be equally ensured that the selection process and criteria 
be more transparent. For example, NGOs should be included in panel committees not 
only on paper but in practice, and more facilitation should be provided to local 
governments during this process. Alternatively, donors may consider other 
organisational-institutional options to channel funds to NGOs, such as regional or 
District NGO forums.
In order to avoid the pitfalls of partnership, focus must be put on fostering the 
actors' capacity to interact as well as their willingness to do so, by improving the 
interaction culture and establishing an interaction framework that allows for regular 
and constructive interaction. It is also necessary to specify guidelines and 
performance indicators to facilitate, monitor and evaluate partnerships between 
NGOs and the local government. A starting point is to clarify responsibilities of who 
is in charge of dealing with NGOs, to set up office hours for NGO matters, 
institutionalise consultative meetings that are participatory and moderated by neutral 
actors, and establish voice mechanisms for NGOs. This is surely a difficult 
undertaking in a context of co-optation, patronage and clientelism and, thus, also calls
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for strengthening NGOs in their role as civil society. But it is a feasible aim, as the 
promising results of the action research in Kamuli District showed (see Chapter 9).
Ultimately, all of these strategies will require a functional local government. 
Hence, strengthening local legitimisation and bottom-up accountability is 
fundamental. This also calls for extending the people's voice and exit options in 
relation to all three sectors. The next and final chapter will elaborate on some 
theoretical and practical implications resulting from the empirical findings of 
Chapters 5-8.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion: Institutionalised Pathologies or Healing Organisations?
9.1. The Potential and Pitfalls of Institutional Pluralism
This chapter draws together the empirical data described in the previous chapters and 
recapitulates the analysis of institutional pluralism and interorganisational relationships. 
The starting point was the recognition that performance and relative strengths are 
context-specific. Which provider type and which governance mechanism is best can 
therefore not be determined a priori, but requires empirical analysis. Chapter 2 discussed 
the methodological difficulties involved in defining relative strengths; it was noted that 
there is always a normative component to it. By combining people's views with the 
observer's, an adequate understanding of relative strengths has been derived that is based 
on the performance criteria: access, efficiency (in staff resource utilisation) and quality 
of care.
The background chapters (3 and 4) examined the local government developments, 
the previous organisational changes and the context of Uganda's health care system in 
order to illuminate the prevailing legacies with which it is faced today. These include 
deficits in local government accountability (which did not become institutionalised in the 
previous decades), the informalisation process (which resulted in a huge informal, 
unregulated private sector), the privatisation of public resources, and related thereto the 
fragmentation of the health care system. As a result, the roles, responsibilities, ownership 
and loci of decision-making changed and transformed. Given the nature of the health 
policy-making process of the past decade, however, the inherited problems could not be 
quickly solved. Likewise, the identified shortcomings within the decentralisation process 
after 1986 continue to constrain health care provision at the local government level.
An analysis of people's medical-pluralist notions revealed the numerous paths of 
health care seeking and the treatments available. The examination of people's utilisation 
behaviour and the rationale behind helped interpret the results of the comparative 
performance analysis. The factors influencing utilisation comprise qualitative, 
financial/economic and cultural aspects. Choice of treatment is thus contingent upon 
availability, affordability and acceptability. As active health care seekers, people's main
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criterion for choosing a provider is quality, although people's notion of quality does not 
necessarily coincide with a biomedical understanding of quality of care. As in other 
countries, people (both providers and users) have developed a strong preference for 
injections and antibiotics, which they believe to be the most powerful means of restoring 
and maintaining health.
Chapters 5 and 6 were devoted to a comprehensive comparative performance 
analysis: public, private and voluntary sector health care providers were assessed in 
terms of access, efficiency in staff resource utilisation and quality of care. It was shown 
that urban private and NGO clinics are more efficient in the utilising staff resources. 
Accessibility to all providers is contingent upon the patient's ability to pay, but there is a 
trade-off in terms of losses of quality, such as partial doses for partial payments or 
inferior treatment, when patients do not have enough money to pay, although this is not 
that extensive at NGO clinics. Drugshops constitute the least expensive option; on the 
other side of the coin, the unqualified staff completely gives way to people's unhealthy 
preferences. Out-of-pocket user charges are very high at urban private and NGO clinics, 
as well as at government clinics, because of the high extent of informal charges and the 
patients' need to buy drugs at drugshops. Furthermore, exemption practice is very rare 
and hence does not contribute to counterbalancing inability to pay. Ultimately, exclusion 
and self-exclusion are the result.
Process quality, which includes drug availability, staff behaviour, waiting time, 
opening hours, presence and attendance of qualified staff, and appropriate consultation 
and examination, is overall adequate at NGO and private clinics, but extremely poor in 
the public sector. That said, clinical quality of care -  measured as a clinical examination 
provided, the fit between diagnosis and treatment, a correct treatment, the rational use of 
drugs and the use of adequately sterilised syringes -  is inadequate everywhere. Overall, 
the hypothesis is confirmed that the public sector performs worst. In fact, it has no 
relative strengths at all at present, whereas the NGOs deliver relatively better services, 
even though user charges are quite high and as such reduce access. In sum, the 
comparative performance analysis illustrated the numerous problems in service 
provision, which are by no means unique for Uganda, but reflect the overall difficulties 
and challenges in health care provision of developing countries (Bennett et al. 1999). 
Despite the significant performance differences, the question of relative strengths, as a
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matter of fact, turned into which provider type is least worst, since none of the provider 
types performed satisfactorily overall.
In Chapter 7 and 8, (mal-)performance was explained by means of an institutional 
account that demonstrated the importance of the intraorganisational institutional 
mechanisms and interorganisational relationships.
In the public sector, as hypothesised, malperformance is the result of the lack of 
functional accountability mechanisms and distorted local legitimisation processes, 
thereby simultaneously disrupting financial responsibility. Deficits in supervision and 
disciplinary mechanisms lead to a situation where perverse incentives dominate, 
deviating the service providers from the public interest. The staff is thus in a position to 
privatise public resources. For example, the logic of informal charging is based on bad 
performance, particularly as regards behaviour and drug availability, which can then be 
improved by such informal payments. As informal charging generates more additional 
income, health workers give way to the perverse incentive for bad performance. 
Moreover, the prevailing administrative culture is characterised by people's fear for 
negative consequences when using voice. This, in turn, cements a situation in which 
nobody is accountable. In sum, the state operates a system on the basis of assumptions 
that it cannot hold. Instead, it succumbs to institutional degradation that creates the 
serious deficits in relation to the performance criteria access, efficiency (in staff resource 
utilisation) and quality of care. These systemic problems affect not only government 
health care provision but other social services as well. Drawing upon other case studies 
has shown that many African countries suffer from similar and in part identical 
institutional deficits.
Private and NGO clinics are exposed to market competition because of the cost- 
recovery requirement, which exerts pressure on their performance. However, market 
imperfections cause supplier-induced inefficiencies (lower quality than under perfect 
competition) and also make access problematic. For the NGO clinics, this is 
counterbalanced, however, not so much by participatory structures and solidaristic 
motivations per se, as expected, but above all by the existence of strong supervision and 
top-down accountability that succeed in upholding a certain level of solidaristic 
motivations and loyalty, thus offsetting perverse incentives. Furthermore, the extent of 
the hybridisation of the public and voluntary sectors was not expected. Both sectors 
show some distinct features of the private sector, in that patient exit is the main bottom-
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up accountability mechanism for users (even though this has no effect on the 
performance of government clinics) and in that access is contingent upon direct out-of- 
pocket payments, which raises serious accessibility concerns. Given this hybridisation, 
the usefulness of the sector conceptualisation is also in question, as the sector boundaries 
are blurred.
Chapter 8 showed the importance of interorganisational relations in explaining 
performance and malperformance, as hypothesised. It demonstrated that market failures 
and imperfections are not adequately addressed due to regulatory gaps and the state's 
inability to implement these regulations. These problems are also found in other African 
countries (Kumaranayake et al. 2000). Nevertheless, the existence of state clinics as 
some form of benchmark for competition and the DMO supervision -  even though more 
limited to infrastructural aspects -  exert pressure upon NGO facilities and make them 
perform better in the context of their prevailing antagonistic relationship. Further, the 
hypothesis was confirmed that partnership arrangements are beneficial in that they 
improve or extend the NGO services and allow NGOs to take advantage of their relative 
strengths. Yet the potential of these support interactions is undermined by the 
administration's obstructive practices that make it difficult or even impossible for the 
NGOs to obtain the financial and technical support they were promised. The channelling 
of NGO funds through the local governments has produced perverse incentives in the 
context of the severe accountability deficits of the local government, since these funds 
could be turned into an additional lucrative income source for the highest District 
authorities. There are no incentives for the administrative actors to achieve the intended 
interaction benefits, such that their personal interests of appropriating NGO funds 
dominate. On the other hand, the lack of co-operation can be explained as competition 
for scarce resources. As such, the forced "partnership" upon the local government 
authorities has led to resentment. Their obstruction offsets the positive effects of NGO 
clinics competing with and being supervised by the DMO. The situation is worsened by 
the impeding interaction culture and structure, as well as the NGOs' inability to make the 
local government accountable. At the same time, this has prevented the NGOs from 
taking on the role of a local civil society. Thus, there is a vicious circle, in that the 
collective action of a local civil society is required to establish (constructive) interactions 
in order to promote good governance and strengthen the devolved local state by
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supporting a capacity-building process. Again, the literature indicated at various points 
that these problems are not unique to Kamuli or Uganda.
Institutional pluralism has much potential, and some of its benefits are realised in 
Kamuli, but at the same time it suffers from huge pitfalls. In fact, what we find is a 
situation of institutional weaknesses. This is manifested in huge accountability gaps in 
the public sector, lack of patient participation in all three sectors, poor state regulation, a 
particularly imperfect health care market and low professional and ethical standards. As 
a result, perverse incentives for public, private and voluntary sector health workers are 
not fully counterbalanced and lead them to overprescribe and underdrug at varying 
degrees. In combination, the identified deficits constitute severe pathologies within the 
health care system and explain the low organisational and system performance. These 
pathologies are institutionalised in the sense that they are deeply ingrained as norms for 
organisational and individual behaviour that determine future behaviour and expectations 
and in that these norms are constantly reproduced within the prevailing system. This is 
particularly the case in the public sector where stakeholders are interested in their 
reproduction and resist their dissolution.
9.2. Wider Implications and Reflections
9.2.1. Weak Intellectual Thrust of Institutional Pluralism? Or: The Importance of 
Preconditions and Informal Institutions 
The institutional set-up of the three sectors is quite diverse, so that failure occurs in 
various degrees and due to different causes. In a situation, in which all provider types 
perform inadequately and in which the question of relative strengths turns into which 
provider type is least bad, one may question the intellectual thrust of institutional 
pluralism, since what we have to explain is a situation of failure and specifically 
institutional and organisational pathology.356 However, as was noted in Chapter 1, theory 
and the validity of its predictions are contingent upon preconditions and assumptions. 
Obviously, the assumptions of institutional pluralism, namely functional sectors with
356 It must be noted that the term "failure" is used in relative terms. Obviously, in comparison with 
previous decades or imploding states, today's Uganda is doing much better and the achievements during 
the past 15 years must be clearly acknowledged.
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their respective (inherent) strengths (and weaknesses) for making it a superior social 
order, are not met in Kamuli, and we have found that all three sectors perform below the 
theoretical expectations.
In Kamuli, there are particularly severe market imperfections and failures due to 
poverty and deprivation, as there usually are in rural African settings. Markets are not in 
equilibrium because of locked supply, information asymmetries, the relatively long 
travelling times and the high costs to reach providers (D. Leonard 2000b: 260, 264). 
Another market imperfection is the "economy of affection" that acts as one of the 
strongest informal institutions. In many instances, markets are able to create the 
institutions or other markets required on their own to overcome market failure and 
imperfections. As regards health, one of these is professional associations, which ensure 
quality of care and ethics. Another one is insurance markets and other community-based 
financing schemes to increase market access. Yet both of these types of institutions are 
very poorly developed in Uganda. As regards insurance markets, this is due to the 
absence of collective action, the incompatibility between rural household structures and 
formal insurance requirements, as well as high levels of illiteracy (ibid., cf. 
Abraham/Platteau 2000 on the reasons for the failure of community insurance 
systems).357
Voluntary sector performance is based on very specific assumptions, such as the 
prevalence of collective action, solidarity, a participatory structure and functional 
accountability chains. These requirements are not sufficiently explicated in the voluntary 
sector discussion, but it is a mistake to take the existence of these factors for granted (cf. 
Abraham/Platteau 2000, Larmour 1997). Likewise, the state fails in direct service 
delivery and indirect provision since its institutions are underdeveloped and weak. As 
was shown in Chapter 7, the central cause is rooted in the severe accountability gaps, 
such that the most fundamental assumption of the Weberian model is not met. At this 
point, there is no scope for providing a detailed explanation of why these assumptions do 
not prevail; moreover this would require a detailed empirical study on its own. However, 
based on my observations and elaboration of some of the points made in Chapter 7, the
357 Also, for the poorest, even community-based financing schemes are often unaffordable (Preker et al. 
2001 for a review of 45 community-based financing schemes).
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following aspects appear to be critical in understanding the roots of this lack of 
accountability and collective action.
First, the prevailing administrative culture makes people suppress their demands out 
of fear for negative consequences. Strong trust in hierarchies (Mathauer 1997; Golooba- 
Mutebi 1999), a leadership culture ("personalissimo"), and the acceptance of inequalities 
(Munene 1991, Munene et al. 2000) raise the threshold for taking action against the 
authorities' wrongdoing. Further, people's level of information about their rights or 
regarding where to address their views is low and they are not experienced in asking for 
that information.
Second, while there is a strong sense of community in African societies, my 
impression of Uganda in comparison with other African countries I have worked in is 
that the society is relatively more individualised, possibly as a result of the despotic 
regime of Idi Amin and the civil war. This impression was confirmed in various 
conversations with persons who worked in other parts of Uganda. During the focus 
group discussions, the communities themselves complained about this. Related thereto 
are low levels of social co-operation and low capacity for collective action (cf. Mathauer 
1997, 1998; Mutebi-Golooba 1999).358 Triandis (1976) conceptualised this as 
"ecosystem distrust", whereby one's wider environment is perceived as hostile rather 
than benign (in Munene 1991: 456). As a result, problems are solved individually 
through patron-client relationships. The vicious circle is not interrupted by the local 
NGO sector, since it has not yet reached Korten's (1987) "third generation" of system 
development but remains in the "second generation" of promoting small-scale 
development.
The effect of informal institutions is enormous and is particularly strong in the 
public sector. They subvert the assumptions on which the sector conceptualisations are 
based, especially when formal institutions are already weak. In turn, the preconditions 
for the adequate functioning of the three sectors and hence for institutional pluralism do 
not frilly exist. This questions the appropriateness of the (Weberian) state model for a 
context like rural Uganda, as Simon (1993) does for developing countries, or the 
adequacy of the private sector, as does D. Leonard (2000). The resulting policy question 
is thus whether a health care system should use other provider types and other
358 As a vicious circle, this is also undermined by the contradictory logic of the LC system; for example, 
the indirect elections of the LC2 level as the critical gate to the directly elected LC3 level.
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institutional arrangements, notably NGOs, which are the remaining category. This then 
brings the rationale of institutional pluralism into question. If not, is the solution to 
change the preconditions, specifically the political and social conditions that inhibit 
successful public and private provision? Or are there other solutions? The following 
sections address these questions.
9.2.2. Which Provider Type to Set On?
The government (and donors) endeavour to extend and improve health care services. In 
light of each sector's failure, the question of which provider type to promote and invest 
in becomes difficult. The comparative performance analysis indicated a relatively 
superior performance on the part of NGO clinics given their strong internal supervision 
system, even though severe performance gaps remain. D. Leonard also argues that NGOs 
perform better since church missions in particular have high-powered incentives through 
their institutionalised set of values, thereby substituting for system-wide organised 
professional (self-)regulation (2000: xxxvii). He therefore recommends an expansion of 
the role of NGOs. However, the mere extension, replication and scaling up of NGO 
services is not unproblematic, because NGOs may loose their flexibility, their "small is 
beautiful" advantage and their unbureaucraticness. Furthermore, extending the number of 
NGO facilities also raises funding questions and, as we have seen in Chapter 8, the 
provision of funds is accompanied by numerous problems, which affects their 
performance and endangers their autonomy.
Apart from these considerations, it is ultimately crucial to note again that the 
performance of NGOs is also related to the DMO's supervision and the antagonistic 
relationship as well as the prevailing competition, which puts added pressure on them. 
The existence of institutional pluralism, specifically the presence of private and public 
sector health care providers, and not only the state in its function as regulator, is critical, 
in that the other providers constitute a benchmark and an incentive for NGOs to perform 
better. In consequence, an extension of the number of health clinics should prioritise the 
NGO sector and secondly the well-regulated private sector, but this should not lead to an 
active down-sizing of the government clinics, since their existence is equally needed as a 
distinct type of service delivery, though with a rather different internal institutional set­
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up (see below). This argument is also based on the fact that current experiences in 
contracting out are not fully promising and convincing.359
9.2.3. Is Institutional Pluralism Superior?
This point brings us back to one of the hypotheses of this research, namely that 
institutional pluralism is a superior social order for providing services and governing 
service provision and hence is a means to provide better services. Moreover, an effective 
pluralistic system allows for appropriately addressing the issues of access and equity. 
The empirical findings have demonstrated the actual achievements and the potentials of 
institutional pluralism. One of the advantages is the existence of competition, which 
ideally yields improved process quality if the health market is regulated. Other 
advantages are the increased availability of drugs, physical proximity of providers in 
rural areas and some degree of provider choice, as well as the benefits of partnerships, 
including the use of relative strengths.
That said, it is evident that institutional pluralism per se is not the solution, since it 
may also entail numerous problems and pitfalls, particularly when the state is too weak 
to overcome these deadlocks. In fact, in Uganda, as elsewhere, the move towards 
institutional pluralism has not been accompanied by the development of strong (formal) 
institutions. As D. Leonard puts it,
The expansion of markets has exposed the absence or weakness of the institutions 
required for their efficient operation. [Thus], the market has not yet worked any 
miracles (2000b: 260).
Also, because of the substitution processes that take place from the public to the (rural) 
private sector, there is always the danger that the increase in private provision may not 
fully add to the total activity of the health care sector (McPake 1997: 33). This also 
appears to hold true for Uganda, as the overall health budget has stagnated (Oloka- 
Onyango 2000: 24) and as the increase in private sector activities is linked to informally 
"privatised" state resources (mainly drugs and staff time).
Further, in Uganda, the shift to a pluralistic system was not managed and governed 
properly and hence resulted in fragmentation, duplication and eventually sub-optimal use 
of scarce resources, so that overall health goals have become more difficult to achieve.
359 Cf. for example Gilson et al. 1997, Bennett et al. 1997, Palmer/Mills 2000, McPake/Ngalande-Banda 
1994.
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Likewise, in an environment characterised by weak formal institutions, the potentials of 
partnerships are undermined. Institutional pluralism requires strong functioning 
governance mechanisms, but we have seen that they do not function effectively either. It 
puts higher governance demands on the system and particularly on the state, while 
paradoxically, in Uganda, institutional pluralism emerged because of state service 
delivery failure and governance failure. This is why the shift to institutional pluralism 
was accompanied by institutional weakening, resulting in the pathologies described in 
the previous chapters.
It is difficult to prove directly that institutional pluralism, despite all its pitfalls, is 
still potentially superior to an approach that uses only one sector. However, having 
gained an understanding of how the system functions at the moment, one can assume 
that a system based on solely one provider type would perform much worse today, 
precisely because of the lack of competition among different provider types.360 
Ultimately, a one-sector model is not a viable alternative and institutional pluralism is 
the only remaining policy alternative. The practical question is how to make it 
functional.
9.3. Making Institutional Pluralism Work: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to
Reform
Institutional pluralism is potentially superior, but also much more complex to manage, 
especially because of the two-way interrelation of the intra- and interorganisational 
institutional mechanisms.361 On the one hand, it requires the functioning of the intra- 
organisational institutional mechanisms of all provider types. System improvement will 
hence not primarily come about by changing the division of labour, although a role 
specification is necessary, but by reducing intraorganisational deficits. On the other, 
institutional pluralism requires functional governance mechanisms and conducive 
interorganisational relationships. For this institutional pluralism to be healthy and
360 In fact, the decentralised organisational change occurred because of the failure and breakdown of the 
previous health care system in the 1970s.
61 Managing institutional pluralism is made even more challenging through cross-linkages with other 
policy fields (agriculture, sanitation, water, nutrition).
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beneficial in Uganda, the right balance and combination of more competition, and 
therefore more effective regulation, but also more co-ordination and more partnership 
arrangements are necessary, as each of these are relevant. The right balance will also 
make it possible to reset intraorganisational institutional mechanisms and incentives and 
to address system concerns.
For developing countries, finding the optimal institutional-organisational 
arrangements for service provision at the local level is not simply a matter of 
determining the relative strengths of each service provider in order to reorientate the 
division of labour, as initially assumed. Instead, it requires a simultaneous assessment of 
the potential institutional capacity of the actors in delivering services and in governing 
interorganisational relationships in order to correct institutional deficits. This implies a 
move from a static notion of relative strengths to a dynamic one. As said, the providers' 
relative strengths -  also vis-a-vis their institutional and organisational capacity -  are 
situational and they can be influenced and promoted (Mathauer 2000). For example, 
although the public sector in Kamuli District currently does not have the institutional and 
organisational capacity to deliver services in an efficient and effective manner, or the 
capacity to contract or regulate, it may so in the future with the appropriate support. 
Under such a scenario, relative strengths will have to be reattributed to the providers.
It is therefore central to improve both the functioning of intra-organisational 
institutional mechanisms and interorganisational relationships, including the mix of 
governance mechanisms and beneficial partnership arrangements. This also serves to 
bring the required preconditions and assumptions about institutional pluralism into 
existence through capacity strengthening. In finding the least worst option, such a 
capacity-strengthening approach must equally take into account the relationship between 
formal and informal institutions and the way they are subverted. These recommendations 
seem to be very ambitious in light of the many institutionalised pathologies, and a 
comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach to promoting healthy institutional 
pluralism is therefore needed. Only this will make it possible to address the interrelated 
performance criteria (access, efficiency and quality of care) and hence to raise their 
scoring in order to improve overall organisational performance.
Increasingly, the New Public Management (NPM) model for the governance of 
institutional pluralism, or elements thereof, is being propagated and its suitability is
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being scrutinised. Its core features are the reduction of government's direct role in 
providing services to citizens and greater reliance on markets, communities and 
individuals to manage themselves. It also aims at extending government's role in the 
indirect management of other actors and calls for management reforms in the remaining 
areas of government action (such as internal markets, performance-related salaries, 
establishing a service culture) in order to create new pressures and incentives for 
efficiency and effectiveness.362 These different aspects reshape the relationships of 
accountability between officials and politicians and between the public administration 
and society (Batley 1994a, 1999a). Country experiences are promising, but have so far 
not been very far reaching, as the introduction of NPM elements "require not only 
changes in organisational structure but also organisational culture" (Batley 1999b: 773; 
similar Grindle 1997).363
Nevertheless, the system's functioning still requires some hierarchical regulation for 
licensing and ultimate health safety enforcement, either by an independent self- 
regulatory body or by a state institution. For those tasks (now reduced to a minimum), 
the conventional state model of hierarchy has still practical relevance. The state's 
different roles of regulating, monitoring, enabling, co-operating, contracting, financing 
and co-ordinating are not easily accommodated with each other (Batley 1994a). Enabling 
and co-ordination are particularly challenging when state services also compete with 
other provider types. While the different roles (regulatory versus enabling) are difficult 
to combine, this can be eased by organisationally separating these opposite functions. 
Ultimately, the success of these reforms -  strengthening the conventional roles of the 
state and pursuing a NPM approach -  depends upon two crucial measures: (1) 
establishing accountability and (2) fostering the willingness and capacity of all actors to 
interact and co-operate.
Promoting administrative and political accountability at the local level serves to 
break up the vicious circle of a weak state failing in delivery, which then tries in vain to 
regulate an underdeveloped market that grew out of state failure. Apart from institutional 
changes and in particular changes in procedures of decision-making and control over 
resources, it is also necessary to "enhanc[e] the capabilities of communities to exercise
362 For a detailed account on NPM measures, cf. Walsh 1995, Osbome/Gaebler 1992, Osbome/Plastrik 
1997.
363 Similarly, Bennett et al. note the importance of organisational culture (1999: 27).
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their new rights and responsibilities" (Cornwall et al. 2000: 3).364 In light of the 
numerous deficiencies that characterise the local government system in Kamuli, this 
appears to be a great challenge. While this is not easy, it is not insurmountable. This is 
confirmed by the action research process undertaken in Kamuli District, which aimed at 
strengthening people's voice options and providing information about decentralisation. 
The communities' strategies were focused on making structures and institutions more 
functional and increasing community awareness and capacity. The communities aimed to 
create and strengthen voice options and accountability mechanisms by requesting to be 
involved in local decision-making and planning processes. A small but notable change 
took place in that people started to use voice and to take action against the wrongdoing 
of office-holders (cf. Mathauer 1998 for the results of the action research).
The second key reform is to promote the willingness to interact and collaborate in 
order to establish the conditions necessary for intensified networking co-ordination and 
partnership arrangements. This calls for reshaping the incentive structure at the local 
level to make civil servants co-operate with non-state service providers. At the same 
time, this requires interorganisational trust and a change in the interaction culture, since 
it will be impossible to implement the partnership policy if the current central-local-civic 
constellation remains the way it is.365 Instead of a bureaucratic machinery, a "co­
operative administration" and a co-operative administrative culture are required, which 
allow for "two-sided, open and results-oriented co-operation rather than one-sided 
hierarchical rules application" (Simon 1993: 69, translated). Again, this points to the 
fundamental importance of strong accountability mechanisms, as partnerships can be 
successful only if voice options and accountability mechanisms are functional so as to to 
avoid the pitfalls of partnership; this also holds true for contracting. The approach must 
also comprise the promotion and strengthening of NGOs and civil society in order for 
them to play a central role in ensuring accountability.
The positive and encouraging action research experiences of promoting 
interorganisational co-operation and the establishment of the NGO Forum in Kamuli
364 The field of institutional development of local government has only begun to emerge in the 
development literature since the late 1980s (Montiel 1997: v).
365 As a matter of fact, the promotion of interaction entails per se (re-)shaping the relationships (cf. 
Hanf/O'Toole 1992: 170).
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indicate the potential of such an approach (cf. Annex 1.6 for the proceedings). The NGO 
meetings led to improvements in the interaction culture among them. Similarly, there 
was an increase in resource sharing and pooling (transport sharing, borrowing office 
equipment, exchange of educational material, etc.) among them. Altogether, these were 
low-profile improvements at a small scale. Nonetheless, this was a crucial starting point, 
as it reduced mistrust and envy and created a basis for speaking univocally and acting 
collectively.
Moreover, the existence of the Forum meant that the administration had to take the 
NGOs more seriously. The NGOs asked for the appropriate recognition as gap-fillers and 
complementary service providers. The interaction culture began to change as NGOs 
started to actively shape their relations with the public sector. As a result of the NGOs' 
advocacy, two NGO representatives were allowed to attend the District Management 
Team meetings, and the NGOs were also invited to the Sectoral Committee meetings366 
and in the District Council, although the latter is open to the public anyway. The NGOs' 
behaviour and tone has changed from the previous one of caution to one of being more 
aware and confident of their importance. Likewise, collectively, NGOs have been less 
afraid of addressing their problems and views to the administration. These are critical 
steps in taking on some of the roles of civil society (cf. Mathauer 1998,2000).
Specific policy recommendations
Only in addressing those two main issues in combination -  local accountability and 
conducive interorganisational relations -  can more specific reform measures be pursued 
in order to avoid their being captured and subverted by individual self-interest and 
perverse incentives.
One crucial reform is reducing the prevailing rent-seeking options of government 
health workers. As McPake et al. argue, "there is no option to 'unlearn' the strategies they 
have devised" (1999: 864). As long as the large consumer surplus and the much better 
income opportunities in the private sector exist, it must be clearly acknowledged that 
from the point of view of health workers, the balance between incentives/rights and 
obligations is not satisfactory. Nevertheless, the prevailing patterns (diverting staff time 
for private practice, drug leakage and staff misbehaviour) could be considerably
366 However, some of the NGO envoys did not attend the meetings, presumably because they would not 
receive a sitting allowance.
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diminished if there was more supervision and pressure upon health workers to ensure 
staff attendance and responsible behaviour and if the health workers received at least the 
officially agreed upon salaries. At the same time, health workers’ private practices should 
be more openly acknowledged, while staff attendance during core duty hours needs to be 
strictly enforced. Moreover, a new work culture must be introduced, especially among 
the young health workers, that expects health workers to behave appropriately (cf. 
Asiimwe et al. 1997b). Likewise, a clear and rewarding performance system, training 
opportunities and a supportive supervision scheme are required to strengthen 
professional values and to make staff feel valued again (cf. Mackintosh/Tibandebage 
2000: 18).
In addition to the attempt at introducing and strengthening a work culture that 
promotes process quality, it is vital to address clinical quality of care by supervising 
health units more closely in order to implement the national treatment guidelines. This 
support supervision should include educating health workers, drugshop attendants and 
communities on the rational use of drugs, since intervention studies have shown that 
appropriate awareness can considerably enhance the rational use of drugs (Le Grand et 
al. 1999).
All these efforts should equally contribute to increasing access for those unable to 
pay and hence make health care more redistributive. In addition to lowering cost by 
reducing the degree of polypharmacy, and apart from a new consensus that puts equity 
high on the agenda, a range of specific measures should be pursued. These include a 
rigorous implementation of exemption, a shift from user fees for registration to user 
charges for drugs and the officialisation of informal charges (cf. Chapter 6). Ultimately, 
however, further thinking as to how to implement prepayment and community-based 
financing schemes beyond mere community involvement in user charge management is 
required. Although the prevailing conditions for introducing a social insurance system 
are less favourable than in other neighbouring countries (cf. Griffin/Shaw 1995), there 
are some prepayment pilot projects in Uganda. These call for further analysis to examine 
their replicability and options for upscaling.
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9.4. From Institutionalised Pathologies to Healing Organisations
In sum, we have seen that the health care system, and particularly the public sector, 
suffers from many pathologies and that these are, in part, strongly institutionalised, in 
that informal institutions determine the logic of the system's functioning. Many of these 
pathologies are legacies from previous decades, but this is not to say that these 
pathologies cannot be rectified. In comparison to what the health care system looked like 
after the NRM took over, the past years have clearly constituted a substantial recovery 
process for the various types of organisations to be healed; for example in terms of drug 
supply management, staffing and salary payments, the introduction of formal 
accountability mechanisms (even though not yet functional) and increased financial 
responsibility.
While the system is performing badly, it is clearly no longer as appalling as it was 
in the 1970s and 1980s, when no care at all was better than the care that was delivered. 
Today, clinical quality of care was found to be low at all provider types but, nonetheless, 
the organisations are overall somehow healing and curing people. In fact, this may be the 
case exactly because of some of the existent institutionalised pathologies, namely the 
incentives that foster the high extent of polypharmacy and the overuse of antibiotics in 
order to cover for insecurity in diagnosing. (This has, however, severe consequences 
both on the system-level as regards drug resistance and on the efficient utilisation of 
resources.)
There is potential for organisations to be healed themselves and to heal. In fact the 
move to this stage, i.e., organisations to be healed and healing, would accelerate, once 
the crucial institutional bottlenecks are addressed. The state's capacity as a service 
producer and also as a regulator and enabler must be strengthened if the health care 
system wants to benefit from institutional pluralism and a private and voluntary sector 
expansion. This notwithstanding, I argue that the potential of local government has not 
yet been tapped sufficiently both as a service producer and a provider in charge of 
regulation, enabling, contracting and other forms of governance. Before laying down the 
public sector as a service producer, we should attempt to rectify some of the institutional 
pathologies and heal the local government. As was outlined above, the critical reform is 
to establish effective accountability mechanisms, to reset the civil servants' incentives for
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partnerships and to introduce a conducive interaction culture and structure in order to 
take advantage of the potentials of partnerships and to avoid their pitfalls. So, once the 
right incentives are provided, the public sector as well as the other provider types can 
potentially perform much better. In fact, these reforms also encourage the installation of 
some of the preconditions for the formal institutions to function. This would allow to 
break up the vicious circle of weak formal institutions that contribute to persistent 
deprivation and hence to the inability of developing and setting up some of the 
preconditions for institutional pluralism to function. The action research results showed 
that this is a feasible undertaking if capacity programs actually do go down to the 
community level. It also demonstrates, however, that external actors and donors may be 
required to trigger such processes at the local level.
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Annex 1: Further Methodological Issues
Research Design. Data Collection Methods and Sample Selection
Chapter 1.4 has outlined the research design in its broad features. This Annex discusses 
the methodological and technical proceedings, the sampling, and the difficulties 
encountered as well as reliability and validity concerns in further detail.
1. Selection of the Research Location
Kamuli District was chosen, since the German Development Service (DED), under 
whose auspices the action research project was undertaken, had been operating in 
Kamuli District for several years. The DED helped establish the contact with a local 
NGO, the Kamuli District Women Development Association (KADIWODA), which 
provided access to communities and community groups. Furthermore, the DED's support 
of the District health services facilitated the access to government health care providers 
and also allowed me to benefit from the expertise of and collaboration with DED health 
professionals, particularly as regards clinical aspects.
2. Interpreters and Facilitators
From the beginning, I had decided to work with interpreters, because my previous 
experience in learning Kiswahili had made me realise that I would be unable to reach a 
mastery of the language sufficient of conducing focus group discussions and interviews 
on my own within a few months' time. I therefore decided to take some language training 
in Lusoga, the language spoken in the kingdom of Busoga, to which Kamuli District 
belongs, in order to be able to broadly follow conversations. Research assistants played 
an important role by acting as simultaneous translators for interviews (household, exit, 
and other), where necessary, but also as facilitators during the focus group discussions 
with communities.
Even though a language barrier creates the potential losses of information, the 
involvement of research assistants had also many advantages. They helped me in finding 
the right terms for complex concepts, such as accountability. Moreover, their cultural
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familiarity allowed me to get access to people, i.e., to make them comfortable feel in 
talking to us and airing their views. Even if I had commanded the language, I would not 
have been able to interact so closely with the people as I did through the help of the 
research assistants.
For the action research, I worked with six facilitators. They were all Basoga and 
grew up in Kamuli District. Four of them had very long work experience in community 
development in Kamuli District; the other two were social scientists who had recently 
graduated. The facilitators were trained for 20 days on the rationale of the action 
research, and on interviewing, facilitation and recording skills, as well as the discussion 
of the thematic aspects. Continuous review and monitoring sessions were carried out 
(practising facilitation and interviewing).
3. Focus Group Discussions
One of the research methods used in the communities was the focus group discussion. A 
focus group discussion is a qualitative research technique involving a group of people 
brought together to discuss a particular topic. This discussion is led by a "moderator" 
who keeps the participants "focused" on that topic (Frey/Fontana 1993: 29). The decisive 
element distinguishing focus groups from one-to-one interviews is the presence of group 
interaction. Thus, in addition to the respondent-interviewer relationship, group 
interviewing takes advantage of this group interaction and dynamic, which provides a 
stimulus to elaboration and expression and which thus produces new and additional data 
(ibid.: 32). This was particularly the case for the rather abstract and complex nature of 
the research topics investigated, such as decentralisation, accountability, transparency 
and provider choice. Also, it seemed that some women felt more comfortable in 
elaborating on a topic if other group members had already discussed it. That said, even 
though they often had to be explicitly encouraged to give their view, the women did not 
simply repeat what had been said, but also expressed different perceptions.
A great advantage of the focus group is that the interaction and non-verbal actions 
of the participants can tell us a great deal about the underlying social relations and the 
social context that exist beyond the group (Morgan/Krueger 1993: 32). Focus groups can 
also generate new ideas outside the actual research aspects. Above all, they can give
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insight into shared cultural understandings (Crabtree et al. 1993: 143). For example, the 
sitting arrangements and who talks and who does not (unless not explicitly encouraged 
and asked by the facilitator) provided insights into the different degrees and the gendered 
nature of access to and participating in the public sphere (for the question about what 
sort of people actually came to the meetings, see below). Furthermore, by means of the 
focus group discussions, insights could be gained into how people perceive their efforts 
and problems as regards collective action and self-help.
The focus group technique generates a good degree of external validity, because 
focus groups constitute a more natural setting. This point, however, equally endangers 
validity. Communication in a focus group is a social process, in that opinions and 
respondents’ behaviour are shaped by compliance, conformity or social desirability, and 
identification or internalisation (Morgan/Krueger 1993). Group responses can be 
influenced by the group members' view of the interview purpose, the size of the group or 
the role of the interviewer in the group, face-politeness and low levels of trust. It was 
therefore crucial to clearly state what the intentions of this research were.
Chairpersons of NGO groups, Executive Committee members of the LC 1, and 
other local elites (schoolteachers, for example) dominated the discussions. In response, 
the facilitators constantly encouraged the more silent people to talk about their 
experience. Usually, these people seemed a little bit more cautious about what they were 
saying. Yet across the zones, similar responses with the same delicate content came up, 
whether dominant or more silent persons had spoken first on that particular issue. The 
fact that people also expressed different views on some topics gives me confidence that 
the above influences were rather minimal. Nevertheless, not all statements can be taken 
as face value; the interpretation has to be related to the context in which the statements 
were made. Hence, after each focus group discussion, the research team went through 
the notes and discussed the issues that had pricked our concern. However, it seemed that 
people took the chance to talk about their problems. They appreciated it that somebody 
came to them and listened to their problems.
Focus group discussions should be held with homogenous groups (Morgan/Krueger 
1993: 12). This was guaranteed to the extent that women, men and youth from one
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village were met separately.367 The unit of analysis was the group, with the results (i.e., 
the data) constituting the shared understanding of groups (cf. Crabtree et al. 1993: 144), 
but this does not necessarily mean that there was only one opinion.
4. Action Research
Action research is a research process that involves the communities in analysing the 
"research problem". A solution-finding process follows the joint problem analysis, so 
that participants can make use of the generated information and to rectify some of the 
analysed problems. People are subjects and owners of the research; action research is 
therefore more likely to guarantee people's willingness to participate. This, in return, 
makes discussants more comfortable in talking about delicate issue, and thus may 
provide more insight than the conventional empirical-analytical research method. Action 
research is empowering by virtue of the fact that it provides people the chance to develop 
problem-solving capacities. Instead of extracting data from a community, action research 
ideally leaves the data within the community for their own use (Fals-Borda 1987).
The related data collection method of action research is the focus group discussion. 
The ultimate objective of this is to trigger collective action, which is facilitated through a 
group-based problem analysis. Chambers argues that group discussions rather create the 
atmosphere for "collective and creative enthusiasm" being a crucial element for action 
(research) (1994: 1263). The back and forth bouncing of opinions and statements during 
group discussion contributes to making people aware of things they may not have 
thought about before and allows them to exchange experiences. Focus groups are a 
means to provide information not only by the researcher, but also by the group itself 
(Morgan/Krueger 1993: 17). Finally, focus group meetings and communication 
correspond to a more natural setting in contrast to the rather artificial one-to one- 
interviews. It is mainly the social group in which opinions are formed and problems 
about community issues discussed and solved.
367 The focus group discussions during 1999 were held with mixed groups due to time and resource 
constraints.
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The action research process
During the 1997 and 1998 research phase, one research focus was on local government 
issues, administrative culture and service delivery (public, private, NGO, and 
community-based), health care being the main focus. 15 communities (LCls) took part 
in the action research. They were located in four Parishes (two in Subcounties A and B, 
respectively, which are within the same County). The locations were chosen in 
agreement with local councillors and KADIWODA representatives, based on the 
following criteria: (1) a Subcounty within feasible reach and medium travel distance to 
Kamuli town (20-25 km) given the costs and time constraints; (2) presence of a 
KADIWODA women group and/or other NGO target groups operating in the zone; (3) 
interested and co-operative communities; and (4) adjacent LCls for joint community 
action. In each of the zones, focus group discussions were carried out with the LC1 
Executive Committee, and a group of men, women and youth respectively.368
The moderated discussions, using key questionnaires, focused on the service 
provision deficiencies of the different providers as people encountered them, whether 
and how people were involved in the decision-making of the service provision, how the 
degree of decision-making involvement affected the service provision quality, etc. The 
community discussions also served to identify people's preferences as regards the service 
provider types, whereby a particular focus was placed on health care. These preferences 
constitute a core component in the definition process of relative strengths (comp. 
Chapters 2.4 and 4.5.4).
The men, women and youth groups were attended by 15-25 people, with a mean of 
20. It was not possible or desirable to dictate the exact number of people in each group. 
Reflecting on the scope of the focus group discussions, the research team assumed that 
the people in attendance were those who also usually came to LC meetings, namely the 
"better-ofF', the active community members, and "those who had time" (as the group 
discussants said themselves), while the poorest were much less likely to come.369 One 
research assistant facilitated the groups, and another took notes or translated for me. In 
order to avoid biases, we refrained from tape recording. A few days after these group
368 The youth (young unmarried adults) constitute a social group on their own within the LC system.
369 Yach points out that local status hierarchies cause a certain degree of self-selection, which leads to 
groups comprising higher status members (1992: 607).
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meetings, all the groups were invited to come together for a joint discussion and 
reflection process on possible solutions to the previously identified problems. Eight 
communities that had shown great interest and self-initiative in the action research were 
then selected and revisited two to three times to follow up on their solution finding 
process and implementation activities.
Problems encountered
While it was planned to conduct three separate meetings with men, women and youth (a 
total of 45 FGDs), this schedule could not be realised in all 15 communities. A large 
number of meetings had to be rescheduled because of rain,371 burials or poor 
mobilisation (particularly of the youth groups). Because of costs and time constraints, 
the youth group discussions then often had to be left out or it was combined with the 
men's groups. A total of 37 FGDs with communities and 15 FGDs with LC1 Executive 
Committee members were thus realised.
Sometimes, in the course of discussing a particular issue, people became quite angry 
and grumbled about the "government". People started recounting similar incidents and 
became very repetitive. In order not to lose the group dynamics, we felt that it was 
necessary to allow the discussion to continue along these lines before getting back to the 
key questionnaire, and thus some other questions had to be left out.
Additional focus group discussions were carried out with 16 member groups from 
ten NGOs (see Annex 2 for a list of the groups) to extend on the above research issues. 
On the basis of discussions with the NGO staff, an active, well co-operating group and, 
where a second group was met, a less active group for each NGO were chosen in the 
same two Subcounties. These focus groups gathered 18 group members on average 
(ranging from 8-30).
In order to deepen the analysis on people's views and their assessment of health care 
services, 12 focus group discussions were carried out in the same catchment areas where
370 For reasons of scope, the action research activities and results are not reported here (cf. Mathauer 1997, 
1998).
371 The focus group discussion phase had been scheduled for the dry season, but the seasons had changed, 
so that the scheduled phase fell in the rainy season.
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the household interviews took place (see below). The chairpersons of the respective 
zones were asked to gather about 15 women and men who were active village residents.
5. Qualitative Interviews Based on Key Questionnaires
The above research issues were further followed up by interviews based on key 
questionnaires with LC2, LC3 and LC5 Executive Committee members, Parish and 
Subcounty Chiefs, Subcounty Accountants, the Chief Administrative Officer and the 
Deputy, the Chief Financial Officer and Deputy, the heads of the service departments 
(health, education, agriculture, community development, water), seven section heads of 
the DMO, health assistants, community-based service officers, and agricultural extension 
officers. An additional gender perspective on the above issues was collected through 
interviews and focus group discussions with women leaders, namely Secretaries for 
Women at the LC1, LC2, LC3 and LC5 levels, Women Council chairpersons and 
KADIWODA Subcounty representatives.
To collect data on the health care providers' performance, individual interviews 
(with some exceptions) were carried out with at least two health workers at each of the 
selected health care providers, except at drugshops, where one interview only was 
carried out at some places. Further information on health care planning and facility 
management was collected by interviewing Health Unit Management Committee 
members, Secretaries for Health at the Subcounty and District level, Chairpersons of 
Subcounty Health Committees and the District Health Committee, as well as supervisors, 
namely staff of the District Medical Office and the Assistant Drug Inspector, as well as 
NGO Headquarter staff. These interviews usually lasted about one hour, or longer, if the 
respondents were interested and willing (see Annex 2 for a list of interviews).
District top officials would sometimes attempt to hide information that could put 
them in a bad light, but two senior officials in the Finance Department had a strong 
interest in telling me about the intra-administrative happenings and served as valuable 
key informants. Furthermore, one former civil servant was especially willing to reveal 
insider information. Lower (Subcounty) civil servants were sometimes afraid of making 
negative statements about the District leadership, but the re-emphasis on my
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confidentiality and my interest in identifying the problems that lower civil servants had 
to deal with as well as my follow-up visits, which established a trusting relationship, 
helped to overcome their hesitation.
6. Network Analysis
For the network analysis of interorganisational relationships, action research-oriented 
discussions (using key questionnaires) were held individually with NGO staff and civil 
servants during 1997 and 1998.372 The network analysis comprised the heads and 
Subcounty civil servants of the District departments of health, education, agriculture and 
community development as well as 20 NGOs, that is, all Ugandan NGOs operating in 
Kamuli District with an office in Kamuli Town373 (see Table 4.7 for their activities). The 
rationale behind including other non-health related organisations was to get the full 
spectrum of interactions, which do not only take place within health care but also across 
other fields. Thus, the analysis will not suffer from being dislocated from its context.
The individual discussions with NGO staff and civil servants revealed a great need 
and demand for greater communication and networking, so that we -  the KADIWODA 
executive committee and myself (under the auspices of DED) -  organised and moderated 
six workshops during a period of three months. The first three workshops were tailored 
for the NGOs, while the departments joined thereafter. These meetings aimed to initiate 
a joint discussion on the interaction problems between the administration and the NGOs, 
followed by a discussion of solutions. This solution finding process was further pursued 
in three working groups on AIDS/health, women and agriculture that took place 
fortnightly.374 One of the results of this action research process was the establishment of 
a District NGO forum in 1998.
372 With most, two formal interviews/discussions were carried out, one in 1997, the other in 1998. More 
informal talks took place in 1999.
373 1 have come across only two NGOs that are not based in Kamuli town. The focus was on NGOs based 
in Kamuli Town, since interaction is more likely to occur where there is physical proximity. Moreover, 
District authorities (and not Subcounty authorities) are the main state actors that shape interorganisational 
interactions by distributing and allocating resources and exerting power. In contrast, the scope of NGO- 
Subcounty relationships is still very limited, and only a full coverage of all Subcounties, which was 
impeded by time and cost constraints, would have generated sufficient data material for a substantial 
analysis.
374 Some District civil servants attended these meetings.
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Another series of interviews and informal talks with the NGOs and DMO staff was 
held during 1999. To assess the progress and the ways forward, a review workshop was 
facilitated. My attendance and participation at another two forum meetings in 1999 
provided further opportunities to study the relationships between the local administration 
and the NGOs.
7. Exit Interviews
For the comparative performance analysis of health care providers, the patients' (or their 
attendants') views were gathered by 146 exit interviews at the providers of the core 
sample.375 As some providers have very low daily utilisation rates, the desired number of 
10 exit interviews per provider could not be fulfilled within the scheduled sessions, 
which explains the odd number of 146 (see Annex 4 for the distribution of exit 
interviews).
The exit interviews lasted approximately 20 minutes each (up to 30 minutes), and 
took place between nine o'clock in the morning and one o'clock in the afternoon. When 
patients and attendants walked out, they were told the purpose of the study and asked 
whether they were willing to participate.376 We did not ask individuals who, from our lay 
perspective, seemed to be severely ill patients who were suffering pain and were taken 
home quickly. Thus, the most severe cases may be underrepresented. At the drugshops, 
customers were excluded when they only came to buy some drugs for home storage. 
Instead, the focus was on those patients or customers who had a patient at home. In 
many instances, it was the attendant of a patient who answered the questions.
Exit interview respondents were classified into three socio-economic groups 
(ultrapoor, medium and "better-off'377) by using a range of indicators: clothing and 
shoes, schooling, occupation of the patient and spouse, means of transport used to reach 
the clinic, other "features" (such as a watch, the type of handbag, jewellery, glasses, 
hairdressing) and general appearance, both of the patient and the attendant.
375 This was preceded by a pre-testing phase.
376 The refusal rate was less than 5%. Reasons given for refusal were other urgent business to do or the 
severity of the patient's illness.
377 Cf. Chapter 1.4 for the same qualifications to be made on this term and the categorisation process.
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8. Household Interviews
Given the strong research interest in understanding how and whether the very poor 
access health services, the target was to identify at least 50 percent of household 
respondents who belonged to the poorest section. The original plan aimed for a random 
sampling process using the LC tax register, but it was found that almost every household 
was classified into the lowest graduated tax rate, while those exempted were not in the 
list. Thus, the tax register was not useful for a random sampling process.
The next attempt was to ask the LC1 chairperson to provide the names of the 
poorest households in the zone, taking into account income, number of children not 
attending school378, the housing type and state (roof and walls), the size of the land 
owned and female-headed households.379 The search for these pre-selected households 
proved to be very difficult given the scattered settlement structures in rural Uganda, 
while directly asking for a specific individual raised too much attention and made the 
respondent suspicious. Ultimately, it was found that the households that had been 
selected by the LC1 chairperson did not seem to be part of the poorest section. The 
chairperson may have suggested names of friends or relatives, hoping that our visit 
would produce direct benefits for him or them. Presumably, this would also be the case 
when asking other key informants, such as village elders, school headmasters or 
religious leaders, to select poor households. Therefore, it was decided to select the 
respondents ourselves; following the methodology that was discussed in Chapter 1.4, 9- 
10 household interviews were undertaken in the 12 areas chosen.
The households were classified into two categories -  the poorest and the "better-off' 
(i.e. less poor) -  by means of an index of inhabitants' assets and wealth, as listed in 
Chapter 1.4. Household interviews were conducted in the afternoon, when people would 
no longer be working in their gardens. The interviews lasted about 60 to 75 minutes. 
There was sufficient room left at the end of each interview to provide the respondent
378 With the introduction of Universal Primary Education, by which parents do not have to pay school fees 
for up to four children, they have been strongly encouraged to send their children to primary school. While 
UPE reduced the financial burden, parents still have to pay an average of USh 7,000 for uniforms, books, 
feeding etc. (cf. Azfar et al. 2000). Consequently, the primary school rate is not 100% (Deininger 2001). 
Thus, the number of children not going to school is a valid indicator of the household's socio-economic 
situation.
379 Cf. Smith/Sander (1987) for Kenya, who asked local leaders to identify their respondents.
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with the opportunity to raise other issues as he or she wished. This allowed us to get a 
sense of the more general problems and concerns that people had. Interviewees were 
asked to recall events within the previous two months. This period is considerably long 
and therefore subject to unintentional extension or shortening by the respondent. Further, 
remembering specific facts may be difficult over that period. However, any recall period 
beyond two weeks is endangered by recalling mistakes and inaccuracies. It is for these 
reasons that the exit interviews gained relevance for triangulation purposes.380 That said, 
the chosen period meant that a reasonable amount of health care seeking events could be 
gathered and discussed. Related to this, a longer recall period increases people's 
representativeness in judging performance (Mathiowetz 2000).
9. Other Data Collection Methods
Another important way of examining the health care providers' performance was a 
"healthy patient test". A healthy Ugandan aged 25 was instructed to visit all urban 
facilities (government, private, NGO clinics and the hospital OPD) within two days and 
to pretend to suffer from the same diffuse combination of symptoms. These records 
illuminated the examination procedures, staff behaviour, the diverse range of diagnosis 
and the different prescribed treatment options for the patient's symptoms, and so forth.
The drugshop observation study provided further insights into the transactions that 
were taking place. Most of the drugshop attendants or owners were co-operative and 
quite open about the drugs they were selling, but two drugshop sellers kept some of their 
drugs (those they are not supposed to sell) behind the counter, so that it was impossible 
to get information about all types of drugs sold.
During my research, five DED health professionals (doctors, nurses and midwives) 
were working in Kamuli. We usually met at least once a week on an informal basis and 
to talk about the daily experiences in the hospital and the government clinics or related 
clinical and organisational matters of health care. Their anecdotes and the discussions 
allowed me to gather many small facts and also eventually extended my lay medical 
understanding, thus increasing my awareness and attention during observation. I could
380 However, a number of research findings suggest little to no difference in the quality of retrospective 
recall as a function of the length of the recall period (Mathiowetz 2000).
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always come back and consult with them on medical-clinical aspects that I had observed. 
Ultimately, their observations provided many further insights into what was going on, 
while I could simultaneously get an understanding of the DED health professionals' 
framework, namely how they perceived "their" reality, which allowed me to assess their 
statements.
Apart from the formal interview situations, numerous informal conversations with 
the research assistants, who became crucial as valuable key informants as well as with 
other acquaintances (mainly NGO staff) provided important insights.
Finally, an important data collection method was observation at council meetings, at 
electoral meetings preceding the local government elections, at the District 
Administrative Headquarter and the District Medical Office, where the time spent 
waiting to interview officials afforded me the chance to observe first hand how citizens 
and lower-level civil servants of rural areas were treated. Likewise, as the KADIWODA 
office is located in one of the district administration headquarters (Department of 
Education, Community Development and Labour), the work with the research assistants 
there provided numerous opportunities to observe what was going on there.
10. Reliability and Validity
Patient records at all three provider types provided information on the patient numbers, 
user charges, diseases and diagnoses, and treatment. It is known that government health 
staff forge health unit records by recording ghost patients in order to record drug 
dispensing, while the drugs are actually channeled into private pockets (McPake et al. 
1999). Any government records therefore must be treated with caution. However, 
observation allowed us to get a realistic view for example of utilisation rates. Given a 
different incentive structure and tighter control (see Chapters 7 and 8), it was found that 
the number of patients at NGOs and private clinics are usually reliably recorded.
The reliability of the focus group discussion results is assumed to be high given the 
"investigator triangulation" (Burgess 1984: 143), in that different teams of research 
assistants consistently found the same patterns. Likewise, as these patterns corresponded 
to my observations, the interview data and the focus group discussions results of the 
1997 DED evaluation, which had some overlapping questions, I am confident of the
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FGD data validity. One incident in a village was particularly indicative of this. When a 
government extension officer showed up during a focus group discussion, the 
respondents' behaviour suddenly changed and they started giving us answers that were 
the opposite of what they had said a minute before his arrival. In general, both in FGDs 
and during household interviews, people expressed their dissatisfactions very strongly.
Various forms of triangulation ensured or at least increased the reliability of the key 
questionnaire interviews. One was, as said, the use of different data collection methods 
(interviews, reports, focus group discussions and observation). Another form was what is 
called "person triangulation" (Burgess 1984) by talking to a large number of different 
persons at different levels and in different settings. Household and exit interviews are 
equally subject to verification and validity concerns because of people's own "truth" and 
recalling mistakes. Again, triangulation with other sources (observation, patient records, 
interviews with key informants, etc.) and "investigator triangulation" (Burgess 1991: 
143) is therefore key to identifying possible distortions.
Construct validity (i.e., the researcher actually measures what he or she claims to 
measure) was enhanced by using similar questions in consequence and several indicators 
to measure the same phenomenon. The validity of data can suffer from a number of 
factors that influence the data collection. One severe one was the fact that my being 
white and often associated with the DED raised expectations for technical or financial 
support among communities as well as health professionals. I therefore made it clear 
from the beginning that I had no funds to bring, but that I was strongly interested in the 
problems of health care provision. On the other hand, for Ugandans, I appeared to be in 
the early twenties, so that it was easy to believe what I was saying, which gives me 
confidence that social desirability responses could be reduced to a minimum.
While my being an outsider surely made some people cautious in what they were 
telling me, as one does not like to tell visitors "bad things", most people appreciated it 
that somebody from outside sat down on a mat and came to listen to their concerns and 
grievances in order to hopefully forward them to a higher level.
361
11. Household and exit respondent distribution
Household Survey
Table 1: Distribution of poor vs. better-off respondents
Poor Better-off Total
Rural area 35 40 75
Urban area 25 12 37
Total 60 52 112
Table 2: Distribution: Female and male respondents
Female Male Both Total
Rural 37 28 10 75
Urban 19 18 0 36
Total 56 46 10 112
Exit Interview Survey
Table 3: Distribution of poor vs. better-off patients
Poor Medium Better-off Coding gap Total
Women 13 31 11 55
Men 6 10 2 18
Child/children 23 25 15 10 73
Total 42 66 28 10 146
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Annex II
List of Interviews and Focus Group Discussions
Interviews at the National Level
Organisation Position Location Date
AMREF - Program Manager Kampala 4 June 1999
AVSI - Director Kampala 21 April 1999
Decentralisation 
Secretariat / MoLG
- Planning Officer Kampala 9 February 1998
Decentralisation 
Secretariat / MoLG
- Senior Official Kampala 9 April 1998
DENIVA - Program Manager Kampala 17 October 1997
GTZ - Health Coordinator Kampala 23 April 1999
MFEP - Director of Aid 
Coordination
Kampala 7 April 1998
Ministry of 
Agriculture
- Senior Officials Kampala 6 April 1998
Ministry of Health - Planning Unit, 
expatriate
Entebbe 9 February 1998
Ministry of Health - Planning Unit Entebbe 8 April 1998
Ministry of Health, - Officer in charge of 
DHSP
Kampala 3 September 1999
National Drug 
Authority
- Senior Drug Inspector Kampala 4 June 1999
National NGO Forum - Coordinator Kampala 24 April 1998
Red Cross - Program Manager for 
Health
Kampala 3 September 1999
UCBHCA - Program Manager Kampala 2 September 1999
UCMB - General Secretary Kampala 26 April 1999
UMDPC - Registrar Kampala 18 June 1999
UPMB - General Secretary Kampala 22 April 1999 
6 September 1999
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Interviews with the District Medical Office
Position Location Date
Assistant Drug Inspector Kamuli 20 May 1999
District Medical Officer Kamuli 23 September 1997
District Medical Officer, 
Deputy
Kamuli 17 February 1998
District Director of 
Health Services
Kamuli 17 June 1999 
9 July 1999
District Health Educator Kamuli 9 September 1997
District Health Educator 
Assistant
Kamuli 31 March 1998
District Health Inspector Kamuli 31 March 1998 
3 May 1999
District Health Visitor Kamuli 23 September 1997 
30 March 1998 
3 May 1999
District Nursing Officer Kamuli 24 September 1997
Senior Health Assistant
Subcounty A
Subcounty A 3 October 1997
Health Assistant
Subcounty B
Subcounty B 6 October 1997
Health Assistant
Subcounty surrounding 
Kamuli town
Kamuli Town 9 July 1999
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Interviews with Hea th Professionals
Facility Type Qualification of 
Interviewee
Location Date
Urban government 
uG-1
- Medical Assistant, I/C
- Registered Nurse
- Nursing Aid
Kamuli 17 August 1999 
12 August 1999 
12 August 1999
Rural government 
clinic, rG-2
- 2 Nursing Officers
- Nursing Officer
Subcounty A 31 May 1999 
13 August 1999
Rural government
clinic,
uG-3
- Medical Assistant, I/C
- Senior Nurse
- Midwife
- 2 Senior Nursing Aids
Subcounty C 28 July 1999
29 July 1999 
26 July 1999 
29 July 1999 
29 July 1999
Rural NGO clinic 
rN-1
- Nursing Aid
- Midwife
Subcounty B 13 May 1999 
15 May 1999
Rural NGO clinic 
rN-2
- Midwife
- Nursing Aid
Subcounty B 7 May 1999 
26 May 1999
Rural NGO clinic 
rN-3
- Nurse-midwife, I/C
- Midwife
Subcounty C 27 July 1999 
26 July 1999
Rural NGO clinic 
rN-4
- Nursing Aid Subcounty B 21 May 1999
Rural NGO clinic 
rN-5
- Nursing Aid Subcounty C 29 July 1999
Urban NGO clinic 
UN-1
- Medical Assistant
- Nurse
Kamuli 10 August 1999 
10 August 1999
Urban NGO clinic 
UN-2
Medical Assistant
- Medical Assistant
- Nurse
- Nurse-Midwife
Kamuli 9 August 1999 
9 August 1999 
13 August 1999
Mission Hospital -Medical Superintendent 
-Medical Superintendent
- Hospital Administrator
- Bursar
- Nurse (Registration)
- Nurse
- Nurse
- Pharmacist
Kamuli 13 January 1998
25 May 1999 
28 May 1999
7 June 1999 (short talk)
17 June 1999 
22 August 1999
8 July 1999
24 August 1999
18 August 1999
26 August 1999
27 August 1999 
18 August 1999
Rural private clinic 1 - Medical Assistant Subcounty A 9 June 1999
Rural private clinic 2 - Dispenser Subcounty C 14 August 1999
Private clinic A** - Medical Assistant and 
Nurse
- Nursing aids (informal 
talk)
Kamuli 24 August 1999
25 August 1999
Private clinic B - Medical Assistant
- Laboratory Assistant
- Nurse (informal talk)
Kamuli 23 June 1999 
23 June 1999 
23 June 1999
Private clinic C - Doctor
- Nursing Aid
- Midwife
Kamuli 24 June 1999 
7 August 199 
7 August 1999
Private clinic D - Doctor
- Nurse
- Senior Nurse
Kamuli 6 August 1999 
6 August 1999 
9 August 1999
** For anonymity reasons, the A-B-C-D names do not correspond to the P-l, P-2, P-3, P-4 codes.
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Interviews with Drugs iiops Attendants
Drugshop Qualification Owner of Drugshop Location Date
Drugshop 1 - Nurse Business person Kamuli 26 August 1999
Drugshop 2 - Dispenser
- Nursing Aid
- Nursing Aid
Lab assistant Subcounty A 1 June 1999 
24 June 1999 
10 July 1999**
Drugshop 3 - Med. Assistant, Nursing 
Aid
- Nursing Aid
Medical Assistant Subcounty A 3 June 1999 
10 July 1999 **
Drugshop 4 - Trained on the job
- Nurse
Nurse * Subcounty A 1 June 1999 
10 July 1999**
Drugshop 5 - Nurse Nurse Subcounty A 3 June 1999
Drugshop 6 - Nursing Aid Health Assistant Subcounty A 10 July 1999 **
Drugshop 7 - Trained on the job Nurse Subcounty B 16 May 1999
Drugshop 8 - Midwife Midwife Subcounty B 7 May 1999 
(short talk)
Drugshop 9 - Trained on the job Business person Subcounty B 7 May 1999 
14 May 1999
Drugshop 10 - Trained on the job Laboratory assistant Subcounty B 21 May 1999
Drugshop 11 - Trained on the job Business person Subcounty
Naminage
7 May 1999 
(short talk)
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cont.
Drugshop Qualification Owner of Drugshop Location Date
Drugshop 12 - Traditional Birth 
Attendant
Business person Subcounty B 
Naminage
7 May 1999
Drugshop 13 - Nursing Aid Nurse Subcounty B 7 May 1999
Drugshop 14 - Nursing Aid Nurse Subcounty C 26 July 1999
Drugshop 15 - Trained on the job Business person Subcounty C 28 July 1999
Drugshop 16 - Trained on the job Business person Subcounty C 14 August 1999
** These interviews were carried out by Patrick Mwigo
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Interviews with Non-government Supervisors
Facility Affiliation Position Location Date
Jinja Diocese - Health Coordinator Jinja 7 June 1999
Busoga Diocese, - Program Manager for 
Health
Jinja 1 October 1997 
10 February 1998 
19 June 1999
Busoga Diocese - Zonal Manager 
(Supervisor)
Kamuli 19 August 1999
Busoga Diocese - Zonal Manager 
(Supervisor)
Kamuli 19 August 1999
Busoga Diocese - Supervisor Kamuli 19 August 1999
Fellowship,
Jinja Headquarter
- Manager Jinja 15 July 1999
Interviews with Members of HUMCs and Health Subcounty Committees
Position Location Date
Subcounty Health 
Committee A
Chairperson
Subcounty A 16 June 1999
Subcounty Health 
Committee B
Chairperson
Subcounty B 21 May 1999
Subcounty Health 
Committee C
Chairperson
Subcounty C 30 July 1999
HUMC, rG-2 Chairperson 
and Vice
Subcounty A 31 May 1999
HUMC, rN-1
Treasurer
Subcounty B 14 May 1999
HUMC, rN-2
Zonal Representative
Treasurer
LC1 Chairperson
Subcounty B
26 May 1999 
29 May 1999 
29 May 1999
HUMC, rN-4
Treasurer
Subcounty B 22 May 1999
HUMC, rG-3 Chairperson 
LC1 Chairperson
Subcounty C
30 July 1999
31 July 1999
HUMC,rN-3
Vice Chairperson
Subcounty C 29 July 1999
Hospital Board of 
Governors
member
Kamuli 13 January 1998 
6 March 1998
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Interviews with Staff of PPHC NGO in Kamuli1
NGO
' : : V . :
*1
3 § s o 3 Location Da.e
AEGY - Program Coordinator
- Program Coordinator
- Program Coordinator
Kamuli 13 September 1997 
21 January 1998 
1 May 1999
CCF - Management team
- Program Coordinator
- Program Coordinator
Kamuli 15 September 1997 **23 
January 1998 
23 August 1999
FFWP - Chairperson
- Chairperson
Kamuli 6 February 1998 
20 August 1999
IMAU - 3 members of Executive 
Committee and Coordinator
Kamuli 5 February 1998
KAASFA - PWA members
- Field worker
Kamuli 30 January 1998 
14 August 1999
KADIWODA - Executive Member
- Executive Member
Kamuli 20 August 1997 
25 October 1997
KAMASO - Program Coordinator
- Program Coordinator
- Program Assistant
Kamuli 23 January 1998 
29 April 1999 
3 May 1999
NACWOLA - Chairperson
- Chairperson
Kamuli 21 March 1998 
23 August 1999
NASCRUD - Assistant Fieldworker Kamuli 17 September 1997
Red Cross - Volunteer
- Volunteer
Kamuli 2 October 1997 
30 January 1998
1 This list does not include the many, more informal talks with the majority of the NGOs at various occasions.
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cont.
NGO Position Location Date
UCOBAC - Chairperson
- Vice Chairperson
- Program Officer
Kamuli 12 September 1997*** 
29 September 1997 
5 February 1998
UTHA - Program Officer Kamuli 18 September 1997
Don Bosco - Program Managers Kamuli 15 October 1997
KAEA - Executive Committee Member
- 4 Execut. Committee Members
- Program Coordinator
- Executive Committee Member
- Program Coordinator
Kamuli 22 August 1997
2 September 1997 
28 January 1998 
12 February 1998
23 August 1999
Kiribawa Rural Women 
Development Network
- 3 Execut. Committee Members Kamuli 8 September 1997
KREDA - 2 Program Officers Kamuli 19 February 1998
M aria’s Care - Program Manager
- Staff
Kamuli 11 October 1997 
26 March 1998
SAFA - Program Officer
- Program Officer
Kamuli 29 September 1997 
20 February 1998
UNFA - 5 Execut. Committee members
- Program Coordinator
- Program Officer
Kamuli 3 September 1997
13 February 1998 
23 August 1999
USSIA - Coordinator
- Coordinator
Kamuli 23 January 1998 
21 August 1999
UWFCT - Program Officer Kamuli 21 August 1999
** Interview was carried out by Annie Alimuwa and Fredrick Ssali Execut. = Executive
*** Interview was carried out by Paul Bukuluki and Fredrick Ssali
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Interviews with other District Departmen
Department Position Location 07, e -
District Agricultural 
Department
- Veterinary Officer and 
County Extension 
Officer
Kamuli 9 September 1997 **
- M+E Officer Kamuli 24 March 1998
- Agriculture Extension 
Officer
Subcounty A 2 October 1997
- Assistant Agricultural 
Extension Officer
Subcounty B 6 October 1997
District Community 
Development Office
- Senior Community 
Development Officer
Kamuli 10 September 1997 ** 
15 October 1997
- Community 
Development Officer
Kamuli 10 September 1997 **
- Subcounty Community 
Based Service Officer
Kamuli 16 March 1998
District Education 
Department
- District Education 
Officer
Kamuli 18 September 1997
- Complementary 
Primary Education, 
Field worker
Kamuli 11 March 1998
interview carried out by Paul Bukuluki and Fredrick Ssali
Interviews with Women Leaders
Position Location Date
Women Council 5, 
Chairwoman
Kamuli 29 October 1997
LC5 Secretary for 
Women
Kamuli 5 October 1997
Women Councillors, LC3 
5 members
Subcounty A 24 October 1997
Women Councillor, LC3 Subcounty B 22 October 1997
LC2 Secretary for 
Women
Subcounty A 21 October 1997
LC2 Secretary for 
Women
Subcounty B 24 October 1997
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Interviews with District Administration Authorities
Position Location Date
LC5 Chairperson Kamuli 26 September 1997
LC 5 Vice Chairperson Kamuli 25 August 1999
Chief Administrative 
Officer
Kamuli 30 September 1997
Chief Administrative 
Officer, Deputy
Kamuli 14 October 1997 
27 January 1998
Chief Administrative 
Officer
Kamuli 5 May 1999
Chief Finance Officer Kamuli 23 September 1997
Chief Finance Officer 
Deputy
Kamuli 30 September 1997
Finance Officer Kamuli 1 October 1997
Finance Officer Kamuli 8 October 1998
Clerk to the LC5 Council Kamuli 22 September 1997
RDC, Deputy Kamuli 23 October 1997
Secretary for Health Kamuli 6 May 1999
District Health 
Committee Chairperson
Kamuli 7 June 1999
District Service 
Commission
Kamuli 13 March 1998
District Tender Board 
Chairperson
Kamuli 11 March 1998
Planning Officer Kamuli 4 February 1998 
18 March 1998
Former civil servant Kamuli 2 March 1998 
11 March 1998 
10 April 1998 
17 April 1998
Meetings attended
LC5 Council Kamuli October 1997 
February 1998 
June 1999
DMO Nutrition Planning 
Seminar
Kamuli 20 March 1998
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Interviews with Authorities at the Subcounty level and below
Position Location
: : '■ : : •
Date
Subcounty Accountant Subcounty A 2 October 1997
Subcounty Chief Subcounty A 26 February 1998
Subcounty Chief Subcounty A 31 May 1999
LC3 Executive 
Committee (4 members)
Subcounty A 10 October 1997
LC3 Secretary General Subcounty A 9 June 1999 
(shorter talk)
Secretary for Health Subcounty A 9 June 1999
3 Parish Chiefs Subcounty A 3 October 1997
LC2 Executive 
Committee (6 members)
Subcounty A 3 October 1997
LC3 Executive 
Committee (5 members)
Subcounty B 6 October 1997
4 Parish Chiefs Subcounty B 24 September 1997
LC2 Executive 
Committee (5 members)
Subcounty B 7 October 1997
Acting Subcounty Chief 
(Parish Chief)
Subcounty B 13 May 1999
Subcounty Chief Subcounty B 7 October 1997 
with Annie notes
LC3 Chairperson Subcounty C 28 July 1999
Subcounty Accountant Subcounty C 28 July 1999
Secretary for Health, 
Town Council
Kamuli 26 August 1999
Secretary for Health, 
Subcounty Nabwigulu
Kamuli 27 June 1999
Subcounty Health 
Committee Chairperson
Subcounty surrounding 
Kamuli Town Council
9 July 1999
LC1 Chairpersons in 
12 villages**
Subcounty A, B, C, Kamuli 
Town Council
June -  August 1999
** These were the same communities where the Focus Group Discussions took place in 1999.
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Interviews with DED Staff
Position Name Location © S•
Country Director Klaus-Dieter Seidel Kampala 12 May 1997
Liaison Officer Jochen Becker Kampala 16 October 1997 
12 January 199821 
April 1999
Health coordinator Cornelia Grade Kampala 21 April 1999
NGO Coordinator, 
Mbale
Helen Fielding Kampala 23 April 1998
NGO Coordinator, 
Fort Portal
Karin Eckert Kampala 23 April 1998
NGO Coordinator, 
Soroti
Kerstin Kampala 24 April 1998
Development Worker Dr. Georg Kopf Kampala 3 September 1999
Development Worker Nenad Kostansjek Kampala 13 May 1997 
4 March 1998
Health Professional Marianne Schmiicker Kampala 2 June 1997
Health Professional Dr. Ulrich Schmeidl Kamuli 12 August 1997
District Health 
Planner, Kamuli
Helmut Weigt Kamuli 30 June 1997 
20 August 1997
Health Professionals Teresa Almeda 
Elske Rasenack
Kamuli throughout field stay in 
1997 and 1998
Health Professionals Hannelore Kristen 
Dr. Bernhard Krotz 
Dr. Miiller-Stover 
Annerose Beer 
Manuela Biilow
Kamuli throughout field stay in 
1998 and 1999
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Focus Group Discussions with NGO Target Groups
NGO Location Date
AEGY Subcounty A 27 September 1997
AEGY Kamuli Town 13 October 1997
CCF Kamuli Town 16 September 1997
KAEA Subcounty B 17 September 1997
KADIWODA Subcounty A 26 September 1997
KADIWODA Subcounty B 14 October 1997
KADIWODA Subcounty B 25 September 1997
NAWOLA Kamuli Town 5 February 1998
KAMASO Kamuli Town 30 January 1998
Kiribawa Subcounty A 19 September 1997
Kiribawa Subcounty A 19 September 1997
Nascrud Subcounty B 29 September 1997
UCOBAC Subcounty A 20 September 1997
UNFA Subcounty A 15 September 1997
UNFA Subcounty B 15 September 1997
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Focus Group Discussion with Communities
Activity Number of Communities and 
Location
Date
15 FGDs
with 15 LC1 Executive 
Committees
- 7 communities in Subcounty A
- 8 communities in Subcounty B
July -  September 1997
37 FGDs
with 15 communities (LCls) 
(same as above)
• 12 FGDs with men
• 15 FGDs with women
• 10 FGDs with youth
- 7 communities in Subcounty A
- 8 communities in Subcounty B
July -  September 1997
16 solution finding FGDs
with 8 communities (selected 
from the 15 communities)
- 4 communities in Subcounty A
- 4 communities in Subcounty B
February, April 1998
12 FGDs
with 12 health catchment areas
- 3 communities in Subcounty A
- 3 communities in Subcounty B
- 3 communities in Subcounty C
- 3 communities in KamuliTown
June -  August 1999
Observation of NGO Forum Activities
Activity Date
7 meetings
- 3 NGO meetings
- 4  NGO Forum-local administration meetings
February -  May 1998
2 NGO Forum meetings July, September 1999
8 meetings with sectoral NGO working groups
- AIDS/health;
- Agriculture;
- Community development
March -  May 1998
10 meetings of the NGO Forum Task Force March-May 1998
4 meetings of the NGO Forum Task Force July -  September 1999
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Annex III. Figure 1: Organisational Diagram of the DMO and task division
District Medical Office:
District Director of Health Services
District level
District District District District Assistant UNEPI
Health Health Health Nursing Drug Officer
Educator Inspector Visitor Officer Inspector
Tb/Leprosy Drug
Officer Store
Officer
County level
3
Health
Educators
4
Health
Inspectors
Subcounty level
19
Health
Assistants
1 not directly under the DMO
2 These numbers refer to Kamuli District.
Vector1
Control
Officer
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Annex IV
Distribution of Exit Respondents
■ Poor Medium Better-off Coding gap Total
uGl 4 8 2 14
rG2 4 7 11
7G 3 5 4 9
~P1 2 4 5 11
T 2 4 4 2 10
P3 3 4 5 12
1 m 1 7 1 9
~um 4 5 9
uN2 4 6 10
Hospital 4 9 2 15
Prot. NGOs 3 3 1
Catholic clinic 5 2 7
3 Drugshops 7 13 2
Total 42 66 28 10 146
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Annex V
User C harges for M alaria T reatm ent
T able 1:
User charges for oral malaria adult treatment at rural health care providers (in USh)
rG-1 rG-2 rN-1 rN-2 rN-3 Drugshops
800**
(including
laboratory
test)
500 350 for drugs 
+ some 200 
for
consultation
300 for drugs 
+ some 200 
for
consultation
700 300
Source: User charge lists, interviews, facility records
Table 2:
User charges for oral malaria adult treatment at urban health care providers, including laboratory 
test (in USh)
shops
uG-1 uN-1 uN-2 Hosp
OPD
P -l P-3
400 1,500** 2,500 1,800 1,500 2,000 5,000 4,500 2,500
Source: User charge ists, interviews, facility records
** These are the official costs, but ultimately may not include additional costs for drugs, such as 
informal charges, or by purchasing drugs at a drugshop.
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Figure 1: Costs for Malaria Treatment [in USh]
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Annex VI
Chi Square Test Scores for Chapters 5.6 and 5.8.
1. Method of partial payment in relation to wealth group
Poor Medium Well-off Total
N 22 37 22 74
% of patients w/ credit 6 7 3 16
or partial payment 27.27% 18.91% 13.63% 21.62%
% of patients with credit 1 1 0 2
4.5% 2.70% 0% 2.70%
% of patients with no 16 30 19 58
deferment 72.73% 81.09% 86.37% 78.38
Chi Square p-value 0.11
Utilisation patterns in relation to wealth group (household respondents)
2. Home treatment
Poor Better-off
N N
Low use of home treatment 46 45
(0-1 times)
Higher use of home treatment 8 2
(>1 times)
Chi-Square p-value .073
Gamma -.593 (.062)
Two-sided significance levels are shown in brackets
3. Rural government clinics
Poor Better-off
Low use of rural government 
clinics (0-1 visits)
22 28
Higher use of rural government 
clinics (>1 visits)
7 7
Chi Square p-value .330
Gamma -.120 (.692)
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4. Drugshops
Poor Better-off
N N
Low use of drugshops 34 33
(0-3 visits)
Higher use of drugshops 20 14
(>3 visits)
Chi Square p-value .289
Gamma -.162 (.439)
5. Drugshops, (peri-)urban households
Poor Better-off
N N
Low use of drugshops 17 10
(0-3 visits)
Higher use of drugshops 8 2
(>3 visits )
Chi Square p-value .285
Gamma -.404 (.286)
6. Catholic clinic
Poor Better-off
No utilisation 4 1
Utilisation (>1) 5 1
-
7. Protestant clinics
Poor
N
Better-off
N
No utilization 8 6
Utilisation (> 0 visits) 3 5
Chi Square p-value .330
Gamma .379 (.367)
8. Rural private clinics
Poor
N
Better-off
N
No utilization 48 39
Utilisation (>0 visits) 6 8
Chi Square p-value .411
Gamma .269 (.327)
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9. Urban government, rural households
Poor
N
Better-off
N
No utilization 29 31
Utilisation (>0 visit) 0 4
Chi Square p-value .082
Gamma 1 (.034)
10. Urban government clinic, (peri-)urban households
Poor
N
Better-off
N
No utilization 16 6
Utilisation (>0 visits) 9 6
p-value .438
Gamma .254 (.409)
11. Urban government clinic, all households
Poor
N
Better-off
N
No utilization 45 37
Utilisation (> 0 visits) 9 10
Chi Square p-value .368
Gamma .149 (.556)
12. Urban NGO clinics, rural households
Poor Better-off
N N
No utilisation 29 35
Utilisation (>1 visit) 0 0
-
13. Urban NGO clinics, (peri-)urban respondents
Poor
N
Better-off
N
No utilization 22 10
Utilisation (> 0 visits) 3 2
Chi Square p-value .53
Gamma .189 (.711)
14. Private clinics, rural households
Poor
N
Better-off
N
No utilization 29 33
Utilisation (> 0 visits) 0 2
Chi Square p-value .295
Gamma 1.00 (.146)
383
15. Private clinics, (peri-)urban households
Poor
N
Better-off
N
No utilisation 22 4
Uilitsation (> 0 visit) 3 8
Chi Square p-value .003
Gamma .874 (.001)
16. Private clinics, all households
Poor
N
Better-off
N
No utilization 51 37
Utilisation (> 0 visits) 3 10
Chi Square p-value .019
Gamma .644 (.02)
17. Hospital OPD
Poor
N
Better-off
N
No utilisation 38 34
Utilisation (> 0 visits) 18 13
Chi Square p-value .345
Gamma -.133 (.535)
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